APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Shamika Sykes, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellants filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for parental relocation and its entry of a modified permanent parenting plan naming Father/Appellee the child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court magistrate entered a plan that modified the residential parenting schedule and gave the mother sole decision-making authority over all educational and non-emergency health care decisions. The father argues that the magistrate did not maximize his participation in the children’s lives as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and that there was no basis for modifying the allocation of decision-making authority. We affirm the judgment in all respects. We have also determined that the mother, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice in the parking lot of a grocery store, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the store, the owner of the parking lot, and the company hired to perform snow and ice removal services for the parking lot. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants because the court found that the proof at the summary judgment stage showed conclusively that reasonable minds could not differ that the man was at least fifty percent at fault for the injuries he alleged to have suffered. Discerning that the evidence shows that a dispute of material fact exists, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan in which the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and awarded the mother supervised visitation. We now affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

Petitioner seeks to appeal a denial of her motion to recuse. Because she did not include her trial court motion and supporting documents, the record is insufficient to determine this appeal. We affirm.

This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount.

This is an action for breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The defendants, who are Minnesota residents and who have no business activities in Tennessee except for this one transaction with the plaintiff, responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting.  The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., concurring. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority’s thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

Finding good cause, a trial court issued an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that extension of the ex parte order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. We agree with the petitioner that the statute mandates extending an existing ex parte order of protection upon finding that a predicate act was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we vacate and remand.

This appeal concerns jail behavior credits. Dickson County Jail inmate Brandon Shane Wooley (“Plaintiff”) sued Dickson County and several officials (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was wrongfully denied credits for good behavior. When Defendants failed to respond within 30 days, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. In addition, the Trial Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Trial Court stated, therefore, that it was unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the Trial Court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand for the Trial Court to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and what those remedies were.

The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings of six counts of criminal contempt against Mother following a contentious, years-long custody battle. Due to the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal.

After discovering that the roof of her new car leaked, the owner returned to the dealership several times for repairs, but the leaks persisted. Later, when she began feeling sick, the owner suspected that mold growing in the car was the cause. The ownersued the dealership claiming, among other things, that negligent repairs led to the mold growth and caused her health issues. The dealership moved for summary judgment, asserting that the owner could not prove causation. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm.