APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a boundary line dispute between neighbors. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs' boundary line description, and defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Robert W. O'Neal ("Father") and Sandra K. O'Neal ("Mother") were granted a divorce by the Sumner County Circuit Court in 1986. There were two minor children born of the marriage, and Father was ordered to pay $650 per month in child support. After Mother passed away in June of 1990, the children's maternal grandparents, William and Marjorie Kirkpatrick, were awarded full custody of both children by the Sumner County Chancery Court. In 2001, Marjorie Kirkpatrick ("Petitioner") filed a petition in the Hamilton County Circuit Court seeking to have the previous order requiring Father to pay $650 per month in child support enforced. Petitioner also sought a substantial amount of arrearages. The Hamilton County Circuit Court determined that Father was in arrears a total of $55,063 covering from when Petitioner was awarded custody until June of 2002. Petitioner also was awarded her attorney fees. Father appeals, claiming the original order from the Sumner County Circuit Court requiring him to pay $650 per month in child support had no effect once Mother died. We modify the judgment of the Hamilton County Circuit Court, and affirm as modified.

The chancery court reversed the Assessment Appeals Commission and held that Youth Programs, a charitable organization, is entitled to a property tax exemption on real property in Shelby County used in conjunction with the FedEx/St. Jude Classic golf tournament. The trial court determined the disputed property is used exclusively for a charitable purpose and that an unusable area is used constructively and is likewise exempt. The Shelby County Assessor of Property and the State appeal. We affirm.
 

Lydia Ann Bishop Watkins ("Wife") filed for divorce from William C. Watkins, Jr., ("Husband") after thirty-five years of marriage. The Trial Court awarded Wife a divorce and distributed the marital property. The Trial Court also concluded that Wife was not economically disadvantaged and refused to award her any alimony. The Trial Court ordered each party to be responsible for his or her attorney fees. Wife appeals claiming the Trial Court's distribution of the marital property was inequitable, the Trial Court erred by not awarding her alimony in futuro, and the Trial Court erred by not requiring Husband to pay her attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff-Appellant instituted a detainer action in general sessions court seekingpossession of property owned by Plaintiff-Appellant. From an adverse judgment in general sessions court, Plaintiff-Appellant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Defendant-Appellee filed a counter-claim in circuit court, alternatively requesting that if she is forced to vacate the premises, she should be awarded damages for improvements made to the premises. The trial court entered judgment for possession to the Defendant-Appellee. Plaintiff-Appellant appeals. We reverse.

This is an appeal of the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights to her six children. The mother, who had appeared at earlier hearings, did not appear at the termination hearing. A motion for default judgment was neither filed nor served on the mother. The trial court granted a default judgment based upon the mother's failure to appear at the termination hearing. We find that the mother's failure to appear did not constitute grounds for a default judgment in this case. We find that the State did not comply with Rule 55 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and the cause is remanded.

This case involves a custody dispute between the parents of one daughter. Mother lives in Belgium, and Father, the primary residential custodian, currently lives in Lewis County, Tennessee, although he has also lived with his daughter in Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington State at various times since the parties' separation in 1998. Father has refused to allow most of Mother's visitation since the divorce became final, has interfered with communication between Mother and Daughter, and has convinced Daughter to falsely accuse her maternal grandfather and stepfather of sexual abuse. The trial court found that these occurrences amounted to a material change in circumstances and found that it would be in the best interest of Daughter to make Mother her primary residential custodian and to allow Daughter to move to Belgium with Mother. We affirm the trial court.

This case presents the issue of whether the trial court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs' action where there was an identical lawsuit, filed prior to this Circuit Court action, pending in General Sessions Court. We hold that the trial court correctly dismissed this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of prior suit pending.

Laurie Ann Searcy sought, by post-divorce Petition, a modification of the child custody and visitation privileges provided by the divorce decree. The trial court held that no change of circumstances had occurred “with a negative impact upon the child” and denied modification. We hold that the trial court applied an improper standard for determining the change of circumstances issue. We hold, however, that no change of circumstances has occurred under Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a child support action. The trial court awarded Mother retroactive child support, set base child support, and ordered Father to make monthly payments into educational and future child support trust funds. The trial court also ordered father to pay private elementary and high school tuition, provide health insurance, and maintain life insurance. The trial court awarded Mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees. We affirm as modified and remand.
 

I agree with the majority’s analysis in this case, except for its conclusion regarding whether Mother presented evidence demonstrating a need for child support based on income amounts in excess of $10,000 per month, for both the retroactive and prospective child support. Moreover, an upward deviation is warranted by Father’s failure to exercise visitation.

The Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit alleging that he was unlawfully deprived his right to practice his religion and that certain of his religious tapes were confiscated and he was denied the right to congregate and worship in accordance with his faith. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit and Plaintiff responded with his own affidavit. Having determined that there are disputed issues of material fact, we reverse.
 

This case involves premises liability. At her apartment complex, the plaintiff tripped and fell on the metal edging of a limestone gravel walkway and sustained injuries to her elbow. The plaintiff sued the owner of the apartment complex, alleging premises liability, and also sued the company that put in the metal landscape edging. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff did not establish that defendants violated the duty of reasonable care.

This appeal concerns a pyramid sales scheme involving the sale of unregistered investment contracts. After discovering that their contracts were worthless, four purchasers filed separate actions against the person who sold them the contracts. These cases were consolidated for trial in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the seller had breached his personal guarantee contract with two of the buyers and had violated the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980 by selling unregistered investment contracts to all the purchasers. Accordingly, the court awarded the four purchasers judgments totaling $99,450.00, as well as $44,979.50 for attorney's fees and legal expenses. The seller asserts on this appeal that the Tennessee Securities Act claims were filed after the statute of limitations had expired and that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel prevent the purchasers from asserting these claims. In addition, he insists that the court erred by permitting the purchasers to amend their complaints one week before trial to add their Tennessee Securities Act claims. He also takes issue with the trial court's decision to award the purchasers their attorney's fees. We affirm the judgments.

Plaintiff/Appellant, an unsuccessful candidate for mayor of The City of Memphis, brought “Complaint for Election Contest” against Defendant/Appellee, Shelby County Election Commission and Tennessee Division of Elections. Plaintiff/Appellant filed Motion to Compel Discovery and for Continuance, asserting that Defendant/Appellee had withheld information crucial to Plaintiff/Appellant’s case. The trial court denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s action pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). We affirm.

This is an appeal contesting the award of discretionary costs by the Trial Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves the parental relationship between a three-year-old child and her biological father. Shortly after the child's birth in Ohio, her mother placed her for adoption with relatives residing in Tennessee. These relatives filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County seeking to terminate the biological father's parental rights and to adopt the child. The biological father thereafter filed a petition to establish parentage. Following a bench trial, the trial court established the child's parentage and determined that the biological father had not abandoned the child. Accordingly, the trial court denied the adoptive parents' petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and to adopt the child. Because it had reserved ruling on the custody and visitation arrangements, the trial court granted the adoptive parent's application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur that an interlocutory appeal is warranted in this case. We also concur with the trial court's conclusion that the adoptive parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the biological father abandoned his daughter.

This parental termination case presents the Court with two issues: (1) whether a case manager can testify regarding facts about which she has no personal knowledge but which are documented in a case file not made an exhibit, and (2) whether the guardian ad litem of a minor child can testify as a witness. At the trial of this case, the State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services presented only two witnesses: the case manager who had only been working on the file for six months and the child's guardian ad litem. The case manager had no firsthand knowledge of the facts except what she had read in the case file which was not present at the trial and not introduced into evidence. The defendant objected on the basis of hearsay and the trial court allowed the case manager to testify under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The guardian ad litem testified concerning her investigation into the matter over the Defendant's objection. We hold that the case manager's testimony was hearsay and was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We hold that the guardian ad litem's testimony was not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40 which forbids such testimony. Because of the exclusion of the testimony of these witnesses, the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand to the Juvenile Court for Sevier County for a new trial.

This is a divorce case. The husband appeals from the trial court’s divorce decree distributing the marital and separate property and awarding the wife alimony in futuro. We affirm.
 

The plaintiffs filed a complaint for repayment of borrowed money. The defendant, who was living in Ohio at the time, did not to respond to the complaint. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for default judgment, to which the defendant again failed to respond. After a hearing, the trial court granted the default judgment. The judgment was domesticated in Ohio, and substantial monthly garnishments were ordered from the defendant’s trust funds to satisfy the judgment. More than two years after the garnishments began, and almost three years after the default judgment was rendered, the defendant took his first step to contest the plaintiffs’ claim, by filing a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves a homeowner’s attempt to pierce the corporate veil to reach the shareholders of a construction company. During the course of the litigation, the construction company was administratively dissolved, and the homeowner filed a motion to join as defendants the shareholders, officers, and directors. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the homeowner against the construction company for breach of contract, but denied the homeowner’s motion to join the shareholders, officers, and directors. We affirm.
 

The trial court terminated parents’ rights based on abandonment. Father appeals. We affirm.

Jeffrey Scott West (“Father”) filed a petition against his former wife, Sharon Ann West (“Mother”), seeking to modify the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan, which plan had not required Mother to pay child support due to the fact she was unemployed. The trial court, finding that, since the entry of the parenting plan, Mother had had a two-year gross income of over $25,000, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring that Mother pay child support of $290 per month. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support and in the methodology used by the court in calculating child support. We affirm.

Matthew Lawson, by his mother and next friend, Shirley Lawson, and Ms. Lawson, individually (collectively "the plaintiffs") brought an action for negligence against Edgewater Hotels, Inc., and Stokely Hospitality Properties, Inc. (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that Matthew sustained injuries as a consequence of swimming in the indoor pool at the defendants' hotel. According to the plaintiffs, Matthew sustained these injuries (1) due to the excessive amount of chlorine in the pool water and/or (2) because the defendants failed to properly ventilate the indoor portion of the pool. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to both of the plaintiffs' theories. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants' pool contained excessive levels of chlorine. However, we vacate the trial court's judgment with respect to the allegation that the defendants' indoor pool was not properly ventilated. We hold that the defendants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment with respect to this claim.

This appeal involves allegations of sexual abuse brought against Wilburn Lee Brown, Jr., ("Petitioner") by his stepdaughter. After the allegations were investigated, DCS concluded there was substantial and material evidence to support the allegations and the report of abuse would be "validated" pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0250-7-9-.02. Because Petitioner was employed at a youth development center, he was notified that his employer would be informed that he was the indicated perpetrator in a "validated" report of child sexual abuse and that Petitioner was no longer allowed to have access to children. After exhausting his administrative appeals, Petitioner appealed to the Trial Court. The Trial Court concluded there was substantial and material evidence to support the allegations of abuse and affirmed. Petitioner appeals and we, likewise, affirm.