APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this class action, the Trial Court refused to permit Homebuilders and individual claimants to intervene. On appeal, we reverse as to Homebuilders, but affirm as to the individual claimants.

The Trial Court granted defendants Summary Judgment on claims of fraud in the inducement to contract. On appeal, we Affirm.

The biological, custodial parent of a minor child appeals the juvenile court’s award of visitation rights to the child’s adult half-sister. We find no authority granting an adult sibling visitation rights to a minor child. We accordingly vacate the juvenile court’s order.
 

The City of Chattanooga abolished its school system which was then integrated into the Hamilton County system. Two and one-half years later the Plaintiffs, who were administrators in the City system, filed this action claiming that under Tennessee law their compensation was unlawfully reduced by the Board of Education of Hamilton County. The County insisted that the Commissioner of Education of Tennessee approved the Personnel Plan proposed by the Superintendent of Education of Hamilton, as required by law, and that the Plaintiffs were paid in accordance with the Plan. Moreover, the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City and its teachers expired concurrently with the abolition of the school system, and the Plaintiffs’ salary agreement also expired. Further, the salary of Ms. Hardaway, paid by the City, was in excess of the negotiated amount, and the duties of Ms. Settles were substantially less burdensome in her new position.
 

Administrator Ad Litem for estate of deceased-grantor appeals trial court's finding that deceased grantor was competent at the time he executed a deed of real property to his daughter, and that he was not acting under undue influence at the time of execution. We affirm.

Mother appeals the decision of the trial court which terminated her parental rights on two statutory grounds, abandonment and failure to comply with the permanency plan, and upon the finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. Mother claims the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidentiary standard necessary to prove the statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.

WILLIAM B. CAIN, J., concurring. I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights

Peggy Bailey and her husband, Gary Bailey, sued Dr. John J. Tasker for wrongful conduct in connection with two separate surgeries, one on April 10, 1997, and another on June 24, 1999. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the material filed by the parties fails to reflect a genuine issue of material fact and that the record before it demonstrates conclusively (1) that the defendant did not violate the applicable standard of care, and (2) that the plaintiffs' claims were filed outside the period of the applicable statutes of limitations and of repose. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the order of the probate court on a claim filed against an estate by the Tennessee Attorney General pursuant to the authority granted by the Nonprofit Corporation Act. The probate court denied the claim in part and granted the claim in part by various rulings concerning the existence of a nonprofit public benefit corporation for operation of child daycare centers, the ownership of assets thereof, and continued operation of the centers. The estate appeals and the Attorney General appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.
 

In this divorce case the Appellant, Darrell C. Silvey, contends that the Trial Court erred in its allocation of property between himself and the Appellee, Judith Lynn Silvey. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court, affirm as modified and remand. Costs of this appeal are adjudged equally against Mr. and Ms. Silvey.

Plaintiffs’ insurer appeals award of benefits to Plaintiffs under Plaintiffs’ uninsured/underinsured motorist policy. We affirm.
 

Landowners sued to abate a nuisance claiming that a concrete causeway, built over a creek by an adjoining landowner, caused water to flood their property. After hearing from one witness, the trial judge discouraged further proof and instead chose to visit the plaintiffs' land at the next flooding. He subsequently found the causeway to be a nuisance and ordered it removed. We reverse because trial court based its decision solely on the basis of the judge's personal observations.

This is a will contest. The will disinherited two of the decedent's five living children and the one child who had predeceased her. One of the disinherited children contested the will, asserting that the decedent did not have the mental capacity to execute a valid will. Four years prior to the will's execution, the decedent had been diagnosed with dementia, a progressive mental disorder. Based on witness testimony, the trial court found that, on the date the will was executed, the decedent had the mental capacity to execute the will. The will was admitted into probate. The will contestant appeals. In deference to the trial court's determinations of credibility, and in light of the weight of the evidence demonstrating capacity, we affirm.

This is a case involving an alleged hostile work environment based on disability. The employee worked in the maintenance department of a large printing facility. He had an on-the-job accident which resulted in the amputation of his leg. To accommodate his disability, the employer created a clerical position for him. The employee's work space was a "community desk" located in the maintenance area, an area to which numerous employees had regular access. The employee reported to the employer several incidents of alleged harassment, such as grease under the desk, lunch residue being left on the desk, dirty footprints in the desk's chair, and his computer monitor defaced with a profane statement. The employer moved the employee to a private office, and there were no further incidents. The employee filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, a hostile work environment based on disability, his amputated leg. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. We affirm, finding that the incidents do not amount to harassment, and that there is no evidence that the conduct was either directed at the employee or linked to his disability.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights with regard to two of her six children. Less than four months after the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services was granted temporary custody of the children, their foster parents filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Houston County seeking permanent custody and the termination of the parental rights of the biological parents. The children’s mother contested the petition, but the father did not. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the order terminating the mother’s parental rights must be vacated because the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her children.
 

Plaintiffs obtained two judgments in General Sessions Court. On appeal to Circuit Court the second Plaintiffs were awarded a monetary Judgment against defendant in Sessions Court, and defendant appealed to Circuit Court, where the Court declared the Judgment void for lack of  jurisdiction, and dismissed the case judgment was vacated for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal we affirm.

A conservation easement affecting property adjoining South Chickamauga Creek in Chattanooga was created in 1996. Property zoned for business and owned and developed by some of the Defendants is adjacent to the easement. The Plaintiffs allege that the development and construction activities of the Defendants adversely and unlawfully affect the easement. The complaint was dismissed upon a ruling that the Plaintiffs had no standing to enforce the easement, notwithstanding the language of the Conservation Easement Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-9-301, et. seq., that it may be enforced by the “holder and/or beneficiaries” of the easement. The controversy centers on the meaning of the word “beneficiaries.” We hold that any resident of Tennessee is a beneficiary of the easement, and thus has standing to enforce it. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded.
 

This is an appeal from an Order denying Appellant’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion, which sought relief from the grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant’s attorney failed to set the Motion for hearing until some nineteen (19) months after the entry of the Order granting summary judgment. The trial court found that the attorney’s failure to prosecute resulted in prejudice to Appellee and denied the Rule 60 Motion. We affirm.

This is an appeal of a final decree of divorce primarily as it concerns custody of the parties’ children. The trial court awarded custody to mother and provided for a supervised visitation to father. Father appeals and, in addition to the custody issue, also presents issues pertaining to the trial court’s out-of-court interview with the children and the mental examination of the parties. We affirm.
 

Wife filed for divorce alleging Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. Trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce, ordered a martial property distribution, and awarded wife alimony and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm the distribution of marital property, modify the award of attorney’s fees, vacate the requirement to provide life insurance and remand.
 

This case arises out of a breach of contract by the Defendant for a roof Defendant installed on Plaintiff's freezer storage facility. The case was tried before a jury, who found the Defendant had materially breached the contract between the parties and awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $5,655.00. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, a motion for additur or new trial. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment but suggested an additur increasing the award to $30,655.00, which Defendant appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In 1964, Mr. and Mrs. Woodard executed a Joint Last Will and Testament (the "Joint Will") which provided that the survivor would receive the decedent's entire estate in fee simple. The Joint Will further provided that, upon the death of the survivor, the survivor's estate would be divided in equal one-fourth shares among George D. Woodard ("Plaintiff"), Mr. Woodard's son from a previous marriage, and Mr. and Mrs. Woodard's three daughters. Mrs. Woodard executed a new will in 1998 (the "1998 Will"), approximately twenty years after Mr. Woodard's death. Pursuant to the terms of the 1998 Will, Plaintiff was to receive $10,000, with the remainder of Mrs. Woodard's estate to be divided equally among her three daughters. Mrs. Woodard's three daughters sought to probate the 1998 Will after she passed away. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit claiming, among other things, that the Joint Will created a contractual obligation on the part of Mrs. Woodard to distribute her estate in accordance with the terms of the Joint Will and, therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to one-fourth of Mrs. Woodard's estate. Plaintiff sued Mrs. Woodard's estate as well as his three half-sisters, Sandra Norton, Martha Scissom, and Barbara Lambert (collectively referred to as "Defendants"). The Trial Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. We conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there existed a contractual obligation on the part of Mrs. Woodard to distribute her estate according to the terms of the Joint Will. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a state prisoner who desires to change his name for religious reasons. Even though the prisoner's petition was uncontested, the Davidson County Probate Court declined to permit the prisoner to change his name solely because he had been convicted of a felony. While we have determined that the probate court erred by denying the prisoner's petition solely because he had been convicted of a felony, we have determined that the petition was properly dismissed.

This case arose out of a labor dispute. In October 1999, the defendant union began a labor strike at the plaintiff trucking company's Nashville facility. The company filed a petition in the lower court seeking to enjoin the union from engaging in violence and intimidation in connection with the strike. The company later amended its complaint to include a claim against the union for intentional interference with business relations. Between October 1999 and January 2000, the trial court entered five injunctions against the union, each more restrictive than the one before, enjoining the union from engaging in the alleged unlawful violence and intimidation. In August 2000, the trial court issued a show cause order, citing 128 alleged violations of the injunctions, requiring the union to show cause why it should not be held in civil contempt. In March 2002, the trial court determined that the company's petition for civil contempt was moot because, by that time, the contemptuous conduct had ceased. In August 2002, the trial court dismissed the company's claim for intentional interference with business relations for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff trucking company now appeals. We reverse the dismissal of the civil contempt petition, finding that the company may seek damages caused by conduct in violation of the injunctions, and affirm the dismissal of the intentional interference claim.

Tanikia Yolanda Boone (“the tenant”) sued Houston Gibson, Jr. (“the landlord”), seeking damages and other relief for wrongful eviction and for the wrongful withholding of her personal possessions, pursuant to the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“the URLTA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-101, et seq. (1993 & Supp. 2003). The tenant attempted service on the landlord by having the landlord’s process served on Donna Gibson, the landlord’s former wife. After the landlord failed to respond to the complaint, the tenant filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion and awarded the tenant damages of $20,000 and attorney’s fees and costs totaling $3,500. Approximately two years later, in response to the tenant’s efforts to execute on her judgment, the landlord filed a motion to dismiss the default judgment on the ground that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Following a hearing on the landlord’s motion, the trial court held that the landlord’s former wife had authority as his agent to accept service of process on his behalf. We affirm.