APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the maternal aunt and uncle proved two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

A member of a limited liability company (“LLC”) brought a suit on behalf of the LLC
alleging a breach of fiduciary duties and constructive fraud by another member in regard
to transfers of LLC property. The plaintiff admitted that no demand for corrective action
was made on the defendant, nor was any demand made on the other members of the LLC
to join in the litigation. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding
both that the plaintiff’s complaint was outside the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the derivative action. We agree with the trial court that the
plaintiff’s complaint was subject to dismissal because his complaint did not include
allegations sufficiently particular to excuse his failure to meet statutory demand
requirements. The remaining issues are therefore pretermitted.

Following a hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees resulting from a discovery dispute, the trial judge or his office contacted an attorney for the defendants to obtain certain discovery responses that had not been filed with the court. The defendants’ attorney responded by email with the requested documents, carbon-copying plaintiffs’ counsel on the email. The trial court then entered an order awarding the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in which the fees awarded were only a small portion of those requested. The plaintiffs filed a motion to recuse, citing the communication between the defendants’ attorney and the trial judge. The trial court denied the motion for recusal. We agree with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that recusal was not required.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding in which the appellants filed a complaint to set aside a trust established by the ward, along with a motion to recuse the trial judge. The trial judge entered orders dismissing the complaint, resolving various other matters, and closing the conservatorship, without entering any order mentioning the motion for recusal. We vacate the orders entered by the trial court while the recusal motion remained pending and remand for further proceedings before a different trial judge.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother and father appeal the trial court’s
order terminating their parental rights, arguing that there was not clear and convincing
evidence to support termination. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over a testamentary trust, which was established by the will
of the decedent’s husband. Upon her husband’s death, the decedent became a life income
beneficiary of the trust. Upon the decedent’s death, the corporate trustee distributed the
remaining corpus in equal shares to the remainder beneficiaries, which were two nieces of
the decedent’s husband and a nephew of the decedent. The plaintiffs in this case—a niece
and the surviving spouse of the other niece—filed a complaint to set aside the probate of
the decedent’s will and for an accounting of distribution of trust assets. They alleged that
the decedent’s will should be declared null and void for various reasons. They also alleged
that the testamentary trust was improperly invaded by the decedent’s nephew. However,
the plaintiffs later sought to voluntarily dismiss their complaint insofar as it pertained to
setting aside the probate of the decedent’s will, which the probate court granted. They then
amended their complaint and no longer contested the will. Instead, they alleged, among
other things, that the corporate trustee failed to prevent the improper invasion of the
testamentary trust, thereby breaching its fiduciary duties. The corporate trustee filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Ultimately, the probate court granted the
motion finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims against the corporate
trustee of the testamentary trust. The court explained that the plaintiffs were neither
beneficiaries under a will of the decedent nor heirs at law entitled to take in the decedent’s
estate through intestate succession. The court further explained that the testamentary trust
was never a part of the decedent’s estate and that the plaintiffs could have brought their
claims in the estate that created the testamentary trust, which was the estate of the
decedent’s husband. Additionally, because the court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing,
it found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion
to transfer the case to the estate of the decedent’s husband finding that it had no authority
to transfer the case to a closed estate in its court. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the
decision of the probate court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights on the ground that she was not properly served with the termination petition. Because the record raises substantial questions as to whether the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services exercised diligence in its attempt to locate and serve Mother with process, we vacate the termination of her parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

This third appeal in a long-running landlord/tenant dispute presents the question of the proper amount of an attorney’s fees award. The tenant, John T. Rochford, III, and several business entities owned or controlled by Mr. Rochford (collectively “Rochford”), sued the church now known as Green Hills Community Church (“Church”), claiming among other things that Church breached a lease agreement. Following a second appeal in which this Court held that an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Church was warranted, the trial court awarded Church $343,535.07 in attorney’s fees and expenses, which reflected a rate of $295 per hour. The trial court declined Church’s request for 10% yearly interest starting from the date of the filing of the complaint, July 30, 2015, finding it unwarranted by the terms of the lease. Church appeals, arguing that it should have been awarded attorney’s fees at a rate of $450 per hour and interest. We affirm.

This appeal concerns access to a spring on rural land. Arthur Ray Nicely and Henrietta
Nicely (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Jarrod W. Atkins (“Defendant”) in the Chancery
Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to establish the boundary line
between their respective properties. After a hearing, the Trial Court accepted the opinion
of Defendant’s surveyor as to the boundary line. The spring at issue was determined to be
on Defendant’s land, but the Trial Court also found an easement by implication whereby
Plaintiffs may use water from the spring. Defendant appeals the Trial Court’s finding of
an easement by implication. We find that, while separation of title was proven, the other
elements of an easement by implication, prior use and necessity, were not proven.
Plaintiffs failed to prove any obvious, permanent, or long-established practice of their tract
using water from the spring.

This is an employment contract dispute involving the interplay of a paid sick leave provision and a bonus compensation provision. The appellant, Keith Cousins (“Cousins”), was hired by a real estate business in 2017. He signed a two-year contract which included provisions for salary, bonuses, and paid sick leave. After being with the defendant company for only a few weeks, Cousins suffered a major heart attack and, ultimately, never returned to work. A dispute regarding his compensation arose and in July of 2017, Cousins filed suit against his former employer for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court determined that the company breached Cousins’ contract and awarded him some damages, but not the full balance of the two-year contract as Cousins requested. Both Cousins and the company appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

This case concerns service of process on an out-of-state defendant’s registered agent by
mail and a subsequently entered default judgment in the general sessions court. The
defendant moved under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to set aside the default judgment based on
insufficient service of process. The defendant also asserted that the default judgment was
void because the general sessions court awarded a judgment greater than the amount prayed
for in the summons. The circuit court found service was valid and upheld the default
judgment in all respects. We agree that service was sufficient and could serve as a basis
for default judgment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-904(e); however, we reduce the
amount of the judgment to conform with the amount the plaintiff requested in the summons.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.

A father filed a petition seeking, in addition to a modification of child support, a judgment
for past overpaid support. The father asserted that mother, without his knowledge, had
received for a period of time double child support payments as a result of payments being
taken directly from his paycheck and also being paid through electronic funds transfers that
he remitted directly to mother. While prevailing as to child support modification, the trial
court denied the father’s claim for overpayment of child support. The trial court concluded
his claim was barred by res judicata and, also, a directed verdict on this matter was
warranted due to the father’s failure to present certain critical evidence in support of his
claim. Father appealed the court’s decision barring his claim due to res judicata, but he
did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s granting of a directed verdict in connection
with failure to present evidence to support his claim. As a result of the appellant’s failure
to challenge an independent alternative basis for the trial court’s decision on appeal, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.

A restaurant supplier brought suit for breach of a guaranty. The guarantor admitted
liability. So the trial court entered partial summary judgment on that issue. The supplier
then moved for summary judgment on damages. The guarantor challenged the
admissibility of the evidence submitted in support of the motion. But the trial court ruled
that the evidence was admissible under the business records exception. And, based on the
undisputed facts, the court granted the motion for summary judgment. We conclude that
some of the supplier’s evidence should have been excluded. So we vacate the summary
judgment on damages.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

The defendants in this action failed to timely answer the plaintiff’s complaint.  Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered judgment by default against the defendants.  The defendants moved to set aside the default judgment.  The trial court denied the motion to set aside.  Because the trial court’s order lacked findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their child.
Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to
establish the following statutory grounds of termination for each parent: (1) abandonment;
(2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions
which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the
child. The court also found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest
of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

A landlord appeals from the grant of summary judgment to a commercial tenant in the landlord’s breach of contract action. The lease contained a provision requiring the tenant to obtain fire insurance on the “Premises.” The trial court concluded that the lease failed to define the term “Premises” and that such failure rendered the fire insurance provision unenforceable. We reverse because we find the term “Premises” as used in the fire insurance provision to unambiguously refer to the space within the commercial building that the tenant rented and occupied during the lease. We further conclude that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding whether it was possible for the tenant to obtain fire insurance on only the portion of the building which it rented and occupied. Consequently, we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

The City of Orlinda filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the Robertson County Planning Commission’s rezoning of property from “Agricultural Residential” to “Neighborhood Commercial,” alleging the rezoning was “illegal spot zoning” and was also procedurally deficient. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe
child abuse. Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her
rights was in the best interest of the child. Concluding that clear and convincing evidence
was presented of both the ground for termination and that termination was in the child’s
best interest, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

The owners of a restaurant in downtown Clarksville sued the City of Clarksville for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the City’s failure to construct an alleyway on property Plaintiffs sold the City. Plaintiffs also filed a claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the City’s construction of a sewer line encroached on their land. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and section 1983 claim for failure to state a claim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and dismissed Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claim on summary judgment. After a jury trial on the inverse condemnation claim, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $8,335 for the value of land on which the sewer was built, and the trial court awarded Plaintiffs $30,000 in attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees. Plaintiffs appeal each of the dismissals, the measure of damages from the jury trial, and the award of attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees, among other things. We affirm the decisions of the trial court and decline to award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees on appeal.