APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court granted Mother's petition for conservatorship of the parties' disabled son; enforced MDA provision requiring Father to pay child support beyond child attaining age of majority; increased Father's child support obligation; and ordered Father to continue to maintain life and disability insurance. We affirm.

This case involves the attachment of a mobile home and its subsequent transport to a storage facility. The Appellee sued out an attachment on the Appellants’ mobile home to secure payment of past rent due on a tenancy at Appellee’s trailer park. Appellee had the mobile home transported after it was attached and Appellants sued Appellee for damages to the mobile home. The Shelby County General Sessions Court found in favor of Appellants, and Appellee appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court found in favor of Appellee, and Appellants now appeal to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

Stefan Olaru filed an action for malpractice against his former attorney, Steven D. Brown. The trial court dismissed the complaint based upon the defendant's plea of a discharge in bankruptcy. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Trial Court held defendant’s purchase money security interest in cattle had priority over
plaintiffs’ prior security interest. On appeal, we affirm.

Conservator brought action to recover assets for the Estate of Carolyn Brown which had been given to defendant by Brown. The Chancellor invoked the constructive trust doctrine and ordered assets returned to the Estate. On appeal, we affirm.
 

In 2001, the trial court entered an order ("the 2001 order") awarding the State of Tennessee ex rel. Laura Fabrizio ("the State") a child support arrearage of $9,785. Subsequently, the same court, by order entered March 25, 2003, confirmed a referee's "Findings and Recommendations" adding interest of $2,152.70 to the original award. Richard R. Cadmus ("Father") seeks to go behind the 2001 order in an attempt to invalidate it on a number of grounds. The State, on the other hand, complains that the interest calculated by the referee and approved by the trial court is incorrect. We find no basis in the record submitted to us for disturbing the trial court's last order. Accordingly, we affirm.

This appeal involves an action for breach of an oral contract to pump out a swimming pool. The Circuit Court for Wilson County conducted a bench trial and awarded the plaintiff a judgment against both the owner of the pool and the affiliate real estate broker who requested the work. We have concluded that the evidence does not support the judgment against the property owner but affirm the judgment against the broker.

The trial court awarded Appellee recision of a contract for purchase of an automobile. We affirm.

This cause is a civil suit for damages against Gary and Cynthia Mann resulting from Cynthia Mann's embezzlement of funds totaling $550,000.00 from the law firm of Marks, Shell, and Maness. The trial court found Mr. and Mrs. Mann jointly and severably liable for the loss. Mr. Mann appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Marjorie Delapp, Mary Sherrod, and Elsie Caton ("Plaintiffs") sued their brother, Arthur David Pratt ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant exercised undue influence over their mother, Mary Armstrong Pratt ("the Deceased") to induce the Deceased to make a will in Defendant's favor. After a jury trial, judgment was entered holding the Deceased was competent to make the will, that a confidential relationship existed between Defendant and the Deceased, and that the will was not the last will and testament of the Deceased. Defendant appeals claiming, in part, that the Trial Court erred in allowing testimony regarding his alleged racial prejudice to be introduced and in failing to grant a mistrial after reference was made to his alleged sexual misconduct. Defendant also argues there is no material evidence to support the jury's verdicts of confidential relationship and undue influence and that the Trial Court erred in denying his objection to the entry of judgment. We affirm

This appeal involves competing claims for breach of contract. J.W. Gibson d/b/a J.W. Gibson Company ("Defendant"), entered into an oral contract with Pratt Masonry Company ("Pratt Masonry") for Pratt Masonry to furnish masonry work on a house. When the work was completed, Defendant refused to pay, claiming the masonry work was so defective that all the bricks had to be removed and replaced. Pratt Masonry filed suit seeking payment for the work performed under the oral contract. Defendant counterclaimed for damages incurred in having to remove and replace the bricks. The Trial Court concluded Pratt Masonry breached the contract by performing  substandard masonry work, but Defendant failed to prove it was necessary to remove and replace all the bricks. Both parties appeal. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the procedures for returning a formerly disabled police officer to work. After the Employee Benefit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County determined that the former officer was no longer disabled, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department directed him to report to a 13-week training class. Fearing that he could lose both his disability pension and his job if he failed the training class, the officer filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department lacked the authority to require him to complete the training class before returning him to work. The trial court determined that requiring the officer to complete the training class before returning him to active duty was not inconsistent with Nashville's charter or ordinances. The officer perfected this appeal. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Department has the authority to require the officer to complete the training before returning him to active duty.

This case involves the rights of a survivor in a joint bank account. During her lifetime, the decedent sold certain real property, put the proceeds in a separate bank account, and executed a will leaving half of the proceeds to her niece. The bank account in which the proceeds were deposited was a joint account between the decedent and her brother. The brother had power of attorney over the decedent's affairs and was the named executor in the her will. After the decedent died, the decedent's will was admitted to probate. The brother, as executor, filed a petition asking for instructions as to the proper disposition of the money in the joint bank account. The trial court held that, when the funds were placed in the joint bank account, the bequest to the niece was adeemed and the funds were no longer a part of the decedent's estate. Therefore, the trial court determined that the brother, as the joint account holder with a right of survivorship, was entitled to all of the proceeds. The named beneficiary now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the bank account was a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship.

Unmarried couple in their forties decide to have children. Due to the woman's concern that she may be too old to produce viable eggs, the couple engaged the services of an in vitro fertilization clinic and signed contracts required by the clinic, following which the clinic obtained eggs from an anonymous female donor, which were fertilized with the man's sperm and then implanted in the woman who carried them full term resulting in the birth of triplets. Thereafter, the couple separated and the woman filed for custody. The man answered and asserted that the woman is not the mother or a legal parent of the children because she was merely a gestational surrogate who has no genetic tie to the children. The man further asserted that the children have no mother because the egg donor waived her parental rights. The trial court held that the woman is the mother of the children, awarded joint custody to the couple and primary custody to the woman. The man appealed. We affirm, finding that the woman is a legal parent and the mother of the children based on the intent of the parties.

This appeal raises the validity of an ordinance passed by the City of Memphis annexing a portion of Shelby County. Appellants contend that Appellees violated the Open Meetings Act when such ordinance was passed. All parties filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted Appellees’ motion. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The juvenile court entered an order declaring Appellant the father of T.S.R. and ordered child support. Appellant failed to pay child support and incurred an arrearage of $27,051.68. Appellant petitioned the court for Rule 60.02 relief from the final order and requested a blood paternity test. The DNA test indicated that Appellant was not the father. The trial court relieved Appellant of his ongoing child support but required him to pay the child support arrearage. For the following reasons, we affirm

The trial court denied Appellants’ petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and returned physical custody of children to Mother. We reverse and remand for determination of whether termination is in the best interests of the children. We vacate the order returning physical custody to Mother.

This case involves the interpretation of certain provisions of a Trust Instrument. The trial court found a latent ambiguity in the Instrument, allowed extrinsic evidence, and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant appeals. We affirm.

An inmate who was convicted and sentenced for passing worthless checks filed suit against six officers of the court for conspiracy, violation of his constitutional rights, and various derelictions of duty. The plaintiff asked the trial court to sanction the defendants by impeachment and/or disbarment. He also asked for $33 million in monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.

An inmate filed a claim with the Claims Commission contending negligence on the part of the Tennessee Department of Correction in miscalculating his sentence credits. The Commission dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the inmate appealed, and we affirm.

This case involves the wrongful payment of funds by Defendant over Plaintiff’s forged signature. The lower court found that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by former Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-4-406, which places a one-year limit on certain claims by bank customers seeking to recover losses occasioned by unauthorized signatures. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

The divorce judgment approved a MDA which provided that the minor children would reside with their father in Rhea County while mother was working in Atlanta. When not working, mother had custody. Two years after the divorce, father petitioned for custody, alleging that at the time of the divorce it was contemplated that mother would return to Tennessee and share equal parenting time. Mother counter-claimed for custody. Father was awarded primary custody. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing on the comparative fitness of each parent.

The trial court denied a Petition for Name Change. Among the allegations the Petitioner raises on appeal are that the master or special judge who denied his Petition was biased against him and that she was not authorized to act as a judge. We do not find sufficient evidence of bias in the record to justify reversal on that ground. We do find that the record is devoid of proper documentation of the basis of the master's authority to sit as a substitute judge. However, we need not determine whether reversal is required because of that deficiency, because we find that the trial court failed to articulate and the record fails to demonstrate any legally sufficient reason for denying the Petition. Therefore, the denial and dismissal of the Petition must be vacated.

This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of property in a marriage of relatively short duration. Prior to marriage, the parties lived for a few months with the husband's parents before moving to a farm purchased by the husband with a down payment provided by his parents.The wife gave birth to the parties' child a few months after the move, and the parties  subsequently married. Twenty-two months later, the wife filed for divorce. Both before and during the marriage, the wife assisted the husband with his cattle farming operation as well as with improvements to the property. The trial court found the farm to be marital property under the doctrine of transmutation, assigned it a value of $100,000, and awarded it to the husband. The trial court awarded most of the farm equipment and forty-eight head of cattle to the husband as his separate property and divided the marital property between the parties, with the husband awarded the remainder of the farm machinery and all but eleven head of cattle, and the wife awarded a 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, the remaining cattle, and a cash judgment of $27,000 for her "substantial contributions to the farm and farming operation." The husband was assigned sole responsibility for the marital debt. The husband appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly classified, valued, and distributed the property. We conclude that the trial court correctly found that the farm was marital property, but erred in its valuation of the farm and in its distribution of the marital property. Accordingly, we modify the trial court's cash judgment to the wife to $11,886.50, which represents one-half of the equity in the farm at the time of the divorce and one-half of the unaccounted-for proceeds from the husband's sale of cattle in violation of an automatic injunction in the case.

This appeal involves a child support and visitation dispute. Mother and Father, never married, have two minor children. The parties lived together from 1997 until March 2001, when Father was arrested for domestic assault. Father moved out of the residence. Mother filed a complaint seeking to be the primary residential parent, requested child support and arrearages and asked for temporary support and attorney fees. The juvenile court placed primary custody of the children with Mother, set visitation, and ordered Father to pay $4,000 a month in child support plus $31,586 in arrearages. Father appealed, taking issue with visitation, child support, arrearages, and the court's failure to make findings of fact regarding the alleged domestic assault. Mother appealed claiming the court erred by rejecting most of her claim for her attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's determinations concerning child support and visitation, modify the offset against the arrearage owed for child support, and reverse and remand Mother's request for attorney fees. Further, we find that the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact concerning the domestic abuse charge because the alleged domestic assault was not against a minor.