APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Telecommunications corporation appeals trial court’s grant of summary judgment to city, alleging that trial court incorrectly determined that city ordinance imposing a charge of five percent
of gross revenue of the corporation was not inconsistent with T.C.A. § 65-21-103 or any other provision of Tennessee law. We reverse.
 

Mrs. Burton and Mr. Fine had an automobile accident. Both sides claimed the accident was caused by the other's fault. Mr. Fine settled his claim with Mrs. Burton's liability carrier and gave Mrs. Burton a general release. Mrs. Burton's claim proceeded to trial and she asserted that the release waived Mr. Fine's defense of comparative fault. The trial judge held that it did not and approved the jury's verdict assessing the greater fault to Mrs. Burton. We affirm. We also affirm the amount of discretionary costs awarded to Mr. Fine.

This case involves a dispute between neighbors. The plaintiffs owned a one-acre parcel of property in a rural setting almost completely surrounded by a sixteen-acre parcel of property owned by the defendants. The defendant larger landowners began building structures and storing equipment in an escalating commercial use of their property. The plaintiff small landowners complained to county officials that the defendants' use of their property constituted a zoning violation. The ensuing dispute between the two landowners was marked by the defendants engaging in threatening and intimidating behavior and the plaintiffs repeatedly complaining to authorities and incessantly documenting and videotaping the defendants' activities. Finally, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for, among other things, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs on the malicious prosecution claim but declined to award punitive damages. The trial court dismissed the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims of malicious harassment and civil conspiracy. We reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim for outrageous conduct, finding that the defendants' behavior rose to the level of outrageous conduct, and remand for an award of damages on this claim. Finally, we reverse the denial of an award of punitive damages on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim.

This case involves a question of whether a plaintiff who brings suit for a debt due him resulting from his agent’s business activities has standing as a real party in interest. The trial court found that the agent was acting on behalf of his employer, that the plaintiff had standing to sue as a real party in interest, and granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Appellant Don Pickard appeals the action of the trial court finding that he defamed Sergeant Sam Spicer in public statements to the news media. Spicer cross appeals from the action of the trial court in dismissing his malicious prosecution action against Don Pickard, Stace Thompson and Howard Morris. We affirm the action of the trial court in the defamation case and affirm the action of the trial court in the malicious prosecution case as to Howard Morris. The malicious prosecution case against Don Pickard and Stace Thompson is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Action was filed by plaintiff's Conservator to recover assets transferred by his wife prior to her death. The Trial Judge awarded certain assets to plaintiff and plaintiff appealed.

This case involves the dismissal of Appellant’s legal malpractice claim against Appellee on the basis that Appellee, after the initial dismissal of Appellant’s medical malpractice claim, failed to file a County entered a judgment for Appellee. Appellant subsequently appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, which dismissed Appellant’s cause for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit

This case arises from a divorce action between the Appellant and Appellee. After a hearing, the trial court divided the marital property, granted Appellee alimony in futuro, and awarded Appellee her attorney's fees. After denying Appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court increased Appellee's award of attorney's fees. Appellant appeals to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal by K.L.K. (“Mother”) challenges the Juvenile Court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on three statutory grounds, and further challenges that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in her daughter’s best interest. We conclude there was no clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the Juvenile Court, but that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the third ground. However, we also conclude there was no clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, reversed.

Two children were placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services because of the mother’s inability to provide stable and sanitary housing. The Department established permanency plans whereby the mother would obtain and maintain stable and sanitary housing, pay child support, attend parenting classes, work with Homemaker Services to learn how to keep the home clean, obtain a parenting assessment, and undergo counseling for her mental health issues. A third child was born while the mother’s other two children were in the Department’s custody. This child was born prematurely and required extensive hospitalization and was also placed in the Department’s custody. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to all three children, which the juvenile court granted on the grounds of abandonment due to failure to pay child support, failing to comply with the permanency plans and persistent conditions. We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment, but affirm the termination of parental rights based on persistent conditions and failure to comply with the permanency plan. We also affirm the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

This is a declaratory judgment action to establish coverage under an insurance policy. The  plaintiffs’ home was insured by a homeowners policy with the defendant insurance company. The insurance company canceled the policy for nonpayment of the premium and claimed that it mailed a notice of cancellation to the insureds at that time. Six months later, the plaintiffs’ home was damaged by fire, and they filed a claim on their policy. The insurance company denied the claim. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to recover on the policy, asserting that they never received the cancellation notice, and that the insurance company did not properly cancel the policy. At trial, the insurance company representative testified about the company’s customary routine of sending cancellation notices, and it was undisputed that the insurance agent and the mortgagees received notices. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs based on, among other things, its determination that the insurance company did not prove that it had mailed a cancellation notice to the plaintiffs. The insurance company now appeals. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the cancellation notice was mailed to the plaintiffs.
 

I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in  this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the  children to terminate her parental rights.

This case arises from the Estate’s suit to recover a debt from defendant Corporation. The parties reached an agreement regarding payment of the debt, and the trial court entered a consent order reflecting the terms of this agreement. Appellant then filed a rule 60.02 motion for relief from the consent order. The lower court denied the motion, finding that Appellant was not a party of record in the suit and, accordingly, had no standing to challenge the judgment. We affirm.
 

Gregor Nadler ("the plaintiff") took a default judgment in the amount of $68,270.98 against Gerald H. Lucas ("Mr. Lucas") in a Florida proceeding. The judgment survived Mr. Lucas's subsequent bankruptcy filing. The plaintiff domesticated his judgment in Tennessee and then filed suit against, inter alia, the Mountain Valley Chapel Business Trust and Mr. Lucas, claiming (1) that Mr. Lucas had engaged in a fraudulent conveyance when he formed the trust and (2) that the trust was his alter ego. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. From this judgment, the plaintiff appeals, challenging the trial court's rulings with respect to his fraudulent conveyance and alter ego claims. In addition, the plaintiff raises an evidentiary issue. We affirm.

Nashville Lodging Company and G.P. Credit Company, LLC appeal the action of the trial court in which the trial judge having previously granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment as to liability in this breach of contract action decided all issues as to damages in favor of Appellees. We affirm the action of the trial court.

This tort action arises out of a two-vehicle accident. At trial, the defendant Ernestine W. Francis admitted liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Melanie Sue Gibson for property damage in the amount of $6,900; however, the jury declined to award her any damages on her claim for personal injuries. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court did not properly perform its role as thirteenth juror; that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; and that the trial court erred when it re-instructed the jury in response to a question from that body. We affirm.

Plaintiff brought suit on a defectively executed joint will, arguing that, despite its infirmities as a testamentary instrument, it is still enforceable as a contract for the benefit of a third party. In her suit, Plaintiff sought to recover certain property, purportedly covered by the defective joint will, that Decedent had devised to Defendant in a subsequent will. The lower court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the defective joint will does not constitute an enforceable contract. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Plaintiff, a customer who was injured when assaulted on the premises, brought action for damages against the owners-lessors of the premises and others. The Circuit Court, Campbell County, Conrad Troutman, Judge, dismissed the action as to the owners-lessors for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This case started out as a dispute over the title to a twenty to thirty-five foot wide strip along a state highway. The Chancery Court of Roane County held that the defendant held the title, but that the plaintiff had an access easement over the property. The defendant asserts on appeal that the Court erred because the plaintiff never claimed an easement in its pleadings and that the Court simply created one. The plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in finding that the defendant held the title to the property. We affirm.

In this case it is argued that the Trial Court erred in approving the decision of the Appellees, the City of Maryville and the City Council for the City of Maryville, to issue certificates of compliance to three applicants as a precondition to each such applicant securing a license to operate a retail liquor store from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand

This is a an action for damages under FELA wherein the Plaintiff claimed that he was negligently exposed to toxic chemicals in the workplace. The Defendant pleaded, inter alia, the defense of the three-year statute of limitations, to which the discovery rule was applicable. This issue was bifurcated and tried separately, to the same jury, which found in favor of the Plaintiff. On the issues of liability, causation, and damages [the second phase of the trial] the jury found in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff appeals, claiming that the issue of the statute of limitation should not have been bifurcated, that the court should have directed a verdict for the Plaintiff on account of OSHA violations, and the exclusion-admission of expert testimony. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

Action by corporation for judgment on promissory notes representing loans made to partnership resulted in Judgment against defendant partner for one-half of amount of the loans plus interest and attorney's fees. On appeal we affirm.

The plaintiff A.D. Doe for himself and his daughter M.A. Doe sued the Sheriff of Knox County and the County itself for damages when M.A. Doe was allegedly raped by a deputy sheriff. The complaint alleged that the sheriff was liable on his bond and on his oath of office and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 imposed liability on the County because the deputy was acting “by virtue of or under color of the office.” The Circuit Court of Knox County dismissed the complaint against the Sheriff and the County for the failure to state a claim. We affirm.

This is a claim for unemployment benefits. The claimant was terminated from her employment at the defendant business. Her separation notice indicated that she was terminated for improper conduct and having a disrespectful attitude. Subsequently, the claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The agency denied benefits. The claimant appealed. The appellate tribunal conducted a telephonic hearing and affirmed the denial of benefits. The claimant filed the instant petition for judicial review, claiming that the administrative proceedings were so fundamentally flawed that her procedural due process rights were violated. The trial court denied the petition and affirmed the denial of benefits. The claimant now appeals. We affirm, finding that the claimant’s due process rights were not violated, and that there is substantial and material  evidence to support the denial of benefits.
 

This is a will contest case. Patricia Henderson Jolley and Howard E. Henderson, Jr. (collectively "the Contestants") appeal the chancery court's judgment that they do not have standing to contest their father's will. The Contestants contend that the chancery court erred in addressing the issue of their standing and in other ways. They argue that their stepmother, Wanda K. Henderson ("the Executrix"), failed to raise the standing issue and, as a consequence, waived it. They also rely on alleged procedural errors and contend that they do have standing. We affirm.