APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father to their children. After a hearing, the Lauderdale County Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights over W.N. and C.N. on the grounds of abandonment for failure to support and severe child abuse. Further, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother now seeks review by this Court, and we affirm.
 

This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court's Order, which denied Father/Appellant's Petition to change custody from the minor children’s Mother to Father. Finding that there is not a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of custody, we affirm.
 

Lisa Karen Stowers Hoffer, formerly Smith ("Mother"), filed a petition against her former husband, Mark Edward Smith ("Father"), seeking to modify the provisions of the parties' judgment of divorce, which judgment required Father to pay $1,200 per month in child support. The trial court, finding that, in the most recent three years, Father had had an average annual income of $117,238, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring Father to pay child support of $2,803 per month. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff sued for breach of employment contract. The Trial Court found a breach and awarded damages. On appeal we hold the employer had just cause to terminate, and reverse Judgment.

This is a zoning case. The appellant landowner owns a tract of land that it sought to resume using as a sanitary landfill. The appellees are the newly-incorporated town in which the landfill is located and the town’s zoning board. In 1996, the landowner and the county in which the town and landfill are located resolved a dispute in which the landfill was deemed a legally permitted nonconforming use under the county zoning ordinance. In 2002, the landowner sought a building permit from the town planning commission. The town planning commission refused to grant the permit until the landowner obtained a determination from the town zoning board that the landfill was a legally permitted non-conforming use under the town’s newly-enacted zoning ordinances. The town zoning board determined that the landfill was not a legally permitted nonconforming use under the town zoning ordinances because the landowner had discontinued its nonconforming use of the landfill for longer than one year. Consequently, no permit was issued. The landowner unsuccessfully appealed the ruling to the town zoning appeals board. The landowner then appealed the decision of the zoning appeals board to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the ruling of the zoning appeals board. We affirm, finding that the use of the property as a landfill had been discontinued for more than one year and thus the landfill did not fall within the nonconforming use exception to the town’s zoning ordinance.

This case involves the construction of a will. The will established a trust for the benefit of the decedent's children that provided income for eleven years. At the end of the eleven year term, the trust was to be terminated and the trust assets distributed to the beneficiaries. During the eleven-year term, one of the decedent's children died, leaving no spouse, children or surviving parent. The beneficiary under the deceased child's will sued, seeking that child's share of the trust assets. At issue was whether the trust assets vested in the beneficiaries when the testator died or when the trust terminated. The probate court held that the decedent intended for the trust corpus not to vest in the beneficiaries until the trust terminated, and that the beneficiary under the child's will would not receive her share of the trust assets. We affirm, finding that the language of the will indicates that the testator intended for the corpus of the trust to vest when the trust terminated.

This appeal involves the court's authority to order a parent to pay support for an adult disabled child. The parties were married with two severely disabled adult sons. In 1995, while the parties were still married, the probate court established them as co-conservators for their sons. In June 2001, the mother filed a petition for divorce in circuit court. Neither party informed the divorce court of the conservatorships that had been established for their sons. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce which incorporated a parenting plan, submitted by the father, which provided for joint custody of the sons. The divorce decree required the mother to pay child support to the father. The divorce decree was not appealed. The mother later filed a motion requesting that the decree requiring her to pay child support be vacated pursuant to Rule 60.02(3), asserting that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require her to pay support for the adult sons. Rather than rule on the mother's motion, the divorce court transferred the case to the probate court, which had before it the conservatorship actions. The father then filed a motion in the probate court asking it to confirm the divorce decree entered by the divorce court. The probate court, in the same order, denied the mother's motion to vacate and granted the father's motion to confirm the decree adopting the parenting plan, determining that the divorce decree entered by the divorce court was valid. The mother now appeals that order. We reverse, concluding that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the parent to pay support for the adult disabled children, but finding that the probate court is permitted to consider requiring the parents to pay support in the context of the conservatorship proceedings.

This is a personal injury case arising from an automobile accident. Defendant/Appellee was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and attempted to pass Plaintiffs/Appellants’ vehicle in a no pass zone as Plaintiffs/Appellants were making a left-hand turn into their driveway. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Plaintiff/Appellant driver 40% at a fault for the accident and Defendant/Appellee 60% at fault. Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal on issues of fault and damages. We affirm as modified herein.
 

This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment. We Affirm.

Forty-six year old female employee who had worked for company for seventeen years filed this action against her employer after her position and employment were terminated. She claims her termination constituted a breach of contract and violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The trial court dismissed the THRA claim on summary judgment as time barred, holding that the savings statute did not apply to THRA claims. The remaining contract claims were tried and resulted in judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We find that the trial court erred by holding the savings statute inapplicable to THRA claims against private employers. We also find that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the THRA. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This is an appeal from a decree of legal separation, involving issues of division of  marital property and debt, alimony, and attorney fees. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
 

The mother of a three year old girl asked the court to deny the girl's father any visitation with the child because she believed that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial court did not find that the evidence conclusively proved abuse, but denied the father any visitation or other contact with his daughter, stating, "I have to side with the protection of the child." Because the trial court did not make the requisite findings to support elimination of all visitation, we must vacate the judgment.

This is an action against an insurance company that is alleged to have breached its duties to an insured by failing to provide a defense in a prior personal injury action, wherein a substantial default judgment was entered against the insured. The former plaintiffs, now judgment creditors, and the purported insured, now judgment debtor, have joined forces as plaintiffs in this action to recover damages, including the amount of the default judgment, the purported insured suffered due to the insurer's refusal to provide a defense. The trial court dismissed the action on a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 motion for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm. The judgment on which this action is based is void, because the relief granted therein by default judgment exceeded the relief sought. In the alternative, if the previous judgment on which this action is based is valid, the purported insured is not afforded coverage; the policy excluded injury or damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured and it was held in the previous judgment that the purported insured intended the collision and the Alcantars' injuries.

This case involves claims of fraud arising out of the sale of a house. The plaintiff purchasers signed a contract to buy a house owned by the defendants. The contract to sell contained an "as is" clause, allowing inspection of the property but requiring the sale to be "as is." The purchasers did not inspect the house further before the closing. After the purchasers took possession, they noticed several defects in the house that were not disclosed by the sellers. The purchasers sued the sellers, alleging that the sellers had made material misrepresentations of fact and had fraudulently concealed or failed to disclose material defects in the house. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the sellers. It concluded that, although the sellers had made material misrepresentations of fact, the purchasers' reliance on those representations was not reasonable because of the "as is" provision in the contract and because the defects were either apparent or readily discoverable. The purchasers now appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the purchasers' reliance was not reasonable.

The issues in this case are whether the trial court's award of alimony to the wife was excessive because the husband's income may be diminished when he retires from his current employment and whether the trial court's award to wife for her attorney's fees and expenses was erroneous. Upon a finding that the time of the husband's retirement is uncertain and a further finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's fees and expenses, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as rendered and remand.

This case involves a claim for reimbursement against an estate. A trust was established during the decedent's lifetime to pay for her needs. Before the decedent died, her husband paid for her needs, in part to preserve trust property. After her death, the husband filed a claim against the wife's estate seeking reimbursement for his payments for the healthcare and support of the wife. The trial court found that the payments were made to protect the wife's trust property, as well as for the care and support of the wife, and would have been paid by the trustee but for lack of assets, and the wife's estate was the successor-in-interest to the remaining assets of the trust. Consequently, the trial court sustained the husband's claim against the wife's estate. The wife's estate now appeals. We affirm, finding the expenses paid by husband constitute a valid claim against the wife's estate.

Plaintiffs appeal an adverse judgment from the general sessions court to the circuit  court for a trial de novo pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-5-108 (Supp. 2004). On motion of defendant, the circuit court transferred the case to the chancery court because a previous suit filed in the chancery court on the same cause of action was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. The chancery court granted defendant’s motion to adopt the findings of the special master filed in the previous chancery court suit and then granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have appealed. We vacate and remand to the circuit court.
 

This case arises out of a petition filed by Appellants to compel the executor of Decedent’s estate to collect certain assets and a petition for declaratory judgment filed by Appellee. The trial court determined that Appellants’ motion in limine to exclude certain evidence based on the parol evidence rule should be denied. Additionally, the trial court denied Appellants’ objection to certain testimony based on the statute of frauds. The trial court further denied Appellants’ objections to exclude testimony based on the Dead Man’s Statute. The trial court determined that Decedent successfully gifted annual $10,000 sums to Appellee in the form of forgiving interest and principal owed by Appellee to Decedent as stated in a promissory note, finding there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that such transfers were advancements. Further, the court determined that such promissory note called for simple, rather than compound, interest, finding that Appellee owed Decedent’s estate the sum of $64,297.78. Appellants seek review by this Court and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
 

This appeal arises from a dispute between the City of Lebanon Planning Commission and real estate developers regarding approval of a proposed subdivision. The planning commission approved the plans for the first phase of this subdivision but then disapproved the plans for the second and third phases. The developers filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Wilson County seeking judicial review of the commission's actions. The trial court granted the writ and determined that the planning commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying approval of the final subdivision plans. We affirm the trial court's decision.

Appellants appeal (1) a jury determination that a rock quarry, an asphalt plant, and trucking activities did not create a nuisance and (2) the allowance of discretionary costs. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed suit asserting that she was the owner by adverse possession of four acres of farmland in Maury County. Defendants, who purchased adjoining property in 2001, assert that they are by deed the true and rightful owners of the disputed parcel. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was the owner of the property by adverse possession based on a finding that she and her predecessors in interest had possessed the property visibly, exclusively, actually, continuously, openly, and notoriously for twenty years. We affirm.

This appeal involves a boundary line dispute between neighbors. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs' boundary line description, and defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Robert W. O'Neal ("Father") and Sandra K. O'Neal ("Mother") were granted a divorce by the Sumner County Circuit Court in 1986. There were two minor children born of the marriage, and Father was ordered to pay $650 per month in child support. After Mother passed away in June of 1990, the children's maternal grandparents, William and Marjorie Kirkpatrick, were awarded full custody of both children by the Sumner County Chancery Court. In 2001, Marjorie Kirkpatrick ("Petitioner") filed a petition in the Hamilton County Circuit Court seeking to have the previous order requiring Father to pay $650 per month in child support enforced. Petitioner also sought a substantial amount of arrearages. The Hamilton County Circuit Court determined that Father was in arrears a total of $55,063 covering from when Petitioner was awarded custody until June of 2002. Petitioner also was awarded her attorney fees. Father appeals, claiming the original order from the Sumner County Circuit Court requiring him to pay $650 per month in child support had no effect once Mother died. We modify the judgment of the Hamilton County Circuit Court, and affirm as modified.