APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court terminated parents’ rights based on abandonment. Father appeals. We affirm.

Gibraltar Taft Highway Limited Partnership, through its general partner, The Raines Group ("the plaintiff"), filed an application with the Town of Walden's Board of Aldermen ("the Board"), seeking a permit to build a townhouse project on property located within Walden. The Board denied the plaintiff's application. The plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. Following a hearing, that court upheld the decision of the Board, finding that the Board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or capriciously in rejecting the application. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred in its determination. We affirm.

This case involves a homeowner who defaulted on her home mortgage. After the holder of the note commenced foreclosure proceedings, the homeowner filed suit in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County asserting numerous claims against the original mortgagee, the subsequent purchasers of the note, and an executive employed by one of the subsequent purchasers. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the homeowner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The homeowner appealed and, while the appeal was pending, requested the trial court to vacate its earlier decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the homeowner's motion. We now affirm both of the trial court's decisions.

Jeffrey Scott West (“Father”) filed a petition against his former wife, Sharon Ann West (“Mother”), seeking to modify the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan, which plan had not required Mother to pay child support due to the fact she was unemployed. The trial court, finding that, since the entry of the parenting plan, Mother had had a two-year gross income of over $25,000, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring that Mother pay child support of $290 per month. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support and in the methodology used by the court in calculating child support. We affirm.

Matthew Lawson, by his mother and next friend, Shirley Lawson, and Ms. Lawson, individually (collectively "the plaintiffs") brought an action for negligence against Edgewater Hotels, Inc., and Stokely Hospitality Properties, Inc. (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that Matthew sustained injuries as a consequence of swimming in the indoor pool at the defendants' hotel. According to the plaintiffs, Matthew sustained these injuries (1) due to the excessive amount of chlorine in the pool water and/or (2) because the defendants failed to properly ventilate the indoor portion of the pool. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to both of the plaintiffs' theories. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants' pool contained excessive levels of chlorine. However, we vacate the trial court's judgment with respect to the allegation that the defendants' indoor pool was not properly ventilated. We hold that the defendants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment with respect to this claim.

This appeal involves allegations of sexual abuse brought against Wilburn Lee Brown, Jr., ("Petitioner") by his stepdaughter. After the allegations were investigated, DCS concluded there was substantial and material evidence to support the allegations and the report of abuse would be "validated" pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0250-7-9-.02. Because Petitioner was employed at a youth development center, he was notified that his employer would be informed that he was the indicated perpetrator in a "validated" report of child sexual abuse and that Petitioner was no longer allowed to have access to children. After exhausting his administrative appeals, Petitioner appealed to the Trial Court. The Trial Court concluded there was substantial and material evidence to support the allegations of abuse and affirmed. Petitioner appeals and we, likewise, affirm.

This appeal arises from the decision of Anesthesia & Pain Consultants, P.C. ("A&PC") to terminate the employment of Dr. Alan Gardner. After A&PC fired Dr. Gardner, he brought this action alleging breach of employment contract, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and promissory fraud. The trial court granted A&PC summary judgment on the misrepresentation claims. At the close of Dr. Gardner's proof at trial, the trial court granted A&PC a directed verdict on his claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The jury returned a verdict in favor of A&PC on the promissory fraud claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

The matter now before us finds its genesis in a divorce action brought by Ellen Hopson Bell ("Wife") against her husband, William Hall Bell ("Husband"). In her complaint for divorce, Wife sought, inter alia, reasonable attorney's fees. She renewed her request for fees at the conclusion of the divorce trial. Without conducting a hearing, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,000, representing one half of her reasonable legal expenses incurred in the divorce. Husband appealed. We subsequently vacated the trial court's judgment, remanding the matter to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of Wife's entitlement to a fee award. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,250 as an allowance on her legal expenses. Husband appeals. We affirm and hold that Wife is entitled to her fees and expenses incurred on appeal.

In this post-divorce case, Jeannette Cutrer Day Siniard ("Mother") sought to modify the parties' residential schedule pertaining to their children. That schedule provided that Caroline Siniard and Wesley Siniard (collectively "the children") would alternate weeks between Mother's home and the home of their father, Mark Alan Siniard ("Father"). The trial court granted Mother's request in part by designating her as the primary residential parent of Caroline. In a subsequent order granting Mother child support, the trial court went further and designated Mother as the primary residential parent of both children. Father appeals, contending, among other things, that Mother failed to show a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of the residential schedule. We affirm.

The Trial Court awarded child support from birth of the child to marriage of the parties, subsequent to their divorce. The father appealed. We affirm.

In this dispute between attorney and client, a jury awarded the client damages against the attorney which award was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

The Chancery Court transferred this action to Circuit Court and plaintiff has appealed the transfer. We affirm.

Action alleged retaliatory discharge for filing workers compensation claim. Employer defended termination on grounds employee was unable to perform his job due to disability. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. We affirm.

The Commissioner found defendant's physician breached the standard of care in the treatment of plaintiff, but refused to award damages. On appeal, we affirm Commissioner's finding of breach, but award damages and remand to enter Judgment.

In this breach of contract action based on a policy of insurance, the Trial Court determined defendant had breached the contract and awarded compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse in part,  affirm in part, vacate and remand.

Husband appeals property settlement award to wife in divorce action. On appeal, we affirm.

Homeowner’s insurance policyholders filed a complaint against an insurance carrier seeking benefits under policy and a declaratory judgment that policy language was ambiguous. Homeowners filed a motion seeking certification as a class action. The insurance carrier filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff Beckwith’s claim for benefits was time barred and plaintiff Simmons’s claim was non-justiciable. The insurance carrier filed separate motions to stay discovery and defer the class certification hearing until after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court granted the insurance carrier summary judgment against all plaintiffs, thereby disposing of the class certification issue. Homeowners appeal from the order granting summary judgment. We affirm.
 

The sole issue before the court in this protracted domestic relations litigation is the finding by the trial court that Appellant was in criminal contempt for failure to make mortgage and tax payments on the marital residence. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court did not set a specific deadline for payment and that the uncontested proof shows that Appellant lacked the ability to pay when the debt became due. We reverse the trial court action finding that the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the ability to pay.

This case involves a wrongful death action filed against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) and (J). Appellant is the administrator of the estate of the deceased driver of an automobile involved in a collision with another vehicle on a state highway. Following a hearing, the Commissioner ruled that the state was negligent under section 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) in inspecting and maintaining the section of highway at issue, the shoulder of the highway did not constitute a dangerous condition under section 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), the Appellant failed to prove that the condition of the highway was the proximate cause of the decedent’s untimely death, and the Appellant was not entitled to recover because decedent’s negligence in causing the accident was at least fifty percent (50%). The Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, arguing that the Commissioner’s findings constitute error. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
 

This appeal arises out of a cause of action filed by a municipality against a corporate landowner for breach of a sewer easement which the municipality purchased as a path for its underground sewer line. The municipality alleged that after construction of the sewer line, the landowner's long- standing practice of depositing fly ash and cinders over the area of the easement rendered the line inaccessible and necessitated the construction of an alternate sewage system for which the municipality requested compensation. The municipality also sought to hold the landowner's president and chief executive officer liable as the alter ego of the landowner. The trial court decreed that the landowner had unreasonably burdened the easement, awarded the municipality compensatory damages, and decreed that although the landowner's president was an alter ego of the landowner, he was not personally liable. On appeal the landowner argues that the municipality's cause of action was barred under the statute of limitations and equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches, that under the rule of practical construction the easement allowed the landowner to dump material over the sewer line, that the trial court erred in its award of damages, and that the court erred in refusing to strike findings with respect to the landowner's president. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as rendered and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Madison County, terminating her parental rights on the grounds of persistence of conditions. Specifically, Mother asserts that the termination of her parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination is not in the best interest of the children. We reverse and remand.
 

Randel P. Carlton, and Julie S. Carlton ("Plaintiffs") purchased a house from Mark L. Williams and Sandra Kay Williams ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs later sued Defendants claiming, among other things, that Defendants knew and failed to disclose that the swimming pool was not in good working order and that the swimming pool encroached onto a sewer easement and neighboring property. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants had warranted that all fixtures, including the swimming pool, were free of liens and encumbrances and had breached this warranty. The case was tried on the issue of whether Defendants had warranted that all fixtures, including the pool, were free of liens and encumbrances. The Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the paragraph of the sales contract relied upon by Plaintiffs contained no warranty and that the owner's affidavit also contained no warranty because it merged into the deed at closing. The Trial Court dismissed the case against Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This case arises from trial court’s denial of Appellant Bank’s request for equitable subrogation of Appellee Bank’s lien to Appellant Bank’s lien. Because Appellant Bank had knowledge of Appellee Bank’s deed of trust prior to making the loan, Appellant Bank is not entitled to equitable subrogation. We affirm.
 

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the Mother and alleged Fathers of two children under the age of 18. Mother appeals. We affirm.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case. Tammy Robbins (“Ms. Robbins”) appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Weakley County terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Robbins asserts that the trial court erred the following five respects: in admitting the testimony of a certain expert witness; in disregarding the testimony of another expert witness; in disregarding the testimony of Robbins’s fact witnesses; in refusing to observe Robbins with her children; and in considering, in the termination proceeding, evidence of the State’s earlier removals of the children from Robbins’s custody. Because we find appellant’s assertions to be without merit, we affirm.