APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a parental dispute over the payment of child support for a fifteen-year-old child. One year following the divorce, the child's father filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Franklin County seeking to modify his $2,100 per month child support obligation because his visitation with his daughter had increased and because his daughter was receiving Social Security benefits as a result of his retirement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the father was willfully unemployed and declined to lower his child support obligation. However, the court determined that the father was entitled to an offset in the amount of the Social Security benefits that the child was receiving as his dependent. Both the mother and the father take issue with the judgment. The father asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to lower his child support obligation. The mother insists that the court erred by giving the father credit for the Social Security benefits the child was receiving. We affirm the judgment.

I concur completely in the majority’s conclusion that “the facts preponderate against the Trial Court’s holding that only $2,000 in fees was a reasonable amount for work performed at the trial court level.” I also agree with the majority’s decision that $6,500 is a reasonable fee for counsel’s work at the trial court level.

This appeal centers around the Trial Court’s award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs in this Tennessee Consumer Protection Act case. Following remand after the first appeal, the Trial Court awarded attorney fees of $2,000 for work performed in preparation for and the jury trial of this case, and an additional $4,500 in attorney fees incurred on the first appeal. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court’s award of $2,000 in fees incurred at the trial court level was unreasonably low. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in awarding any fees incurred on the appeal. We reverse the award of fees incurred on the appeal, and modify the Trial Court’s judgment to award $6,500 in fees for work performed at the Trial Court level.

Mr. Chatman was a policeman in Chattanooga. He was fired on September 15, 2003 for untruthfulness during an investigation, and for conduct unbecoming a police officer. He appealed to the Chattanooga City Council which upheld his dismissal. His petition for certiorari was denied and he appeals. We affirm.

In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a premises liability suit. After reviewing the record, we hold that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant owed her a duty of care. Specifically, the plaintiff failed to offer any proof tending to show that the ramp on which she slipped and fell constituted a defective and/or dangerous condition. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant.

Kenny Vaughn and Barbara Vaughn ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Vaughn" and "Mrs. Vaughn" as appropriate) sued Notie L. Cunningham and John Doe concerning an automobile accident that occurred in Hamilton County. The case was tried before a jury and the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. The jury found John Doe 100% at fault for the accident, but awarded Plaintiffs no damages. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court claiming that the jury verdict is contrary to the evidence because the amount of damages is not within the range of reasonableness, and that the Trial Court erred by not granting a new trial and by awarding court costs against Plaintiffs. We affirm as modified.

This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. The chancery court designated and divided the parties’ assets and placed an equitable lien on the separate property of the husband. The chancery court did not award alimony or attorney’s fees and discretionary costs to the wife. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Further, we decline to award attorney’s fees and costs on appeal

The divorced father was found to be in willful criminal contempt of a previous court order by the trial court and sentenced to 10 days in the Williamson County jail for not paying his child support in June 2006, 10 days for not paying his child support in November 2006, 10 days for not paying his child support in December 2006, and 10 days for not paying his share of the medical bills of his minor children. The father appealed. We affirm.

An unsuccessful party to an arbitration proceeding appeals the trial court's confirmation of the arbitration decision. The challenge is based on alleged ambiguities in the agreement to arbitrate and alleged failure by the arbitrator to disclose potential conflicts. We affirm the trial court's confirmation.

This appeal involves three cases consolidated for oral argument. Because of the duplication of the major issues in the cases, we consolidate the cases into one opinion. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions, acting on statutory authority, took emergency possession of a Tennessee trust company, filing due notice of such action in the Chancery Court of Lewis County. Subsequently, the Commissioner gave notice, as required by statute, of the liquidation of the company, which was commenced in the Chancery Court of Lewis County. The company filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The court denied the petition for supersedeas and dismissed the writ of certiorari.  Appellants appeal. We affirm. In the Lewis County Chancery Court proceeding, the court approved the transfer by the Commissioner of the various fiduciary accounts administered by the company and other assets of the company, and the appellants appeal. We affirm. Included in the disposition of the property was real estate located in Bellevue, and the Commissioner filed a motion in the Lewis County Chancery Court for approval of the sale of this real estate. Objections were filed to the Bellevue sale motion. The court, after hearing proof, approved the sale. Appellants filed separate appeals. We affirm.

This is a suit for collection of a credit card debt. AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth") filed a complaint on a sworn account seeking a judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Soltis for the unpaid balance on three credit card accounts. Mr. and Mrs. Soltis answered and denied AmSouth was entitled to any relief. AmSouth filed a motion for summary judgment. Mr. and Mrs. Soltis responded by filing three documents entitled "Verified Application to Confirm and Enforce Arbitration Award" and three "Award" documents indicating that AmSouth Bank owed Mr. and Mrs. Soltis money. The parties had not agreed to arbitration and had not participated in arbitration. The trial court granted AmSouth's motion for summary judgment and Mr. and Mrs. Soltis appealed. The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting AmSouth's motion for summary judgment and in entering judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Soltis. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action to recover on a surety bond. The plaintiff automobile wholesaler sold vehicles to the third-party defendant automobile retailer. The retailer gave thewholesaler the certificates of title for the vehicles as security, pending the retailer’s payment in full for the vehicles. Subsequently, the retailer sold the vehicles to third parties, but did not pay the wholesaler. The wholesaler, therefore, retained the certificates of title. Consequently, the retailer was unable to transfer the certificates of title to the third-party purchasers when they bought the vehicles. Later, in a separate lawsuit, the wholesaler obtained a judgment against the retailer for breach of contract. The wholesaler then filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant surety company on the retailer’s automobile dealership surety bond, claiming that it was damaged by the retailer’s failure to transfer the certificates of title to the purchasers of the vehicles. The surety company filed a third-party complaint against the retailer, asserting that the retailer was required to indemnify the surety company for its attorney’s fees expended in defending the underlying lawsuit. The surety company filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the surety company against both the wholesaler and the retailer. The wholesaler and the retailer now appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiff inmate filed a petition with the Tennessee Department of Corrections for a declaratory ruling that he was entitled to a parole hearing. Upon denial of his petition, Plaintiff inmate filed an action against two Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole employees, seeking judicial review of the denial of his petition. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff inmate appeals and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an action to recover damages for the alleged improper disposition of funds in a conservatorship account, conspiracy, and false advertising. The plaintiff’s mother was placed under a conservatorship, and the conservator opened an account at the defendant bank for the conservatorship. After the plaintiff’s mother died, the account was settled and the accounting was approved by the Gibson County Chancery Court. The plaintiff sought to recover funds from the account, but was informed that the account was settled. The plaintiff sued the bank and its branch manager for conspiracy, false advertising, and disappearing funds. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This is an action to enforce a commercial guaranty. The defendants were both 25% shareholders in the plaintiff corporation. They each signed a guaranty on a $70,000 line of credit issued to the corporation. Subsequently, two other shareholders of the corporation drew down $50,000 from the line of credit without notifying the defendant guarantors or the corporation’s board of directors. Two days later, the guarantors resigned from the corporation. Within weeks, the two other shareholders who drew the money from the line of credit caused the corporation to default on its obligation.  These two shareholders then purchased the corporation’s debt from the bank in the name of the plaintiff corporation and demanded payment from the guarantors under their guaranties. The guarantors refused to make the requested payments. The plaintiff corporation then sued the guarantors pursuant to the guaranties. The guarantors filed an answer asserting the affirmative defenses of fraud and fraud in the inducement of the guaranties. The plaintiff corporation filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the broad “waiver of defenses” provision in the guaranties.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff corporation, concluding that the defenses asserted by the guarantors were waived under the general waiver-of-defenses provision. From that order, the guarantors now appeal. We reverse, concluding that the defenses of fraud and fraud in the inducement were not waived in the general waiver-of-defenses provisions in the guaranties at issue.

This case involves business interruption insurance. The furniture store owned by the plaintiff typically sells furniture under “rent to own” payment plans, whereby customers purchase the furniture through payments over time. The furniture store was damaged by a tornado. As a result, the store was closed for eight months for repairs. The plaintiff store owner had a business interruption insurance policy with the defendant insurance company that covered the loss of business income during the time in which the store was closed for restoration. The store owner sued the insurance company for the loss of business income it would have received during the eight-month period of restoration. Cross-motions for partial summary judgment were filed regarding how to measure the loss of income. The store owner claimed he was entitled to the entire value of sales contracts that would have been signed during the period of closure, even though most of the payments under those contracts would be due after the eight-month restoration period. The insurance company, on the other hand, claimed that the store owner was entitled only to the value of payments that actually would have been received by the store during the eight-month restoration period. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the store owner, finding that the store owner was entitled to the entire value of the contracts that would have been signed during the restoration period. The insurance company was granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal.
We affirm.

In this post-divorce case, Richard Austin Demonbreun ("Father"), filed a petition to modify the parties' visitation arrangement, seeking additional time with one of the parties' three children. Rhonda Fay Demonbreun ("Mother"), the primary residential parent of the children, countered with a petition requesting an increase in child support and the imposition of an obligation upon Father to pay the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. In addition, Mother sought one-half of the refund associated with the parties' 1998 income tax return, and an award of her attorney's fees and court costs. Following a bench trial, the trial court (1) denied Father's petition to modify visitation with his oldest son; (2) increased Father's child support obligation and his share of non-covered medical expenses; (3) awarded Mother one-half of the 1998 income tax refund; (4) awarded Mother $5,000 in attorney's fees; and (5) ordered Father to pay all court costs. Father appeals all of the trial court's decrees, and Mother seeks an award of attorney's fees for the filing of a frivolous appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part, but do not find this appeal to be frivolous in nature.

This appeal involves a dispute between divorced parents over one of their son's college expenses. Their older son became eligible for a substantial tuition discount after his father was employed by the university where he was enrolled. However, the father and son concealed the father's employment and the son's discount from the mother and actually sent her statements that did not reflect the discount. The mother paid one-half of the expenses reflected in these statements until she discovered the tuition discount. She then filed suit against her former husband and her son in the Circuit Court for Wilson County alleging breach of contract and fraud. She also sought a declaration regarding her continuing obligation to pay her son's college expenses. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the father had breached the marital dissolution agreement and ordered the father to pay the mother $2,737.01. The court also found that the mother had breached the marital dissolution agreement by declining to pay her son's college expenses after discovering the tuition discount and ordered her to resume paying her share of these expenses. The mother appealed. We have concluded (1) that the father committed a material breach of the marital dissolution agreement, (2) that the father and the son engaged in fraudulent conduct by concealing the tuition discount from the mother and then pocketing her overpayments, (3) that the mother did not breach the marital dissolution agreement when she stopped paying her son's college expenses, and (4) that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of the mother's overpayment. Accordingly, we have determined that the mother is entitled to recover $3,590 from the husband and that the actions of the father and son warrant terminating her obligation to pay the son's college expenses.

This is the second time that this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants assert that summary judgment was appropriate based on the claims and defenses raised at trial, including res judicata, law of the case, and statute of limitations. We affirm.

This is the second time that this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants assert that summary judgment was appropriate based on the claims and defenses raised at trial, including res judicata, law of the case, and statute of limitations. We affirm.

In this case, the biological father of a child contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. Father argues that the evidence presented is not sufficient to establish statutory grounds for termination and that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Upon our finding that father was incarcerated when the petition to terminate was filed and failed to visit the child for four consecutive months immediately preceding his incarceration and our further finding that the Department made reasonable efforts at reunification, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a claim against an estate. The claimant and the decedent had a romantic relationship. After the decedent’s death, the claimant filed a claim against the decedent’s estate, based on alleged promises of financial support by the decedent in the course of their relationship. The estate moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the claimant could not establish the existence of an enforceable contract or a valid gift. We affirm.

I write separately to voice my dissent to the holding reached by the majority in this case.  The majority concludes that Father expressly waived the issue of whether the trial court correctly determined him to be voluntarily unemployed. Although Father did state in his brief that he is not challenging the trial court’s determination that he is voluntarily unemployed on appeal, I believe the issue should nonetheless be addressed. In doing so, I would hold that the trial court erred in finding that Father was voluntarily unemployed and in imputing potential income to Father on which to base an award of child support.

This appeal arises from a multi-faceted business dispute. LDI Design, LLC, an engineering firm, was engaged by Dukes & Co., a real estate developer, to design plans for Spencer Hall, a planned subdivision in Franklin, Tennessee. LDI provided its engineering services, however, Dukes failed to fulfill its financial obligation to LDI. The parties negotiated a new agreement in April 1999 compromising a claim for damages by Dukes in consideration of a reduced fee for LDI's services. After Dukes failed to honor the new agreement, LDI filed this action. Dukes filed an answer denying liability and filed a counter complaint for damages due to deficiencies in the plans prepared by LDI. Spencer Hall, LLC, owner of the Spencer Hall subdivision, while not a party to the contract, joined in the counter complaint claiming to be a co-developer of the project and the third-party beneficiary of the contract between LDI and Dukes. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim finding the renegotiated agreement between LDI and Dukes constituted an accord and satisfaction that barred Duke's claims, and the evidence insufficient to prove any claim for damages against LDI. Although we find the new agreement did not bar Dukes' claim, we affirm the trial court's finding that the evidence failed to prove any claim for damages against LDI. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of all claims against LDI.

This is an action for conversion involving two ex-spouses. The wife was the lone signatory on two trust accounts for their daughters. Without authorization from the wife, the defendant bank transferred all of the funds in both trust accounts to the husband’s account. The wife then filed this lawsuit for conversion, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against the bank, the bank employee who transferred the funds, and the husband. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. As part of the plaintiff wife’s response, she admitted that she originally put the money into the trust accounts in order to defraud creditors during their divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, based in part on the doctrine of unclean hands. The plaintiff wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the trial court properly applied the doctrine of unclean hands.