APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the third action between Stanley Morrison and Citizen State Bank concerning a series of promissory notes and security agreements. In the first action, Citizen State Bank filed a civil warrant in General Sessions Court against Stanley Morrison to recover a deficiency judgment and repossess a truck that was collateral on a series of loans. The bank obtained a default judgment against Morrison and repossessed the truck when Morrison failed to appear in court. Morrison failed to timely appeal the default judgment. Thereafter, Morrison and his wife filed this action challenging the validity of the default judgment and seeking damages for fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion of property, contending four of six promissory notes and security agreements that the judgment was based upon were forgeries. The trial court held this action was barred by res judicata and dismissed it on summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of this action on the basis of collateral estoppel.

The mother has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application for an extraordinary appeal from an ex parte Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order entered by the Chancery Court for Lawrence County on September 6, 2005. The mother asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it had transferred the case to the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2001. The father now agrees that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the application for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order.

This is a petition to modify alimony. The divorce decree required that the husband pay the wife alimony of $1,500 per month for ten years or until she remarries. The husband filed this petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that there had been a material change in circumstances. The wife maintained that the alimony award was alimony in solido and, therefore, not subject to modification. The husband filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the alimony award was modifiable. The trial court held that the alimony award was alimony in solido, not subject to modification. From that order, husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the award was alimony in futuro and, therefore, subject to modification.

The juvenile court granted Appellee’s Rule 60.02 Motion to vacate its prior order of legitimation.  We reverse.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the husband argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable division of the marital estate. Specifically, the husband challenges the trial court’s treatment of certain real property as the wife’s separate property, and he challenges the valuation placed on their vehicles. Finding the appeal meritorious, we reverse and remand for a new division of the marital estate.

Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree as to the rights Dr. Russell had with regard to notice of non-renewal.

Plaintiff, a college professor, appeals the dismissal of her breach of employment contract action upon
summary judgment. She was employed by Meharry Medical College for thirty-three (33) years but was not tenured because the tenure program, adopted in 1984, was never implemented. She is seeking entitlement to formal tenure, or de facto tenure. She also seeks damages, claiming she was entitled to but did not receive twelve (12) months notice her contract of employment would not be renewed. The trial court found plaintiff had not attained de facto tenure and had waived her claim for tenure. It also held plaintiff’s employment contract entitled her to six (6) months notice her employment would not be renewed and she received the requisite notice. We affirm.

The parties were divorced based on stipulated grounds. Husband appeals the award of property to Wife. We reverse and remand.

This appeal involves a dispute between a country music songwriter and a music publishing company arising out of an "exclusive co-publishing agreement" relating to the song "Riding with Private Malone" and other works. Because of the parties' dispute, ASCAP declined to release royalties for "Riding with Private Malone" to either the songwriter or the publisher. The songwriter filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a determination that the publishing company had breached the agreement and that he was entitled to receive the royalties held by ASCAP because all the rights to "Riding with Private Malone" had reverted to him. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the songwriter was not entitled to the withheld royalties. After the trial court denied his motion to amend his complaint to seek money damages, the songwriter appealed. We have concluded that the trial court erred by holding that the songwriter was not entitled to the withheld royalties and that the trial court properly denied the songwriter's motion to amend his complaint.

Robert Hugh Benson ("Father") sued Deborah Watkinson ("Mother") for divorce. The parties have two minor children. The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and designated Father as the primary residential parent with Mother to have no overnight visitation due to a finding of her alcohol abuse. Mother appeals to this Court. We modify the judgment only to order Father to attend and complete an anger management course, and affirm as so modified.

This appeal involves an alimony award granted by the trial court to Plaintiff Sonya Ausley. While the divorce in this case was pending, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay $17,000 to the Clerk and Master of the court after Defendant willfully refused to pay temporary support and further disposed of a $34,000 social security disability settlement in violation of court order. The trial court later granted Plaintiff $5775 from the funds as temporary support. In the final divorce decree, the trial court awarded Plaintiff the remaining $11,225 balance as lump sum transitional alimony.  Defendant appeals, arguing that 1) the trial court erred in failing to classify Defendant’s social security benefits as marital or separate prior to ordering its division, 2) the trial court’s order that Defendant pay half of his social security benefits into the Clerk and Master constituted in improper presumption that such benefits were marital property, and 3) that Defendant’s social security benefits were exempt from garnishment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111. We affirm.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals and raises issues involving the division of certain marital property. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its division of the marital property, we affirm.

A Metropolitan Nashville police officer seeks judicial review of the Final Order of the Civil Service Commission of Metropolitan Government pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322 following his termination from Metropolitan Government service. After reviewing the record, the Chancery Court of Davidson County determined that the decision of the Civil Service Commission was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed.

This is a parental rights termination case. The father appeals the trial court's decision terminating his parental rights to his three children. The father argues, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the decision of the trial court and therefore, we reverse.

Former Fleet Manager of Davidson Transit Organization contends he was demoted because of his age in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-401(a)(1). The employer conceded the employee had presented a prima facie case of employment discrimination; however, it contended a prima facie case was insufficient when the employer presented a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. The trial court agreed. The summary dismissal was based upon a finding the burden of proof had shifted back to the employee who was required to, but did not provide additional evidence of age discrimination. An employee’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find the employer's stated reason for its employment decision false may permit the trier of fact to conclude the employer unlawfully discriminated. The employee provided evidence from which a jury could conclude the employer's stated reason for its employment decision was not credible, thus summary judgment was not appropriate. We, therefore, vacate the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Father appeals from a modification of the residential schedule for his three children which was triggered by Mother's move to another county and the resultant burden on the children of commuting to and from school. Because the evidence supports the trial court's decision, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The appellant, United Imports, Inc. ("United") seeks relief from a circuit court's order on its appeal from a general sessions action brought by the late Moses Pieny. Pursuant to a Local Rule of Practice, the circuit court's order dismissed United's appeal and adopted the general sessions order in favor of the deceased plaintiff. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case to the circuit court for dismissal of the claim.

Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed suit against the Warden of the West Tennessee State Penitentiary on grounds of retaliation and violation of inmate’s civil rights arising from inmate’s reclassification and transfer. The trial court granted Warden’s Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff seeks to recover from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries received when he was arrested by officers of the Nashville Metropolitan Police. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the actions of the officers constituted an assault and battery, and further argues that the government is vicariously liable through respondeat superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the government after finding that a stand alone allegation of respondeat superior was insufficient to sustain a claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act for damages resulting from intentional torts. Rather, the court held that Plaintiff needed to plead a separate and distinct claim of negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Government. Plaintiff has appealed the ruling of the trial court. Because we find that the trial court correctly found that the GTLA requires a plaintiff to assert separate claims of negligence against governmental entities in cases arising from intentional torts, we affirm.

The trial court denied Father's petition to decrease child support upon finding Father was voluntarily underemployed. It also determined Father's previous payments of child support in excess of the court ordered amount were a gift and refused to credit them to Father's subsequent arrearage. Father appeals. We affirm.

This is an action to quiet title filed by the grantor against an assignee of the grantees relative to an installment land contract. Remote grantees of the grantor were joined as third party defendants by the original defendant/assignee relative to portions of the land involved in the installment land contract and held by the third party defendants under deeds from the grantor. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the grantor and against the assignee of the grantees in the installment land contract. He further granted summary judgment to the remote grantees of the grantor in the third-party action by the assignee against them. The assignee appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a Circuit Court determination, in a de novo appeal from juvenile court, that a juvenile was delinquent on the basis of a sale of marijuana to another juvenile. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence presented was insufficient for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree, and we reverse the trial court.

This is a will contest. In May 2002, the decedent had a stroke at age ninety-five. She had no children, and the plaintiff nephew and the defendant niece and defendant nephew took over her care.  The three parties established a conservatorship, became co-conservators, and placed the decedent in a local nursing home. Later, the parties agreed to move the decedent to a nursing home closer to the defendants. Soon after the move, without informing the plaintiff, the defendants brought a lawyer to the decedent so that she could draft a last will and testament. In October 2003, the decedent died. The decedent’s will left her $550,000 residuary estate to the defendants, and left only two pieces of furniture to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed the instant petition to contest the will, alleging that the decedent was unduly influenced by the defendants. After a bench trial, the trial court upheld the will, concluding that the burden of proving undue influence had not been met. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the decedent received independent advice in the drafting of her will.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct on the part of defendants resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This case is about subject matter jurisdiction. A professor employed by the University of Memphis filed a lawsuit in chancery court against the University, alleging claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and failure to execute a settlement agreement on his discrimination claims. The University filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear contract claims against an agency of the State of Tennessee. The trial court granted the motion, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint. We affirm in part and reverse and remand, finding that the chancery court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims for discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.