APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Husband appeals the division of marital property. The trial court found Husband did not bring into the marriage as many assets as Wife did, thus awarding a greater portion of the parties' home to Wife rather than Husband. The trial court further found that Husband had dissipated marital assets when he sold the parties' horse riding rings in violation of the statutory injunction. Husband claims that the division of property was not equal and challenges the finding that he dissipated marital assets while not making the same finding with regard to Wife. We affirm.

The Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff for damages from destruction of road over easement and reformed deed. On appeal, we affirm.

Purchasers of real property filed suit for breach of contract, negligence per se, intentional misrepresentation, breach of warranty of title, and emotional distress against various parties, alleging that purchasers had purchased the subject property in reliance upon misrepresentations by defendants as to the merchantability of title to the property, only to discover later that the property had been illegally subdivided by defendants. Purchasers contended that they suffered catastrophic pecuniary and other loss as result of alleged misrepresentations, due to extremely limited legal uses that could be made of illegally subdivided parcel. At trial, jury found that each of the defendants had committed intentional misrepresentation, and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $170,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. Defendants appeal on numerous grounds. Finding that the trial court erred, we vacate and remand.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of this case. I have very little dispute, if any, with the law as set forth in the majority’s Opinion.  Likewise, I have no dispute with the majority’s statement that “[t]he determinative issue, as we perceive it, is whether the action was correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.” I, however, respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of the law to the facts of this case.

This is an action to enforce a foreign judgment. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Because the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants was proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified to clarify that the dismissal is without prejudice.

Alma Edna Smith ("Wife") sued Don Edward Smith ("Husband") for divorce. The Trial Court entered its Final Decree on July 20, 2004, finding and holding, in part, that both parties were entitled to a divorce and that Wife was to be awarded various items of personal property and the marital home with Husband to assume the indebtedness on this property. Husband received two other parcels of real property and certain items of personal property. Husband appeals the division of property. We modify the Trial Court's property division in this short duration marriage as it concerns the marital home, and we affirm as so modified.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order designating Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father less than equal parenting time. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition to establish visitation filed by the paternal grandparents on behalf of themselves and the father of the minor child. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order wherein it found that the grandparents had failed to establish the statutory requirements for grandparent visitation. The juvenile court granted the father shared parenting time. However, the order provided that, if the father was unable to exercise his visitation for one full month due to his service in the military, the grandparents were granted the power to exercise the father’s visitation for the last full weekend of any such calendar month. From this order, the mother appeals. For reasons stated herein, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the judgment of the juvenile court.

In 2002, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the circuit court. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce and incorporated the court’s permanent parenting plan. The trial court ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for three years, awarded the parents joint custody of their minor son, and ordered both parents to pay child support. The wife filed an appeal to this Court contesting the trial court’s decision regarding joint custody. The husband filed an appeal to this Court contesting the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony and child support. We reverse the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony, child custody, and child support, and we remand this case tot he trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case involves the denial of a beer permit. The beer board denied the appellant’s application for a beer permit because of the detrimental effect that beer sales would have on the health, safety, and morals of the community. The appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the trial court upheld the beer board’s decision. The appellant appeals. We reverse.

This is a legal malpractice case. The plaintiff sued his former lawyer, claiming the lawyer was negligent in his representation of the plaintiff in a case involving alleged racial discrimination. Upon our finding that the defendant supported his motion for summary judgment with expert proof that he did not violate the applicable standard of care in his representation of the plaintiff and our further finding that the plaintiff submitted no expert proof that the defendant did violate the applicable standard of care, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On July 10, 1997, Edward A. Miller ("Father") was designated the primary residential parent for the parties minor child. Kerry L. Kelk ("Mother") was not ordered to pay any child support at that time as that order was silent on the issue of child support. No order requiring Mother to pay child support was entered until May 26, 1999. In the May 1999 order, the Trial Court refused to award Father any retroactive child support back to when he was awarded custody. The Trial Court in a later order also held Father responsible for all of the health insurance premiums covering the child from November of 1999 through March of 2002. The Trial Court held each party responsible for one-half of the health insurance premiums from that date on. We conclude that the Trial Court erred in refusing to award retroactive child support to Father for the period from when he was designated the primary residential parent up until May 26, 1999. We further conclude that the Trial Court erred by refusing to hold Mother responsible for all of the child's health insurance premiums.

This is an action by the mother of a child, in which she is joined by her husband, to terminate the parental rights, if any, of the apparent biological father of her child. Prior to the commencement of this action, a separate action was filed by the apparent biological father to establish parentage. That parentage action was tried and appealed, the result of which was a ruling that the apparent biological father was not the "legal" father of her child, TKY, that the legal father of TKY was the husband of the child's mother, and the apparent biological father had no parental rights or responsibilities. That ruling renders the issue of the apparent biological father's parental rights, or lack thereof, moot. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights as being moot.

The husband filed for divorce after a marriage of over twenty-three years. The trial court granted the divorce to the wife on the ground of the husband's inappropriate marital conduct and divided the marital property equally between the parties. Because of the property division, and because the wife had more formal education than the husband, the court decided that she was not entitled to any alimony. The wife appealed. We modify the trial court's decree to eliminate the payment to the husband ordered as part of the property division. Because this modification serves the goal of self-sufficiency for the economically disadvantaged spouse, we affirm the denial of alimony. We also affirm the award of attorney's fees.

This appeal arises out of a divorce. The trial court awarded the mother a divorce on the stipulated ground of adultery, named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest child, named the father primary residential parent of the parties’ second oldest child by consent of the parties, set child support payments for both parties, divided the marital property, awarded mother alimony in futuro, and denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. The mother appeals the denial of her request for attorney’s fees, and the father cross-appeals the naming of the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest child, the child support amount set for the mother, the division of marital property, and the award of alimony in futuro. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This is a casualty insurance case. A bank had a mortgage on residential property. The homeowner stopped making payments on the mortgage, abandoned the property, and allowed the homeowner’s insurance coverage on the property to lapse. The bank, in order to protect its interest in the property, purchased insurance coverage on behalf of the homeowner. The bank later sold the mortgage to a third party and cancelled the insurance coverage. The new mortgagee purchased insurance coverage for the property. Shortly thereafter, the property burned, resulting in a total loss. The new mortgagee’s insurance company filed the instant lawsuit, asking for a declaratory judgment that the prior insurance policy was still effect at the time of the fire. The trial court held that the prior policy was not in effect at the time of the fire. The new insurance company appealed, arguing that, in the course of the purchase, the prior insurance coverage had transferred to the new mortgagee as assignee of the prior mortgage holder, and that the bank’s cancellation of the prior insurance policy was ineffective. We affirm, finding that the prior insurance coverage was not transferred to the new mortgage holder and that the prior insurance policy was not in effect at the time of the fire.
 

Defendants appeal the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for directed verdict. This is Plaintiff's second action against Defendants to recover damages resulting from a personal injury accident. The first action was timely filed and voluntarily dismissed. This action, which is a separate, subsequent action, was commenced within one year of the voluntary dismissal; however, Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts in the complaint to establish the timeliness of the commencement of the new action. Defendants affirmatively pled the statute of limitations defense in their answer; however, Plaintiff did not amend the complaint nor introduce evidence at trial to address the statute of limitations issue. Defendants put the affirmative defense at issue during closing arguments. The trial court took the motion under advisement, the trial proceeded and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, the trial court elected to take judicial notice of facts appearing in the record in the first action, the date the first action was commenced and the date of the voluntary dismissal, determined the second action was timely filed and denied Defendants' motion. We affirm.

This appeal lies from a trial court’s entry of a purported consent order of dismissal. The trial court entered judgment based upon the defendant’s submitted consent decree. The plaintiffs contend, however, that they did not consent to the terms of the order as written and withdrew any consent prior to entry of the judgment. Because the statement of the evidence in this case is irreconcilable, we vacate the judgment of the trial court entering the consent decree.

Husband and Wife were married in Mexico while wife's divorce from her previous husband remained pending. The couple eventually moved to Tennessee. Following a marriage of approximately eighteen years, wife filed for divorce alleging adultery, inappropriate marital conduct, and irreconcilable differences. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for annulment alleging that the marriage between the parties was invalid due to wife's prior subsisting marriage. Following a bench trial, the court below declared a marriage by estoppel and granted wife a divorce on the ground of adultery. The trial court then distributed the parties' accumulated property and ordered husband to establish a lifetime trust with income to be distributed to wife and the remainder to the parties' children. The parties were granted joint custody of their four children with wife designated as primary residential parent. From this order, wife appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified.

This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a twelve-year marriage. Even though the husband filed a petition for divorce in the Circuit Court for Williamson County, the parties eventually stipulated that the wife was entitled to divorce on the ground of the husband's adultery. Following a bench trial, the court awarded the wife eighty percent of the net marital estate, $1,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony for three years, $25,000 in alimony in solido, and one-half of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed. We have determined that the evidence does not support the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate, the amount of the rehabilitative alimony award, the alimony in solido award, or the award for attorney's fees. We modify the judgment accordingly.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce as it concerns custody of the parties' children.  The trial court awarded primary residential custody to Father and provided for visitation with Mother. Mother appeals asserting that, pursuant to the factors set out in T.C.A. §36-6-106, she should have been named primary residential parent. We affirm.

Appellee brought suit against Appellant, a car dealership, after experiencing problems with purchased vehicle. Among other things, Appellee alleged fraud in the inducement. Appellant sought to enforce arbitration agreement in the contract for sale. The trial court ruled that, under Tennessee law, claims of fraud in the inducement are not arbitrable. Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a charge of civil contempt. The plaintiff wife and defendant husband were divorced by final decree entered in May 2001. In the final decree, the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro as well as marital debts. He did not do so. In December 2003, the wife filed a petition in the trial court, seeking to hold the husband in contempt as well as an award of the alimony arrearage. The wife gave the husband notice of the contempt proceedings by mailing a copy of the petition and notice of hearing to the husband’s counsel of record. At the hearing, the husband’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition for contempt, arguing that the husband had not received proper notice of the hearing. This motion was denied, and the husband was held in contempt of court and ordered jailed until the contempt was purged. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the husband received sufficient notice of the petition for contempt.

This case involves a dispute over the subdivision of a lot within a residential neighborhood restricted by protective covenants. The plaintiff purchased a lot within a neighborhood in Memphis. Although not required under the then-existing protective covenants, he obtained majority consent of the other neighborhood lot owners to subdivide his lot into two separate lots. The Land Use Control Board denied the side-by-side configuration as well as a previously recommended flag-lot configuration.  The plaintiff appealed to the Memphis City Council, and the council overturned the Land Use Control Board’s rejection of the plaintiff’s application. Before the council’s decision was formally issued, however, the lot owners amended the neighborhood’s restrictive covenants so that the plaintiff’s proposed re-subdivision, as well as any further subdivision of lots within the neighborhood, would be prohibited. The plaintiff filed an action for declaratory judgment. At the hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties agreed to submit the case on stipulated evidence, and the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals and raises issues involving valuation and division of marital property, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.