APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the Petitioner’s application for a permit to sell beer both on and off-premises of her proposed business establishment. The trial court affirmed the Appellee McMinn County Commission’s decision to deny the permit, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, on grounds that Petitioner’s application contained a false statement. Petitioner contends on appeal that she should have been granted the permit because she did not know the statement was false at the time she made it, and because she attempted to amend the application to correct the false statement prior to the hearing before the McMinn County Chancery Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal of a divorce action in which the Wife argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and the trial court erred in dismissing her independent lawsuit against Husband, and a corporation owned by Husband, for wages claimed to be earned by Wife and owing by the corporation. We hold that the distribution of marital property should be modified so as to award Wife sole ownership of the marital home, subject to Husband's right of first refusal to purchase the home in the event it is sold, and Husband's right to visit and maintain the gravesite of the parties' daughter, located near the home on part of the marital estate, upon Husband's providing reasonable notice to Wife. We further find that the trial court erred in dismissing Wife's lawsuit against Husband and therefore vacate the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice the Wife's lawsuit against Husband and the corporation. We affirm the trial court's ruling in all other respects.

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order which amounted to a denial of the plaintiff’s motion.  Accordingly, the trial court’s order does not constitute a final judgment which the plaintiff may appeal to this Court. This appeal stands dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Emerson E. Russell ("the plaintiff") and his wife, Angie Russell, brought this suit for medical malpractice against Dr. Ted W. Brown, Jr., seeking damages associated with injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Brown. The plaintiff also named as a defendant Dr. S. Morgan Smith, the anesthesiologist who attended the plaintiff's surgery. In the complaint, the plaintiff averred, among other allegations, that he was not adequately informed of alternative treatments for his snoring problem, and that he was not fully advised of the attendant risks of the procedure performed by Dr. Brown. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Following the trial, the defendants filed separate motions for discretionary costs, which motions were granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff and his wife appeal, arguing that the plaintiff was not furnished sufficient information to enable him to give "informed" consent to the surgery performed by Dr. Brown. They also contend that the trial court's charge to the jury on the issue of informed consent did not adequately instruct the jury on the subject. Finally, they raise several issues pertaining to evidentiary matters. As a separate issue, the defendants contend that the trial court's awards of discretionary costs were inadequate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the jury's verdict. We modify the trial court's two awards of discretionary costs. As modified, those awards are affirmed.

In this premises liability suit, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant/landowner. The trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, the injured plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor performing electrical work on the premises, could not establish that the defendant/landowner owed him a duty. Since the plaintiff could not establish an essential element of his negligence cause of action, the trial court granted the defendant/landowner’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract action wherein the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that the contract was too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced. The action of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for trial on its merits.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants' statements of undisputed facts. We affirm.

Nursing home brought suit against former resident's daughters seeking to recover amounts owed for resident's care by setting aside alleged fraudulent conveyances to the daughters. We affirm the judgment of the trial court setting aside a portion of the conveyances as fraudulent.

Diana Ruth Brown ("the defendant") was stopped by a City of Oak Ridge police officer and cited for speeding. Following an adverse decision in municipal court, the defendant appealed to the trial court. The trial court ruled that the defendant could not pursue, in the trial court, her assertion and defense that the posted speed limit of 45 mph was not legally established. Subsequently, that court found her guilty of speeding and imposed its judgment. The defendant appeals. Both sides raise issues. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves protracted litigation over a parcel of land conveyed by the City of New Johnsonville, Tennessee, to a member of the New Johnsonville City Council. The mayor, on behalf of the city, subsequently filed suit against the councilman seeking to nullify the transaction. During the pendency of that litigation, several taxpayers filed their own suit against the councilman alleging the same causes of action set forth in the city’s complaint. The city and the councilman ultimately settled their lawsuit. The taxpayers’ lawsuit continued, ultimately naming the city as a defendant.  The trial court partially granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment by ruling that the taxpayers did not have standing to contest the land transaction between the city and the councilman.  The court ruled that the taxpayers did have standing to continue with their other causes of action concerning allegations that the councilman engaged in illegal business transactions with the city.  The taxpayers subsequently took a voluntary nonsuit on their remaining claims and filed an appeal to this Court to contest the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on their claim regarding the land transaction. We vacate the trial court’s decision regarding the land transaction, and we remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I agree with the careful reasoning in the majority opinion, with clarification on the remedy ultimately available. Here, ouster of the public official alleged to have engaged in self-dealing, Handley, is likely a moot issue, since the record apparently indicates that his term of office as Councilman ended the day before the settlement with the City. The settlement, however, left the Handleys with a handsome profit from the land transaction at issue, profit that the Taxpayers apparently allege should be disgorged as the product of the wrongdoing.

Plaintiff was injured in a fall and the jury returned a verdict for damages against defendant which was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

Cathy L. Chapman, Brandon Chapman, Kaylan L. Chapman, and Dana L. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) retained attorney Rick J. Bearfield ("Defendant") to represent them in a medical malpractice action. During the course of this representation, Defendant filed an amended complaint repudiating a theory of the case originally alleged. Plaintiffs later hired new counsel and filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted on the grounds that Plaintiffs' expert's affidavit was deficient technically and did not comply with the locality rule. We vacate the grant of summary judgment.

In this divorce case, husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding wife rehabilitative alimony and attorney's fees and contends that a post-judgment change in circumstances warrants termination of alimony. Because husband failed to submit a transcript or statement of evidence, failed to support his argument with citations of authority and appropriate references to the record, and failed to raise the issue of post- judgment change of circumstances prior to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The Trial Court held appellant's retirement was not a material change of circumstances so as to enable appellant to reduce his alimony payments. On appeal, we reverse.

This appeal involves the collateral consequences of the dismissal of a wrongful death claim for failure to prosecute. The mother of a student who fell to his death from a dormitory window filed suit in both state and federal court against the university her son was attending. After the state proceedings lay dormant for over one year, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the university moved to dismiss the federal suit on the ground that the dismissal of the state suit was res judicata with regard to the federal claim. The mother filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion in state court requesting modification of the dismissal order to reflect that it was not an adjudication on the merits. The state court denied the mother's request for Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 relief and also denied her request for permission to file a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal. The mother has appealed both decisions. We have determined that the trial court erred by denying the mother's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion.

This case is about nuisance and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff homeowners and their minor child lived in a house in a subdivision. The defendant landowner owned a house next door to the plaintiffs’ home. The defendant landowner rented his house to tenants. The tenants allegedly began to engage in disturbing conduct, including illegal drug use, discharging firearms, and harassment. The plaintiffs sued the tenants and the defendant landowner for nuisance and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant landowner filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs had no medical evidence of their emotional distress. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not respond to the motion for summary judgment and did not notify the plaintiffs of the pending motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The plaintiffs later got a new attorney and filed a motion to set aside this judgment. The trial court set aside the grant of summary judgment, to enable the plaintiffs to file a response. After the plaintiffs filed a response, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and reverse as to claims of nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

This is a parental termination case. The parents' next door neighbors overheard the mother striking, cursing, and threatening her daughter over a baby monitor and recorded the incident. The tape also captured the father coming home from work and asking the mother about certain marks on the child. The neighbors subsequently turned the tape over to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. The juvenile court placed the children in the protective custody of the department, and the department implemented a permanency plan requiring the mother and father, among other things, to undergo therapy. The department subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking to terminate the parents' parental rights. The juvenile court found that the department proved each ground alleged by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children's best interest. We affirm.

This appeal involves the courts' power to require a property owner to post a bond to regain possession of real property on which a public nuisance had been maintained. After the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County filed suit in the Criminal Court for Davidson County seeking to enjoin the operation of a brothel at a Nashville address, the property owner conveyed the property to a Nevada corporation. Even though the new property owner agreed to the entry of an order permanently enjoining the operation of a house of prostitution on the premises, the city insisted that the new owner should also be required to post a $20,000 bond to assure compliance with the injunction. The trial court acceded to the city's request and conditioned the restoration of the property to the owner's control on the owner posting a $20,000 cash bond. The owner has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by conditioning the property owner's lawful use of its property on the filing of an open-ended bond.

This is an appeal of a modification of alimony. The parties were divorced in February 2003. In the decree, the trial court awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony for eighteen months, but reserved jurisdiction to evaluate and review the award at the end of the eighteen-month period based on competent medical proof, noting that the wife was expected to pursue disability benefits during that time. During the interim, the wife’s second application for Social Security disability benefits was denied on the grounds that she had not worked long enough to qualify for such benefits. Over a year after entry of the divorce decree, the wife filed a motion for the trial court to review the alimony award. The trial court conducted a hearing and the wife entered into evidence medical proof that she could not be rehabilitated. The trial court did not require the wife to show a material change in circumstances, explaining that it had mistakenly classified the original award as being “rehabilitative.” Therefore, based on the additional proof, the trial court reduced the monthly amount and designated the award as alimony in futuro. The husband now appeals, arguing that the wife was required to show a substantial and material change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the original rehabilitative alimony award. We affirm, finding that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the medical proof and did not err in changing the award to alimony in futuro.

This appeal comes from the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s governmental tort liability claim
and its denial of the plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend based on newly discovered evidence. We
affirm the trial court in all respects.

The pro se Appellant has asked this Court to review the lower court's denial of his petition contesting the manner in which the executrix administered the estate. Specifically, the Appellant seeks certain personal property from his father's estate he argues the Appellee, his sister, is unlawfully withholding as executrix. The Appellant filed a statement of the evidence with this Court in lieu of filing transcripts of the testimony. After the Appellee objected to the statement of the evidence, the trial court ruled that the Appellant's statement of the evidence was inaccurate or incomplete. Without a sufficient record, we cannot adequately review the trial court's decision to dismiss the Appellant's petition. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, J.L. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also found the termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. We affirm.

Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that they had not been "made whole" in a settlement agreement with third-party tortfeasors and that any subrogation claim by Defendant insurer should be denied. The trial court awarded Plaintiffs summary judgment. Defendant insurer appeals. We reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This is a divorce case. The husband filed a petition for divorce after five years of marriage. Following a trial, the trial court entered a final decree detailing the equitable distribution of the parties' property. The wife filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, arguing, among other things, that some of the property awarded to the husband was not marital property. The trial court denied that motion. The wife now appeals. We affirm, noting that, in the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must presume that the evidence supported the trial court's rulings related to the equitable distribution of the parties' property.