APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce proceeding, Carol Lyn Roberts (“Mother”) seeks to relocate to North Carolina with the parties’ minor child, Victoria Noel Roberts (DOB: June 25, 1997). William Frederick Roberts (“Father”) filed a petition in opposition to the move. Following a bench trial, the court determined, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, that the parties were spending “substantially equal intervals of time” with their child and that it was in the child’s best interest to remain in Tennessee.  Accordingly, the court denied Mother’s request to relocate. Mother appeals. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s decision and grant Mother’s request to relocate with the child.

This litigation arose out of an automobile accident. The parties settled the plaintiffs' claims for $30,000; in due course, the defendants' insurance carrier paid the plaintiffs the full amount of the settlement. Sometime after the payment had been made, the defendants moved the trial court to hold the plaintiffs and their attorney in contempt because of their failure to satisfy the lien of a third party and because of their failure to pay a $500 attorney's fee ordered by the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants appeal the trial court's action, but only with respect to the court's failure to hold the plaintiffs' attorney in contempt. We affirm and hold that the defendants' appeal is frivolous in nature.

The divorced mother was permitted by the Trial Court to relocate with her two children to Cincinnati, Ohio from Hamilton County, Tennessee. The father has appealed. We affirm.

This appeal involves the division of marital property following the dissolution of a nine-year marriage. The wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Chancery Court for Dickson County. Following a bench trial, the court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the parties' marital estate, and denied the wife's requests for spousal support and attorney's fees. The wife takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified, valued, and divided the parties' property. We have determined that the trial court's decision regarding the parties' marital estate must be modified with regard to the division of the increase in the value of the marital home and the increase in the value of the husband's retirement. Accordingly, we modify the judgment and affirm.

The chief point of contention in this bitterly fought divorce case involves the valuation and disposition of a one-half interest in a service company which the husband and his business partner founded and worked for during the marriage. Both parties had asked the court to award the husband the share of the business, and the wife had asked the court to award her the monetary equivalent of one-half its value. Instead, the trial court awarded the business to the wife, together with all the debt associated with it. The wife argues on appeal that actions by the husband rendered the company valueless and the distribution of property and debt was, consequently, inequitable. Because we find that the business had no value apart from the efforts of its principals, we modify the valuation of property and allocation of debt. Because of the modification, we remand the case to the trial court to reconsider the question of attorney fees.

In this third appeal from a Williamson County divorce, the wife challenges the trial court's valuation and distribution of the marital estate and award of alimony upon remand. Both parties seek an award of attorney's fees. The husband seeks damages for frivolous appeal. We affirm the trial court's valuation and distribution and award of alimony and deny the husband's frivolous appeal damages request.

In a class-action case, in which a settlement had been agreed to, certain members of the class were allowed to opt out of the class action based on the representations of their purported attorneys that their clients had been notified of the settlement and the proposed opt out and that they approved of same. Subsequently, litigation was commenced by the former members of the class in another jurisdiction, and the original defendants were compelled to defend the case incurring expenses, including attorney fees. The original defendants, and one of the attorneys for the class, filed motions against the purported attorneys for the opted out class members for them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for making false representations to the court that resulted in the court allowing the opt out. The respondent attorneys moved to dismiss the motions filed on the basis that, if there was contempt, it was criminal only and on the basis of judicial estoppel. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent attorneys holding that any contempt was criminal and not civil and on the basis of judicial estoppel. The motions of the original defendants and a plaintiffs' attorney were dismissed. The  defendants and plaintiffs' attorney have appealed. We affirm.

In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the propriety of the trial court’s decision to award a creditor a deficiency judgment against the debtor following the sale of the collateral after the debtor defaulted on the loan. The debtor filed an appeal to this Court arguing that the creditor failed to provide him with reasonable notice of the sale of the collateral and that the creditor did not conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner. We hold that the creditor did not provide the debtor with reasonable notice. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Petitioner, James Lester Qualls, appealed the decision of the Civil Service Commission, which had overturned the Administrative Law Judge’s decision and reinstated the Department of Corrections’ disciplinary actions against Mr. Qualls. Upon determining that the Civil Service Commission had failed to make written findings for review, the chancery court vacated the order and remanded the matter to the Civil Service Commission for findings. Mr. Qualls filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to include an award of attorney’s fees. The chancery court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Civil Service Commission and Department of Corrections filed a motion to alter or amend in chancery court and now appeal to this Court, asserting this action does not fit within 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and, alternatively, the attorney’s fees award is unreasonable. We dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Purchaser of a residence filed a suit against sellers and real estate agent for rescission of the contract and damages, claiming that Defendants engaged in misrepresentation by suppressing or concealing the existence of a TVA easement along the backside of the property. The Davidson County Chancery Court granted Defendants summary judgment and Plaintiff appealed. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

This is a petition to modify custody. When the parties divorced in 2000, the mother received primary custody of the parties' three children. After the mother sought an increase in the father's child support obligation, the father filed this petition to obtain primary custody of the children, alleging a material change in circumstances. The father later amended his petition to include allegations of physical abuse by the mother. The trial court declined to modify custody, finding the evidence insufficient to justify modification. We vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand for written findings on the abuse allegations, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a)(8).

I fully concur with all aspects of the Court’s well reasoned majority opinion. Nevertheless, I wish to address the scurrilous, unfounded and unprofessional personal attacks made by Appellee against the person holding the position of and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee.  Unfounded and unwarranted accusations such as those cast by Appellee accomplish little but to reflect adversely on the one casting. This jurist enjoys a heated exchange of differing opinions and an aggressive analysis of legal theories and principles. Moreover, I find such exchanges often productive, enabling the tribunal to get to the intellectually honest assessment of the case; however, scurrilous and unfounded personal attacks serve no legitimate purpose and have no place in the dispute resolution arena.

Defendants appeal the refusal of the Chancellor to impose Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After the trial court denied an inmate’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the inmate filed a suit against the trial judge seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to section 29-21-108 of the Tennessee Code. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s complaint for numerous reasons, including the judicial immunity of the trial judge. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.

The trial court specifically found that the complaint herein was “duplicative of matters already settled and litigated by rulings of superior courts.” Nonetheless, the court decided sanctions were not appropriate due to the ambiguity created by the Special Master’s determination the case could proceed under the order limiting the cases filed by the plaintiff. The majority opinion agrees that the lawsuit’s clearance under the screening order and the Attorney General’s failure to challenge the result of that screening justify the refusal to impose sanctions. Thus, the test applied by the trial court and the majority of this court is whether the complaint complied with the screening order.

This is a property dispute between next-door neighbors over a gate across a driveway easement. The two neighbors shared a common driveway from the public road in front of both properties. After a clash between the two neighbors' dogs, one neighbor erected a fence on the boundary line with a gate across the other neighbor's portion of the driveway. This lawsuit followed. The trial court enjoined the defendant neighbor from placing the fence and gate over a portion of an easement that was the only existing driveway to the plaintiff's residence on the adjoining property. The trial court found that the gate was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of their property, and held that the defendants' erection of the gate constituted an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement. The defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that, although the gate may not have been an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that it was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of the property.

George R. Caldwell, Jr. and Angie R. Caldwell ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Caldwell" as appropriate) sued PBM Properties ("Defendant") for nuisance claiming that during Defendant's development of Blue Grass Heights Subdivision ("Blue Grass"), Defendant denuded the land altering water runoff and causing Plaintiffs' property to flood. The case was tried before a jury and the jury found that Defendant was 100% liable to Plaintiffs for a temporary flooding nuisance. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $3,820.50 in damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming that the evidence supported a finding of permanent nuisance, the nuisance had to be abated on Defendant's property to be considered abated, and, the jury did not award the proper amount of damages. We affirm.

AT&T sued the Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee to recover sales tax paid on central office equipment for the years 1995 and 1996 asserting that the equipment qualifies for exemption as industrial machinery. Determining that the outcome of the case was controlled by AT&T v. Johnson, 2002 WL 3124708 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the Chancellor held that the industrial machinery exemption was not applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

This appeal involves a dispute stemming from an effort to probate a will and two codicils in solemn form. The testator’s widow filed a petition to probate these instruments in solemn form in the Chancery Court for Marshall County. Prior to the entry of an order admitting the will and two codicils to probate, the widow discovered that a third codicil she believed to have been destroyed had, in fact, not been destroyed by her late husband or in his presence and that her late husband’s lawyer had made a copy of this codicil before destroying it himself. Accordingly, she filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to admit the third codicil to the probate in solemn form along with the will and the other two codicils. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form without mentioning the declaratory judgment petition. The testator’s daughters moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition, and the testator’s widow filed a motion for postjudgment relief from the order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form.  Following a series of hearings, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment petition and denied the motion for post-judgment relief. The testator’s widow appealed. We have determined that the order admitting the will and the first two codicils must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings regarding the third codicil.

This appeal involves a challenge to an antenuptial agreement. Following the death of her husband, the decedent's wife filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County to have her husband's will and two codicils admitted to probate in solemn form. She later discovered that a third codicil that would have dramatically increased her share of the estate had not been properly revoked. When the trial court rebuffed her efforts to have the third codicil admitted to probate, she filed a petition to dissent from the will and to seek an elective share of the estate and one year's support. The decedent's daughters opposed the petitions based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the court set aside the antenuptial agreement after finding that the decedent's wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably and without duress. The decedent's daughters appealed. We have determined that the antenuptial agreement is enforceable.

Petitioners' Writ of Certiorari was dismissed as being moot because petitioners had moved outside defendants' jurisdiction. On appeal, we affirm and remand with instructions.

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Student of the University of Memphis was struck by two vehicles while crossing the street from the University-owned parking lot to the University campus. Student and husband filed suit in the Claims Commission against the University and the State, claiming that Defendants negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Claims Commission granted the motion. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission in all respects.

Plaintiff/Appellant, a computer distribution company, sued Defendant/Appellee, a temporary employment service, for damages resulting from a temporary employee’s allegedly negligent act.  The trial court found in favor of the Defendant/Appellee on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellant had not met its burden of proof to show negligence. We affirm on the grounds that the temporary employee was the loaned servant of the Plaintiff/Appellant and, as such, Defendant/Appellee is not liable for the negligent act of the temporary employee.

Appellant is a defendant in a delinquent tax suit by Williamson County for business personal property taxes for the year 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff because the defendant had not utilized his available administrative remedies, and Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court determined Plaintiffs had standing to bring this malpractice action against their attorney and that they properly filed the action within the statute of limitations under the discovery rule. The trial court apportioned fault between Plaintiffs, Defendant, and nonparty Shelby County.  The court awarded Plaintiffs damages for costs incurred, but did not award damages for lost property value. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs had standing and brought their action within the limitations period. We reverse the trial court’s finding regarding causation, and hold Plaintiffs were at least 50% at fault in this case. Judgment for Plaintiffs is reversed.