APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves a boy whose mother placed him in the care and custody of an aunt when he was two months old because she could not take care of him. The aunt furnished all the child's needs and raised him as if he were her own. After he reached the age of ten, the mother filed a petition to have custody of the child restored to her. The aunt subsequently filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. After a hearing, the trial court denied the mother's petition for custody and terminated her parental rights. We affirm the denial of the petition for custody, but we reverse the termination of parental rights because the grounds were not proved by clear and convincing evidence.

This divorce action was dismissed by the trial court after the parties resumed cohabiting. This ruling was not appealed. The issues on appeal involve Grandparents’ right to intervene, joinder of third parties, the appointment of an attorney ad litem and the assessment of fees of the guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem. We affirm.

This Court reversed a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiff’s action and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court entered judgment for Plaintiff, as authorized by the appellate court, and also, on motion of Plaintiff, awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Defendant-Appellants appeal, asserting that the award of attorney fees was not authorized by the appellate court and, therefore, the trial court did not have authority to award same. Appellants also assert that the award of attorney fees was excessive, and Appellee asserts, in a separate issue, that the award of fees was inadequate. Both parties appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute between an investor and the owners of several failed business ventures. The investor filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against her erstwhile business colleagues seeking to recover damages for breach of contract and conversion. A jury awarded the investor $86,691.82 in compensatory damages and $40,000.00 in punitive damages. One of the defendants appealed. We have determined that the judgment must be reversed because of inconsistencies in the jury's verdict caused by ambiguous special interrogatories.

This is a post-divorce modification of child support case. The trial court reversed the Divorce Referee and found that the provisions of a Marital Dissolution Agreement unambiguously obligated Father/Appellant to pay child support based upon his stated earning capacity for 1998.  Finding that the Marital Dissolution Agreement, by its plain language, is modifiable, we reverse and remand.

Plaintiff, a tenth grade high school student, was attacked while riding the school bus. She was seriously injured by another student using a razor provided by the school as part of the cosmetology curriculum. Plaintiff filed this action against the school system alleging negligence for failure to properly supervise students using dangerous instructional instruments and for violation of the school's zero tolerance policy by permitting students to take razors to and from school, thereby permitting the attacker to have the razor on the school bus where the attack occurred. Following a bench trial, plaintiff was awarded a judgment of $80,000 from which defendant appeals. Finding the school system is not liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to enter an order dismissing the action.

Plaintiff purchased real property at delinquent tax sale and in a declaratory judgment action the Trial Court held the sale included a mobile home located on the land. On appeal, we reverse.

Respondent appeals to set aside an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. She argues the evidence does not support the Order. We affirm.

The plaintiff is a former University of Tennessee faculty member. He was dismissed from his position after the defendant corporate officer circulated a letter to government officials accusing him of using numerous deceptions in the procurement of a grant from the United States Department of Energy. The plaintiff's pro se defamation lawsuit named the defendant in both his individual and his corporate capacities. The trial court dismissed the claim against the defendant in his individual capacity under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and certified the dismissal as final under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 so it could be appealed. We reverse the trial court.

The parties filed Motions for Summary Judgments. The Trial Court granted defendants' Motion which stated defendant was not a proper party and insurance policy issued to plaintiff did not cover plaintiff's damages. On appeal, we affirm.

The plaintiffs suffered damage to personal property at a location other than as described in a policy of insurance. They failed in their attempt to recover on the policy, and filed suit against the issuing agency, claiming that the agency knew or should have known that they desired coverage not only at their business address but also at their residence. The signed application listed only their service address, and the loss occurred at their residence. Summary judgment was entered for the defendant.

City-County Federal Credit Union ("Plaintiff") filed suit in the General Sessions Court seeking over $12,000 it claimed was owed on a VISA credit card it had issued to Suzanne E. Linboe ("Defendant"). After Plaintiff was awarded a judgment by the General Sessions Court, Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, awarding Plaintiff a judgment for $15,323.10. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Plaintiff/Appellant owner of jet ski customizing business brought defamation action against defendants alleging libel, civil conspiracy and false light invasion of privacy stemming from statements defendants made about plaintiff, which were published on an Internet news group. The trial court held that venue was proper in Warren County, Tennessee, and that the court had jurisdiction over out-of-state resident defendants. Finding that plaintiff was a public figure for purposes of libel action, that plaintiff could not prove actual malice, and that plaintiff failed to show actual damage, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The issues in this case are whether the trial court erred in granting a non-custodial parent unsupervised visitation and in limiting the number of witnesses at trial. Father, the custodial parent of the minor child, contends that the trial court's grant of unsupervised visitation to mother is not in the child's best interest and ignores evidence that mother abused the child. Father also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to hear witness testimony as to mother's abuse of the child and as to mother's mendacity. We find that the evidence supports a finding that unsupervised visitation is in the child's best interest and, therefore, the trial court's award of unsupervised visitation to mother was not an abuse of discretion. We further find that the witness testimony excluded by the trial court was cumulative, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This is a personal injury lawsuit filed by William E. Castle ("Plaintiff"), an inmate at the Brushy Mountain Correctional Complex. As a trustee, Plaintiff was allowed to work as a carpenter for the defendant State of Tennessee, Department of Correction (the "State"). Rick Cox Construction Company was a contractor building an addition to the Batley Baptist Church, and Plaintiff and other inmates assisted with this construction. Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a scaffold while working at the Batley Baptist Church. Plaintiff bought this negligence claim against the State, Rick Cox Construction Company, and Batley Baptist Church. The Trial Court granted the State's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The Trial Court later granted motions for summary judgment filed by the remaining two defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. applied for reimbursement of remediation expenses pursuant to the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act. When Texaco's application was denied by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Underground Storage Tanks, Texaco filed this Declaratory Judgment action seeking a ruling that it was eligible for reimbursement from the storage tank fund. The Chancery Court granted Texaco's motion for summary judgment from which the Department appeals. We reverse finding Texaco was not in substantial compliance with the Act because it failed to timely report releases of petroleum, and it had no vested right to reimbursement.

The Trial Court refused to terminate the mother's parental rights to MEI. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr. Hopper injured his back February 19, 1996 while working in the warehouse of his employer. On November 17, 1997 Mr. Hopper settled this claim for 20% vocational disability. All told, Mr. Hopper initiated four workers’ compensation claims during his employment with OshKosh resulting in 100% vocational disability. Several years later, after he lost his job with OshKosh, Mr. Hopper filed a motion to reconsider his earlier settlement of the February 19, 1996 claim against the Second Injury Fund only. The trial court granted this relief, increased Mr. Hopper’s vocational disability by 30%, and assigned liability to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals on the grounds that the employee’s motion was untimely, that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the employee had suffered subsequent injuries, and that the evidence preponderated against increasing the employee’s vocational disability. After carefully reviewing the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

Ford vehicles leased by its dealers are simultaneously purchased by Ford Credit, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. Ford Credit is subject to a franchise tax which is determined by the book value of its tangible personal property owned or used in Tennessee. If the leased vehicles are finished goods inventory, their value is excluded from the calculation of franchise taxes. The trial court ruled that the leased vehicles were not held by Ford Credit for sale, and thus did not qualify as finished goods inventory. Ford Credit appeals. The judgment is affirmed.

This is a defamation case. After listening to a local talk radio show, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants, asserting that the defendants had broadcast defamatory material on the radio show concerning the plaintiffs’ business practices. There was no recording of the talk radio show. In a bench trial, many witnesses testified about statements made on the show. After the trial, the trial court found that there were so many different versions, there was no way to determine what was actually said on the radio program. The trial court concluded that, assuming unflattering statements were made, they did not damage the plaintiffs’ reputations. The trial court also concluded that, even if the statements made were defamatory, the plaintiffs did not prove any injury. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The petitioner prisoner was found guilty on the charge of “failure to participate” in work as instructed by a prison official. He lost his prison job and was sentenced to a brief period of segregation and a $5.00 fine. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court, naming as respondents the warden and the disciplinary board. The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse and remand to the trial court for issuance of the writ.

This is the third action between Stanley Morrison and Citizen State Bank concerning a series of promissory notes and security agreements. In the first action, Citizen State Bank filed a civil warrant in General Sessions Court against Stanley Morrison to recover a deficiency judgment and repossess a truck that was collateral on a series of loans. The bank obtained a default judgment against Morrison and repossessed the truck when Morrison failed to appear in court. Morrison failed to timely appeal the default judgment. Thereafter, Morrison and his wife filed this action challenging the validity of the default judgment and seeking damages for fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion of property, contending four of six promissory notes and security agreements that the judgment was based upon were forgeries. The trial court held this action was barred by res judicata and dismissed it on summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of this action on the basis of collateral estoppel.

The insurer of a general construction contractor brought an action for a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the contractor against the claims raised against the contractor in a demand for arbitration. The Chancery Court for Sumner County, Tennessee, Judge Tom E. Gray, granted summary judgment to the contractor, holding that the insurer, as a matter of law, had a duty to defend the contractor in the arbitration. The court reserved ruling on whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify the contractor for damages paid as a result of the arbitration settlement until after the arbitration proceeding. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

The mother has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application for an extraordinary appeal from an ex parte Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order entered by the Chancery Court for Lawrence County on September 6, 2005. The mother asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it had transferred the case to the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2001. The father now agrees that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the application for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order.

This is a petition to modify alimony. The divorce decree required that the husband pay the wife alimony of $1,500 per month for ten years or until she remarries. The husband filed this petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that there had been a material change in circumstances. The wife maintained that the alimony award was alimony in solido and, therefore, not subject to modification. The husband filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the alimony award was modifiable. The trial court held that the alimony award was alimony in solido, not subject to modification. From that order, husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the award was alimony in futuro and, therefore, subject to modification.