APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pfizer, Inc. challenges the assessment of the additional rate of business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). It contends the sales in question, which were from one wholesaler to another wholesaler, were not within the definition of “wholesale sales” as the term is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-702(a)(19), and thus not subject to the additional business tax. The State of Tennessee contends sales, whether a “sale at retail” or a “sale at wholesale,” are taxable pursuant to the percentages set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). The facts are not disputed. Based upon a statutory interpretation, we find sales from one wholesaler to another wholesaler are not subject to the additional business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B).

This appeal arises from a custody dispute involving an eleven-year-old boy. After the parties agreed to end their marriage, the father filed a complaint for divorce in November 2001 in the Chancery Court for Cheatham County. In addition to the complaint, the father filed a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan designating the mother as the primary residential parent. The child remained in the mother's custody until October 2002 when the trial court awarded the father temporary custody of the child. Following a hearing in July 2003, the trial court entered an order in September 2003 declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as the primary residential parent. The mother has appealed. Despite the father's conduct following the parties' separation, we have concluded that the trial court's decision to designate him as the child's primary residential parent does not fall outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from a correct application of the governing law to the facts established by the evidence in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Barnes & Robinson Co., Inc. filed this action against two related companies claiming breach of contract, failure to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel. The claims arise from negotiations pursuant to two letters of intent and subsequent representations upon which Barnes & Robinson contends it relied to its detriment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending Barnes & Robinson failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted, which the trial court granted. Barnes & Robinson appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

In this action arising from a vehicular accident, the issues presented are whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence deposition testimony of a Defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01, and whether the amount of the jury verdict was supported by material evidence. We hold the trial court did not err in its discretionary decision to admit the deposition testimony, and that there is material evidence supporting the duly approved jury verdict. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Three competing parties claim rights to commercially exploit performances of legendary performer Hank Williams that were recorded and broadcast by WSM Radio in the 1950s. Polygram Records, Inc., claims exclusive phonograph exploitation rights, relying on a contract Williams entered into with its predecessor in interest, MGM Records. Legacy Entertainment Group, LLC., claims rights of exploitation to the recordings under a chain of title. Williams' heirs, Hank Williams, Jr. and Jett Williams, contend neither Legacy nor Polygram have contractual rights to exploit Williams' performances embodied in the WSM recordings, and further contend the rights passed to his heirs. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims of Polygram and Legacy, finding neither own rights to exploit the recorded performances, and the rights belong to Williams' heirs. Legacy and Polygram appeal. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail for violating an Order of Protection. He appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient. We agree.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mary Katherine W.B. ("Mother") and Christopher M.B. ("Father") with respect to their five minor children: Christian B. (DOB: August, 13, 1993), Nathaniel B. (DOB: August 11, 1996), Stepan B. (DOB: April 22, 1998), REanne B. (DOB: March 3, 1999), and Dolton B. (DOB: January 1, 2001). Mother and Father appeal, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings, stated to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination exist in this case. We affirm the trial court's judgment terminating the parental rights of the parents but vacate one of the bases upon which the trial court relied.

This appeal stems from the change of a nine-year-old child's custody. The child was removed from his mother's custody after animal control officers, responding to complaints of animal abuse, discovered deplorable conditions in her home caused by a menagerie of cats. The father filed a petition for change of custody in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County. Following a bench trial, the court granted the father's petition and designated him as the primary residential parent. We agree with the trial court that there was a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the initial custody determination and that it is in the child's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent.

After fourteen years of marriage, Donita Dale Dowden ("Wife") sued Ronald J. Feibus ("Husband") for a divorce. After trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the parties' marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro of $1,000 per month. Husband appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony, in awarding Wife 50% of Husband's federal pension when a portion of that pension was earned prior to the marriage, and in dividing an award that Husband received from a personal injury lawsuit. We affirm.

Inmate filed a petition for certiorari contesting his housing placement while incarcerated at WTSP.  The trial court dismissed the petition under the doctrine of mootness in view of the fact that inmate, during the course of the proceedings below was incarcerated at another penal institute. The trial court further  determined that the placement in housing was an administrative decision by the prison authorities and Petitioner’s rights were not violated by their decision. We affirm the dismissal under the doctrine of mootness.

The unsuccessful plaintiff brings this appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Stephanie Wilwayco, M.D., and St. Thomas Family Health Center. Upon de novo review we affirm the action of the trial court.

Defendant in this divorce case appeals asserting that the trial court erred in failing to treat his admittedly untimely Motion for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend the Divorce Decree as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 Motion. We affirm the action of the trial court.

In this quo warranto action contesting annexation by the City, the Trial Could held landowners were not entitled to a jury trial and they had the burden of proof to contest in the annexation. Following trial, the Court held landowners had carried the burden of proof to invalidate the annexation. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's preliminary rulings, but reverse the invalidation of the annexation.

This is an action by Alton Bowman seeking damages against Smith County Motor Co., Inc. arising from the purchase of two vehicles. Bowman claims damages based on alleged misrepresentations and fraud concerning his intent to purchase disability insurance when he purchased the vehicles. He contends he requested both disability and life insurance when he purchased the vehicles from the dealership, however, only life insurance was provided and the contracts executed by the parties at the time of the sale clearly evidence only life insurance was provided. Bowman suffered a stroke subsequently and when he attempted to file a claim for disability coverage he was notified he did not purchase disability insurance. Bowman filed suit seeking damages in the amount of the balance owing on the vehicles. The case went to trial and at the close of Bowman's proof, the dealership moved for a directed verdict on all issues, which the trial court granted. On appeal, Bowman contends the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict and by failing to grant a voluntary non-suit as to the issue of negligent misrepresentation. Finding there is no material evidence to support a verdict for Bowman, we affirm the grant of directed verdict. We also find that Bowman did not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1) by providing an unequivocal notice of dismissal in open court and, thus, affirm on this issue as well.

This appeal involves the imposition of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against a lawyer. The lawyer filed a civil rights suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against five state judges seeking monetary damages to punish the judges for their judicial actions in a prior case. The judges filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and later imposed monetary and other sanctions against the lawyer. The lawyer insists on this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against him. We have determined that the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions fashioned by the trial court are carefully tailored and are clearly warranted by the lawyer's conduct.

Appellants Ben and Janice Dick ("the Dickes") appeal the trial court's grant of pre-judgment interest against the J-Bar Corporation ("J-Bar") on a promissory note issued by J-Bar to Appellees Ronald and Judith Parrish. Because we find that the Dickes lack standing to appeal this issue, we dismiss.

This appeal involves a prisoner seeking to be released on parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to grant him parole, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed, and the prisoner appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed.

In 2001, a pharmacy, when filling the plaintiff’s prescription, gave the plaintiff the wrong medication. The plaintiff began taking the medication as directed, but she soon developed symptoms related to taking the wrong medication. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy alleging negligence, misrepresentation, and strict liability, and she sought compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages. The pharmacy served the plaintiff with discovery requests specifically designed to discover the basis for the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and the plaintiff responded. The pharmacy deemed the plaintiff’s responses inadequate, and it filed a motion to deem facts admitted, a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the motions for summary judgment. At a hearing on the pharmacy’s motion to deem facts admitted and the plaintiff’s motion to strike, the trial court orally indicated its intention to grant the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Thereafter, the plaintiff orally stated that she wished to take a voluntary nonsuit of her remaining claims. The plaintiff has filed an appeal to this Court asking us to review the grant of partial summary judgment to the pharmacy on her claim for punitive damages. We have determined that, due to the plaintiff’s decision to nonsuit her remaining claims, the present appeal is presently moot. Moreover, we find that this appeal is so devoid of merit that it warrants the imposition of damages for the filing of a frivolous appeal.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Department of Correction regarding his eligibility to be considered for parole. The prisoner filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the Department and three of its employees seeking declaratory relief and damages because he had not been declared eligible to be considered for parole. The Department's employees moved to dismiss the complaint because the prisoner had failed to specify whether they were being sued in their personal or official capacities. The court dismissed the complaint after being informed that the prisoner had been considered for and had been denied parole. We have determined that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint.

This appeal involves a dispute between a widow and the Tennessee Department of Human Services regarding the Department’s denial of her deceased husband’s application for Medicaid nursing home benefits. The widow filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Robertson County asserting that the Department erred by classifying as available resources four tax deeds for real property in Georgia being held in her revocable trust. The trial court found that the Department’s classification of the four tax deeds as available resources was supported by substantial and material evidence. The widow asserts on this appeal that the tax deeds should not have been classified as available resources because they were “unavailable” and because they were income-producing property. Like the trial court, we have determined that the Department’s classification of the four tax deeds for real property in Georgia was correct.

This appeal involves a prisoner seeking custodial parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole denied his request, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed.

This appeal involves a prisoner seeking to be released on parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to release him on parole, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed.

This case stems from a business deal gone sour. This is the third time that these parties have brought identical claims against one another. In the previous versions of this suit, the cases were dismissed without prejudice. At this trial, both the plaintiff’s claims and the defendants’ counter claims and third-party claims were dismissed with prejudice based on the doctrine of laches. Upon a motion to alter or amend judgment, the trial court modified its order to dismiss all claims without prejudice based on a failure to prosecute. In this appeal, appellants ask this Court to determine (1) whether the chancery court erred when it amended its judgment with prejudice granting the appellants’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of laches to a judgment without prejudice based on a failure to prosecute and (2) whether the chancery court erred when it dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte. The appellants argue that the chancery court should not have amended its judgment dismissing the defendants’ counter and third-party claims because the facts presented at trial warranted a dismissal based on the doctrine of laches. Further, the appellants argue that the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte based on the doctrine of laches because the defendants did not demonstrate at trial any undue prejudice to them. We affirm.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred when it modified the original custody order between the parties. Appellant contends that there are no material changes of circumstances to warrant modification of the original custody order. We affirm.