APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the parental rights of the biological parents of seven minor children. After the children had been removed from their biological parents’ custody for approximately one year, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Perry County seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents. The trial court conducted a bench trial and then entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights because the conditions that caused the children to be removed from the parents’ custody continued to persist and because the parents had committed severe child abuse. Both parents appealed. We have determined that the record contains substantial and material evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusions that the biological parents’ conduct provides substantive grounds for terminating their parental rights and that the termination of the biological parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

I concur with the legal principles set forth in the majority opinion and particularly with the recognition of the importance of affording a parent an opportunity to request appointed counsel, and when appropriate, a hearing and due inquiry on the request for appointed counsel in dependent and neglect proceedings. I, however, respectfully dissent, believing the facts, particularly those demonstrating the irresponsible acts and omissions of David H. and Mary Ellen H. in seeking appointed counsel and then retaining separate counsel, are sufficient to affirm the trial court.

After a hearing, the Circuit Court declared seven children to be dependent and neglected and determined that their parents had committed severe child abuse. The parents claim on appeal that the court erred by refusing their request that counsel be appointed to represent them at the hearing.  After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine whether or not the parents were financially able to retain their own counsel, and we accordingly vacate the order concluding that the children were dependent and neglected.

Joan Oates (“Plaintiff”) was employed by the Chattanooga Publishing Company (“Defendant”) for approximately twenty-three years. In January of 2004, Plaintiff was observed on Defendant’s security camera making obscene gestures with her middle finger toward the camera and then covering the security camera with a cup for a period of time. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that she was terminated because of a disability.  Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and malicious harassment while employed by Defendant. Plaintiff also sued for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

I adhere to my longstanding view that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a
“clear and convincing evidence” standard are incompatible with each other and cannot be reconciled either in the trial court or in appellate courts. The effort to make these standards compatible, as asserted in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001), and its progeny are in my view incorrect for reasons stated at length in Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) and In re Z.J.S. and M.J.P., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, filed June 3, 2003 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003-Cain, concurring).

The trial court determined a material change of circumstances had occurred which warranted modification of the parties’ child visitation scheduled. Father appeals. We affirm.

James L. Williams, Brenda G. Williams, Charles Roberson, and Marjorie Roberson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Jordan Lee Fox (“Defendant”) claiming, in part, that Defendant was constructing a mobile home/modular home in the Oma Lee Williams subdivision in violation of the subdivision restrictions. Plaintiffs sought, among other things, a restraining order prohibiting Defendant from constructing and completing the mobile home/modular home. The case proceeded to trial. The Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the structure in question is a modular home and that under existing case law Defendant was in violation of the subdivision restrictions.  The Trial Court awarded Plaintiffs a permanent injunction and ordered Defendant to remove the structure. Defendant appeals to this Court claiming, in part, that the existing case law upon which the Trial Court based its decision dealt with double wide or manufactured homes, not modular homes. We affirm.

This is not the first time this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the chancery court erred when it found that an insured individual was made whole by a settlement agreement with a third party tortfeasor so as to require the insured to reimburse his insurer.  Specifically, Appellant contends that the chancery court erred in finding that the insured was not made whole because it failed to use the formula method used by federal courts for determining whether an insured is made whole and failed to engage in an analysis of the dollar amounts of the insured’s recovery and losses. We reverse and find that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the insured.

I respectfully dissent from majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment. I would reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment.

Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) brought this interpleader action seeking judicial guidance as to the person or persons entitled to receive benefits under a policy of insurance insuring the life of Brenda Gail Langley (“the deceased”). The deceased designated three of her four children and a grandchild as the beneficiaries of the policy; however, prior to the deceased’s death, her sister, Linda Sue Rose, acting under her authority as attorney in fact for the deceased, changed the beneficiary of the policy to herself. After the death of the deceased, Ms. Rose, the three children, and the deceased’s grandchild, Ethan E. Langley, all asserted rights to the proceeds of the subject policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the deceased’s children and grandchild, finding that they were entitled to the proceeds because – as found by the trial court – Ms. Rose did not have the authority under the deceased’s power of attorney to change the beneficiary on the policy. Ms. Rose appeals. We affirm.

The trial court awarded Petitioner child support for one child in accordance with the child support guidelines. Respondent appeals, asserting the trial court erred by failing to deviate from the child support guidelines. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against doctor and his employer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed the admission into evidence of expert testimony offered by two physicians under the locality rule and the award of certain discretionary costs. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

This action stems from a petition for child support and a subsequent petition to modify child support.  In this appeal, the appellant has presented numerous issues for review. However, this Court finds one issue dispositive of the case: whether the trial court complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 when it entered its order establishing child support and its subsequent order modifying child support. We dismiss this appeal and remand for entry of both orders pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“the State”) filed a Petition for Temporary Custody of N.T.B. (“the Child”) in July of 2002, alleging, among other things, that the Child was abused and/or dependent and neglected. The Juvenile Court held that the Child was a dependent and neglected child within the meaning of the law and awarded temporary custody of the Child to the State. Reba Johnson (“Mother”) and Michael Blevins (“Father”) appealed the Juvenile Court order to the Circuit Court (“Trial Court”), and the case was tried. After trial, the Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the Child was a dependent and neglected child within the meaning of the law and that the Child had suffered severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(21)(A) while in the care of his parents. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court erred when it dismissed the appellant’s class action suit based on lack of standing and primary jurisdiction. On appeal, the appellant asserts that she had standing to bring her suit and that the circuit court should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. We affirm.

The trial court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by sending notice to a mortgagee of an impending tax sale of the mortgaged property by regular mail. We reverse.

This appeal arises from the second civil action between these parties. In both civil actions, Mr. Federico brought suit against Aladdin Industries for breach of a written employment agreement. In the first action, Federico only sought recovery of a bonus. In this second action Federico seeks to recover the value of a so-called “phantom unit” equity plan provided for in the employment agreement. Both claims were based on the same employment agreement. Aladdin filed a motion for summary judgment contending res judicata barred this second action. The trial court granted Aladdin’s motion, and we affirm.

This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff/Guests’ fall over a landscaping wall while walking down Defendants/Homeowners’ walkway after dark. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants/Homeowners. Finding that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the lighting conditions created a dangerous condition on the Defendants/Homeowners’ property, and that McIntyre requires a comparison of the respective negligence of the parties, we reverse and remand.

The chancery court awarded Plaintiffs Weeks damages for the taking of trees by the City of Eastview. Eastview appeals, and we vacate the award of damages against Eastview for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On cross-appeal, Weeks assert the trial court erred in failing to assess damages against Defendant Ingram and in determining Weeks had impliedly dedicated a roadway known as Autumn Lane as a public roadway. We modify and affirm on these issues.

I agree with the results reached by the trial court – including the award of attorney’s fees – as affirmed by the majority opinion. I write separately to express my disagreement with the appellant’s belief and the majority’s belief that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the custodial arrangement. I recognize that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the identity of the primary residential parent. However, I believe the trial court did find that the circumstances regarding the child’s custodial arrangement had changed so as to “affect[] the child’s well-being in a meaningful way,” Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002); and that it then proceeded to (1) modify the existing parenting plan by transferring decision-making authority regarding the educational/extracurricular activities of the child from the father to the mother and (2) grant the mother the right to obtain a second opinion as to medical matters.

The father filed a Petition to Change Custody of child from the mother to the father, alleging change of circumstances. Following trial, the Trial Court refused to order a change of custody, but modified the Parenting Plan. On appeal, we affirm.

In an action for damages caused by flooding, the Trial Court invoked comparative fault, awarded damages, and ordered defendants to correct conditions which caused the flooding. Both parties appealed. We affirm.

This is a construction case. The defendant homeowners entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff contractor to construct a house for the defendants. After the contractor had substantially completed construction of the house, the homeowners discharged the contractor. The contractor then filed suit for unpaid costs and fees. The defendant homeowners counter-sued, alleging breach of the original contract. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order granting a monetary award to the contractor for his unpaid fees, minus several credits awarded to the defendant homeowners. The record does not include any factual findings or legal conclusions detailing the basis for the award.  The defendant homeowners appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of an expert witness and in its calculation of the award to the contractor. We affirm the trial court’s admission of the expert testimony, but vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for factual findings and legal conclusions in order to resolve the remaining issues on appeal.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.