APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of marital property. The parties signed a prenuptial agreement. After they married, the parties operated a cattle and farming business, which was conducted in the wife’s name only. After three years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. A trial was held primarily on issues related to property distribution. The husband argued that the cattle and farming equipment was purchased with his separate funds and therefore was his separate property under the prenuptial agreement. The husband also alleged that the wife had discarded or destroyed numerous items of his separate property. The trial court found that the cattle and farming equipment was marital property and divided it equally, and declined to find the wife responsible for the items that had been discarded or destroyed. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would reverse the Trial Court and
remand this matter for entry of judgment as requested and as proven by the plaintiff.

Upon review under common-law writ of certiorari, the trial court affirmed disciplinary actions against Petitioner/Appellant by the Tennessee Department of Correction. We affirm in part and remand.

In this suit for breach of contract, the assignee of a loan agreement alleged that the defendant was in default of the agreement and requested judgment for monies advanced, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The defendant denied owing the debt. The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of proof and dismissed the case. Upon our determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court, judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action immediately following a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

B.R.P. (“Father”) was sentenced to serve eighteen years in prison when his daughter was six years old. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights of a person who is incarcerated under a sentence of ten years or more if that person’s child is under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. In this appeal, Father argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) is inapplicable because Father might not have to serve his entire sentence if he obtains postconviction relief. He also maintains that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of his daughter. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the possibility of postconviction relief is irrelevant to a trial court’s determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) have been met. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of his daughter. Therefore, we affirm.

Plaintiff sued her former employer on grounds of breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as well as the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Trial Court.

This case involves accord and satisfaction. The defendants fraudulently transferred real property
owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendants for damages related to
the fraudulent transfer. The parties later agreed to settle the matter for approximately $6,000. The
defendants initially paid the plaintiff $3,000 pursuant to the settlement agreement. Before the
remainder was paid, the plaintiff repudiated the agreement in writing. Later, the defendants sent the plaintiff a check for the remainder of the settlement. The plaintiff kept the second payment, but told the defendants that she did not consider the payment to satisfy the debt and stated her intent to set the case for trial. At the subsequent trial, the defendants did not appear. A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $58,000. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the judgment as well as a motion to dismiss the case, based on the original settlement agreement. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the case on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the parties’ settlement agreement was an executory accord which was not effectively repudiated and was properly enforced under the circumstances.

This is a boundary line dispute. The parties are adjacent landowners. In April 2003, a dispute arose between the parties over the exact boundary line between their properties. The plaintiff erected a seven-foot privacy fence on what she perceived to be the proper boundary line. The defendant dismantled the fence and removed it. The plaintiff brought this action for the trial court to set the appropriate boundary line and for damages related to the defendant’s removal of her fence. After a hearing, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, determining that the boundary line should be set according to a 1997 survey conducted when the plaintiff purchased her property and awarding the plaintiff damages for the removal of the fence. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, concluding that, in the absence of a trial transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must presume that the trial court’s decision was supported by the evidence.

James Edward Williams and Gladys Pineda Williams were divorced on December 13, 2004, following a very contentious proceeding in the Chancery Court of Knox County. Mr. Williams filed the action at bar against his former attorneys and also against attorneys representing his former wife. He alleges against these attorneys various acts of tortious activities, malpractice and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed all of his claims, and Mr. Williams appeals. We affirm the action of the trial court.

This case involves a commercial lease. During the lessor’s divorce, his wife brought suit against the tenant to collect its current rent payments. The wife claimed that the underlying realty was marital property and she was entitled to the rent. The husband-lessor filed a motion to intervene in that case, but the trial court never addressed his motion. The husband signed some consent orders in the case and filed a motion on his own behalf, but he was never formally named as a party. After that case had concluded, the husband brought suit against the tenant for past due rent and other damages under the lease. The tenant claimed that his suit was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, but the trial court disagreed. After the trial court entered a judgment for the husband-lessor, the tenant appealed to this Court.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

This is a petition for contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered
an order dismissing the petition and reducing the respondent’s child support arrearage by $2,000. The petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously ordered a retroactive modification of the original child support order. We reverse.

The plaintiff filed this action against Williamson County alleging the County failed and/or refused to return her dog and cat for which she sought monetary damages. The County filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, contending the negligence claim asserted pertained to a discretionary function for which the County was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Finding no error, we affirm.

Bobby Lee Brooks has appealed, seeking dismissal of an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. No record of the evidence has been filed. We affirm the Trial Court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the issue we address is which trial court – the Rhea County Family
Court, the Williamson County Chancery Court, or the Rhea County Juvenile Court – has jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties’ post-divorce disputes. We hold that pursuant to the prior suit pending doctrine, the tribunal where the first petition was filed, the Rhea County Family Court, has subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss the later-filed actions in Williamson County Chancery Court and Rhea County Juvenile Court, and vacate the orders entered by those courts.

This is a child custody dispute. The biological parents of the child involved in this action met in Georgia, where the child was born in December 2002. The parties lived together with the child, but never married. Initially, the parties moved several times with the child, following job opportunities for the father. When the child was about nine months old, the parties moved to Jackson, Tennessee.  Not long after that, the mother and the child returned to Georgia to live with the mother’s parents in Georgia, in order for the mother to seek professional help for depression. About nine months later, after an altercation between the mother and the child’s maternal grandmother, the mother told the father that she could not care for the child and asked him to assume custody. Accordingly, the father took the child to live with him in Jackson. About two months later, the father filed the instant petition for legitimation of the child and to seek custody. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition for custody. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the father was comparatively more fit than the mother and designated him as the primary residential parent.  The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination.

This is the second appeal of a property case involving the ownership of three parcels of real property held by tenants-in-common.  We dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment.  On remand, the trial court entered a supplemental decree.  After reviewing the record and the supplemental decree, we find that there is still not a final appealable judgment.  We must, therefore, dismiss this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an insurance case. The plaintiff cargo company entered into a carrier agreement with an independent trucking company to transport freight, in which the trucking company agreed to indemnify the plaintiff for any loss or damage to the freight transported.  The trucking company obtained a motor truck cargo liability insurance policy, which insured property while in due course of transit. In the process of transporting a shipment of tires for the plaintiff, the driver for the trucking company parked the trailer portion of the tractor-trailer behind a shopping center and left it overnight.  During the night, the cargo was stolen.  The trucking company submitted a claim against its cargo insurance policy and the claim was denied.  The plaintiff sued the trucking company and the cargo insurance company for breach of contract, seeking to recover the value of the stolen cargo.  The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against the defendant cargo insurance company and, in response, the defendant insurance company filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the cargo insurance company, finding that the shipment of tires was not “in transit” when it was stolen and that, consequently, there was no coverage under the policy.  The plaintiff cargo company appeals.  We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is a negligence case brought under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.  The plaintiff’s minor daughter slipped and fell at a public swimming facility and broke her arm.  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant swimming facility, alleging that her minor daughter slipped
on a wet concrete floor in the dressing room area and that the swimming facility created and maintained a dangerous and defective condition that caused her daughter’s injury.  At trial, the defendant swimming facility moved for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s proof.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the trial court applied an adult standard of care to her minor daughter, and that she established a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.  We affirm, finding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence.

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff finance broker and the defendant church entered into an agreement under which the plaintiff broker was to assist the church in obtaining a loan, and the church would pay the plaintiff a 3% broker’s fee for this service. The plaintiff broker negotiated a financing arrangement as requested by the church. Independent of the plaintiff, the church obtained financing from a different lender. The plaintiff then claimed a right to its broker’s fee under the parties’ agreement, claiming that it had an exclusive arrangement with the church. The church refused to pay the fee, denying that it had an exclusive arrangement with the plaintiff broker. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the church to recover its broker’s fee. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the parties’ agreement was exclusive. The church now appeals. We affirm, finding that the issue turns on the credibility of the witnesses.

This case involves an automobile accident that occurred on a road maintained by Madison County.  The plaintiff sued the negligent driver who struck his vehicle, the other driver’s parents, and Madison County. Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the design of the road and inadequate signs and road markings contributed to the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to Madison County, finding that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.  We affirm.

Appellants Augustus and Sheila Beasley (the Beasleys) seek to challenge the denial of their request to appeal an adverse unlawful detainer judgment to circuit court and to set aside the foreclosure of their residence. Specifically, the Beasleys appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CitiFinancial Mortgage, Inc. (Citi) and denial of their petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas, filed after the deadline for appealing the judgment as of right. The court denied the petition on the grounds that it did not set forth sufficient merits for removal to circuit court for a trial de novo. In the petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas, the Beasleys advanced as grounds for review the insufficiency of funds for filing a timely appeal and premature foreclosure on their residence in violation of the deed of trust. On appeal, they contend these allegations constituted sufficient merits as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129.  We reverse and remand.

Petitioner/Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his appeal under a writ of certiorari arising from the decision of the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board to terminate his employment with the Criminal Court Clerk’s Office.  We affirm.

Appellant appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his appeal from the Juvenile Court of Shelby County. The Criminal Court found that Appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed under T.C.A. § 37-1-159. Finding that the Appellant’s appeal was timely, we reverse and remand.
 

The sole issue in this appeal involves the division of property upon the divorce of the two parties. Having reviewed the record, we modify the division as to one specific finding of fact and affirm the judgment as modified.