APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns two related, but distinct, proceedings in Juvenile Court. One was a custody proceeding, and the other a contempt of court proceeding arising from a failure to comply with child support obligations. Separate docket numbers were assigned to each case. After a judgment was rendered in the contempt proceeding, the father filed a notice of appeal. Several months later, another judgment was rendered in the custody modification proceeding. No notice of appeal was filed for the custody modification proceeding. After the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the father obtained a consolidation order from the Juvenile Court. On appeal, the father argues only that the Juvenile Court erred in its custody order. Finding that neither of the two orders is final and appealable, we must dismiss the father’s appeal based upon a lack of jurisdiction and remand all proceedings to the Juvenile Court.

A prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari in the trial court seeking to contest the prison disciplinary board’s findings. The department filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the petition’s lack of notarization, its failure to state that it was the first application for the writ, and the prisoner’s failure to file it within sixty (60) days of the administrative action. The trial court granted the department’s motion to dismiss. The prisoner filed a motion for a new trial asserting that he complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 5.06. The trial court denied the motion. The prisoner timely filed an appeal to this court. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit against Defendants/Appellees claiming that Defendants/Appellees had violated the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the common law doctrines of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment in its contracting for commercial waste hauling services in the Memphis area. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees on both the statutory violation claims and the common law claims. We affirm.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Rene V. (“Mother”) to her child, Thomas P. (DOB: September 27, 2000),1 upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for terminating her parental rights existed and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals.  We affirm.

I agree completely with Judge Lee’s well-thought-out opinion. I write separately to emphasize what I believe is the linchpin of the reasoning in this case.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. In this case, a lessor and his insurance company brought a direct action against a lessee and the lessee’s insurance company seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights under the lease agreement and reimbursement to the lessor’s insurance company for amounts paid to the lessor for damages to the rental property as a result of a fire while the lessee resided on the property. On appeal, the appellant argues that under the terms of the insurance policy maintained by the lessee, no obligation to pay the lessor or his insurance company arose as a matter of law. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand to the chancery court for the entry of an order granting summary judgment to the appellant.

A high school student was injured when she fainted after viewing a first aid instructional video depicting simulated wounds that was being shown in one of her classes. The student, through her parents, sued Knox County and the Knox County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the teacher supervising the class was negligent in allowing her to leave the classroom unattended because it was foreseeable that she might be suffering a physical reaction to the video and that she might faint. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her damages in the amount of $30,000. The defendants appeal, arguing that plaintiff's fainting was not foreseeable and that, even if the trial court was correct in its finding of negligence, the trial court awarded excessive damages. Upon our determination that the harm suffered by the student was not reasonably foreseeable, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss this case.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the juvenile court erred when it increased the amount of child support the father was required to pay the mother for their child born out of wedlock. The father originally filed a petition to modify child support seeking to decrease his child support obligation based on the fact that he had another child with another woman that currently resides with him. The juvenile court increased his child support obligation finding that he failed to visit his child after the mother moved to Knoxville, Tennessee, including certain periods of time when the mother brought the child to Memphis, Tennessee to visit the father. The father contends that it was error for the juvenile court to increase his child support obligation because the mother was in violation of the parental relocation statute, section 36-6-108 of the Tennessee Code, and that the father was prevented from visiting his child due to the distance and his medical condition. We affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of T.H.W. (“Mother”) and all potential fathers. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The trial court granted Respondent Father a downward deviation from the child support guidelines when setting retroactive child support. We reverse.

This is an adoption and termination of parental rights case. The maternal grandparents of the two children at issue filed this petition requesting that the rights of the children’s father be terminated and that the grandparents be permitted to adopt the children. The mother of the children joined in the petition. The petitioners alleged that the father’s rights should be terminated based on his abandonment for failing to visit or support the children for a period of four months preceding his incarceration. After a hearing, the trial court found three grounds on which to terminate the father’s parental rights: abandonment, persistent conditions, and the length of the father’s prison term. The trial court also found that the children’s best interest would be served by terminating the father’s parental rights. The father now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in terminating his rights based on abandonment. We affirm the trial court’s decision, because the father did not challenge the other two grounds on which his rights were terminated, and the termination of the his rights based on those grounds must stand.

The issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies in a transitory, intrastate tort action. This is a medical malpractice action in which all of the alleged negligent acts and omissions occurred in Dekalb County. Plaintiffs, White County residents, filed suit in Davidson County, where two of the four defendants have their principal offices. The two Dekalb County defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon improper venue, or in the alternative, forum non conveniens. The trial court found forum non conveniens inapplicable to this intrastate forum dispute and venue proper. We affirm.

Decedent executed a Power of Attorney document granting her son broad general powers to act on her behalf. The son executed a Trust Deed and Modification Agreement on Decedent’s property.  Decedent and later her Estate asked the Chancery Court to void these documents. The Court refused.  On appeal, we affirm.

In this case we are asked to review a juvenile’s confinement following a juvenile court’s finding that the juvenile violated the terms of his probation. The juvenile court found the juvenile to be delinquent after the juvenile entered a guilty plea to an assault charge, and the court placed the juvenile on probation. Thereafter, the juvenile was charged with other offenses, and the juvenile court entered a verbal directive placing the child on house arrest. When the juvenile violated this directive, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the juvenile violated the terms of his probation and committed him to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.  After being confined, the juvenile filed a post-commitment petition pursuant to the Juvenile Post-Commitment Procedures Act in the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the juvenile court’s ruling.  The juvenile appealed the circuit court’s decision to this Court. During the pendency of this appeal,  the juvenile was released from custody. Accordingly, we hold that the present appeal is not justiciable under the doctrine of mootness, therefore, we dismiss the present appeal.

The Zoning Administrator of the Metropolitan Codes Department of Nashville and Davidson County issued a permit to an elementary school to create a park on property adjacent to the school campus. The local neighborhood association appealed the issuance of the permit to the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board revoked the permit on the basis that (1) the property would not remain in its natural state; (2) the school intended to use the property as athletic fields for the physical education of their students; (3) instructional activity is not allowed in a park; and (4) the requested use of the property would more likely be classified as a recreation center. The elementary school filed a common law writ of certiorari in Davidson County Chancery Court appealing the revocation. The chancery court reversed the decision of the Board and reinstated the permit finding that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, beyond its authority, and without supporting evidence in the record. We affirm the decision of the chancery court in all respects.

Plaintiffs/Appellees obtained a judgment on a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court at Lauderdale County requiring the Defendants/Appellants to relinquish possession of the residence at 465 Maple Hill Circle in Ripley, Tennessee. The Defendants/Appellants filed a de novo appeal as of right in the Circuit Court at Lauderdale County. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the sessions court. Appellants appeal. We affirm.

In this divorce case, Appellant/Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification of certain real property as marital property. The property at issue was Husband’s separate property prior to the marriage. The property was sold to a third party during the marriage, and a deed of trust secured the balance of the purchase price. The third party defaulted in the installment payments, and Husband purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and received a trustee’s deed in his name only.  Husband asserts that the property is separate property under either T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(A) or T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(B). The trial court concluded that the property was marital property under T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

The juvenile court dismissed Mother’s dependency and neglect petition. Mother appealed to circuit court, which dismissed her appeal without a hearing or presentation of evidence. Mother appeals.  We vacate the order of dismissal and remand.

Donna Marie Tait (“Wife”) filed for divorce from William Frank Tait (“Husband”) citing grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The parties entered into a Permanent Parenting Plan and a Property Settlement Agreement, but reserved the issue of alimony for trial. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that Wife was not in need of additional alimony support from Husband, despite Husband’s ability to pay. Wife appeals. We affirm.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s appeal of the Collierville Municipal Planning Commission’s denial of Appellant’s subdivision application as barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse, vacate the order of dismissal, and remand.

The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment on the grounds the statute of limitations had run on plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

In 1997, the Appellant, a shareholder in a Tennessee corporation, reviewed the corporation’s records and discovered that the corporation’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of the board of directors, had been misappropriating corporate funds for his personal use. In 1999, the Appellant filed a shareholder’s derivative action against the majority shareholder of the corporation alleging breach of fiduciary duty. In addition to his derivative claim, the Appellant also filed a direct claim against the majority shareholder for breach of a Pre-Incorporation Agreement signed by the shareholders at the corporation’s inception. The corporation appointed a one person special litigation committee to investigate the Appellant’s derivative action.  The committee determined that the majority shareholder had indeed misappropriated corporate funds. In its report to the board of directors, the committee recommended that the corporation either attempt to settle the lawsuit with the majority shareholder pursuant to terms suggested by the committee or, in the event the majority shareholder declined such terms, proceed with the litigation.  The trial court subsequently approved the report, and the corporation settled the derivative litigation.  Regarding the direct claim for breach of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement, the majority shareholder moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s decision to approve the special litigation committee’s report. We reverse the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the Appellant’s direct claim, as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Appellant’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The trial court held the Metropolitan Government comparatively liable for injuries sustained by a motorist injured in a vehicular accident. The Metropolitan Government was held comparatively at fault based upon the finding the intersection where the wreck occurred was dangerous, it had notice of the danger, and it failed to remedy the situation. It appeals, contending the design of the intersection and whether to install a stop sign or traffic light is a discretionary function, for which it is immune under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The evidence supports the findings that the intersection was dangerous and that the Metropolitan Government had notice of the danger, but failed to take remedial action. We therefore affirm.

This is an appeal from a post-divorce criminal contempt proceeding. The parties were divorced by final decree in July 1999. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, in which the husband agreed to pay the wife spousal support over a period of time. The husband did not make the support payments, and consequently the wife filed several motions for criminal contempt against the husband. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order reserving judgment on the issue of the husband’s criminal contempt, but requiring a non-party corporation in which the husband was a shareholder to pay to the wife a portion of the monies received by the corporation in satisfaction of the husband’s support obligation. The husband now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in holding the corporation liable for his personal debt. We dismiss the appeal, finding that it is not an appeal from a final order, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “Stanfort had sufficient actual knowledge of its injury no later than January 13, 2000.” I also agree that the second amended counterclaim cannot be saved by the relation-back doctrine found at Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. I write separately to state my opinion that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which, if resolved in Stanfort’s favor, would support a determination that Richard Phillips and/or Robert G. Campbell & Associates, LP, are equitably estopped from relying upon the defense of the statute of limitations.

The majority has accurately stated that portion of the broad doctrine of equitable estoppel applicable to the facts of this case: 

Statements or conduct that support an estoppel claim include representations, made prior to the expiration of the limitations period, that the defendant either would not assert a statute of limitations defense or that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit. 

Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). I agree that the affidavit of Terry Fortner, Stanfort’s principal, along with the July 27, 1999, letter signed by Campbell and the letter of October 7, 1999, signed by Phillips, establish, for the purpose of this summary judgment analysis, certain things: first, that Fortner had been assured, in the words of the majority opinion, “that the general contractor was pursuing [Stanfort’s] claim for extra compensation” (emphasis mine); second, that Campbell recognized, in the words of the July 27, 1999, letter, that “[Stanfort] reserve[d] the right to file a claim for additional rock excavation, as provided by the contract documents;” and third, that the letter of October 7, 1999, indicated that Stanfort’s claim for compensation for extra rock excavation was “being evaluated” and that there was no contract requirement that the claim be resolved, one way or the other, “prior to the work being executed.”  My problem with the majority’s conclusion that these three documents create a genuine issue of material fact is that I find nothing in them that brings this case within the rubric of Ingram. Neither of the letters, expressly or by implication, states that a statute of limitations will not be asserted in the event a lawsuit is filed at a later date. Furthermore, there is nothing in either which could lead one to reasonably believe “that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit.”  Certainly, Stanfort had reason to believe that its claim for extra compensation was being considered and might be resolved short of litigation; but this is a “far cry” from the necessary factual predicate for a reasonable belief that the claim was going to be paid without the necessity of suit being filed. 

In my judgment, the facts before the trial court, construed, as required by applicable law, in Stanfort’s favor, simply do not make out a case of equitable estoppel. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.