APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves a claim for unemployment compensation filed with the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The claimant was initially denied unemployment benefits based on the Agency’s finding that she had been terminated for work related misconduct. First-level appeals from agency decisions are allowed within fifteen days. The claimant appealed and an inperson hearing was scheduled. She requested a re-scheduling of the hearing, and her request was accommodated. She then canceled the second scheduled hearing and requested a withdrawal of her unemployment claim. Later, she attempted to re-appeal the initial agency determination outside the
fifteen-day time limit. She subsequently requested an appeal of the first-level tribunal’s decision allowing her to withdraw her appeal. The second-level board found it lacked jurisdiction because the claimant had not filed her appeal within fifteen days of the determination. Plaintiff claimed she was denied procedural due process because her in-person hearing was not rescheduled. The chancery court affirmed the board’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. In 1999, the children involved in this action were taken from the mother’s custody into state custody. They were later adjudicated dependent and neglected by the juvenile court. The children remained in foster care, and the state developed several permanency plans with the goal of returning the children to the mother. The plans required the mother to, inter alia, attend parenting classes and anger management programs and to obtain stable housing and employment. The children remained in foster care for the next six years. Meanwhile, the mother obtained stable housing, but she failed to complete either parenting classes or an anger management program, and she failed to obtain stable employment. The goal of the plans was changed to adoption. The state filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on persistent conditions and failure to comply with the permanency plans. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights on both grounds. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports termination on both grounds.

Plaintiffs, house purchasers, sued defendant, seller, for breach of contract, negligent and fraudulent concealment, negligence, wilful and negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Consumer Protection Act on the grounds the house was subject to flooding. The Trial Court granted summary judgment. We affirm.

In this post-decree child custody case, the trial court changed custody from the mother to the father after finding, among other things, that the mother had smoked marijuana while operating a motor vehicle in which the child was a passenger. Based upon this finding and evidence that the change of custody was in the best interest of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from the termination of Appellant’s membership in a private country club.  Appellant asserts a proprietary interest in the assets of the club, and seeks to have his membership reinstated.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the club/Appellee and Appellant
appeals.  We affirm.

Plaintiffs sought property damages in the amount of $2000 for diminution of value.  A jury awarded Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $500; the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to alter/motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs appeal.  We affirm.

In this dispute over a right of way, the Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant on grounds the suit was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. On appeal, we affirm.

We dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure where the record contains no final order(s) disposing of Plaintiff’s claims.

A roofing contractor applied for workers compensation insurance, declaring in his application that he had no employees. He paid a $750 minimum premium, and the insurance company issued a policy. The company subsequently audited his records and assessed an additional premium of over $14,700 for roofers who worked under contract with him or his subcontractors, but who were not covered by their own workers compensation policies. The contractor refused to pay, and the insurance company brought suit. The contractor claimed at trial that all the workers were independent contractors and, thus, that he was not obligated to insure them. The trial court ruled against him. We affirm the trial court.

Trial court granted dismissal for failure of service of process although defendant failed to raise the defense timely by motion or in her answer. We reverse.

Jack T. McKinney and his wife Brenda McKinney, obtained a judgment against Charles T. Kimery. After the judgment was recorded in the Register of Deeds’ office, Mr. Kimery and his wife conveyed property they owned as tenants by the entirety to Mr. Kimery’s mother. The McKinneys filed this action to execute upon the property and have it sold to satisfy the judgment lien. The issue presented is whether the McKinneys may levy against the entire interest in the property and have the property sold to satisfy their judgment lien, or whether the McKinneys’ lien attached only to Mr. Kimery’s separate, alienable interest in the property at the time of recording of the judgment lien, which consisted of Mr. Kimery’s right of survivorship. The trial court held that the McKinneys’ judgment lien attached to Mr. Kimery’s survivorship interest in the property at the time the judgment was recorded, and that the subsequent transfer of the property by both tenants by the entirety (the Kimerys) did not augment the interest to which the judgment lien attached, so that the McKinneys continued to hold a lien against the survivorship interest only after the transfer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I cannot concur in the conclusion of the majority opinion, i.e., that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment designating the husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children. My review of the record persuades me that the trial court went against the overwhelming weight of the evidence favoring an award of primary custody to the wife for one reason and one reason only, i.e., because of the wife’s admitted adulterous relationship during the marriage. I believe the trial court premised its decision on an incorrect interpretation of the law and/or made a factually-erroneous decision. 

In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded primary custody of the parties’ minor children to the father. The mother appealed and we affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment.

The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on the statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the statute of repose was tolled where the action was brought on behalf of their minor children and commenced before December 9, 2005.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This is a personal injury action. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

It is elementary that a statute waiving sovereign immunity must clearly do so, and any statute purporting to waive that immunity must be strictly construed. Courts are to determine to what extent and in what ways the Legislature has allowed suits against the State. The statute allowing the suit herein, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-304, authorizes de novo judicial review of the termination or suspension of tenured state university professors. The statute does not mention or refer to backpay or the award of damages. This court cannot imply such a remedy or interpret the statute so as to enlarge the waiver of sovereign immunity beyond that intended by the legislature. 

Following termination of his employment, a professor at Tennessee State University prevailed in this protracted tenure termination proceeding. On remand to Chancery Court following a successful appeal, the professor filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the pre-appeal judgment to assert a claim for back pay. The Chancellor granted relief and awarded back pay, which the defendants challenge on two grounds. They contend the court abused its discretion by awarding Rule 60 relief, and because back pay is not  specifically authorized by statute, an award of back pay violates the sovereign immunity doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm.

Husband, a farmer, and wife, a teacher, married in 1992. In 1993 or 1994, they purchased an eighteen acre parcel of real property located in Newbern, Dyer County, Tennessee. In 1995, the couple secured an insurance policy from Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company through their local Farm Bureau agent. The policy covered husband’s farming operation and the house under one policy. In 2001, husband andwife separated. The couple renewed the insurance policy annually,
and the most recent renewal was set to expire on February 22, 2003. Prior to the ending date of the policy, and during the couple’s separation, the insurance company sent insurance premium notices
to a post office box established by Husband. Husband decided not to renew the policy. Accordingly, the insurance company maintained that the policy expired on February 22, 2003 due to the nonpayment of the premium. On May 4, 2003, a tornado severely damaged the home, which the wife occupied at the time. The insurance company refused to cover the damage. The wife subsequently filed a lawsuit against her husband, the insurance company, the local agent, and others.  The agent and the insurance company moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the agent. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurance company, and we hold that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether an insurance policy covered the home on the date of the injury complained of.

This is an appeal from the granting of specific performance pursuant to an option to purchase contained in a lease agreement between Sam Teague and Sam Teague Chrysler, Inc., and the predecessor in interest of Harper-Wittbrodt Automotive Group, LLC. Each of the parties have made numerous assignments of error with respect to the ruling of the trial court and the relief granted by it. After consideration of each of the issues raised by the parties, we affirm, in all respects, the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute over a non-marital child's surname. Father/Appellant filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County, seeking to legitimate his son and to give him his surname. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court legitimated the child, and directed that the
child's surname be changed to a hyphenated surname consisting of Mother’s maiden name and Father’s surname. Father/Appellant appeals.¹ We reverse the trial court’s finding concerning the child’s surname and remand for further proceedings consistent with T.C.A. 27-3-128 and this
Opinion.

¹Because juvenile courts are courts of record, T.C.A. § 37-1-159(a) (2005), appeals in proceedings such as this one proceed directly to this court. T.C.A. § 37-1-159(g).

This appeal stems from a divorce. In this appeal, the husband asserts that the circuit court erred when it (1) awarded his wife transitional alimony in the amount of $4,000 per month for the first four years and $1,000 per month for the next five years, (2) assigned 100% of the parties’ marital debts to him, and (3) allocated $650 for his wife’s work related child care expenses when calculating the parties’ child support obligations. Husband argues that the amount of transitional alimony was excessive as he did not have the ability to pay that amount and that the amount exceeded his wife’s needs. He also argues that the circuit court should have equitably distributed the parties’ marital debts and that the circuit court should not have allocated work related child care expenses in excess of his wife’s monthly gross income. Additionally, the wife has requested that this Court award her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm as modified the decisions of the circuit court. We decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees on appeal.

I agree with most of the majority’s analysis in this case, and in particular I agree with the majority’s holding that the question of the applicability of the arbitration agreement is a “gateway” issue, properly before this Court. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the dispute as to Mr. Fuller’s coaching position was subject to arbitration. 

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Board of Education, vacating a portion of an arbitration award that required reinstatement of Plaintiff to his high school coaching assignment. We reverse.

Patient filed a medical malpractice claim against an orthopedic surgeon for his alleged negligence in her diagnosis and spinal surgery. After a three week trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the physician. The patient appealed, claiming that she was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred with regard to several evidentiary rulings, its communications with the jurors, its jury instructions and verdict form, and its decision to permit the jury to examine medical articles used in cross-examination. We have determined that the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

This is a lawsuit for on-the-job injury benefits. The plaintiff was employed as a jailer for the defendant county government. She injured her back in a slip-and-fall accident which occurred during the scope of her employment. The county paid her on-the-job injury benefits while she was being treated for her injuries. After about two months, her treating physician released her from his care, stated that she had no permanent anatomical disability, and determined that she was capable of unrestricted work. The county stopped paying her on-the-job injury benefits and she returned to full-dutywork. Later, complaining of continued back pain, the plaintiff saw another physician. This physician opined that the plaintiff had a 6% permanent disability to her body as a whole as a direct result of the slip-and-fall accident. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit for further benefits under the county’s OJI policy. After a trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff did not have a permanent vocational disability and held in favor of the county. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that there is no reason to reject the trial court’s determinations of credibility and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.