APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the legitimation of twin children and two subsequent actions to establish child support. In the first case, the parties agreed to attempt mediation of the issues, and it appears that a permanent parenting plan was agreed upon which provided for equal and joint custody of the
children. Because parenting time was split equally, neither party was to pay support to the other, but certain expenses were to be paid by each parent. The parties allegedly signed the agreement at mediation, and a formal memorandum was subsequently drawn up and presented to the court. The
court approved the formal memorandum and entered the parenting plan as an order of the court. In the second action, the mother claimed that because she had never signed the formal, typed version of the agreement, the parenting plan was void. The trial court agreed and set aside the mediated parenting plan. A new plan was entered by the court awarding primary custody to the mother and ordering the father to pay child support, which was calculated retroactively to the date of the children’s birth. The father timely appealed, and for the following reasons, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

This is a tort action. The defendant mortgage company serviced the mortgage loans on two homes owned by the plaintiff. After one of the plaintiff’s two homes burned down, the plaintiff received insurance proceeds for the destroyed home. The proceeds were mistakenly applied to the mortgage on the wrong property, and a deed of release was prepared on the intact home. Subsequently, the defendant mortgage company recorded an affidavit to reinstate the trust deed and the funds were paid to satisfy the mortgage on the destroyed home. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant. Liberally construed, the plaintiff’s complaint asserted claims for deprivation of civil rights, tortious interference with business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to properly serve process on the defendants and the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that the plaintiff has not appealed from a final judgment.

This case began as a breach of warranty and misrepresentation action against a husband and wife as sellers of property. The buyers had been sued in a separate action by adjoining landowners who disputed the boundary between their land and the property purchased by the buyers. After a judgment was entered against the buyers ordering them to convey a portion of the property to their neighbors, they filed suit against the sellers, who had since divorced. The trial court entered a default judgment against the wife after she failed to defend the case. The court then dismissed the husband from the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19, finding that he had been an indispensable party to the previous boundary dispute lawsuit between the buyers and their neighbors, and that failure to join him in that lawsuit required that he be dismissed from this subsequent suit. The buyers timely filed their notice of appeal. The trial court subsequently entertained and granted the wife’s motion to set aside the default judgment and ultimately dismissed her from the suit as well, finding that she had also been an indispensable party to the boundary dispute action and was not joined in the lawsuit. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order which set aside the default judgment, reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the claims against the husband, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

The Commissioner granted defendants summary judgment on a medical malpractice claim. On appeal, we dismiss the case on the failure of plaintiffs to timely file notice of appeal.

In a dispute over death benefits from employer, the trial court held designated beneficiary who later divorced decedent, was entitled to benefits rather than the estate.  We affirm.

Appellant, Executrix of Decedent’s Estate, filed a request with the Probate Court of Shelby County to authorize the post-mortem transfer of real property to a limited family partnership, which was allegedly established by oral contract entered by and between the Appellant and Decedent prior
to Decedent’s death.  The United States, Appellee, disputed the Appellant’s contention that there was an oral contract to form a partnership. The trial court found that the record did not support an enforceable oral contract by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant appeals. We affirm and remand.

The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C. (“Mother”) to her three children, L.A.L.R., K.M.C., and R.S.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals, claiming DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Mother also claims DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.
 

When read together, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (West 2003) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116(c) (2004) plainly permit the State of Tennessee to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estate of a recipient’s surviving spouse. However, I concur with the court’s conclusion that the property from which these benefits can be recovered is limited to property owned by the recipient at the time of his or her death that passed to the surviving spouse “through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.” 

Estate appeals probate court’s determination that subject estate was liable to Bureau of Tennessee for Medicaid nursing home benefits correctly provided to a pre-deceased spouse. We reverse.

In this appeal, S.L.B. (“Mother”) contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to four of her five children.  Mother does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to the fifth child. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of her children.  Therefore, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children. The mother of both children and the father of one of the children appeal separately from the Order of the Juvenile Court of Hardin County terminating their respective parental rights. Both Appellants assert that the grounds for termination of their parental rights are not met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of their parental rights is not in the best interest of the minor children. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

With great reluctance, I must part ways with the court regarding the dismissal of this will contest. Based on the facts of this case, I have concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the will contest without first disposing of Don Brown’s motion to implead additional parties and Alton Brown’s petition to intervene.

Four years after the contest of his uncle’s will was filed, Alton Brown filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 Motion to Intervene in the contest of his uncle’s will. The motion, however, was not accompanied by a proposed pleading setting forth the claim for which intervention was sought as required by Rule 24.03. Subsequent to the filing of the motion, an order of dismissal of the will contest was entered.  Thereafter, the movant filed his proposed pleading following which the trial court denied the Motion to Intervene based upon a finding the movant had slept on his rights. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Theressa Joanne Booker (“Wife”) a divorce from Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (“Husband”), divided the parties’ property, and decreed an award of alimony in solido and alimony in futuro. Husband appeals, asserting that the division of marital
property was not equitable.  He also challenges the propriety of each of the alimony awards.  We modify the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro so as to make it an award of rehabilitative alimony.  As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Appellant challenges trial court’s order setting aside the consent order acknowledging paternity and ordering no child support after July 1, 2005, based on the results of DNA tests which conclusively prove that Appellee is not the father of the child.  We affirm and remand.

This is a divorce case in which grounds were stipulated.  Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife.  He asserts, in the alternative, that if this Court affirms the award of alimony the matter must be remanded for reconsideration of the division of property. We vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand.

This is a garnishment action. The plaintiff lawyer filed a lawsuit against the defendant to collect on a promissory note. This lawsuit was settled by a consent decree requiring the defendant to make installment payments. The defendant became delinquent in the agreed payments. The plaintiff then issued a garnishment request to the defendant’s employer, based on the consent decree. In response, the defendant filed a motion in the trial court to stay the garnishment and establish installment payments. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order as to the monthly amount to which the plaintiff was entitled in garnished wages. This amount was less than the maximum statutory amount permitted for garnishment. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not awarding the maximum statutory amount. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s civil action for failure to pay costs in prior lawsuits. The plaintiff inmate, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the trial court against the defendant municipality alleging violations of the government tort liability act, proceeding as a pauper. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case based on Tennessee Code Annotated §41-21-812, because the plaintiff had failed to pay costs in previous lawsuits filed by him. Realizing that his lawsuit was subject to dismissal under the statute, the plaintiff then paid the initial filing fee
and cash bond for the instant lawsuit, but did not pay the costs for the prior lawsuits. The plaintiff subsequently filed a response to the City’s motion to dismiss, claiming that, although he initially was prohibited from filing the lawsuit, because he subsequently paid his filing fees for the instant lawsuit, Section 41-21-812 was not applicable. The trial court dismissed the case pursuant to the statute.  The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

This is a parental relocation case. The parties were divorced and, under their MDA, the mother was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. Within a month after the divorce decree was entered, the mother wrote the father a letter saying that she was moving to Canada with the children. The father filed an objection to the relocation in the trial court. The mother filed a response and a petition to relocate with the children to Canada, stating that she intended to marry a citizen of Canada who was currently serving in the Canadian armed services.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the mother’s petition, finding that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose and that the relocation was not in the children’s best interest. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the evidence  preponderates against the trial court’s finding of no reasonable purpose under the parental relocation statute.

This is an appeal from an unusual order in a termination of parental rights case.  The child involved in this action was placed into state custody soon after the child’s birth, because both the mother and the child tested positive for cocaine.  The child was placed in the custody of a foster mother who was a single parent.  The state filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents of the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the parents’ parental rights. Additionally, the trial court sua sponte ordered the state to find a suitable dual-parent home in which to place the child and ordered the state to consult with private adoption agencies to accomplish this task.  The state now appeals the portion of the trial court’s order requiring it to place the child in a dual-parent home.  There is no appeal from the termination of parental rights. We reverse the trial court’s order regarding placement of the child, concluding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate placement of the child after the parents’ rights were terminated and the state was given complete guardianship over the child.

Husband appeals the type and amount of alimony awarded to Wife after the termination of a twenty-seven year marriage. The decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified.

In this case to terminate parental rights, the Trial Court entered a Default Judgment against the father and terminated his rights as a parent without hearing any evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

This is an appeal from an order of the juvenile court increasing child support.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this appeal, landowner sued builder alleging that the parties had entered into a partnership and an oral contract to construct a house on property belonging to landowner. Landowner claimed that builder failed to pay him the total consideration for the sale of the land after landowner deeded the property to builder and that builder failed to equally divide the profits from the sale of the improved property once the house was sold. Builder denied the existence of a partnership and oral contract, alleged that the lot had been paid for in full, and claimed that landowner had no interest in the property or the proceeds from the sale of the improved property. The trial court found that a partnership and oral contract existed between the parties and awarded landowner the balance on the sale of the land and one-half of the profits from the sale of the improved property. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.