APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an action for malicious prosecution of an attorney’s fee claim. The plaintiffs contend
that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant under the one-year
statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1). The court held
that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the allegedly-malicious prosecution
terminated, and it held that the prosecution terminated when the first court denied the
defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.04. The plaintiffs contend that this is wrong because the defendant was a
party to and participated in the appeal of those proceedings. They assert that the defendant’s
action did not terminate until he exhausted his appellate remedies. We agree and hold that
the defendant’s cause of action did not terminate until his time for filing an appellate brief
expired. Thus, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to
reinstate the complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from an employment termination case in which an employee of the Division of Fire Services for the City of Memphis was terminated for a second positive drug test.  After receiving notice of his termination, the employee requested an appeal hearing with the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission.  Following the hearing, the Civil Service Commission issued a decision affirming the termination of his employment.  The employee filed a petition for the trial court to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.  The trial court found that substantial and material evidence did not support the decision and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  Accordingly, the trial court granted the employee’s petition and remanded the matter to the Civil Service Commission.  The City of Memphis appeals.  We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order to remand to the Civil Service Commission with instructions to issue a decision addressing certain deficiencies.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

At issue is the validity of an amendment to a revocable trust. The specific issue is whether the Settlor’s attorney-in-fact was authorized to execute an amendment to the Robert McKeel Bone Living Trust. The trial court held that the amendment was valid. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to § 2.02 of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

A patient brought a health care liability action against a hospital after she developed a pressure wound during her hospital stay. The hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that the patient’s standard of care expert was not competent to testify under the Health Care Liability Act. Alternatively, it sought to narrow the remaining claims through a partial summary judgment. The trial court disqualified the expert witness and granted the hospital summary judgment on all claims. The court’s decision was based, in part, on grounds not raised in the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the expert was competent to testify and the trial court erred in ruling on additional grounds not raised by the movant, we vacate the judgment in part.

Keith S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, Abraham S. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the juvenile court”) terminated Father’s parental rights based on several statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support; abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability to assume legal and physical custody. The juvenile court concluded that one alleged ground for termination, substantial noncompliance with permanency plan, was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s ruling as to all but one ground for termination. Because the record contains scant evidence of help offered to Father regarding housing, we conclude that abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the juvenile court’s ruling as to the other statutory grounds, and we affirm the ruling that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests.

This case stems from an unpaid promissory note secured by real property that was sold in foreclosure. Wheelhouse Partners, LLC (“Wheelhouse”), the beneficiary under a second deed of trust on the subject property, sued Wilson & Associates, PLLC (“Wilson”), the substitute trustee under the first deed of trust on the subject property, and James G. Akers and Deborah L. Akers (the “property owners” or, together with Wilson, “Defendants”). Wheelhouse alleged that the foreclosure sale produced excess funds sufficient to satisfy its second deed of trust and promissory note after satisfying the first deed of trust, but that Defendants refused to deliver such funds to Wheelhouse. Wheelhouse also alleged breach of contract against the property owners. Wilson interpleaded the surplus funds into the court and, following a successful motion for summary judgment, Wheelhouse was awarded the balance of its promissory note as well as its attorney’s fees. Mr. Akers appeals. Because his appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, his issues are waived and the lower court’s judgment is affirmed. Because Wheelhouse’s deed of trust clearly provides for an award of attorney’s fees and Wheelhouse properly requested its appellate attorney’s fees, we award Wheelhouse said fees.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the
grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3)
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial
responsibility of the child. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the
children. We reverse the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This appeal arises from an incident in which the nude body of a resident at an assisted living facility was exposed on a video call via telephone when an employee of the healthcare facility engaged in a personal call while assisting the resident in the shower. The resident, by and through her conservator/daughter (“Plaintiff”), sued the owner and operator of the healthcare facility, Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma (“Defendant”), asserting a claim of “Negligence Pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act” and a generalized claim for invasion of privacy with allegations of “Gross Negligence, Willful, Wanton, Reckless, Malicious and/or Intentional Misconduct.” Relying on the undisputed fact that the resident was unaware and never informed that the incident occurred, Defendant moved for summary judgment due to the lack of a cognizable injury or recoverable damages. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that actual damages were not an essential element of her claims and, in the alternative, moved to amend the complaint to specifically assert a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon the resident’s seclusion and a claim for negligent supervision. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint on the ground “that damages for invasion of privacy . . . cannot be proven as it would be impossible to suffer from personal humiliation, mental anguish or similar damages since [the resident] is unaware that the incident happened” and denied the motion to amend the complaint on the basis of futility. Plaintiff appealed. We have determined that the gravamen of the complaint states a claim for invasion of privacy based upon the distinct tort of intrusion upon seclusion. We have also determined that actual damages are not an essential element of a claim for invasion of privacy based on the distinct tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Thus, Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment. Moreover, granting leave to amend the complaint would not have been futile. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to summarily dismiss the complaint, reverse the decision to deny the motion to amend the complaint, and remand with instruction to reinstate the complaint, grant the motion to amend the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case arises from the demise of a short-lived business venture. For three years, two of
the parties owned and operated a wellness center from the same location as an existing
medical clinic. When disputes arose, the plaintiff (co-owner of the wellness center) sued
the defendants, asserting twelve counts in his complaint and seeking judicial dissolution of
the company. The plaintiff died during the course of the proceeding, and the executor of
his estate was substituted as the plaintiff. A special master held a three-day hearing
regarding fifteen issues, and the trial court adopted the majority of his findings. The trial
court then held a seven-day bench trial. Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants on all counts and judicially dissolved the company upon agreement of the
parties. The plaintiff appeals, raising very limited issues regarding his claims for unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and judicial dissolution. We affirm and remand for
further proceedings.

This case arose from a legal malpractice action filed against a lawyer who had represented
the plaintiff in an employment discrimination and wrongful termination action. The
plaintiff provided no expert testimony to support his claims against the lawyer.
Determining that the plaintiff had not presented proof to support his claim and that the
defendant had presented evidence to negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim,
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Discerning no error,
we affirm.

A mother and father filed a personal injury action in 2022 on behalf of their adult daughter, who was allegedly injured in a car accident in 2007 when she was four years old. The daughter was not represented by counsel, and her parents purported to represent her. The trial court dismissed the daughter’s claims due to the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the daughter argues (through her mother/conservator) that the dismissal was in error because she lacks mental capacity. Because the daughter did not file suit pro se and was not represented by counsel, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This case involves a complaint before the Tennessee Claims Commission.  After a year of no action on the part of the claimant, the State moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.  The Claims Commission granted the motion, and the claimant now appeals.  For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the dismissal of the claimant’s case. 

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights as to two children, based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child.  The trial court granted the petition, finding that the Department proved all alleged grounds by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.  We affirm.

Plaintiff Loring Justice brought this health care liability action against Thomas Hanaway, Ph.D. (“Defendant”), a psychologist who provided family counseling and therapy to Plaintiff’s minor child and the child’s mother, Kim Nelson (“Mother”). Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that he was entitled to immunity as a court-appointed psychologist and testifying witness. Defendant provided therapy as a result of an order by the Roane County Juvenile Court in long-running litigation between Plaintiff and Mother. The Juvenile Court’s order stated that “there will be a transition from the current therapist, Dr. Nancy Brown, to a new therapist to be selected by the Mother.” The issue is whether the trial court correctly deemed Defendant to be a court-appointed therapist and granted Defendant summary judgment on grounds of immunity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother was not present when the trial court found that four grounds for termination were
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination was in the best interest of
the child. The trial court denied the oral motion to continue made by Mother’s counsel.
Mother appeals the denial of the continuance, as well as the findings of grounds and best
interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm (1) the trial court’s denial of Mother’s
motion for a continuance; (2) the finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, and
persistence of conditions; and (3) the finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights was
in the best interest of the child. We conclude that the trial court failed to make appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the ground of failure to manifest an
ability and willingness to assume custody of the child and vacate that ground. Accordingly,
we vacate in part and affirm in part.

The defendant limited liability company terminated the plaintiff’s employment as Chief
Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer and revoked his 120 voting and common
membership units in the company. The plaintiff brought a claim against individuals
belonging to the company’s board of managers, alleging that the defendant board members
had breached their fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing by revoking his 120
membership units. The plaintiff sought no less than $120,000.00 in compensatory
damages, the value of the 120 membership units as of May 5, 2021, and $480,000.00 in
punitive damages. On July 13, 2022, the board of managers adopted a corporate resolution
ratifying the plaintiff’s ownership of 120 membership units in an effort to resolve the
plaintiff’s claim against the individual board members. Consequently, the defendant board
members filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, contending that the
plaintiff’s claim against them was rendered moot by the corporate resolution. The trial
court granted the defendant board members’ motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim
against them based on the doctrine of mootness. On appeal, the plaintiff posits that the
board members failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that they had rendered his
claim moot. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the defendant board members
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the corporate resolution fully redressed
the plaintiff’s claim for relief against them. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.

A mother appeals the chancery court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on
the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support and severe child abuse. The
mother also challenges the chancery court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The petitioners
challenge the chancery court’s dismissal of persistence of conditions ground for
termination. We reverse the court’s decision to terminate based on abandonment by failure
to visit and support, but we affirm the court’s decision in all other aspects.

This case involves enforcement of an arbitration award arising from a defaulted promissory note. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for breach of contract and enforcement of a promissory note. Ultimately, the parties participated in binding arbitration per the terms of their agreement. The plaintiff obtained an award in arbitration against the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion in the trial court to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion, and the defendant now appeals. Having reviewed the record, we determine that the defendant has waived his argument on appeal and affirm the trial court’s order.

This appeal concerns the approval of a site plan.  William Foehring, Janice Foehring, William Best, Mary Beth Best, Ron Terrill, and Sandra Terrill (“Petitioners”) filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari against the Monteagle Regional Planning Commission (“the Commission”) and RBT Enterprises, LLC (“RBT”) (collectively, “Respondents”) in the Chancery Court for Marion County (“the Trial Court”).  Petitioners alleged that the Commission acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously in approving the site plan at issue because the underlying zoning for one of the parcels is invalid.  The Trial Court ruled in favor of Respondents.  Petitioners appeal.  In a parallel declaratory judgment action case arising out of the same facts, we determined that the underlying zoning is valid, which is dispositive of this appeal.  We affirm the Trial Court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on five grounds: (1) abandonment by
failure to visit the children; (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the children;
(3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of conditions;
and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal arising from allegations of fraud and breach of contract in a dispute
surrounding a stock transfer agreement that, among other things, provided for the transfer
of controlling interest in a law firm from attorney Robert Hill to attorney Ricky Boren.
Whereas many claims were resolved at summary judgment, others were tried before a jury
and resolved in the Plaintiffs’ favor. The parties present a plethora of issues for our
consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for common law writ of certiorari in which the petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals a disciplinary conviction for “unauthorized financial transactions activity” by the Disciplinary Board at the Turney Center Industrial Complex. The respondents, the State of Tennessee and several governmental officials, filed a joint motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petition was not properly verified as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-104 and the petitioner failed to pay the mandatory initial filing fee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807. The chancery court granted the motion and dismissed the petition with prejudice on the grounds “the statutory requirements of T.C.A. § 27-8-104 and § 41-21-807 are mandatory and have not been met in this case, and failure to comply results in a defective filing by the Petitioner[.]” This appeal followed. We reverse the decision to dismiss based on the filing fee requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807. Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal of the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the petitioner’s failure to file a petition that complied with the verification requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-104 within 60 days of the entry of the judgment of which the petitioner seeks review.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.