APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A member of the Sumner County YMCA was terminated from membership in the organization because of inappropriate sexual comments he allegedly directed toward female staff members. He brought pro se lawsuits against numerous employees of the YMCA, first in United States District Court, claiming that their actions had violated his civil rights, slandered him, invaded his privacy, and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. The federal court dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. A subsequent complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County alleging substantially the same facts was also dismissed, for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Undeterred, the plaintiff then filed a nearly identical complaint in the same court. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata. We affirm the trial court.

Father and Mother entered into an agreed permanent parenting plan following their separation in 2004. In 2005, Father requested a modification of the plan to increase his co-parenting time with the parties’ daughter. The petition to modify was filed shortly after the trial court increased his child support from $30 per week to more than $100 per week, and also less than a week after his marriage to his longtime girlfriend. The trial court found that Father’s marriage and the fact that he had quit smoking marijuana were both material changes of circumstance, and that Father should receive equal parenting time with the child. Mother appeals. After careful review, we find that there has been no material change of circumstance justifying reconsideration of the parties’ parenting arrangement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan and remand.

Plaintiff purchasers sued Defendant sellers, real estate agent, and real estate company alleging intentional fraud and seeking rescission of a contract to purchase real property and punitive damages.  The matter was tried by a jury, which awarded Plaintiffs rescission of the contract and assessed punitive damages against Defendant real estate agent. The trial court further awarded Plaintiffs discretionary costs and attorney’s fees, which it assessed against Defendant sellers and real estate agent jointly and severally. The jury also determined real estate agent was an independent contractor and that Defendant real estate company was, therefore, not vicariously liable for punitive damages.  Plaintiffs and Defendant sellers subsequently entered into a confidential, sealed settlement under which Plaintiffs received a substantial partial refund of the purchase price and retained ownership of the real property. Defendant real estate agent appeals the award of punitive damages and the award of attorney’s fees. Appellant additionally asserts the post-trial settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant sellers resulted in an election of damages as a remedy or, alternately, in accord and satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, asserting the jury verdict finding that Defendant real estate agent was an independent contractor is not supported by the evidence. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Husband appeals the dismissal of his Complaints for Divorce. In a confusing series of pleadings created by Husband, his two separate Complaints for Divorce were dismissed. One was dismissed for failing to pay the filing fee and the other for procedural deficiencies. We affirm the dismissal of the matter in which Husband failed to pay the requisite filing fee. We, however, reverse the dismissal of the first Complaint for Divorce, which was dismissed for alleged procedural deficiencies, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this negligence action. We affirm.

On remand pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-3-128, the trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for assault. We affirm.

This is the second appeal of a case involving the termination of a county employee. The petitioner was a deputy jailor for the County Sheriff’s Department. His employment was terminated because he failed to report an injured inmate. The county’s administrative board upheld the termination. The petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court denied the writ, and the petitioner appealed. In the first appeal, the trial court’s order was vacated and the cause was remanded for reconsideration under the standard of review set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, see T.C.A. § 4-5-322. On remand, the trial court entered a revised order, affirming the termination. The petitioner now appeals the revised order. We affirm, finding that the petitioner received a fair hearing before the administrative board and that the board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

In this Estate, the parties in open court announced the terms of settlement between them of the entire Estate. Appellant sought to set aside the settlement on the grounds of duress, but after an evidentiary hearing the Trial Court refused to set aside the settlement. On appeal, we affirm.

Petitioner intervened in this action, averring that the conservator for her mother had died and asked that she be appointed conservator of her mother. The Trial Court appointed a successor conservator and ruled that petitioner had no standing to contest the conservatorship and to be appointed conservator since she was a non-resident of the State. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The mother of a twelve year old boy filed a petition to establish the paternity of the child. A DNA test confirmed that the man named in the petition was indeed the biological father, and he agreed to pay temporary child support during the pendency of the case. The mother asked the court to order the father to pay retroactive child support back to the date of the child’s birth, in accordance with the child support guidelines. After a hearing, the trial court decided that a deviation from the guidelines was warranted because of the mother’s failure to inform the father of his possible paternity prior to filing the legitimation petition. The court accordingly ordered that retroactive support be paid only from the date of the filing of the petition. We affirm the trial court, but remand this case so the court can state in its order the “the total amount of retroactive support that would have been paid retroactively to the birth of the child, had a deviation not been made by the court,”  as is required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(F).

The plaintiff, a real estate development company, conditionally agreed to purchase real property from a trustee bank if the bank first obtained a satisfactory “Phase I” environmental site assessment of the property. The trustee bank hired the defendant environmental consulting company to perform a Phase I environmental site assessment. After performing an assessment, the defendant prepared a report in which it represented that it had conformed with the applicable professional standard in its assessment, that it had not detected any hazardous materials or environmental concerns at the subject property due to current or past uses of the property, that it had not identified any significant environmental concerns in the surrounding area of the subject property, and that it did not recommend further environmental review of the subject property. The plaintiff purchased the subject property in 1995. During residential development of the subject property in 2004, the plaintiff discovered the remains of a municipal garbage dump which had previously existed adjacent to the subject property, and which extended under a portion of the subject property. The plaintiff had the garbage removed and the land filled, and development was delayed as a result. The plaintiff development company sued the defendant environmental consulting company, alleging professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation. A bench trial was held, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm.

This is a post-divorce case. Paul D. Holden (“Husband”) filed a petition against his former spouse, Nanci I. Holden (“Wife”), seeking to modify the parties’ residential parenting plan pertaining to their minor children. Around the same time, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received an anonymous referral regarding the children’s “safety and possible sexual abuse” at Wife’s residence. The trial court subsequently appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. The court found, as was recommended by the guardian ad litem, that Husband was entitled to more parenting time with the children. The court also found that there was no foundation for the complaint made to DCS regarding the children. The court ordered Husband to pay the fees of the guardian ad litem. Husband appeals that order. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a two-car accident at the intersection of two county roads in Coffee County. The sixteen year-old driver of one of the two vehicles and his parents and sister, who were passengers in his vehicle, filed suit against the County for injuries they sustained in the accident, contending the County was at fault for failing to properly maintain the stop sign and vegetation at the intersection. The trial court attributed 50% of the fault to the County and 50% of the fault to the sixteen year-old driver. Because he was 50% at fault, the sixteen year-old driver was not awarded damages against the County; however, his parents and sister were awarded judgments against the County for 50% of their damages. On appeal, the County contends the parents are barred from recovering against it due to their negligence and negligent entrustment. The County also contends his sister was negligent for riding in the vehicle. We affirm.

Plaintiffs purchased property from defendant by Warranty Deed which stated the property contained 15 acres. Plaintiffs subsequently learned in litigation with a neighbor over the boundary line, that the parcel only contained 10.66 acres. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendant to recover damages and the Trial Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to damages under the warranties in the Deed in the amount of $6,660.00 for the shortage of acreage plus costs and the judgment they incurred in the boundary line dispute with their neighbor. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.  60.02 motion for relief from judgment. Following a bench trial and judgment in favor of the defendant, a third party provided additional materials pursuant to an agreed discovery order, which were not previously disclosed to the parties before trial. The plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02, requesting that the judgment be set aside based on this newly discovered evidence. The plaintiff also argued that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel should be applied to grant relief from the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. After careful review, we find that the trial court incorrectly applied the law in deciding on the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion. Therefore, we vacate and remand.

The trial court held Husband in contempt because he failed to comply with the terms of a postdivorce agreed order which modified the terms of the divorce decree regarding the disposition of the marital residence. On appeal, Husband argues that the agreed order was void because the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree after it became final. We hold that the agreed order, which was a modification of the divorce decree by the parties, was valid and enforceable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in enforcing the terms of the agreed order by holding Husband in contempt of court for noncompliance with the order.

In this suit on a credit card debt, the Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment on the amount claimed. On appeal, we affirm.

The majority holds that the Judgment denominated “Final Judgment” reducing the previous Judgment from $723,426.27 to $598,426.27 was a “juristic act” of acceptance of the remittitur under protest. I do not agree.

John Wayne Webb was injured in a car wreck and filed suit against two other drivers. A jury found defendant Brandon O. Canada to be solely at fault and awarded Mr. Webb $723,426.27 in compensatory damages against Mr. Canada. An order was entered awarding Mr. Webb judgment against Mr. Canada in the amount of $723,426.27 and dismissing the case as to the other driver, Douglas D. Townsend. Mr. Canada filed a motion seeking a new trial or in the alternative, a remittitur. Following a hearing, the trial court suggested a remittitur in the amount of $125,000. Final judgment was entered on July 24, 2006, referencing the remittitur and reducing the amount of the judgment to $598,426.27. On appeal, Mr. Canada argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Mr. Webb never accepted the remittitur, the verdict was excessive, and the remittitur was inadequate. After review, we find no error and affirm.

In this class action lawsuit filed against the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs a portion of their attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the Plaintiffs to be “prevailing parties” in the litigation and that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unwarranted and erroneous. We hold that although the Plaintiffs were not successful on all of their claims, they achieved enough success in their lawsuit to be “prevailing parties.” We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding Plaintiffs $45,000 in attorney’s fees, and consequently affirm.

The appellant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his appeal from general sessions court when he failed to appear on the date of the hearing. He claimed that he had gone to the wrong courthouse on the hearing date. We affirm.

The primary residential parent of the parties' eleven-year-old child requested permission to relocate to Georgia because her husband accepted employment that provided a significant increase in pay and better opportunities for advancement. The father opposed the relocation. The trial court, which made no findings of fact, denied the request based upon the conclusion the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. We have determined the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding that the mother had a reasonable purpose for relocating to Georgia. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant the requested relocation to Georgia.

This appeal involves a prisoner seeking parole. The petitioner was convicted in 1981 and is serving a life sentence. In 2004, he was denied parole based on the severity of his offense. He filed the instant petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, claiming violations of his constitutional right to equal protection and due process, and a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The trial court dismissed the petition on its face, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner filed this appeal. We affirm, concluding that the petition does not state a claim for relief.

Appellant asserts the circuit court erred by dismissing this action as untimely under the savings statute. We affirm.

On this appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding $1,500.00 per month as alimony in futuro to the wife. Finding no basis for determining the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony in this amount, we affirm.