APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An inmate at the Dickson County Jail who was attacked by another inmate filed this action against co-defendants, Dickson County and the Sheriff of Dickson County to recover damages for his personal injuries. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint against both defendants without stating the legal grounds for its conclusion. The plaintiff contends the defendants breached their duty to prevent foreseeable harm because the defendants left a mop in the jail, which was not secured or locked away, and the defendants knew or should have known that a mop could be used by an inmate as a weapon. Penal institutions have a duty to use reasonable and  ordinary care to prevent foreseeable attacks on inmates by other inmates. For a penal institution to be liable for injuries resulting from inmate-on-inmate assaults, the general rule is that the institution must have had prior notice of an attack. The defendants supported their motion for summary judgment with affidavits stating that they had no notice and no reason to believe that the plaintiff was likely to be assaulted. This shifted the burden to the plaintiff to establish that a dispute of fact exists concerning whether the defendants knew of or had reason to anticipate such an attack. The evidence presented by the plaintiff fails to create a dispute of this material fact. Accordingly, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of divorce proceedings. The parties were married for fourteen years and had two children. The trial court declared the parties divorced based on stipulated grounds; divided the marital estate; designated the mother primary residential parent and the father alternate residential parent; and ordered the father to pay the mother $200 per month in alimony in futuro. The father appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of her complaint arising out of the death of her Tennessee Walking Horse while the horse was being trained at Riverbend Stables, LLC. Plaintiff filed suit claiming the horse died as a result of the defendants’ negligence and gross negligence. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the claims of negligence were barred by the exculpatory provisions in the parties’ written agreement and Plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie claim of gross negligence. Finding the exculpatory agreement enforceable and the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning the claims for gross negligence or recklessness, we affirm.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” with respect to the claim of David Stone seeking damages arising out of the death of his wife, Rhonda Stone,1 who was killed by the alleged negligent driving of an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, the Stones had a personal liability “umbrella” insurance policy with State Farm, which provided $1 million in personal liability coverage above and beyond the Stones’ underlying insurance policies, including their automobile liability insurance policy. Their umbrella policy does not, by its language, include uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage. However, Mr. Stone argues that UM coverage should be read into their umbrella policy because the Stones did not reject such coverage in writing, which Mr. Stone says is required by the applicable statute. State Farm argues that the statute in question, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a) (2000), applies only to automobile insurance policies and does not impose the rejection-in-writing requirement on umbrella policies. Based upon the parties’ “Agreed Stipulations,” the lower court, at a bench trial, agreed with Mr. Stone’s interpretation of the statute. We disagree with the interpretation placed upon the statute by Mr. Stone and the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse.

This appeal involves a dispute between two attorneys over a contingency fee generated from a client’s case. The younger attorney worked as an associate at the senior attorney’s law firm, and both parties worked on the client’s case. When the case concluded, the associate sued the senior attorney, claiming that the parties had agreed to equally share the fee. The senior attorney testified that the associate had volunteered to work on the case for free. He further testified that pursuant to the parties’ arrangement, if he chose to pay the associate, he could unilaterally decide how much the associate’s services were worth. The trial court found that the parties had agreed to equally share the attorney’s fee generated in the case, and it awarded the associate one-half of the fee. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal involves concurrent findings of a special master and a trial court. The bank foreclosed on property and the owner filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure. The chancellor referred the matter to a special master for the determination of two factual issues. The special master found that the account in question was in arrears at the time of the foreclosure, and that no payments were made that were not properly credited to the account. The chancellor adopted the findings of the special master and granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The owner appeals, and we affirm.

Plaintiff homeowners sued defendant residential building contractors for breach of a home construction contract upon allegations of defective workmanship and abandonment of contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarded actual damages in an amount based upon the finding that the house was of no value. The trial court also awarded damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act upon a finding that the defendants violated the Act by willfully and knowingly misrepresenting that they were bonded. Upon appeal, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court, and accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in all respects.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s modification of a child’s custody due to a material change in circumstances. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s change of custody of her minor child to Father/Appellee. Specifically, Mother/Appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the finding of a material change in circumstances and also raises issues concerning trial court’s reliance on certain evidence. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm.

This appeal involves a jury’s award of punitive damages. The construction company entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to widen a portion of a highway. The homeowners entered into a contract with the construction company allowing the construction company to place excess materials generated from the highway project on the homeowners’ property. In exchange, the
homeowners would receive compensation based on the cubic fill area, and the company would fill and grade that portion of the homeowners’ property. The project required that the construction
company conduct extensive blasting near the homeowners’ house and vehicles. One of the homeowners became concerned when he witnessed the construction company placing various garbage items and tires on his property near the fill area. After three years, the construction company finished the project. The homeowners brought suit, alleging that the company failed to pay the amount due under the contract and caused damage to their house due to the blasting. The complaint also alleged that the company buried certain items, including tires, on the property which constituted an environmental tort. The homeowners’ amended complaint stated a cause of action in nuisance and also sought an award of punitive damages in the amount of $1 million dollars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the homeowners for the nuisance claim in the amount of $3,305.00 and found that punitive damages should be imposed on the construction company. The jury found in favor of the construction company for the environmental tort claim. After the second phase of the trial, the jury returned an award of $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court remitted the award to $1 million, the amount of the homeowners’ ad damnum. The construction company appeals, and we reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.

Appellant, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the prison disciplinary board’s findings.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon Appellant’s alleged failure to execute his petition in compliance with the statutory requirements found at T.C.A §§ 27-8-104 and 27-8-106. Finding that Appellant had failed to have his petition notarized, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This wrongful death action was brought by the widow of deceased, who committed suicide in the county jail. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant County on the grounds that the undisputed evidence established that the defendant’s suicide was not foreseeable. On appeal, we affirm.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Linkous’s Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that summary judgment was correctly granted in this case because I believe Ms. Linkous has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether her husband’s suicide was foreseeable under the circumstances, and whether the Defendants’ conduct was reasonable.

Plaintiff brought this action to void two deeds executed by the deceased shortly before he died. Plaintiff sought to void the deeds on the grounds that the grantees of the deed exerted undue influence on deceased in obtaining the deeds and that deceased was not competent to make the deeds. In a bench trial, the chancellor held that plaintiff did not prove undue influence and that the deceased was fully competent to contract and execute the deeds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Appellant brought suit against Appellee under Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-5-111 for damage to his vehicle’s engine allegedly caused by Appellee’s negligent performance of an engine flush procedure. Following Plaintiff/Appellant’s proof, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal in favor of Defendant/Appellee. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a divorce action in which the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to § 36-4-129(b) without attributing fault to either party, divided the parties’ property, awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1500 per month, ordered Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance, and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the division of property, the award of alimony, and the award to Wife of her attorney’s fees. We affirm.

Petitioners, Father and his wife, filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for failure to pay child support, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse, and for adoption of child by Father’s wife. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for directed verdict at the close of Petitioners’ proof and dismissed the petition. Petitioners appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves the lower court’s dismissal of a case on the basis of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff, a resident of Shelby County, brought suit in circuit court in Shelby County. The plaintiff alleged that he drank a glass of cranberry juice that contained a dead fly at one of the defendant’s restaurants, located in Tunica County, Mississippi. From that incident, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered emotional and physical harm. The defendant’s answer requested that the court dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, contending that the more appropriate forum was a circuit court in Tunica County, Mississippi. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the claim on the basis of forum non conveniens. After the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, the trial court entered an order denying the motion and setting out its findings concerning its decision to decline jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

This case involves an endorsement to a medical malpractice insurance policy. The physician insured under the policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission of the endorsement based upon a mutual mistake of fact. We affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing the physician’s case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Dr. Brian E. Harris (“Doctor”), the insured, brought this action for breach of contract and on the basis of various torts. He alleged that UnumProvident Corporation (“Insurance Company” or “the company”) had wrongfully canceled his disability policy and retroactively rejected his disability claim. The trial court granted Insurance Company summary judgment. The court found that Doctor had filed his suit outside the applicable limitations periods. Doctor appeals, claiming that his suit
was timely filed. We affirm.

A jury awarded the plaintiff homeowners judgment against their residential building contractor for damages sustained by the plaintiffs when the slope upon which their home was constructed failed. The defendant contractor appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing an expert witness to testify outside his area of expertise and by allowing another witness to testify as an expert when the plaintiff had failed to identify him as a witness before trial. Upon careful review of the record, it is our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of the testimony of these witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of a damage award for negligence. The plaintiff owned a house with a detached carport. During a delivery, the defendant company’s driver backed the delivery truck into one of the four columns supporting the carport structure, causing it to partially collapse. The plaintiff homeowner filed a lawsuit against the defendant company, alleging negligence and seeking damages. Liability was conceded and a trial proceeded on the amount of damages. There was disputed testimony on the condition of the roof structure of the carport before the defendant’s driver hit it. After the trial, the trial court found that the carport did not have a “roof” at the time of the accident, and so it deducted the cost of the “roof” of the carport from the damage award. The defendant company appealed. In the first appeal, we found that the record did not clearly indicate the trial court’s findings underlying the award of damages, and remanded the case for clarification. On remand, the trial court explained its damage award. The defendant company appeals again in light of the trial court’s clarification of the record. Finding that the preponderance of the evidence does not weigh against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his three-year old daughter. Based upon the record that included persistent violent behavior directed at the child’s mother, we conclude the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s rights.

The administrators of the estate of a woman who died after being transported by ambulance from a nursing home to a hospital filed a wrongful death suit which named the nursing home and the ambulance service as defendants. The nursing home responded with a motion to compel arbitration, citing a provision in the admissions agreement which the decedent had signed, requiring both parties to submit any disputes to arbitration and to waive their rights to jury trial. The trial court found the arbitration clause to be unconscionable and denied the motion. The nursing home then filed a direct appeal to this court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-319. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102 as amended in 2001. Plaintiff asserted that the 2001 amendments to the general statute repealed by implication a 2000 private act establishing the compensation of the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk. The trial court determined the amendments to the statute superseded the private act, and that the salary for the juvenile court clerk should be established according to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102 as amended in 2001. We reverse.