APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendants appeal the trial court’s failure to set aside, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the grant of summary judgment in this intentional tort case. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

This case arises from a contract dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein, Nashville Hockey Club, entered into a “Sponsorship Agreement” with the Appellee herein, Robert J. Young Company. Subsequently, the parties agreed to change their agreement. As a result, the parties entered into a subsequent “Letter of Agreement.” When a players’ strike occurred, Appellee wished to cancel the contract. Appellant claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and particularly the force majeure clause contained therein, were not superseded by the “Letter of Agreement.” The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellee and, following a hearing on Appellant’s counterclaim, granted judgment in favor of Appellant but did not award damages based upon its finding that Appellant had mitigated all of its damages. Appellant appeals on the issue of damages. Appellee appeals on the issue of what, if any, agreement exists between the parties. Finding that the plain language of the “Letter of Agreement” supports a finding that same supersedes the “Sponsorship Agreement,” we reverse and remand.
 

This appeal involves the classification and division of marital property after a marriage of approximately thirteen years. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of various assets and debts, and the resulting distribution of the marital estate was inequitable. Therefore, we modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

This appeal involves a change in child custody and a petition for contempt. When the parties divorced, they agreed upon a parenting plan providing that Mother would have primary custody of their two sons. Less than a year later, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, seeking primary custody. Mother filed a counter-petition, also seeking modification of the parenting plan. She also filed a petition to cite Father in contempt. Since the divorce, Mother had become pregnant by another man, and she did not tell the child’s father that the child was born. Mother also lied to Father and others about the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth. Mother had remained unemployed since the divorce, and her only source of monthly income was child support from Father for his two sons. The parties’ oldest son was doing poorly in school and was frequently tardy or absent. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was in the best interest of the children for Father to have primary custody. The court also found that Father’s actions did not rise to the level of contempt. Mother appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to change custody, its refusal to find Father in contempt, and other procedural issues. Finding no error, we affirm.

The trial court held that lessor was entitled to full rent for summer months although the air conditioning was inoperable. The trial court reasoned that since lessor terminated the month to month tenancy months earlier due to the fact that lessor did not intend to repair the HVAC system, then lessor should not be penalized and rent is owed for those months. We affirm.

The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the defendant, a Kentucky hospital, had sufficient minimum contacts with Tennessee for our courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Plaintiff contends Tennessee has general personal jurisdiction over the hospital, which is a Kentucky corporation, because annual reports filed with the Kentucky Secretary of State listed a Nashville, Tennessee, address as the “principal office address” of the corporation, the corporation’s officers and directors are located in Tennessee, and it is a subsidiary of a hospital corporation based in Tennessee. The trial court ruled that the defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Tennessee to justify the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over the defendant. We affirm the jurisdictional determination.

Decedent’s will could not be located after his death, and decedent’s widow and stepdaughters
petitioned the trial court to recognize and establish a copy of such will as decedent’s last will and
testament. The trial court denied the petition upon determining that the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to overcome the strong presumption that the lost will was revoked by decedent.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

In the Trial Court, at the conclusion of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for the entry of an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2), and before the Trial Judge ruled on that Motion plaintiff moved for a voluntary dismissal which the Trial Court denied, and granted defendant’s Motion for an involuntary dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff’s Motion for a voluntary dismissal.

Plaintiffs were granted a voluntary dismissal of their action, and defendant has appealed on the grounds that the Trial Court and attorneys were guilty of fraudulent conduct, and that he had a counter-claim pending at the time the action was dismissed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a divorce case. When the parties met in 1995, the husband was in the Philippines working for an American corporation. The wife was a resident and citizen of the Philippines and the husband was a U. S. citizen. After a brief relationship, the wife learned that she was pregnant. The husband moved back to the United States, but made periodic trips to the Philippines to see their child. In 1998, the wife obtained a marriage visa, and she and the child moved to California to live with the husband. After signing a prenuptial agreement in California, the parties were married in Las Vegas. Two more children were born of the marriage. In 2003, both parties filed for divorce. After a trial, the parties were divorced and the husband was ordered to pay child support, alimony in futuro, and all of the parties’ marital debt. The husband was also ordered to pay for the wife’s medical insurance and uninsured medical expenses as additional spousal support. The wife was designated as the children’s primary residential parent. The parties were ordered to hold the marital home as tenants in common; the husband would pay the mortgage and the wife would live in the home with the parties’ children. The husband appeals. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s adoption of the Wife’s parenting plan except insofar as it awards the federal income tax exemptions to the wife, but vacate the child support award and remand for a recalculation of the husband’s income and his child support obligation. We also vacate the trial court’s order regarding spousal support and remand for recalculation of the husband’s income and re-evaluation of the wife’s need and the husband’s ability to pay support. We affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s decision.

The trial court awarded Defendant/Employer summary judgment in this wrongful discharge action. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from the termination of a police officer for violation of the department’s deadly force policy. While in the apartment of his girlfriend’s mother, the off-duty officer shot the unarmed husband of his girlfriend in the back and paralyzed him from the waist down. The officer was attempting to stop the enraged husband from entering a room where the girlfriend, her mother, and a young child were located. He did not warn the husband that he might use deadly force prior to doing so. The police department and the civil service commission concluded that, for various reasons, the officer’s use of deadly force was not authorized. The officer appealed his termination to chancery court, primarily arguing that the department had failed to consider a parallel burglary investigation report in the pre-termination hearing. Although the civil service commission had concluded that consideration of that file would not have altered the outcome, the chancellor remanded the case back to the commission for consideration of the entire report. On remand, the commission reviewed the entire report but declined to hear further testimony. It re-affirmed its original decision. The officer sought review in chancery court and, after an unfavorable result there, appealed the case to this Court. We conclude that, even if the officer’s assertions are correct, there still exists substantial and material evidence to support the decisions below. If there was error below, it was harmless. Affirmed.

This appeal involves an attempt to pierce a corporate veil. The plaintiff purchased a hot tub from a corporation, paying $3,000 by check and agreeing to finance the balance of $1,178. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the two sole shareholders of the corporation had been deadlocked and involved in litigation for almost two years. After the corporation accepted the plaintiff’s $3,000 check, but before it delivered the hot tub, the litigation ended. A jury determined that one of the shareholders held a perfected security interest in practically all of the corporation’s assets, and the judge entered an order recognizing that shareholder’s right to foreclose on the collateral if necessary. Both shareholders filed post-trial motions, then submitted a proposed “agreed amended final order” that was approved by the trial judge. The agreed order provided that, “in lieu of foreclosure,” the secured party-shareholder would be awarded all the assets of the corporation outright. The corporation was left with no assets and ceased to operate. The plaintiff never received her hot tub or a refund of the $3,000 she paid to the corporation. Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit seeking a judgment against the corporation and against the two shareholders individually. The trial court entered a total judgment against the corporation of $17,663.52, which included treble damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. However, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on the individual shareholders. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This case arises from a dispute over an antenuptial agreement. Appellant Husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement, whereby Husband was obligated to pay for daily necessities. Wife executed a durable power-of-attorney, naming her adult Children, the Appellees herein, as her attorneys-in-fact. When Wife became unable to care for herself because of advancing Alzheimer’s, a dispute arose between Husband Appellant and Children Appellees as to who would be responsible for the costs associated with wife’s care. The trial court held that, under the antenuptial agreement, Husband Appellant was responsible for these expenses. Husband Appellant appeals. We affirm.

This case involves a claim for breach of warranty. The plaintiff purchased a used Ford from a GMC dealership. The truck came with Ford’s bumper to bumper limited warranty. The warranty specifically excluded from coverage any damage caused by after-market components and/or non-
Ford components. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the truck had three after-market modifications: a “super chip,” a “K& N” air filter, and a “Magnaflow ” muffler. The plaintiff began experiencing oil consumption problems and trouble with the engine. He took the vehicle to several Ford dealerships for repair. One dealership service department recommended replacing the engine of the truck, but Ford denied warranty coverage, pointing to the after-market modifications as the cause of the truck’s problems. The plaintiff sent Ford a letter of revocation of acceptance, and thereafter filed suit alleging several claims, including breach of warranty and a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. A bench trial was held, and the court ruled in favor of Ford on all claims. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by the majority. It is undisputed that Mrs. Nelson’s medical condition, Alzheimer’s Disease, required that she be placed in a skilled nursing facility. Mr. and Mrs. Nelson, having executed an “Antenuptial Agreement” prior to marriage, the question presented is who is responsible for the payment of the skilled nursing care. The majority concludes the responsibility lies with Mr. Nelson, looking to paragraph three of the “Antenuptial Agreement and interpreting the phrase “other daily necessities.” The majority opines it is unfortunate that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Nelson thought that either would need long-term care and such was not provided for in the Antenuptial Agreement. I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority. It is clear from reading the Antenuptial Agreement that Mr. and Mrs. Nelson were desirous of keeping their property separate as each had children of another marriage and, to the extent possible, neither wished to burden the other with debts. As I view the entire Antenuptial Agreement, the phrase used by the majority to impose responsibility upon Mr. Nelson I would read it to obligate Mr. Nelson to provide such items as toothpaste, deodorant, toiletries, and other such items, but not extraordinary medical expenses. I do not read the phrase to clearly state it is Mr. Nelson’s responsibility to provide, in essence, hospital care or nursing care for Mrs. Nelson.

An insulator and his wife sued multiple corporate defendants for damages related to his development of mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. Most of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment based upon a release agreement signed by the plaintiffs in 1980 in settlement of another lawsuit concerning asbestos exposure. The trial court denied the motions for summary judgment. We have concluded that, except as to any claims arising from post-release asbestos exposure, the trial court erred in denying the motions for summary judgment.

The trial court determined Defendant orally agreed to assume outstanding debt on personal property offered for consignment sales. The trial court further determined Defendant was equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. We reverse.

This is an action for breach of contract against a bank. Plaintiff Trustee sued bank for breach of the terms of a certificate of deposit (CD) by allowing her husband, who was neither the depositor nor her authorized agent, to redeem the CD held in trust for a $100,000 cashier’s check payable to Plaintiff as trustee. The Plaintiff Trustee appeals the trial court’s award of partial summary judgment to Defendant bank. Despite the bank’s breach of contract, Plaintiff Trustee was unable to maintain a suit founded upon her husband’s lack of authority to redeem the CD. The trial court found she ratified the redemption by previously filing suit against a different bank that had accepted the unendorsed cashier’s check for deposit, opened a checking account in Plaintiff’s name as trustee, and paid out the proceeds over Plaintiff’s forged signatures. The trial court concluded that by asserting ownership in the cashier’s check and the unauthorized checking account in the previous suit, the Plaintiff Trustee had manifested a clear intent to affirm her husband’s redemption of the CD. We agree. Even though Plaintiff Trustee pled alternative, inconsistent claims in the first suit, which is still pending, each claim was necessarily premised upon her husband’s authorized redemption of the CD. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State filed a petition for contempt against a man who had fallen far behind in his child support obligation, in part because he was incarcerated for a large portion of the time. The trial court reduced the arrearage to judgment in the amount of $28,632, found the father in contempt for failing to pay while he was not in jail, and sentenced him to serve 90 days in jail. Because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the father had the ability to pay child support during the periods in question, we vacate the sentence for criminal contempt. We also vacate the arrearage judgment and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of arrearage.

In this dispute over the sale of a home, the Trial Court initially granted purchasers a rescission of the sale, but purchasers appealed to this Court. We ruled that the Trial Court had failed to put the purchasers in the position they would have occupied had the sale never occurred, and remanded the issues of various costs, pre-judgment interest and the fair rental of the property to take into consideration in placing the parties in a pre-contract status quo position. Also, remanded was the issue of attorney’s fees and whether the sellers had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. On remand, the Trial Court ruled that sellers had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and awarded attorney’s fees and pre-judgment interest, as well as adjusting the Judgment to place the parties in status quo upon rescission.

The appeal ensued by the sellers, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, as well as an award of attorney’s fees to the purchasers for their representation on appeal.

This case involves the termination of a municipal police officer. The police department received a report on an attempted suicide by a mental patient. The appellant officer and other officers responded. When the officers arrived at the scene, the suicide victim was sitting on his front porch, bleeding from self-inflicted wounds. As the officers approached the individual, he tried to flee. Attempting to gain control over the individual, the officers repeatedly struck him with their police
batons. The individual ran from the police and fell in the street. The officers again struck him with batons and handcuffed him while he was on the ground. The appellant officer held him on the ground by placing his baton across the back of his shoulders. Shortly afterward, the individual stopped breathing and died of a heart attack. After an investigation, three of the officers, including the appellant, were terminated for using excessive force in this incident. The terminations were upheld by the municipal civil service commission. The three officers then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that the commission’s decision was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial and material evidence. The trial court granted the petition as to two officers and reversed their terminations. However, it denied the petition as to the appellant officer because his termination was based on his disciplinary history as well as his conduct during the incident in question. The terminated officer now appeals. We affirm, finding that the commission’s decision to uphold the officer’s termination was supported by substantial and material evidence in the record.

This is an appeal involving a post-divorce award of alimony in futuro. The court awarded the wife a divorce from the husband after 36 years of marriage. The husband has a bachelor’s and master’s degree in electrical engineering. The wife does not have a college degree and makes a living as a hair stylist. In the final divorce decree, the court awarded the wife temporary alimony in the amount of $3,500 per month. The husband sought to reduce his alimony obligation. At the hearing, the court found a material change in circumstances and reduced the husband’s alimony obligation from $3,500 a month to $2,000 a month. The court ordered, however, that this $2,000 a month award was in futuro until the wife’s death or remarriage. The husband appeals, and we affirm and remand for a determination of an appropriate award of the wife’s attorney’s fees.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. The plaintiff purchased a vacant nightclub and sought to reopen it as a topless club. To this end, the plaintiff nightclub owner filed an application for a beer permit and a compensated dance permit from the city beer board, and for a certificate of occupancy with the local construction code enforcement office. After protracted litigation, the nightclub owner obtained the necessary beer and compensated dance permits. Subsequently, the construction code office issued a certificate of occupancy to the nightclub owner, but later sought to restrict it to prohibit sexually-oriented entertainment. This was unsuccessful, so the construction code enforcement office revoked the certificate. The nightclub owner then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus against the county and the construction code enforcement office, asking the trial court to compel the construction code office to issue an unrestricted certificate of occupancy. The defendants argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s intended use for adult entertainment was not “grandfathered” because the plaintiff had abandoned the nightclub while seeking the required permits. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the nightclub owner and granted the writ of mandamus. The defendants now appeal. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not err in finding that the nightclub owner’s business use was lawful, and that the nightclub owner did not abandon the property during the time it was involved in litigation over the beer permit.

The trial court held that a mortgage company’s branch manager had apparent authority to bind the company to local advertising contracts although there was a limitation on the branch manager’s authority which prohibited execution of contracts without the company’s approval. Since the mortgage company established the branch manager as a general agent, it was incumbent on the company to notify third parties of any limitations on the agent’s authority. Since it did not do so, the third party had a good faith belief in the agent’s apparent authority, and the trial court is affirmed.