APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a jury’s award of punitive damages. The construction company entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to widen a portion of a highway. The homeowners entered into a contract with the construction company allowing the construction company to place excess materials generated from the highway project on the homeowners’ property. In exchange, the
homeowners would receive compensation based on the cubic fill area, and the company would fill and grade that portion of the homeowners’ property. The project required that the construction
company conduct extensive blasting near the homeowners’ house and vehicles. One of the homeowners became concerned when he witnessed the construction company placing various garbage items and tires on his property near the fill area. After three years, the construction company finished the project. The homeowners brought suit, alleging that the company failed to pay the amount due under the contract and caused damage to their house due to the blasting. The complaint also alleged that the company buried certain items, including tires, on the property which constituted an environmental tort. The homeowners’ amended complaint stated a cause of action in nuisance and also sought an award of punitive damages in the amount of $1 million dollars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the homeowners for the nuisance claim in the amount of $3,305.00 and found that punitive damages should be imposed on the construction company. The jury found in favor of the construction company for the environmental tort claim. After the second phase of the trial, the jury returned an award of $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court remitted the award to $1 million, the amount of the homeowners’ ad damnum. The construction company appeals, and we reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.

Plaintiff homeowners sued defendant residential building contractors for breach of a home construction contract upon allegations of defective workmanship and abandonment of contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarded actual damages in an amount based upon the finding that the house was of no value. The trial court also awarded damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act upon a finding that the defendants violated the Act by willfully and knowingly misrepresenting that they were bonded. Upon appeal, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court, and accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in all respects.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s modification of a child’s custody due to a material change in circumstances. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s change of custody of her minor child to Father/Appellee. Specifically, Mother/Appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the finding of a material change in circumstances and also raises issues concerning trial court’s reliance on certain evidence. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm.

Appellant, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the prison disciplinary board’s findings.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon Appellant’s alleged failure to execute his petition in compliance with the statutory requirements found at T.C.A §§ 27-8-104 and 27-8-106. Finding that Appellant had failed to have his petition notarized, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This wrongful death action was brought by the widow of deceased, who committed suicide in the county jail. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant County on the grounds that the undisputed evidence established that the defendant’s suicide was not foreseeable. On appeal, we affirm.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Linkous’s Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that summary judgment was correctly granted in this case because I believe Ms. Linkous has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether her husband’s suicide was foreseeable under the circumstances, and whether the Defendants’ conduct was reasonable.

Plaintiff brought this action to void two deeds executed by the deceased shortly before he died. Plaintiff sought to void the deeds on the grounds that the grantees of the deed exerted undue influence on deceased in obtaining the deeds and that deceased was not competent to make the deeds. In a bench trial, the chancellor held that plaintiff did not prove undue influence and that the deceased was fully competent to contract and execute the deeds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Appellant brought suit against Appellee under Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-5-111 for damage to his vehicle’s engine allegedly caused by Appellee’s negligent performance of an engine flush procedure. Following Plaintiff/Appellant’s proof, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal in favor of Defendant/Appellee. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a divorce action in which the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to § 36-4-129(b) without attributing fault to either party, divided the parties’ property, awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1500 per month, ordered Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance, and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the division of property, the award of alimony, and the award to Wife of her attorney’s fees. We affirm.

Petitioners, Father and his wife, filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for failure to pay child support, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse, and for adoption of child by Father’s wife. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for directed verdict at the close of Petitioners’ proof and dismissed the petition. Petitioners appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves the lower court’s dismissal of a case on the basis of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff, a resident of Shelby County, brought suit in circuit court in Shelby County. The plaintiff alleged that he drank a glass of cranberry juice that contained a dead fly at one of the defendant’s restaurants, located in Tunica County, Mississippi. From that incident, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered emotional and physical harm. The defendant’s answer requested that the court dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, contending that the more appropriate forum was a circuit court in Tunica County, Mississippi. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the claim on the basis of forum non conveniens. After the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, the trial court entered an order denying the motion and setting out its findings concerning its decision to decline jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

This case involves an endorsement to a medical malpractice insurance policy. The physician insured under the policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission of the endorsement based upon a mutual mistake of fact. We affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing the physician’s case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his three-year old daughter. Based upon the record that included persistent violent behavior directed at the child’s mother, we conclude the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s rights.

The administrators of the estate of a woman who died after being transported by ambulance from a nursing home to a hospital filed a wrongful death suit which named the nursing home and the ambulance service as defendants. The nursing home responded with a motion to compel arbitration, citing a provision in the admissions agreement which the decedent had signed, requiring both parties to submit any disputes to arbitration and to waive their rights to jury trial. The trial court found the arbitration clause to be unconscionable and denied the motion. The nursing home then filed a direct appeal to this court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-319. We affirm.

Dr. Brian E. Harris (“Doctor”), the insured, brought this action for breach of contract and on the basis of various torts. He alleged that UnumProvident Corporation (“Insurance Company” or “the company”) had wrongfully canceled his disability policy and retroactively rejected his disability claim. The trial court granted Insurance Company summary judgment. The court found that Doctor had filed his suit outside the applicable limitations periods. Doctor appeals, claiming that his suit
was timely filed. We affirm.

A jury awarded the plaintiff homeowners judgment against their residential building contractor for damages sustained by the plaintiffs when the slope upon which their home was constructed failed. The defendant contractor appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing an expert witness to testify outside his area of expertise and by allowing another witness to testify as an expert when the plaintiff had failed to identify him as a witness before trial. Upon careful review of the record, it is our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of the testimony of these witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of a damage award for negligence. The plaintiff owned a house with a detached carport. During a delivery, the defendant company’s driver backed the delivery truck into one of the four columns supporting the carport structure, causing it to partially collapse. The plaintiff homeowner filed a lawsuit against the defendant company, alleging negligence and seeking damages. Liability was conceded and a trial proceeded on the amount of damages. There was disputed testimony on the condition of the roof structure of the carport before the defendant’s driver hit it. After the trial, the trial court found that the carport did not have a “roof” at the time of the accident, and so it deducted the cost of the “roof” of the carport from the damage award. The defendant company appealed. In the first appeal, we found that the record did not clearly indicate the trial court’s findings underlying the award of damages, and remanded the case for clarification. On remand, the trial court explained its damage award. The defendant company appeals again in light of the trial court’s clarification of the record. Finding that the preponderance of the evidence does not weigh against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102 as amended in 2001. Plaintiff asserted that the 2001 amendments to the general statute repealed by implication a 2000 private act establishing the compensation of the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk. The trial court determined the amendments to the statute superseded the private act, and that the salary for the juvenile court clerk should be established according to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102 as amended in 2001. We reverse.

This application for an extraordinary appeal concerns whether a trial court should consider matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2) and (3). The trial court declined to consider matters outside the pleadings and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because the trial court should have considered the affidavits and other documents submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to the motion to dismiss, we grant the application, vacate the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the motion.

Plaintiff, while excavating, struck a gas line which resulted in an explosion and fire, seriously injuring plaintiff. Plaintiffs brought this action against several defendants and the case went to trial against the City of Lebanon and Bush Construction Company, Inc. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and allocated percentages of fault as to both defendants and the plaintiff. The Trial Court entered Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and defendants appealed. We reverse the Trial Court Judgment and remand for a new trial on the grounds that a part of the charge to the jury was erroneous.

The parents of a young man who committed suicide after being discharged from a psychiatric hospital sued the hospital and the treating psychiatrist for wrongful death. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the basis that the decedent’s act of suicide was an intervening, superseding cause. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Two children of the late Bertie M. Taylor filed this action against two of their siblings, attorneys-in-fact for Ms. Taylor, to set aside a quitclaim deed conveying land of their mother executed through the use of a durable power of attorney. Plaintiffs alleged that the power of attorney was invalid due to Bertie Taylor’s lack of mental capacity; that the quitclaim deed was invalid because it contained the signature of only one of the attorneys-in-fact; and that the Defendants breached their confidential relationship with Ms. Taylor by engaging in self-dealing and/or undue influence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Hoyt on the issues of Ms. Taylor’s mental capacity and the required number of signatures on the quitclaim deed; and granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issues of Defendants’ violation of their duties as attorneys-in-fact, violation of the confidential relationship and Defendant Jack Taylor’s undue influence of Ms. Taylor. The Court declared the quitclaim deed void and vested each Plaintiff with a one-fifth interest in the property. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issues of Ms. Taylor’s mental capacity, Defendants’ violation of their duties as attorneys-in-fact and violation of the confidential relationship; we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of Defendant Jack Taylor’s undue influence; we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of the required number of signatures on the deed; and we affirm the relief granted Plaintiffs by the trial court.

This Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) case was dismissed by the Trial Court after it concluded that it lost subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with this case once a voluntary dismissal was taken in the initiating tribunal in Maryland. The Trial Court concluded that the present case also must be dismissed because there had been at least two previous voluntary dismissals and the dismissal by the Maryland tribunal operated to bar the present case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). We hold that the Trial Court retained subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the petition by the initiating tribunal. We further conclude that the present case is not barred by the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Progress Printing Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee (“Trial Court”) seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment obtained in Virginia against Reliable Printing & Graphic Design, Inc. (“Defendant”). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming, in part, that the Virginia court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant and, therefore, the Virginia judgment is void. The Trial Court entered an order on June 7, 2007, inter alia, denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition, and granting Plaintiff’s petition to domesticate the Virginia judgment. Defendant appeals to this Court. We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the petition, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s petition to domesticate the Virginia judgment, and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings.