APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm.

At the parties’ divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent of their minor child and Father was allowed visitation. The parties continued living together for approximately one year following their divorce, and thereafter, they exercised alternating one-week visitation for  approximately one year. Father petitioned to be named primary residential parent citing his increased visitation with the child as a material change in circumstances. The trial court denied his petition without making the findings required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). We vacate the trial court’s order denying Father’s petition, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to make the necessary findings and then to render its decision accordingly.

Appellees, as shareholders, leased a commercial building and property from a relative. When the relative died, the property was left to numerous heirs, including Appellees and the non-shareholder Appellants, and Appellee Carolyn Lyle was named property manager. Appellees fell behind on their rent owed pursuant to the lease, but ultimately repaid the arrearage, and disbursements were made to the property co-owners. Appellants sued, claiming that Lyle should be removed as property manager, that she was obligated to declare the lease in default and to re-let the property, and that the Appellees breached their fiduciary duties to the other property co-owners. The trial court denied Appellants' claims, and we affirm.

The plaintiff made a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house burned. The insurer denied the claim because, after the policy was issued, the plaintiff deeded the property to his sons so that it would pass to them if he died, and he did not notify the insurer. The plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer claimed that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, that he breached a “warranty of ownership” under the policy, that he had a duty to disclose the change of ownership after the policy issued, and that he violated a provision of the policy addressing concealment and fraud. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the insurer to pay him approximately $72,000 in accordance with the policy limits. The trial court also awarded discretionary costs to the plaintiff, but it denied the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. The insurer appeals, claiming that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the policy for various reasons, and that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff discretionary costs. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in declining to award prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court’s award pursuant to the insurance policy and its award of discretionary costs, and we vacate the portion of the judgment denying the request for prejudgment interest and remand for such an award.

Decedent was struck and killed by an on-duty City of Memphis police officer while attempting to cross the street. The trial court awarded $7,500.00 in a wrongful death award. Decedent’s personal representative appeals, seeking an increased award. We affirm.

Plaintiff landlord brought a detainer action against defendant in Sessions Court. On appeal to the Circuit Court, the Trial Court in its Judgment, awarded possession to plaintiff and awarded plaintiff a Judgment of $17,800.00 for the rent due and one-half of the 2009 ad valorem property taxes. Defendant has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Circuit Court.

The plaintiff/appellant, an owner-operator truck driver, entered into a note, disclosure, and security agreement with the defendant/appellee, Union Planters Bank, for the purchase of a tractor-trailer truck. At the time of the original agreement, the bank promised to have the vehicle’s title converted to a Tennessee certificate of title. The plaintiff filed suit several years later to recover damages incurred due to the bank’s failure to timely provide a copy of said title. Prior to trial, the bank moved to compel arbitration and to strike the plaintiff’s jury demand based on contractual language found in the original agreement and a subsequent refinancing agreement. The trial court declined to compel arbitration but granted the motion to strike. At trial, the plaintiff recovered in breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the enforcement of his pre-dispute contractual waiver of the right to trial by jury, the involuntary dismissal of his Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim, the calculation of his damages, and the denial of his claim for prejudgment interest. We affirm.

The plaintiff/appellant, an owner-operator truck driver, entered into a note, disclosure, and security agreement with the defendant/appellee, Union Planters Bank, for the purchase of a tractor-trailer truck. At the time of the original agreement, the bank promised to have the vehicle's title converted to a Tennessee certificate of title. The plaintiff filed suit several years later to recover damages incurred due to the bank's failure to timely provide a copy of said title. Prior to trial, the bank moved to compel arbitration and to strike the plaintiff's jury demand based on contractual language found in the original agreement and a subsequent refinancing agreement. The trial court declined to compel arbitration but granted the motion to strike. At trial, the plaintiff recovered in breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the enforcement of his pre-dispute contractual waiver of the right to trial by jury, the involuntary dismissal of his Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim, the calculation of his damages, and the denial of his claim for prejudgment interest. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the Appellant's petition for writ of mandamus for failure to state a claim. Because the Appellant failed to timely file his notice of appeal, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss.

Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor.

Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor.

This appeal involves a mother’s claims against her deceased adult son’s estate. The trial court denied the majority of her claims but granted her partial relief on one issue that was not disputed by the son’s estate. The mother appealed. We affirm.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Inmate appeals the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a decision of the prison disciplinary board. Because we have determined that the trial court erred in failing to allow the inmate to amend his petition, we vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

This is a divorce case ending a twenty-one year marriage. Following a three day trial, the trial court entered a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father as the primary residential parent, granting Father decision making authority, and providing Appellant/Mother with visitation. The trial court also entered judgment against Mother for retroactive child support since the parties separation and for marital debts that had been paid by the Father during the separation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Transportation Licensing Commission revoked Petitioner's license to operate a wrecker service. The chancery court upheld the revocation. We affirm.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initially brought suit in General Sessions Court against his former physician for defamation (libel and slander), breach of contract, and violation of the privacy provision of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). The General Sessions Court awarded a judgment of $25,000 to the plaintiff. The defendant timely appealed to the Circuit Court and filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff then amended his claims to include an alleged violation of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 and medical malpractice. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician, reversing the Sessions Court judgment and holding that (1) the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Department of Education forms completed by the defendant physician on behalf of the plaintiff did not constitute a contract; (3) HIPAA and Federal Privacy Act of 1974 claims had been withdrawn by the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to produce expert testimony to prove a claim of medical malpractice. The plaintiff timely appealed. We affirm.

This is a construction case. The defendant landowners entered into an oral contract with the
plaintiff contractor to construct a house. When the house was substantially completed, the
homeowners terminated the builder, citing defective work. At the time of termination, there
were two unpaid invoices. After filing a notice of lien on the landowners’ property, the
contractor filed suit for breach of contract and to enforce the lien. The landowners
counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought damages stemming from the defective
work. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment for the contractor and awarded a portion
of the amount sought. The trial court’s order did not address enforcement of the contractor’s
lien. The landowners appeal. Because the trial court’s order does not address, among other
things, enforcement of the lien, it is not a final judgment, and this Court does not have
jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.

This is a construction case. Appellants/Builders appeal the trial court’s award of damages
to Appellees/Homeowners pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and arising
from Appellants/Builders’ breach of warranty and contract. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed this action seeking to review the business records of the defendant, asserting under oath that she is a 25 percent shareholder of the defendant corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court found that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §48-26-104(a) – the corporate records statute – and ordered the defendant to comply with the request to inspect and/or copy corporate records. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. We reverse.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, outrageous conduct, violation of Article 1, Section 18 of the Tennessee Constitution, and various violations of 11 U.S.C. § 362, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. After removal of the lawsuit to federal court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the federal claims and remanded the state law claims back to the state trial court. The trial court subsequently granted a motion for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining claims. We affirm.