APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a statutory retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the employee failed to establish that he had refused to participate in or remain silent about “illegal activities,” within the meaning of the statute. The employee appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a buy-out provision. One of the four physicians in a medical practice retired and requested a repurchase of his stock. The physicians had previously adopted a formula for the valuation of stock in such situations, but when it came time to apply the agreement, they could not agree as to the meaning of several phrases within the agreement. The trial court heard testimony regarding the parties’ intentions as to the agreement and testimony from two accountants regarding their interpretations of the agreement. After interpreting the various phrases of the agreement, the trial court valued the physician’s stock and awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent since the date of the physician’s retirement. We reverse the trial court’s ruling as to the meaning of the agreement and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

Personal injury plaintiffs filed suit against defendant motorist, who died prior to the filing of the suit, for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. By special appearance, the deceased tortfeasor’s estate filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs had not properly instituted the action against the decedent in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-103 prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, but granted the estate a direct appeal to this Court. Finding error in the judgment below, we reverse and remand the case.

A doctor who earlier submitted an affidavit in this medical malpractice action and who also participated in the peer review process at the defendant doctor’s hospital entered an appearance as plaintiffs’ counsel. The trial court declined the defendant doctor’s request to have the physician/attorney disqualified as plaintiffs’ counsel. After considering the issue on interlocutory appeal, we reverse and find that the physician/attorney is disqualified and may not represent plaintiffs.

This is an appeal from the grant of a voluntary dismissal. The plaintiff homeowners’ association sued the defendants in general sessions court for dues owed. The homeowners’ association was awarded a judgment. The defendants appealed to the circuit court below, seeking a de novo hearing. For several years, the appeal remained pending with no activity. In the meantime, the defendants sold the subject property. The judgment due to the homeowners’ association was paid by the purchaser of the subject property to remove any cloud on the title. Having been paid, the homeowners’ association filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment in the circuit court. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the defendants’ appeal. The circuit court later denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment. From that order, the defendants now appeal. We find that the circuit court order is not final and appealable. Therefore, we dismiss the defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The State filed this action to terminate the parental rights of both parents to their three minor children. Upon hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge terminated the parental rights of both parents on several grounds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner filed a Petition styled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. We affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition, but on the basis that the petition was not supported by oath or affirmation nor does it state that it is the first application for a writ.

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s deposition testimony and awarded Defendants summary judgment. We vacate the award of summary judgment, reverse the trial court’s order excluding testimony of the expert witness, and remand for further proceedings.

Mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her three children based upon four separate grounds. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determinations on the grounds of mental incompetence and persistence of conditions, we affirm.

Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, brought this action to enforce an employment contract for benefits allegedly due under the contract. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the grounds that a provision in the employment contract to which the parties originally agreed to, was an unenforceable contract, as the provision amounted to an agreement to agree and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm.

This case involves a dispute between a decedent’s ex-wife and the decedent’s heirs. When the decedent and the ex-wife divorced, their marital dissolution agreement provided that the decedent would receive certain real property. When the decedent died four years later, the ex-wife had not executed a quitclaim deed conveying her interest in the property to the decedent. Therefore, the heirs filed this action to quiet title. The ex-wife claimed that the decedent wanted her to retain her interest in the property, and she claimed that the heirs were barred from seeking relief under the doctrines of laches and waiver. The trial court found in favor of the heirs, and the ex-wife appeals. We affirm.

In this divorce case the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital estate. The husband appealed on the grounds that a house awarded to the wife was not a marital asset, and otherwise questioned the property and division of the indebtedness of the marital estate. On appeal we affirm, as modified, the modification being that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Judge finding that the father had awarded his son a collection of firearms.

This is an appeal from the granting of a summary judgment to Gtech Corporation and Specialized Communications Companies, Inc., relating to the installation of a satellite antenna on the roof of A&S Market located in Davidson County, Tennessee. The market burned and the owners brought suit alleging that the negligent installation of the satellite antenna caused the fire. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground the negligence alleged by the market owners was not the legal cause of the fire. We reverse.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the father of an eleven year old boy on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay child support. The father admitted that he did not pay the child support ordered by the court, but claimed that his failure was not willful. He argued that his record as a convicted felon prevented him from finding and holding steady employment, thus rendering him unable to pay any support at all. However, the record shows that Father was able-bodied and did in fact work at a number of jobs after his felony conviction. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

In this wrongful death action, Edwina Montgomery (“the Plaintiff”), individually and as the surviving spouse of Thomas M. Montgomery (“the Deceased”), brought suit under the Tennessee Dram Shop Act (“the Dram Shop Act” or “the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002). The Plaintiff also sued for negligence and negligence per se.¹ The Plaintiff sued Kali Orexi, LLC, which operates under the trade name of Gondolier Italian Restaurant and Pizza (“Gondolier”). Gondolier moved for summary judgment, which was granted as to all theories of recovery. We affirm the summary judgment on what appears to be an issue of first impression. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002) apply to third parties and do not authorize an action against a seller of an “alcoholic beverage or beer” by or on behalf of the supplied, or “first” party. Since the Dram Shop Act does not address first parties, its enactment leaves the law as to first parties as it existed before the Act’s enactment. In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly held that the injuries to the Deceased were not foreseeable; thus, Gondolier owed the Deceased no duty. Furthermore, even if a duty were owed, it was not breached. The question whether the actions of the Deceased and a taxi driver, who was paid by Gondolier to take the intoxicated Deceased home, were intervening and superseding causes that relieve Gondolier of liability are not addressed since we hold that the Plaintiff had no cause of action under the Dram Shop Act or for common law negligence. Accordingly, we affirm.²

This appeal involves a petition filed by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services, to terminate the parental rights of a biological father to his now ten-year-old daughter. The Juvenile Court granted the petition and the father has appealed. After carefully reviewing the record and relevant legal authority, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding of abandonment and the judgment terminating the father’s parental rights.

Husband appeals two convictions of contempt of court and sentence of two days incarceration for each finding of contempt. Finding no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm the convictions.

This is a lawsuit filed by eight county officials to resolve a budget dispute. The officials filed an application in Chancery Court seeking judicial authorization to hire additional staff and to increase the salaries and benefits paid to a separate group of county employees. One day after the petition was filed, the officials, along with the defendant County Mayor, entered a consent order approving each petitioner’s requests. One month later, the County Commission attempted to intervene and have the order set aside. The trial court denied the County Commission’s motions, and the County Commission appeals. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene. However, several procedural and substantive defects require this Court to vacate the Consent Order and remand
this matter to the trial court.

Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin enforcement of a detainer judgment and to nullify a foreclosure on their home on the basis that defendant failed to offer the property for sale at the courthouse door, in accordance with the notice of foreclosure. The Trial Court held plaintiffs failed to prove their allegations and found the foreclosure sale was properly held. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This appeal involves authority to accept service of process. The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the defendant corporation and its employee, the defendant physician. The plaintiffs attempted to serve process in person on both the corporation and the physician at the corporation’s business address. Service was accepted on behalf of the physician by a co-worker, who was not specifically authorized to accept service for him. Service was accepted on behalf of the corporation by an employee of the corporation who was not an officer, managing agent, or chief agent, and who was not specifically authorized to accept service for the corporation. Both defendants received a copy of the summons and complaint. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint and attempted to serve both defendants via certified mail. The return receipts for both defendants were signed by an employee of the corporation who was not an officer, managing agent, or chief agent of the corporation, and was not specifically authorized to accept service of process on behalf of either the physician or the corporation. The employee who signed the return receipts was, however, authorized to sign for certified mail. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based in part on insufficiency of service of process. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, relying on this Court’s decision in Boles v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., No. M1999-00727-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1030837 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2000). The defendants were granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the defendant physician argues that service on him was not effective because he was not personally served and because the persons who accepted service on his behalf were not authorized to do so. The defendant corporation argues that service on it was not effective because neither the corporation’s registered agent nor its administrator were served and the persons who accepted service on the corporation’s behalf were not authorized to do so. After reconsidering the analysis in Boles, we reverse the trial court’s decision, finding that service was not effective on either defendant and the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Ron Henry and Linda Henry (“Plaintiffs”) sued Cherokee Construction and Supply Company, Inc. (“Defendant”) alleging damages sustained when a wall in the home that Defendant constructed for Plaintiffs collapsed. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court entered an order finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the four year statute of repose contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-201, et seq., and granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in 2005 and another action, similar in nature, against the same defendant in 2006. The actions were assigned to two separate Judges and the 2005 action was first dismissed by one Judge and subsequently the 2006 action was dismissed by the other Circuit Judge. The plaintiff has appealed the 2006 action. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Members of family in whose name a cemetery was established brought suit against owners of property surrounding the cemetery seeking removal of a cloud upon their title to the cemetery, injunctive relief and damages. The trial court declared the boundaries of the original cemetery and limited those entitled to be buried therein to the family members; allowed that members of the general public were permitted to be buried in land added to the original cemetery tract; and appointed trustees to manage the cemetery as established under both conveyances. Family members appeal, contending that trial court erred in setting the cemetery boundary; in disregarding proof of cost of repairing fence which had been removed by one defendant; and in refusing to hear testimony as to the trust fund established for the maintenance of the cemetery. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees as to Appellants’ claims of civil conspiracy; violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(8), (27); violation of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1986, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-32-229(a); and common law claims of outrageous conduct and tortious interference with another’s business. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ Tennessee Trade Practices Act claims. We affirm.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance based on Appellee’s failure to provide certain documents until the day before trial and the absence of a witness for Appellant. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that no accord and satisfaction was made when Appellee cashed a check from Appellant for a lesser amount than was owed to Appellee for increased insurance premiums. Finally, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the statute of frauds was not violated although no writing was made when Appellant’s insurance policy was re-instated. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance, and affirm the trial court’s ruling that no accord and satisfaction was made. Because a statute of frauds defense was not properly raised in the trial court, we deem the issue waived.