APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Grapevine Trucking, LLC (“Grapevine”) sued Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“Carolina Casualty”) and American Southern Insurance Company (“American Southern Insurance”) alleging breach of insurance contracts. The Trial Court granted Carolina Casualty summary judgment dismissing them from the suit. The Trial Court also granted Grapevine partial summary judgment finding that the theft of a truck and trailer covered by Grapevine’s policy with American Southern Insurance had occurred and that American Southern Insurance was liable. The issue of damages was tried, and the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the combined value of the stolen truck and trailer was $53,000 and that Grapevine was entitled to a judgment against American Southern Insurance for $53,000, plus state sales tax on Grapevine’s loss in the amount of $3,710. American Southern Insurance appeals. We affirm.

This is a petition to establish parentage case. Father/Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his petition. Finding that the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-304(b)(2) have not been met and that Appellant is the child’s biological and legal father, we reverse and remand.

In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, citizens of Davidson County, sought review of the County’s mosquito control policies, which were in effect in 2005. Upon review, the Appellee, Metropolitan Board of Health of Nashville and Davidson County, denied Appellants’ claim for lack of standing. The trial court granted Appellants’ common law writ of certiorari and affirmed the Board’s findings. Upon review, we conclude that the Appellants’ have no standing, and that the issues presented are rendered moot based upon the County’s adoption of a new mosquito control policy in 2008. Affirmed.

Cardiologist whose hospital privileges were revoked brought suit against the hospital asserting multiple causes of action, including breach of contract. Finding the hospital entitled to immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and the Tennessee Peer Review Law, the chancellor granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all claims for monetary damages. The court subsequently granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. We have concluded that the court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief other than the breach of contract claims. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Two of a deceased mother’s six children appeal a jury’s specific findings that their mother’s last will was invalid because they had a confidential relationship with their mother and unduly influenced her to execute the will. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s four other children, commenced this action to contest the will the appellants offered for probate. On appeal, the appellants contend there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings that they had a confidential relationship with their mother or that they exerted undue influence. Appellants also contend the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a criminal conviction of one of the appellants. Whether to admit the evidence was within the sound discretion of the trial court and we find the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence; moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that evidence of the crime was only relevant as it pertained to motive and intent to influence the testatrix to change her will. As for the jury verdict, we find substantial and material evidence that supports the jury’s findings in the record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal involves a conservatorship. When the respondent was eighty-three years old, her sister
died and left the respondent over $200,000. The bulk of the inheritance was placed in an irrevocable
trust for the respondent’s benefit, and the deceased sister’s former attorney was appointed as the trustee. Soon, the respondent began to spend her inheritance at a rapid rate, with much of the spending benefitting her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend. The respondent then purchased a $200,000 home to live in with her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend, with the expectation that the $1,800 monthly mortgage would be paid out of the trust.

Defendants sold materials containing asbestos to the deceased’s employer, where he was exposed to asbestos and contracted mesothelioma from which he died. Plaintiff’s widow brought this action against the supplier, a jury trial resulted and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, which the Trial Court approved. On appeal, we hold that certain jury instructions were error and we reverse and remand for a new trial.

After Plaintiff was injured in a car accident, she filed suit against the minor who was driving the other vehicle and against the minor’s father, alleging that he was vicariously liable for the acts of his son pursuant to the family purpose doctrine. Father moved for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts showed that the family purpose doctrine was inapplicable as a matter of law. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the family purpose doctrine was applicable as a matter of law. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Father. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting Plaintiff’s motion, as we find the family purpose doctrine applicable to this case.

Claimant filed this claim for damages seeking return of bond money he had posted. He alleged a violation of his constitutional rights resulted when the State charged him for the same two crimes in two different counties. The State responded with a motion to dismiss contending that the Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The Claims Commissioner granted the motion. Claimant appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that the parties would jointly own various retirement accounts after their divorce. Several years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for relief alleging that the husband was using the funds in the retirement accounts for his own benefit and denying her access to the funds. The trial court essentially divided the retirement funds between the parties and ordered the husband to repay the wife one-half of the funds he had withdrawn since the divorce. The husband appeals. We affirm.

Mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two children. Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his child with Mother. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination, we affirm.

This appeal involves claims made by a sister against her brother’s estate in addition to a separate dispute between the sister and the brother’s estate regarding how much money the estate was owed from the sale of a house owned by the brother and his siblings. The trial court referred the matters to a special master, who found in favor of the sister on some of the claims. Upon review of the special master’s report, however, the trial court rejected the special master’s findings in favor of the sister and ruled in favor of the brother’s estate. The sister appeals, claiming that the trial court should have deferred to the special master. We affirm.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after discovering damage to a Mercedes-Benz that had been represented to them as a new vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim against all defendants and plaintiffs’ breach of contract and warranty claims against defendant Mercedes-Benz USA. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order terminating a mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, among others. The trial court found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals, and we affirm.

Appellant previously acted as co-conservator of respondent’s estate and person. He was removed from this capacity due to difficulties with his co-conservator cousin. Appellant sought to be renamed conservator of respondent’s estate, but the trial court instead appointed an independent conservator citing Appellant’s previous removal as conservator, the distance Appellant lives from respondent, and the fact that Appellant’s mother is currently acting as conservator of respondent’s person. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s appointment of Robert T. Condo as conservator of respondent’s estate, we affirm.

In this ejectment action, the plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s finding that they did not prove title to the property at issue by adverse possession in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-105 and that they failed to show the boundaries of the property they claimed. Plaintiffs also contend that they were entitled to the presumption of ownership set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109. Finding no basis to reverse the judgment of the trial court, we affirm same.

Commercial real estate broker brought action against seller of property seeking commission following the sale of the property to buyers allegedly introduced to the seller by the broker during the term of the listing agreement. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the seller finding the listing agreement was unenforceable because there was no meeting of the minds and a lack of mutual assent to the terms of the agreement. Broker appeals and finding error, we reverse and remand.

This is a suit between siblings over their mother's Estate. Plaintiff sued his brother, defendant, alleging the defendant had a confidential relationship with the parties' mother and sought a judgment declaring that certain transactions made by the defendant on behalf of the mother were void. Upon hearing the evidence, the Trial Court held the evidence established a presumption of undue influence and the defendant did not rebut the presumption. The Court ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the annuity contracts and bank contracts, that the defendant had caused the plaintiff's name to be deleted as a beneficiary of those contracts, and the Court entered Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $211,830.86 against defendant and placed a lien upon the defendants' real property until the Judgment is paid. Defendant has appealed and on appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had entered an Agreed Order for disbursement of the funds which stated the parties had determined that the purpose of the constructive trust would best be shared out by transferring the funds to a newly created non-profit corporation known as the Lafollette Medical Foundation (the funds had been held by the Clerk of the Court). The Court directed that the trust fund would be placed in the foundation with the monies retained for potential liabilities, and the charter of the LaFollette Medical Foundation, Inc., was filed with the Court, as well as its by-laws. The City of LaFollette filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., along with affidavits. The Court conducted a hearing and filed a Memorandum Opinion finding that its order was not void because the City had been found to have no interest in the fund and the City had actual knowledge of the Foundation and its rules, and transferring the money to the Foundation best served the interest of the public rather than the money being held by the Court. The City of LaFollette appealed to this Court. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

In this divorce case, the trial court granted Nancy Randolph Deakins (“Wife”) a divorce from Lynn Lampton Deakins (“Husband”) thereby ending the parties’ 24-year marriage. Upon dissolving the marriage, the court valued and divided the marital estate, declined Husband’s request for alimony, and awarded Wife discretionary costs, her attorney’s fees and court costs. Husband challenges each of these determinations as well as an evidentiary ruling and the court’s finding that Husband dissipated assets. We reverse the awards to Wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

This is a medical malpractice action filed by Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett and her husband Robert Plunkett (“the Plaintiffs”) as the natural parents and next of kin of their stillborn child. The complaint alleges that Michelle Perry, M.D., and Bradley-Polk OB/GYN Services, P.C. (collectively “the Bradley-Polk Defendants”), negligently failed to diagnose, manage and treat complications during Sarah’s pregnancy and that those failures resulted in the stillbirth delivery of the Plaintiffs’ infant. The Plaintiffs secured only one medical expert, Michael A. Ross, M.D., to present testimony that the Bradley-Polk Defendants violated the standard of care applicable in Bradley County at the time of treatment in early 2004. Doctor Ross was licensed in Virginia and practiced primarily in Fairfax, Virginia, and the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. To satisfy the “locality rule” followed in Tennessee, Dr. Ross testified that Bradley County was similar to two communities where he practiced in Virginia, both of which are within the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., but both of which are distinct communities situated about 40 to 50 miles from Washington, D.C. The Bradley-Polk Defendants first challenged Dr. Ross’s qualifications to testify with a motion in limine, and the trial court denied the motion approximately one month before trial. The Bradley-Polk Defendants renewed their challenge to Dr. Ross’s qualifications on the first day of trial. The trial court allowed a voir dire of Dr. Ross out of the presence of the jury and held that Dr. Ross was not qualified because the large metropolitan area where he practiced was not similar to Bradley County. Upon a stipulation of the parties that there was no proof available other than through Dr. Ross to establish a violation of the standard of care in Bradley County, the trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ oral motion for continuance and granted the Bradley-Polk Defendants’ motion for directed verdict. The Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.