APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations.

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants’ home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff. During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant’s attorney alerted the plaintiff’s attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of an elderly woman's attempt to recover assets from her daughter and former son-in-law, who allegedly exercised undue influence over her financial decision-making for a period of years following the death of her husband. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate two transfers of substantial assets to the defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court's order does not dispose of a claim between the parties, we vacate the entry of final judgment and remand.

This appeal involves the alleged breach of an insurance policy. The plaintiff insured had an automobile insurance policy with the defendant insurance company. The insured paid his insurance premium by check. He subsequently was involved in an automobile accident and notified the insurance company of the accident. The check was later returned for insufficient funds. The insurance company notified the insured that if he did not bring the premium current by a date certain, his insurance policy would be cancelled. The insured gave the insurance company a valid check for the premium, which was negotiated. The insurance company later cancelled the policy, retroactive to a date prior to the insured’s automobile accident. The insured sued the insurance company for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff  insured. The insurance company appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a Mississippi default judgment in the general sessions court of Shelby County. The trial court concluded that the general sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, and it set aside a conditional judgment entered by the general sessions court based on the Mississippi judgment. The judgment creditor appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for assaulting a fellow inmate. TDOC did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the record, the trial court denied the petition, and we affirm.

This appeal involves the breach of a real estate contract. The plaintiff hired the defendant  auctioneer to sell his home at auction. After the defendant corporate purchaser was the high bidder at the auction, it signed a sales contract and made a substantial down payment on the property. The down payment was retained by the auctioneer as his commission. Shortly after that, the auctioneer promised the purchaser that the purchaser’s real estate agent would be paid a commission on the sale. Later, the defendant auctioneer refused to pay the purchaser’s agent a commission and, consequently, the purchaser refused to close on the sale. The auctioneer retained the earnest money. The seller filed this lawsuit against the purchaser for failing to close on the sale, and against the auctioneer for breach of fiduciary duty. The purchaser filed a counterclaim against the seller and a cross-claim against the auctioneer for breach of contract. All of the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller against the purchaser, but held in favor of the auctioneer against the seller. The trial court ordered the purchaser to pay damages to the seller for its breach of the sales agreement and permitted the auctioneer to retain the earnest money. The purchaser now appeals. We affirm, rejecting the purchaser’s claim of fraudulent inducement, and concluding that the seller is entitled to damages pursuant to the plain language of the sales agreement.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for assaulting a fellow inmate. TDOC did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the record, the trial court denied the petition, and we affirm.

This appeal involves a judgment creditor’s attempt to enforce a Mississippi default judgment in the general sessions court of Shelby County. The trial court concluded that the general sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, and it set aside a conditional judgment entered by the general sessions court based on the Mississippi judgment. The judgment creditor appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings.

This is a personal injury case. The defendant’s employee negligently backed the defendant’s vehicle into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had reported discomfort in her shoulders to her physician. At some point after the accident, the plaintiff reported to her physician that she had pain in her right shoulder. Ultimately, the plaintiff required shoulder replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The parties stipulated to the defendant’s liability, and a bench trial was held on causation and damages. Based in part on deposition testimony of physicians, the trial court found that the accident caused the plaintiff’s injury and the ensuing surgery and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

In this action charging retaliatory discharge, the Trial Court granted defendant a dismissal of action based on its Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 Motion. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Plaintiffs attempted to submit an application for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit with the Tennessee Housing Development Agency. The Agency refused to accept the application and plaintiffs subsequently sued, asking the Court to require the Agency to accept and process their application. The Trial Court determined that the issue was moot and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's summary judgment that the case was moot.

Former foster mother and her new husband filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the adoption of three children by the current foster parents. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the distribution of marital property. After a bench trial, the court entered the Final Decree of Divorce and distributed the marital property. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and for attorney's fees. The trial court denied the motion in part and awarded approximately $2,087.50 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses to Wife. Wife appeals. We affirm.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, to the extent the allegations of the complaint allege medical malpractice¹, the defendants are entitled to summary disposition of that claim. This is true because the material filed by the defendants in support of their motion clearly establishes that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the pre-filing requirements of the applicable statute as it pertains to a complaint sounding exclusively in medical malpractice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 20092). I cannot concur, however, that the allegations of the complaint sound exclusively in medical malpractice.

Opal Hughes sustained injuries while in the care of defendant Hillcrest Healthcare - West, and her administrator brought this action for damages. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint was a complaint for malpractice against defendant. Plaintiff argued that the complaint was for simple negligence, and the Trial Court held the complaint was for medical malpractice and since statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice complaint had not been met, dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm.

Bobby R. Hopkins ("Hopkins") sued Doyle K. Riggs and Ruth Riggs ("the Riggs") alleging, in part, that the Riggs had contracted to construct a road on the Riggs' property for Hopkins' use and had failed to construct an adequate road. The Riggs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Trial Court granted them summary judgment. The Riggs then sought attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract. The parties then reached an agreement with regard to attorney's fees, an agreement which the Riggs subsequently alleged was breached by Hopkins. The Riggs then filed a motion and the Trial Court entered an order granting the Riggs additional attorney's fees. Hopkins appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, hold that the Riggs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract, vacate the Trial Court's November 25, 2008 Order granting additional attorney's fees, and remand this case to the Trial Court for entry of an order that complies with the parties' August 6, 2008 agreement.

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

On July 7, 2005, Ashley Strine ("Plaintiff") was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by Joshua Walton ("Walton"). The vehicle was owned by James Rice ("Father"), who had given the vehicle to his son, Kevin Rice ("Son"), for Son's personal use. On the day of the accident, Son had given Walton permission to use his vehicle to pick up Plaintiff. Walton and Plaintiff were planning on attending a birthday party later that day. Plaintiff originally sued only Walton and Father. As to Father, Plaintiff asserted liability based on the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Over two years later, Son was added as a defendant. An order of compromise and dismissal was entered as to Walton. Thereafter, Father and Son filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. With regard to Son, the Trial Court concluded that all claims against him were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm.

At the parties’ divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent of their minor child and Father was allowed visitation. The parties continued living together for approximately one year following their divorce, and thereafter, they exercised alternating one-week visitation for  approximately one year. Father petitioned to be named primary residential parent citing his increased visitation with the child as a material change in circumstances. The trial court denied his petition without making the findings required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). We vacate the trial court’s order denying Father’s petition, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to make the necessary findings and then to render its decision accordingly.