APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case following a long-term marriage. Following a trial, the Trial Court classified the property as separate or marital, divided the marital property, awarded Wife $30,000 as her share of farm income that was earned after the parties separated, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $800 per month and alimony in solido of $20,000 for partial payment of her attorney fees. Both parties appeal raising various issues. We modify the award of $30,000 in farm income to an award of $2,184. We also modify the award of alimony in futuro to be $400 per month, with this modification to become effective sixty days from the date our judgment is entered. In all other respects, the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed this claim for negligent deprivation of a statutory right upon finding that the statute relied upon contained no private right of action. We affirm.

This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioners filed an administrative petition with the defendant commission challenging a newly promulgated rule. Before the commission took action on the administrative petition,
the petitioners filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the trial court, making essentially the same allegations. The commission filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, because the petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing the declaratory judgment lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioners now appeal. We reverse, finding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

This is an appeal of a discovery matter. The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle
accident with the defendants. One year and one day after the accident, the plaintiff filed a
lawsuit asserting negligence. The complaint sought money damages for damage to property
and personal injury. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of
limitations. The plaintiff sought extensive discovery of the defendants’ personal records.
The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss. The plaintiff now appeals. We find that the order from which the
plaintiff appeals is not a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

This is divorce case, ending a fifteen year marriage. Appellant-Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification and division of marital property. Appellee-Wife appeals from the trial court’s decision to impute income to her. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Appellant-
Husband was injured when the bus, on which he was a passenger, collided with a concrete
truck. Appellant-Husband and Appellant-Wife filed suit against Appellees- the bus
manufacturer, the bus owner, and the franchisor. Following trial, the jury found that the
Appellants had suffered $8,543,630.00 in damages, but found that none of the Appellees
were at fault and apportioned one hundred percent of the fault to a non-party. Appellants
appeal. We find that Appellants’ claims based on the use of tempered glass in the side
windows of the bus, and the lack of passenger seatbelts in the bus are preempted by the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §30101 et seq. Further, we find
that the Appellants failed to present evidence that the use of perimeter seating in the bus
caused the injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not granting
Appellees’ motions for directed verdict on the Appellants’ claims based on the use of
perimeter seating. Reversed and remanded.

This is a medical malpractice case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee Hospital
after Appellant’s decedent suffered several falls and a broken hip while a patient at Appellee
Hospital. The trial court granted Appellee Hospital’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion,
thereby dismissing Appellant’s amended complaint. Specifically, the trial court held: (1) that
the amended complaint was ineffective to give notice to Appellee Hospital because it did not
reference the date(s) of decedent’s falls, (2) that the medical malpractice claim and hedonic
damages of the widow arising therefrom were dismissed by previous orders of the court, and
(3) that the proof did not support the averments made in the amended complaint. After
review, we conclude: (1) that the amended complaint is sufficiently specific to satisfy Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 8, and to state a claim for medical malpractice against the Appellee Hospital, (2)
that the previous orders of the trial court only dismissed the wrongful death claims and
widow’s loss of consortium claims arising therefrom, and not the medical malpractice claims,
and (3) that the trial court reviewed matters outside the pleadings so as to trigger summary
judgment analysis under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, and (4) that there are disputes of material
fact in this case so as to necessitate a full evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice
claim. Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice claim
against Appellee Hospital and on the widow’s loss of consortium claims arising from the
alleged medical malpractice.

I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim for adverse possession of the property in dispute. I also concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s ruling that Defendants may construct the fence where proposed as that fence is constructed entirely on Defendants’ property and does not, as found by the majority, interfere with Plaintiff’s use of the easement in any way.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order overruling a pro se petition for writ of mandamus by the appellant. In the petition, the appellant sought access to the grand jury for Bradley County to present evidence of purported wrongdoing by the investigating officer of his case. The trial court denied the petition. On a different basis, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging false light invasion of privacy and defamation after her physician sent a letter she considered defamatory. After finding that plaintiff consented to the disclosure by signing a consent form, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.

I concur in the result reached by Judge Farmer. However, because I reach the result by different reasoning, I write separately.

I must respectfully dissent in this case. Unfortunately, I find that I disagree with both the majority opinion and the concurrence.

The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody of his three minor children, who are in the custody of their maternal grandparents. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner brought this action in Juvenile Court to establish paternity and set co-parenting time with the child. The mother answered and, as an affirmative defense, averred that the father had signed a waiver of his parental right and cited the statutes stating that a waiver of parental rights could not be revoked. The Trial Court appointed a guardian ad litem, and the sole issue tried by the Trial Court was whether the waiver should be voided on the grounds that the father had signed the waiver under duress and undue pressure. The Trial Judge found that the father failed to carry the burden of proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed the waiver of interest and notice due to fraud, duress or intentional misrepresentation. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The plaintiff, formerly an at-will employee of Baptist Hospital, filed this action asserting that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment. She asserted twelve claims, inter alia, retaliatory discharge, age and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, violation of wage and hour laws, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The trial court summarily dismissed all of the claims. We affirm.

This is an appeal by the father requesting modification of his child support obligation due to
his incarceration. The trial court denied relief. We affirm.

This dispute is between an attorney and his former firm. All parties to this suit appeal the trial court’s interpretation of their operating agreement about how the fees and expenses generated by the withdrawing member’s cases should be apportioned among them. The operating agreement gave the firm discretion to value the services provided by its other members, but the trial court correctly determined that the firm’s claimed value was not reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s holding with regard to the withdrawing lawyer’s interest in a member’s share of the expenses he is obligated to pay the firm. The trial court is affirmed on the issue of sanctions and as to its refusal to make an award to nonparties.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted a redevelopment plan for an area of the city which included the site of a long-existing billboard. The Tennessee Department of Transportation subsequently ordered the removal of the billboard to accommodate a road-widening project. The sign’s owner filed an application for a permit to relocate the sign on another portion of its leasehold, but the city declined to approve the application because the redevelopment plan totally prohibits signs of that type. The sign company filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 of the zoning statutes gave it the right to replace the sign. The court agreed, and ordered the city to re-evaluate the permit application in accordance with the statutory provisions for a pre-existing non-conforming use after a change of zoning. We reverse, finding that the grandfather provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 have no applicability to the restrictions contained in redevelopment plans under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201 et seq.

The heirs of the woman who conveyed Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association filed suit claiming, among other things, that due to the Association’s failure to pay the heirs as required in the deed of conveyance, the property reverted to the heirs. We affirm the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Association holding that the Association did not fail to comply with the obligations relevant to the reversion, so no reversion was triggered.
 

In a divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate, its determination of her income for child support purposes, and its division of the parties’ income tax liabilities. We affirm.

Property owners sued, alleging that the Metropolitan Government was using or taking their property without their permission and without compensation. The Metropolitan Government took an easement over the property by eminent domain and the State built the Victory Memorial Bridge over part of it. The Metropolitan Government later transferred its interest in the property to the State. Much later, the Metropolitan Government built the Gay Street Connector over part of the easement and maintained exclusive control over the part of the easement not used for the bridge. The trial court found for the government. The property owners appealed. We affirm.