APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree with the majority that the absence of any evidence of the requirements of the permanency plan[s] sounds the “death knell” for the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with those requirements. If we do not know what the requirements were – and we clearly do not – we cannot intelligently determine whether those requirements were satisfied or not. I completely concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the extent that decision is based upon a finding that she failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the plan(s).

This parental rights termination case was filed by Christopher W. ("Father") and Sara R. ("Stepmother") seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linsie K. ("Mother") to her daughter Tristyn K. ("the Child"). Stepmother also seeks to adopt the Child, who currently is four years old. Following a trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding various grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, we vacate the trial court's judgment finding grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights, and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Tennessee Regulatory Authority - The City of Chattanooga has appealed the decision by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority establishing a rate for the appellee, Tennessee American Water Company. The Tennessee American Water Company filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the issues before this Court are moot. We hold the issues on appeal are moot and in our discretion decline to consider the issues as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The appeal is dismissed.

After the parties were divorced for two years, the father sought to reduce his child support obligation and change the custody of the child which had been agreed upon at the time of the divorce. The trial court heard evidence and modified the visitation schedule, but vested the mother with primary custody all based on Tenn. Code Ann. _36-6-101(a)(2)(C). He also increased the child support obligation of the father, and the father has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Husband appeals trial court's finding of substantial and material change in circumstances and modification of alimony awarded Wife in the parties' divorce. Finding no error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Berkeley Park Homeowners Association, Inc., and Southern Traditions Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as "Berkeley Park") filed a motion for contempt against John Tabor and Tabor Construction, Inc. (collectively called "Tabor"), seeking 1 to enforce a 2006 mediated settlement agreement governing the construction of a house being built by Tabor in Southern Traditions' development known as Berkeley Park Subdivision. Berkeley Park alleged that Tabor was in violation of numerous provisions of the mediated agreement, while Tabor contended that the parties had reached another agreement in 2007 that superseded the earlier agreement. Following a bench trial, the court held that there was no superseding agreement and that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed Tabor had violated the provisions of the mediated agreement. The court entered judgment in favor of Berkeley Park, awarding it damages of $34,042.11, including attorney's fees. Tabor appeals. We affirm.

A homeowner and a contractor agreed to use mediation to resolve their disagreement over the contractor's bill for home renovations. The mediation resulted in an agreement, signed by both parties and their attorneys, which provided that the homeowner would pay the contractor $14,000 and that the parties would release each other from any and all claims. The homeowner paid $11,000, but refused to pay the rest. The contractor sued for the deficiency and filed a motion for summary judgment. The homeowner argued that she did not owe the money because the mediation procedure was unfair and because it did not comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 31. The trial court granted summary judgment to the contractor and ordered the homeowner to pay him $3,000. We affirm the trial court.

Husband appeals the trial court's order under Rule 35 requiring the parties in this divorce action to undergo a mental examination and the court's alleged reliance on that examination. He also appeals the trial court's finding that the home titled solely to husband had transmuted to marital property. We affirm the trial court.

The parties were previously before this Court in an appeal by reason of an easement claim by the plaintiff. This Court ruled that plaintiff had an easement, and we remanded the case to the trial court and defendants filed a motion to determine the extent of the easement. A trial ensued and the trial judge ordered defendants to remove a gate and a fence which impaired plaintiff's use of her easement. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified.

Warren A. Hakanson and Sylvia Harris sued Judith K. Holland both as Trustee of the G.W. Hakanson Living Trust dated November 19, 1996 ("the Trust"), and individually, seeking, among other things, to have Ms. Holland removed as Trustee and to have the Trust correctly administered. The case was tried, and the trial court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Trust, as written, did not comport with the intent of G.W. Hakanson, that Ms. Holland had proposed a distribution which she believed met G.W. Hakanson's intent, that Ms. Holland remain as Trustee, and that prior distributions to Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris should be added back into the Trust with Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris each to receive $247,800 from the Trust and then the remaining Trust assets divided equally three ways with Mr. Hakanson, Ms. Harris, and Ms. Holland each to receive one-third. Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris appeal to this Court. We reverse, in part, finding and holding that there is no ambiguity in the written Trust and that the Trust shall be distributed in accordance with its clear written directions. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's order.

These consolidates lawsuits involve claims by Linda Smith, Melinda Mischlich, Jennifer Hayles, and Fernando Hayles ("Plaintiffs") surrounding two homes purchased by plaintiffs located in a subdivision developed by Harry Lane or an affiliated limited liability company. The trial court granted rescission of the contracts and awarded plaintiffs their attorney fees. The trial court stated that the amount of attorney fees would be determined at a future hearing. Prior to the hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, several defendants filed a notice of appeal. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is a breach of contract case. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff but did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 52.01, we vacate and remand.

This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment. After reviewing the record, we find that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

This is a medical malpractice case. Vicki P. Jacobs ("the Plaintiff") alleges that the failure of Stephen A. Mitchell, M.D., an otolaryngologist, and K. James Schumacher, M.D., a neuroradiologist, to diagnose cancer in the left sinus of her late husband, Harris N. Jacobs ("the Decedent"), in May 2000 caused his death in November 2001. The trial court granted all defendants summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff, in the face of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the element of causation. The court's ruling was premised, in part, on the court's holding that the affidavit of one of the experts was not timely filed and also because, according to the court, the plaintiff's experts gave deposition testimony that superseded and canceled out their assertions in affidavits. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the court's grant of summary judgment and an earlier order allowing the defendants to conduct ex parte interviews of treating physicians of the decedent. We vacate both orders and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Husband and Wife seeking injunctive relief. Wife filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against Plaintiff and Husband alleging fraudulent conveyance, conversion, and misappropriation of assets. After a bench trial, the trial court found that Plaintiff and Husband devised a scheme to cloud the ownership of the business jointly owned by Husband and Wife and to hide assets from Wife during an impending divorce. The trial court awarded damages totaling $175,000 to Wife. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her son. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the mother knowingly failed to protect her child by not immediately seeking medical care and by not immediately reporting her child's injuries to medical providers or the authorities. Therefore, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights. We affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court's change of custody of the parties' minor child to Father. Father appeals the trial court's determination of Mother's child support obligation and its failure to award him a judgment for child support retroactive to the date he was awarded temporary custody. Both parties contest the trial court's findings of contempt. We affirm the trial court's change of custody to Father. We reverse its finding of contempt as to Mother and the denial of retroactive child support for Father. We remand the matter to the court for a determination of Mother's child support obligation.

The chancery court upheld the administrative decision based on Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-4-226(f) (2004); however, the statute was amended in a material way in 2009, during the pendency of this case, which was not brought to the attention of the court. The Department has acknowledged in this appeal that the current statute provides that a former "appointed" municipal court judge, such as Appellant, may obtain a judicial license plate. We have determined the 2009 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-4-226(f) provides the relief Appellant is seeking; therefore, the issues on appeal are moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for mootness.

This is a personal injury case. The Appellant/Defendant's employee backed a van into a vehicle which the Appellee/Plaintiff was driving. Until the accident, the Plaintiff had not had any problems with her right shoulder. The morning after the accident the Plaintiff had pain and soreness in her shoulder. She was treated by three different orthopedic surgeons and ultimately had arthroscopic right shoulder surgery. The parties stipulated to liability. However, the Defendant disputed causation. A bench trial was held and the trial court found that the accident caused the Plaintiff's shoulder injury which necessitated the shoulder surgery. Defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment. We affirm.

Gladys Davis ("Plaintiff") filed this retaliatory discharge case against her former employer, Nissan North America, Inc. ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claims Defendant retaliated against her for filing several workers' compensation claims. Prior to Plaintiff's discharge, she underwent a comprehensive medical examination and, based on this examination, two physicians who are board certified in occupational and preventive medicine opined that there was a high risk of re-injury should Plaintiff be returned to work. Relying on the medical opinions of these two physicians, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court concluded, among other things, that Defendant had negated an essential element of Plaintiff's claim and Defendant, therefore, was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

Tennessee Board of Equalization - Taxpayer, an interstate water transportation carrier company operating boats and barges over various waterways including the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, was assessed an ad valorem tax on personal property for the tax year 2005. Taxpayer appealed the assessment to the State Board of Equalization. Following the filing of Taxpayer's appeal, Taxpayer was retroactively assessed for the two tax years immediately preceding the original assessment, 2003 and 2004. Taxpayer appealed these assessments as well as assessments in subsequent tax years 2006, 2007 and 2008. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge, who upheld both the regular as well as the retroactive assessments. Taxpayer appealed to the State Board of Equalization Assessment Appeals Commission and, following a hearing, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision. Taxpayer appeals; we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Tennessee Claims Commission - This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission. The claimant/appellant alleged that state employees or their agents negligently caused the death of her fianc_, who committed suicide while incarcerated at the Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility in Nashville, Tennessee. The Commission determined the claimant was not entitled to recover because she failed to produce expert testimony to establish the standards of care by which to judge the conduct of the prison officials and mental health professionals allegedly responsible for the care, custody, and control of the deceased. Because the Commission correctly determined that the claimant is unable to prove a breach of duty without expert evidence to establish the applicable standards of care, we affirm.

In this post-divorce custody dispute, father asserts that the trial court erred in denying his petition to change custody and in granting mother's petition to relocate. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Brandon Bivins died in an automobile accident on South Rutherford Boulevard in Murfreesboro. His mother sued the city, claiming that the road was unsafe or dangerous and that the city had notice of the condition of the road. The trial court held that the city did not have notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition at the spot of the accident. Because the city had notice of prior accidents along that segment of the road and had a consultant's report stating that the road did not meet design guidelines, we reverse the trial court and remand for a determination of whether the road was unsafe or dangerous.