APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this action, the Trial Court ordered the Department of Children's Services which had custody of the minor child, to furnish the parents with medical information, including video tapes. A written response was not made by the Department and the video tapes were not obtained and furnished to the parents. The Trial Court held the Department in willful contempt of the Court and entered sanctions as punishment. The Department has appealed.  We hold that the record does not establish a basis to hold the Department in willful contempt of Court and we reverse the Trial Court's contempt judgment.

I respectfully dissent from the holding that Dr. Sobel was not competent to opine as to whether one or more of the defendants deviated from the standard of care.

Trecia Gayle Watson (“Plaintiff”) formerly was employed as a teacher with the Bradley County School System. In 2002, Bob Taylor (“Taylor”), the Director of Schools for the Bradley County School System, instituted disciplinary charges against Plaintiff seeking to have her employment terminated. Plaintiff voluntarily resigned prior to completion of the disciplinary proceedings. In 2007, pursuant to a grand jury subpoena from the criminal court in Whitfield County, Georgia, Taylor sent all information pertaining to the disciplinary charges and other information in Plaintiff’s personnel file to the criminal court. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued for defamation and filed suit against Taylor, the Bradley County School Board (the “School Board”), and various other defendants. All of the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and, thereafter, sought various forms of sanctions against Plaintiff for numerous alleged violations of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The Trial Court expressly declined to Rule on the motion for Rule 11 sanctions, providing instead for this Court to dispose of the defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiff appealed. The Trial Court then granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We conclude that because the Trial Court has yet to rule on the defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, there is no final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Prior to their marriage, John Paul Lewis, Sr., (“Husband”) and Miechelle Forgey-Lewis (“Wife”) signed an antenuptial agreement. In this divorce proceeding filed by Wife, the parties agreed that the antenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable but they disagreed sharply as to its application. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce and alimony in futuro of $3,000 per month retroactive to the date of the filing of the complaint. Wife collected approximately $5,000 of the accrued alimony through garnishments. Husband appeals, challenging the alimony award as well as the garnishments. Wife contends the trial court erred in allowing Husband an offset of approximately $80,000 against her entitlements under the court’s orders for payments made by him on joint debts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court except for the garnishments. We quash the garnishments and order the return of funds collected through them to the garnishee.

The Tennessee American Water Company petitioned the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to approve a revision to the existing rates it charges its customers for water. The Authority authorized a revision in the existing tariffs but made several rulings adverse to the plaintiff. Plaintiff has appealed numerous issues. On appeal, we affirm the rulings of the Authority, except its ruling  which only allowed plaintiff to recover one-half of the rate case expenses. We hold that ruling was arbitrary and we require the Authority to pay the full amount of the rate case expenses claim.

Kathy Young (“the plaintiff”) stepped backward onto an elevated curb as she opened the driver’s door of her vehicle to leave the parking lot of First Bank of Tennessee. She was injured when she tripped over the curb and fell into the shrubbery that bordered the parking lot. She and her husband filed this action alleging that First Bank was negligent ¹ in creating or maintaining a dangerous condition. First Bank filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Bank purchased property at a foreclosure sale, and a tenant of the previous owner continued to occupy the property after the sale. The deed of trust executed by the previous owner provided that if the property was sold, any person holding possession of the property through the borrower would either surrender possession of the property or become a tenant at will of the purchaser. Bank filed a detainer warrant against the tenant and was awarded possession of the property by the general sessions court. On appeal, the circuit court also awarded possession to the Bank. The tenant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christina M. (“Mother”) to her daughters Jazsman (d.o.b. 5/28/08) and Destiny (d.o.b. 11/18/09). DCS was excused from being 2 required to make reasonable efforts to assist Mother to accomplish the goal of reunification because she has previously had children removed involuntarily from her custody. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g)(4). The trial court found and held that clear and convincing evidence existed on the ground of mental incompetence to terminate Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals, asserting that DCS should have been required to make reasonable efforts to maintain her daughters in her care. We affirm.

Plaintiffs brought this action to establish a partnership with the deceased against the estate's personal representative and others. Defendants answered, denying the allegation that a partnership existed, and filed a counter-complaint, asserting the estate should be reimbursed for plaintiffs' mismanagement of the farm, and for monies the plaintiffs removed from the estate's bank account. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court held that deceased and plaintiff had entered into a partnership and that the partnership would be wound up by the Court and the partnership assets distributed. Also, the Trial Court held that plaintiffs would be required to pay rent on the house they occupied on the farm for several years. On appeal, we affirm the finding that a partnership existed, but reverse the Trial Court's holding that plaintiffs owed the estate rent for occupancy of the house on the farm. We remand, with directions to the Court to wind up the partnership.

We granted the application of Daniel Kueter, M.D. (“Defendant”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal on the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in reinstating this case to its  active docket after it had been dismissed without prejudice over a year earlier. We find and hold that although plaintiff was not entitled to relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the Trial Court did not err when it granted Plaintiff’s motion to enter an agreed order nunc pro tunc reinstating this case.  We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order.

This appeal involves the impairment of a hospital lien. The individual defendant was treated at the plaintiff hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by a thirdparty tortfeasor. The patient incurred substantial medical expenses. The hospital filed a hospital lien for the amount of the patient’s medical expenses. Subsequently, the patient received insurance proceeds from his own insurance company under his uninsured motorist coverage, and another payment from the tortfeasor’s insurance company. Nothing was paid to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital filed this lawsuit against both insurance companies for impairment of its hospital lien. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Against the patient’s own insurance company, the hospital was awarded one-third of the monies the patient received. Against the tortfeasor’s insurance company, the hospital was awarded an amount equal to the policy coverage limit. The hospital now appeals, arguing that it was entitled to recover from both insurance companies jointly the reasonable cost of the hospital services rendered to the patient. The insurance companies also appeal, arguing that there was no impairment of the lien and that, if there was impairment, the hospital’s recovery should have been limited to one-third of the payments made to the patient. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the hospital’s lien was valid and was impaired, but that the hospital can recover only for the damages caused by the impairment of its lien.

This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client’s standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented  her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client’s complaint for lack of standing  but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial  court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the client’s complaint.

Mr. Gonzalez filed a petition to alter his final divorce decree, alleging that the decree violates federal law by allowing the wife to receive more than 50% of his military retirement. The trial court denied relief. Mr. Gonzalez appealed. We affirm, holding that federal law does not limit Tennessee trial courts to awarding a maximum of 50% of a former service member’s retirement to the ex-spouse.

In this divorce case, we granted the request of Jason Patrick Shaw (“Father”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal on three issues: (1) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to grant his request for access to his older daughter’s counseling records with a licensed clinical social worker; (2) whether the Trial Court properly prohibited Father from taking this daughter’s deposition, and (3) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused Father visitation with any of the parties’ three children. As to the first issue, we remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether furnishing the social worker’s records would be against the daughter’s best interest, as discussed more fully in this Opinion. We vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father to depose the daughter. Finally, we vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father any meaningful visitation and remand for the Trial Court to determine an appropriate supervised visitation schedule.

Plaintiff, a railroad employee, filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that his left ankle injury was caused by his working conditions. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but subsequently granted the railroad’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the railroad’s application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed this medical battery suit on behalf of his deceased mother and named as defendants the nephrologist who ordered an allegedly unauthorized hemodialysis procedure, another treating physician, and the hospital where she was treated. The trial court granted summary judgment to the treating physician who did not order the procedure and to the hospital. Plaintiff appeals. We find that both of these defendants were entitled to summary judgment and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.

In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court denied the petitions of both parents to modify the parenting time but granted the mother’s petition to modify child support. We affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to parenting time but reverse and remand for a proper determination regarding modification of child support.

Father filed a petition to relocate with the parties’ minor child, and the trial court denied his petition. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court made evidentiary and procedural errors necessitating vacating its decision, that the trial court’s decision denying his petition to relocate was erroneous, and that the trial court erred in declining to award him his attorney fees in defending against  Mother’s petition for dependency and neglect. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

Pursuant to a lease agreement, Defendant was allowed to place a billboard on Plaintiff’s building. After the billboard allegedly caused damage to Plaintiff’s building, Plaintiff notified Defendant. Defendant then sent a letter to Plaintiff terminating the lease, but Plaintiff claims Defendant later agreed to remove the billboard and make repairs to his building. When such repair and complete removal were not made, Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and we affirm.

This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee’s truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee. On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a  comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.

Plaintiff, a lactation consultant formerly employed by Cookeville Regional Medical Center, sued the hospital for common law retaliatory discharge and violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act; plaintiff also asserted a claim for punitive damages. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, the court granted the Medical Center’s motion for directed verdict on the Protection Act and punitive damages claims; the common law retaliatory discharge claim was allowed to proceed to the jury. The jury found for the Medical Center. Plaintiff appeals, asserting error in the trial court’s grant of directed verdict and its rulings on evidentiary issues. Finding no error, we affirm.

Landowner appeals trial court’s grant of summary judgment to county in action to enforce delinquent tax lien. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute over the location of a boundary line between tracts of land owned by two hunting clubs. After many years of litigation, the parties agreed that a new survey would be conducted by a new surveyor and that they would be bound by his decision. After the new surveyor filed a report and survey, one of the clubs filed a motion to set aside the survey, contending that the new surveyor did not make an independent determination regarding the location of the boundary line, but rather, copied a previous survey that was completed in the past. The trial judge refused to hold a hearing regarding the validity of the survey because the parties had agreed to be bound by the surveyor’s decision. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J

Hank P. (“Father”) is the biological father of Destiny S. (“the “Child”). After the Child was removed from Father’s home in 2006, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) eventually filed a petition to terminate his parental rights to the Child. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also found that the evidence established clearly and convincingly that it was in the best interest of the Child for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals challenging these findings as well as an evidentiary ruling and the Juvenile Court Judge’s refusal to recuse himself. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.

In this divorce case, Plaintiff and her counsel failed to appear in court on the scheduled date of trial. The trial court held the hearing ex parte in their absence. Plaintiff hired new counsel and filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment,” which we discern to be a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59. The trial court held a hearing on the motion; however, Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence  explaining her failure to appear on the scheduled trial date. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion. After reviewing the record, we affirm.