APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a dispute over the estate of Mrs. Willie Seeber. Mrs. Seeber left a purported Last Will and Testament executed in 2021,which the personal representative named therein has offered to the Probate Court for Loudon County for solemn form probate. However, various family members and friends of Mrs. Seeber seek to challenge this will and allege Mrs. Seeber lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced to execute the will. The contestants rely upon earlier testamentary documents to establish standing to bring a will contest. The proponent appeals an order of the probate court holding the contestants have standing to bring a will contest. We hold the probate court did not err in its various findings and affirm the judgment of the probate court. This case is remanded for further proceedings.

In this breach of contract dispute between an engineering consulting firm and a real estate development company, we review the trial court’s holding that the real estate development company breached the contract between the parties as well as the court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the engineering consulting firm. We affirm the court’s decision in all respects. Because the parties’ agreement states that the prevailing party in litigation arising from or related to the contract shall be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, we remand the case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to award the engineering firm its reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this appeal.

Plaintiffs sued for injuries and damages allegedly resulting from an automobile accident.
The trial court dismissed one of two defendants based on the statute of limitations.
Although the complaint was filed within one year of the accident, the original summons
went unserved, and plaintiffs did not obtain issuance of new process until over a year after
the issuance of the previous process. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that, because the
automobile accident resulted in a criminal prosecution, the time period for issuance of new
process under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3 was extended. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. After trial, the trial court entered a final decree of
divorce with an attached Permanent Parenting Plan regarding the parties’ minor child. The
determination of child support was left blank. A supplemental order purported to
“bifurcate” the issue of child support and transfer the case from the Roane County IV-D
office to the Anderson County IV-D office. The father appeals. Since the issue of child
support was never resolved or adjudicated, there is no final, appealable judgment. The
appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Former client sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and fraud. The trial court initially dismissed all claims, but was reversed on appeal as to the fraud claims. The trial court then held a bench trial and found in favor of the defendant attorney. In a second appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of all fraud claims except a fraud claim related to the hourly rate charged under the parties’ written contract. That claim was remanded to the trial court for purposes of consideration of the factors outlined in in Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1998). On remand, the trial judge denied the plaintiff’s efforts to disqualify him from the case and to enlarge the scope of the trial. A bench trial was eventually held, despite the plaintiff’s multiple efforts to postpone. After a late motion to continue was denied, the plaintiff did not attend trial. Following the bench trial, the trial court once again ruled in favor of the defendant attorney, resulting in the dismissal of all claims against him. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mother filed a petition alleging civil and criminal contempt against the father of her child
due to unpaid child support. After several continuances, including based on Mother’s
request for an in-person hearing, the juvenile court heard the matter remotely via ZOOM.
At the start of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a continuance for an
in-person hearing. The trial court also ruled that it had the authority to choose whether
Mother would prosecute her action as civil contempt or criminal contempt. The trial court
ruled that Mother’s petition would be treated solely as a civil contempt matter, but then
refused to punish Father for his past willful failure to pay child support because he had
made a purge payment. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant, Mark T. Stinson, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court
that was entered on January 27, 2023. We determine that the January 27, 2023 order does
not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the
grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear
and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the
statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent.

This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”).  SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies.  When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.  The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims.  CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM.  The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration.  When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”).   SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award.  After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate.  SRM timely appealed.  Upon review, we  affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu.  We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

This appeal concerns a claim of negligence. Rex Sullivan, individually and in his capacity as the Administrator Ad Litem for his deceased wife (“Plaintiff”),1filed a complaint in the Rhea County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking damages from James Carden and Carden Trucking Company (“Defendants”)for injuries Plaintiff suffered in a November 2018 car accident. Plaintiff alleged that his accident was caused by Defendants’ failure to remove excessive mud they had deposited onto the rural road he drove on. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, which Plaintiff has not appealed. Otherwise, given the existence of genuine issues of material fact such as how much mud was deposited on to the road and the foreseeability of the risk of injury, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not
filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until August 11, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal concerns the ownership of property used by the defendant but owned by her
father and stepmother. The plaintiff stepmother secured a writ of possession from the
general sessions court once her husband passed away. The defendant appealed to the
circuit court, which ruled that the property at issue belonged to the plaintiff. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. Upon our review, we
conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for
termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children.

This is an appeal of a modification to a permanent parenting plan. Dawn Rushing
Strickland (“Mother”) filed a motion to modify the permanent parenting plan governing
the custody and visitation of two children from her prior marriage to Stephen Rushing
(“Father”). The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“Trial Court”) granted the motion
and modified the permanent parenting plan to designate Mother the primary residential
parent and grant her 265 co-parenting days and Father 100 co-parenting days. Father has
appealed. Upon our review of the final order, we conclude that the Trial Court
erroneously considered Mother’s gender in determining that a material change in
circumstance had occurred affecting the children’s best interest and that its finding that
the best interest factors did not favor one parent over the other demonstrates that Mother
failed to carry her burden of proof. We accordingly reverse the Trial Court’s
modification of the permanent parenting plan. Mother’s request for attorney’s fees on
appeal is denied.

In this matter concerning the interpretation of a will, John Moon and Shannon Moon (“John” and “Shannon”) (“Claimants,” collectively) filed a claim in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) against the estate of their late sister, Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard(“Mary”).1 Arthur Ballard (“Arthur”), Mary’s husband, filed an exception to the claim. Mary’s grandmother, Elise Chapin Moon (“Elise”), had established a trust for her grandchildren, including Mary. It is Claimants’ position that a bloodline provision in Elise’s will (“the Moon Will”) excludes spouses of grandchildren from receiving trust proceeds. The Trial Court, having put certain questions to a jury, ruled in favor of Arthur. Claimants appeal. We hold that once Mary received the funds from the trust, which dissolved in 2016, the funds were hers outright and no longer subject to the will’s “bloodline” restriction. We hold further that the Trial Court erred by putting questions to a jury when the case was resolvable as a matter of law. However, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

After a car accident, a plaintiff sued a defendant, but never served him with process.  Almost two years later, the defendant moved to dismiss the case as time-barred.  The plaintiff opposed the dismissal and moved for an enlargement of time to serve the defendant.  The court denied the requested enlargement and dismissed the case.  We affirm.

Following the denial of her application for a beer permit, Amanda B. Wolfe (“Ms. Wolfe”)
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (the “trial
court”) against Surgoinsville Beer Board (the “Beer Board”) and the Town of Surgoinsville
(collectively, “the City”), seeking a trial de novo. Ms. Wolfe contended that the Beer Board
incorrectly reviewed her application for a beer permit under a newly amended ordinance.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in Ms. Wolfe’s favor, ordering the issuance of her
beer permit and finding that the amended ordinance lacked a rational basis. Having
reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a will contest by the decedent’s children. Counsel for the contestants and counsel for the executrix engaged in settlement negotiations on behalf of their clients. The executrix submitted a motion to enforce the settlement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the Probate Court granted the motion and entered an order of voluntary dismissal of the contestants’ claims with prejudice. The contestants appeal. We affirm.

The parents of Jayla S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. Jayla was removed from her parents’ custody because Jayla tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) subsequently filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a two-day trial, the trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven, including the ground of severe child abuse. Finding it also to be in the best interest of Jayla that her parents’ parental rights be terminated, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this action.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence as barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution
after finding the plaintiff could not establish that the defendants had initiated the issuance
of a criminal warrant without probable cause and with malice. Discerning no error, we
affirm the trial court.

A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision.