Darryl Suggs as Administrator of the Estate of Billy Ray Suggs v. Gallaway Health Care Center, et al.
W2010-01116-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises out of a complaint filed against various healthcare providers. Before the trial court, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with an identical lawsuit he had filed against the same defendants in another county. The motion to consolidate was denied. The trial court later dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against one of the defendant physicians for improper venue, and the other defendants were dismissed for various reasons not relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim against the physician for improper venue, and he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to consolidate. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Judge J. Weber McCraw |
Fayette County | Court of Appeals | 04/18/11 | |
4215 Harding Road Homeowners Association v. Stacy Harris
M2010-01467-COA-R3-CV
The Homeowners’ Association of a high-rise condominium building filed this action against an owner/occupant of a condominium unit alleging she was in violation of the Master Deed and Bylaws due to grossly unsanitary conditions in the defendant’s unit and extremely offensive odors that emanated from her unit into common areas. The Association requested that the defendant’s condominium unit be sold at a judicial sale and that it be awarded its attorneys’ fees. The trial court found the defendant’s acts and omissions violated the Master Deed and Bylaws and that the Association was entitled to the relief it requested; accordingly, the court ordered that the unit be sold and awarded $116,037.77 in attorneys’ fees against the defendant. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Carol McCoy |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 04/15/11 | |
Dawn A. Moss v. William Barry Moss
M2010-01064-COA-R3-CV
At issue is when Husband shall pay $250,000 in cash awarded to Wife in the division of the marital estate and whether post-judgment interest shall accrue. In the Final Decree, payment of the $250,000 was deferred pending Husband’s receipt of an expected inheritance from his recently deceased uncle. The Decree, however, expressly provided that Wife could petition the court for relief in the event the deceased uncle’s estate was not closed within one year. As authorized by the trial court, one year later, Wife filed a motion requesting that Husband be ordered to pay the $250,000 award. The trial court denied Wife’s request for immediate payment of the money and denied her request for post-judgment interest. Wife appeals contending that the trial court erred in not awarding the immediate payment of the full amount and post-judgment interest. Finding it inequitable for Husband to have the use and benefit of the marital estate, much of which is income producing, while Wife is deprived of the bulk of her share of the marital estate, we reverse and remand with instructions for the entry of a judgment in favor of Wife of $250,000 plus post-judgment interest from the filing of the motion for relief.
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge Robbie T. Beal |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 04/15/11 | |
In the Matter of: Melanie T. et al.
M2010-01436-COA-R3-JV
This dependent and neglected action involves the defendant’s minor biological child and two minor stepchildren. The defendant appeals the finding by the circuit court that he severely abused his two stepchildren. He contends that DCS failed to state a claim against him upon which relief could be granted because he is not the biological or legal father of the children. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to find that he committed severe child abuse. We have determined the petition states a claim against the defendant, and that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings that all three children are dependent and neglected, and that the defendant severely abused the two stepchildren children. Thus, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge Vanessa Jackson |
Coffee County | Court of Appeals | 04/15/11 | |
Barry Ogle v. Ben Seigler, d/b/a Ben's Bobcat
E2010-00763-COA-R3-CV
In this breach of contract action, the defendant appealed the Judgment of the Trial Court, who entered a monetary judgment against defendant and awarded attorney's fees. Defendant has appealed, and on appeal we reverse the award of attorney's fees, vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand, with directions for the parties or the Court to prepare a complete Statement of Evidence.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Originating Judge:Judge Rex Henry Ogle |
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 04/15/11 | |
Gwen Shamblin, et al. v. Rafael Martinez
M2010-00974-COA-R3-CV
This defamation action arises out of the publication of a statement to an internet website. The trial court held that plaintiffs were unable to show actual malice in order to sustain defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Finding no error, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge Robbie T. Beal |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 04/14/11 | |
Vivian Kennard v. Arthur M. Townsend, IV, M.D., et al.
W2010-00461-COA-R3-CV
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee healthcare provider after its determination that Appellant patient’s medical expert did not meet the locality requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-115(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Originating Judge:Judge Robert L. Childers |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 04/14/11 | |
Alicia Mathes, et al v. DRD Knoxville Medical Clinic, et al
E2010-01809-COA-R3-CV
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that Appellants had failed to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, and had failed to state a claim for vicarious liability based on theories of agency or joint venture. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, concluding that Appellants’ claims of direct negligence do not sound in medical malpractice, but that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to vicarious liability based on agency or joint venture.
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Originating Judge:Judge Dale C. Workman |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 04/13/11 | |
Carl A. Baker v. Antoinette Welch
M2010-01291-COA-R3-CV
Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 04/13/11 | |
Carl A. Baker v. Antoinette Welch
M2010-01291-COA-R3-CV
Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 04/13/11 | |
Cynthia Lynn Liner v. Robert Clifford Liner, Jr.
M2010-00582-COA-R3-CV
In a divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of the residence he owned before the parties’ marriage as marital property and its award of one-half of the equity in the residence to Wife. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Originating Judge:Judge J. Mark Rogers |
Rutherford County | Court of Appeals | 04/13/11 | |
James M. Flinn v. Jon K. Blackwood
E2010-00667-COA-R3-CV
Plaintiff filed a cause of action against Defendant judge, alleging Defendant wrongfully refused to grant his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:Judge Donald P. Harris |
Anderson County | Court of Appeals | 04/13/11 | |
Easter Baugh v. Barbara Thomas, et al.
M2010-01054-COA-R3-CV
Nephew of grantor of quitclaim deed conveying property to grantor’s sister appeals the declaration that the deed was null and void based on a finding that the nephew exercised undue influence on grantor. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of a confidential relationship between grantor and nephew and in light of nephew’s failure to rebut the presumption of undue influence raised thereby, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Originating Judge:Judge Walter C. Kurtz |
Coffee County | Court of Appeals | 04/12/11 | |
In the Matter of: LaPorsha S.
W2010-02135-COA-R3-JV
This appeal involves a dispute over the placement of a child formerly in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. Because the child turned eighteen years old during the pendency of these proceedings, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:Judge Clayburn Peeples |
Gibson County | Court of Appeals | 04/12/11 | |
In Re: Zada M.
E2010-02207-COA-R3-PT
In this parental termination case the Trial Court, upon hearing evidence, terminated the mother's parental rights upon finding grounds of abandonment and that it is in the best interest of the child. The mother has appealed and we conclude from the record that the statutory grounds for abandonment were established by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Originating Judge:Judge Kenneth N. Bailey, Jr. |
Greene County | Court of Appeals | 04/11/11 | |
In Re: The Adoption of Gabrielle N. N.
E2010-01539-COA-R3-PT
Jeanenne W. M. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition seeking to adopt the minor child, Gabrielle N.N. (“the Child”) and to terminate the parental rights of Russell A.N. (“Father”) to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on June 14, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to support a termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(3) and (g)(5), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 04/11/11 | |
Rebecca Lynn Weingart v. Jonathan Shane Forester
E2010-00895-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from an entry of divorce. The parties executed a prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. The prenuptial agreement outlined the classification of separate property and the parties’ respective rights in the event of divorce. After nearly seven years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. The parties participated in mediation, and a hearing was held to resolve the remaining issues. At the hearing, counsel for both parties presented arguments regarding the unresolved issues and eventually reached an agreement to settle those issues during a recess of the hearing. Counsel for the parties announced the agreement before the trial court, and the trial court subsequently entered an order. The husband appeals and challenges the trial court’s finding that the wife’s retirement account is entirely her separate property. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court erred in finding that the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous. Nevertheless, the trial court properly awarded the wife’s retirement account to her as separate property. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Originating Judge:Chancellor G. Richard Johnson |
Washington County | Court of Appeals | 04/11/11 | |
John Doe, Alias a Citizen and Rresident of Hamilton County, Tennessee, v. Mark Gwyn, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, et al.
E2010-01234-COA-R3-CV
This declaratory judgment action challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201 et seq, on the grounds that plaintiff should not be required to register because his criminal convictions occurred in other states prior to the passage of the Tennessee Act, as applied to him. The Trial Judge declared that plaintiff was required to register under the Act, and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Chancellor's Judgment which requires plaintiff to register in accordance with the Act.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Originating Judge:Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III. |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 04/08/11 | |
Clarence E. Johnson v. Tanner-Peck, L.L.C.; William B. Tanner; Individually and d/b/a Tanner-Peck Outdoor, et al.
W2009-02454-COA-R3-CV
This is the second appeal in this breach of contract case. The plaintiff employee filed this lawsuit against the defendants for breach of an oral employment agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages. The defendants filed a motion to revise the summary judgment order and submitted an affidavit in support of the motion. The trial court struck the supporting affidavit and denied the motion to revise. The defendants filed the first appeal. In the first appeal, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, including the award of damages, was affirmed, but the cause was remanded to the trial court for findings on its denial of the motion to revise. On remand, the trial court explained that it struck the affidavit submitted with the motion to revise for lack of personal knowledge and because it violated the Dead Man’s Statute. The defendants now appeal the trial court’s order denying the motion to revise. We reverse the denial of the motion to revise and remand for a recalculation of damages.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 04/08/11 | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property
E2010-01710-COA-R3-CV
The plaintiff foreclosed on real property following the default on a loan secured by a deed of trust. The plaintiff then filed a detainer warrant in General Sessions Court and the defendant appeared claiming rightful possession to the property because of a quit claim deed. After hearing the evidence, the General Sessions Court awarded possession of the property to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Knox County Circuit Court. A jury trial commenced, and at the close of proof, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the directed verdict and awarded possession of the property to the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Originating Judge:Judge Dale Workman |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 04/07/11 | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property - Concurring/Dissenting
E2010-01710-COA-R3-CV
I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of American General Financial Services, Inc. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Goss’s appeal is not so devoid of merit as to warrant a holding that his appeal is frivolous in nature. When an appellant seeks to reverse or modify a trial court’s judgment based upon an alleged error grounded in the facts of the case, but fails to present us with a verbatim transcript or statement of the evidence, the appellant’s appeal has no chance of success. An appeal is deemed frivolous if it is devoid of merit or if it has no reasonable chance of success. Bursack v. Wilson, 982 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). See also Linn v. Howard, E2006-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 208442 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed on January 26, 2007). When the only issues on an appeal are factual ones – as opposed to legal questions – we must have a record that permits us to reach those issues. In my judgment, this appeal is – by definition – a frivolous appeal. I would remand for a hearing to determine “just damages” due the appellee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000).
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge Dale C. Workman |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 04/07/11 | |
Central Parking Systems of Tennessee, Inc. v. Nashville Downtown Platinum, LLC
M2010-01990-COA-R3-CV
NDP purchased property upon which Central Parking operated pay-parking lots pursuant to lease amendments with the prior owner. Central Parking calculated the rent it owed NDP pursuant to the amendments, but due to a computer glitch, paid double the rent it claimed was owed. NDP refused to refund the money, claiming the payment equaled the fair rental value of the property. Central Parking sued NDP for the alleged overpayment, and the trial court dismissed Central Parking’s claims. Because Central Parking’s only basis for relief on appeal–an implied notice theory–was first raised in a Rule 59.04 motion, and an issue first raised in a motion to alter or amend is not properly raised before the trial court, we find the issue is waived on appeal. The trial court’s dismissal of Central Parking’s claims is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 04/07/11 | |
Melody Jennings Bowers v. Daniel R. Bowers
M2010-00311-COA-R3-CV
Alleging Husband’s failure to pay child support and alimony as required, Wife filed petitions for contempt. The trial court found Husband guilty of seven counts of willful criminal contempt and entered a judgment against him for unmet obligations. On appeal, Husband claims the trial court erred in finding him in contempt, in imputing a $1,000 per month income to Wife, in upholding his work-related childcare obligation, in denying his counterpetition to modify spousal and child support, and in excluding certain witness testimony. He also argues that he was denied a hearing regarding Wife’s attorney fees. Because the trial court failed to make a finding regarding Husband’s ability to pay, we reverse Husband’s criminal contempt conviction. Additionally, we find the trial court erred in upholding the workrelated childcare award, and we remand for a determination of Husband’s retroactive credit for amounts paid subsequent to the filing of his petition to modify and for a recalculation of his future support obligations. However, we find that the trial court did not err in imputing Mother’s income, in refusing to allow Father’s witness to testify, nor in awarding Wife her attorney fees without a hearing.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Judge Carol Soloman |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 04/07/11 | |
Patsy Freeman, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al.
M2010-01833-COA-R9-CV
In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine: (1) whether the Tennessee savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a), may be invoked twice within the one-year savings period to save otherwise untimely actions; and (2) whether the Appellee acted with the diligence and good faith necessary to invoke the protection of the savings statute. We conclude that Appellee’s suit was properly brought within the protection of the Tennessee savings statute. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Staford
Originating Judge:Judge Franklin L. Russell |
Bedford County | Court of Appeals | 04/07/11 | |
Duff L. Brumley v. The City of Cleveland
E2010-00840-COA-R3-CV
This lawsuit stems from a grievance process initiated by a detective with the Cleveland Police Department, Duff L. Brumley (“Brumley”). Brumley was instructed to undergo retraining as a result of a citizen complaint letter written in connection with his investigation of a possible burglary. Brumley was dissatisfied with the mandatory retraining and initiated the grievance process under the City of Cleveland’s official policy. The grievance reached an appeal hearing before the City Manager. The City Manager affirmed the order to Brumley to undergo retraining. Brumley filed an Application for Writ of Certiorari in the Trial Court. The Trial Court denied Brumley’s Writ of Certiorari. Brumley appeals, claiming that the Trial Court improperly excluded additional evidence Brumley wanted to introduce and found a material basis for the City Manager’s decision where none existed. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in its decision as to the additional evidence Brumley sought to admit. We further hold that the City Manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and had a material basis for her decision. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant |
Bradley County | Court of Appeals | 04/07/11 |