APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan. The parties divorced in Tennessee and agreed to a parenting plan that esignated the mother as the primary residential parent of their two minor children. By the time the divorce decree was entered, both parties had moved to New York.  Months later, the mother filed a petition in the Tennessee trial court seeking court approval to relocate with the minor children to Colorado. The mother also sought an increase in child support, and to recover a child support arrearage.  The father objected and filed a cross-petition in the Tennessee trial court to be designated as the primary residential parent. After a hearing, the Tennessee trial court granted the mother’s petition to relocate, increased the father’s child support obligation, and assessed a child support arrearage against the father. The father appeals. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother’s petition to relocate or the father’s petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother’s request for modification of child support. The trial court, however, retained jurisdiction to enforce the existing child support order. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order insofar as it modified the parenting plan and child support.

This appeal involves parental relocation. Mother intended to relocate from Tennessee to Las Vegas with the parties’ two children in order to accept another position with her current employer. Father filed a petition opposing the relocation and seeking modification of the parenting plan to be named primary residential parent. The trial court found that the parties were not spending substantially equal intervals of time with the children, and that the move had a reasonable purpose. Therefore, it permitted Mother to relocate with the children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108. Father raises numerous issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Defendant allegedly suffered an on-the-job injury to his knees over the course of several years, and Plaintiffs paid workers’ compensation benefits on his behalf. However, after Defendant was videotaped building a barn, his employment was terminated and suit was filed against him for fraud. Defendant then filed a counter-complaint alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim, and we affirm and remand.

Defendant defaulted on a $300,000 loan from plaintiff bank. He subsequently renewed the loan but not before transferring certain assets to his wife. He never repaid the loan. The bank filed suit against the husband for breach of contract and fraud and against both defendants for fraudulent conveyance, conversion, civil conspiracy to defraud, and unjust enrichment. The bank also sought a lien lis pendens, a constructive trust, and a judicial sale and foreclosure. The trial court found against the husband with respect to the bank’s claims for breach of contract and fraud (in renewing the loan), against the wife for unjust enrichment, and against both defendants for fraudulent conveyance. The court denied the bank’s request for a constructive trust and a judicial sale and foreclosure. The parties appeal the trial court’s disposition of claims for fraud, civil conspiracy to defraud, and unjust enrichment, as well as its decision not to impose a constructive trust. We find for the bank on its fraud (against the husband) and unjust enrichment (against the wife) claims. We find against the bank on its claims for civil conspiracy to defraud and the imposition of a constructive trust.
 

An applicant for a billboard permit appeals the dismissal of his Petition for Judicial Review of the decision of the Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny his application. During the pendency of this action, the applicant admitted he had sold his leasehold interest in the property on which the billboard was to be located. Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court concluded that petitioner “lacks standing to maintain this lawsuit and this cause is moot as a matter of law.” We affirm.

The owner of a piece of rural property in Wilson County applied for a “permissible use” permit that would allow him to display vehicles for sale on the property. The County planning staff recommended against issuance of a permit, reasoning that the proposed use was not consistent with other uses permitted in an A-1 (agricultural) zoning district. The owner appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which agreed to issue the permit, but limited the use to “no more than 10 serviceable items being on the property at any given time.” The owner challenged the limitation by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wilson County Chancery Court. The court determined that the BZA had acted arbitrarily and had exceeded its authority by placing a condition on the owner’s use of the property of a type not contemplated by the controlling ordinance, and it removed that condition. We affirm the removal of the condition, but we reverse the trial court’s holding that the BZA had violated the property owner’s substantive due process rights.

Plaintiffs sued Defendants in an amended complaint following the expiration of the statute of limitations. Defendants moved for summary judgment/judgment on the pleadings based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Subsequently, co-defendants alleged Defendants’ comparative fault in an amended answer. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings were granted, but were not made final. Based on co-defendants’ answer, Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to name Defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. However, Defendants claimed that section 20-1-119 could not be utilized as they were already parties to the lawsuit, and they moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The trial court granted said motions, and we affirm.

This appeal arises out of an action in which the plaintiff asserted a claim that the agent of a used car business in which the plaintiff allegedly invested committed misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act in failing to give him stock in the business or compensate him for work performed at the business. Plaintiff also asserted a claim based on defendants’ alleged failure to repair his vehicle. The trial court held that plaintiff had not established the necessary elements for any of his claims and dismissed the case; plaintiff appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff requested a transcript of a deposition from the defendant, a court reporter. When the defendant notified the plaintiff that the transcript was ready and told him her fee, he neither retrieved the transcript nor paid her. After the defendant made several telephone calls to the plaintiff in an attempt to obtain payment, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This wife, Stefanie Lynne Brumit (Durham) (“Wife”), and husband, Walter Jessee Brumit (“Husband”), were divorced in the early 1990s. The parties had one child, and Husband was ordered to pay $1500 per month in child support. From that amount, Wife was ordered to place $300 per month into an educational trust account for the child’s benefit. In 2008, Husband filed a motion for contempt, asserting that Wife was $6,600 behind in the payments to the trust account. Wife claimed that she had fallen behind in the payments because of financial difficulties and brought the trust account up to date prior to filing her response. In April 2009, the trial court, prior to hearing, dismissed the contempt motion and taxed the costs to Husband. Upon Husband’s appeal, we vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits before a new trial judge. On remand, the trial court found Wife in contempt of court. As Wife had brought the payments to the trust account up to date, the trial court ordered her to pay the interest income lost by the account due to her delinquent payments and half of Husband’s attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm.

This is a petition for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate seeking review of the calculation of his prison sentence. The petitioner inmate filed two administrative petitions for a declaratory order challenging the calculation of his sentence, and the respondent Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) denied both petitions. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the instant petition for declaratory judgment, arguing that his sentence was improperly calculated. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TDOC. The petitioner now appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress". State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion.

A Colorado court granted a divorce to married parents who were both active-duty members of the armed forces. The court named the mother as the primary residential parent of their two minor children, and a parenting plan with flexible provisions was fashioned in the event of overseas deployment by one or both parents. Both parties were deployed overseas at various times during the next five years. The children spent the majority of that time in the care of the father, or, during father’s deployments, in the care of his mother or his new wife. The father moved to Clarksville, Tennessee in April of 2007, and after living there with the children for eighteen consecutive months, he filed a petition in the Tennessee court for registration of the Colorado judgment and modification of the parenting plan. He asked the court to name him as the children’s primary residential parent. After a hearing, the trial court granted the father’s petition. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that there had been a material change of circumstances which was unanticipated at the time of the divorce, and she contends that the father had therefore failed to meet the statutory threshold before a change in a parenting plan may be ordered under Tennessee law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B). She also argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-113 limits the authority of the trial court to permanently modify the custody and visitation arrangements for the children of a mobilized parent. We affirm the trial court.

In the initial suit between these parties, plaintiff sued and recovered damages for breach of contract and attorney's fees as provided in the contract between the parties. Subsequently, plaintiff brought this action for additional attorney's fees to recover the fees incurred in collecting the judgment against defendants. The Trial Court awarded attorney's fees and defendants appealed to this Court. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and hold that the statute of limitations barred further recovery under the terms of the contract between the parties.

This case arises from a dispute over the repayment of a loan. Penny Chambers obtained a loan through a bank in order to buy a house. Penny Chambers defaulted on the loan. Paul W. Chambers (“Chambers”), Penny Chambers’s husband, later assumed the mortgage. Chambers allegedly defaulted and First Volunteer Bank of Tennessee (“the Bank”) stated that it would foreclose if he did not cure the default. Chambers sued the Bank in the Chancery Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss. Chambers appeals. We find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Bank’s motion to dismiss. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in denying Chambers’s motion to alter or amend and motion for default. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for failure to conform to the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against numerous public officials. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. After review of the complaint, the trial court found that it was unintelligible and failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a negligence action. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that Defendant/Appellee is liable for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell while walking down the steps at the Shelby County courthouse. Due to Appellant’s incarceration, the trial court granted three continuances; however, Appellant’s request for a fourth continuance was denied. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to show negligence on the part of the Appellee, and further concluded that, if there was negligence in the case, Appellant was at least fifty percent at fault so as to bar recovery. Appellant appeals both the denial of his fourth motion for a continuance and the trial court’s ruling in favor of Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.

A nine-year-old child, whose initials are C.M. (“the Child”), told her mother, whose initials are also C.M. (“Mother”), that Eddie Davis had touched her inappropriately. The disclosure was made shortly after the Child had reviewed a comic book that is designed to help children recognize and disclose child sexual abuse. Davis is the executive director of the Youth Emergency Shelter (“Y.E.S.”) in Hamblen County. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), a state agency, initiated an investigation and “indicated” Davis as a perpetrator of child sexual abuse. Davis requested an administrative hearing. The administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) found that the Child’s statements to Mother and later to a forensic interviewer were credible because they were “consistent” in that she told both a story of Davis putting his hand on her buttocks inside her panties. Davis appealed the ALJ’s finding to the trial court. The trial court sustained the findings of the ALJ. Davis appealed to this Court. Because there is no substantial and material evidence to support the findings of the ALJ, we reverse.

Beth L. Wineland, the sole plaintiff, sustained serious injuries when the front wheel of her bicycle fell into the open slots of a metal drainage grate (“the subject grate” or “the old style grate”) situated near a curb of State Highway 60. The slots on the subject grate run parallel with the direction of traffic. The subject grate is inside the municipal boundaries of the City of Cleveland. The plaintiff made a claim against the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission and filed this action against the City of Cleveland in the trial court. The claim against the State was consolidated with this action for trial. The plaintiff alleges that the old style grate constitutes a dangerous condition on the highway and that both the City of Cleveland and the State were negligent in maintaining the highway. The trial court determined that neither defendant had a duty to change the grate and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals only as to the State. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of damages.

Jerome Hertis Phillips brought suit to contest a tax assessment made against him by the Department of Revenue (“the Department”). The Department filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion based upon its finding that Phillips failed to file suit within the time provided by law. Phillips appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves an award of retroactive child support. When the child was an infant, the mother lied and told the father that the child had died. Subsequently, custody of the child was transferred back and forth numerous times between the mother and the maternal grandmother. The father’s paternity was established when the child was thirteen, and after establishing a relationship with the child, the father sought to be named primary residential parent. The grandmother then petitioned for retroactive child support. Father was named primary residential parent, but the juvenile court ordered the father to pay approximately $40,000 in retroactive child support to the grandmother, finding a certain statute that provides for deviations in retroactive child support to be inapplicable to this situation. We reverse the court’s decision and vacate its award of retroactive child support, and remand for further proceedings.

Jefferson County, Tennessee filed a petition against Margaret Vance Smith, seeking to recover possession of the unexecuted marriage license issued to David (“Davy”) Crockett and Margaret Elder by the county’s clerk in 1805. The action was filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-504, which prohibits the destruction of, tampering with, or fabrication of government records. The trial court entered a final judgment against Mrs. Smith, ordering the immediate return of the marriage license to Jefferson County. Mrs. Smith appealed. We affirm as modified.

This is a divorce case. The husband appeals, challenging the trial court’s determinations regarding the classification of property and the valuation and distribution of the marital assets. Wife raises additional issues concerning the property classification and attorney fees. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Appellant appealed the trial court’s order granting a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s order awarding him no visitation with the parties’ children, its classification and award of property to Mother, and the award of attorney’s fees to mother. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand to the trial court to set visitation.