APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns venue in an action to recover royalties. The plaintiff songwriter resided in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff filed the instant  lawsuit in Shelby County against the defendant music company to recover past-due royalties, asserting that he was the sole author of three musical compositions. The defendant music company, domiciled in the United Kingdom, filed a motion to dismiss based on, inter alia, improper venue. The trial court held that venue was improper and granted the motion to dismiss. We  reverse.

This application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 arises from the trial court’s decision to stay the implementation of the parenting plan that the trial court was directed to adopt pursuant to our decision in In re Madison K.P., No. M2009-02331-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 4810665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010). The Supreme Court denied the father’s application for permission to appeal on April 14, 2011 and the mandate of this court was issued on April 27, 2011. Despite this, the ruling of this court has yet to be put into effect, because the parenting plan that was to be approved and entered by the trial court, and which was approved and entered, was immediately stayed by the trial court following its entry, rendering our decision and the parenting plan of no effect.

Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal more than thirty (30) days after the order appealed was entered by the trial court. Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The buyer of unimproved real property sued the sellers for breach of implied warranties, imposition of a permanent nuisance, and diminution in value of the property; buyer also sought damages for alleged violations of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. The trial court held that Tennessee does not provide a cause of action for breach of implied warranty in the sale of unimproved real property; the court also held that buyer had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the lot was “unbuildable.” The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the buyer appealed. Buyer asserts that the sellers had a duty to disclose “possible adverse soil conditions.” She also urges this Court to adopt a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of suitability for residential construction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal of an award of attorney fees in a post-divorce matter. The father had filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, seeking to increase his parenting time and reduce his child support obligation. Approximately six months later, after Father’s discovery deposition was taken, he asked the court to dismiss his petition to modify without prejudice.  The trial court dismissed the petition but awarded the mother $20,000 for her attorneys’ fees.  The father appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees and that the amount awarded was arbitrary and unreasonable. We find that the trial court had the authority to award attorney’s fees, but due to the lack of findings by the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the fee award, we vacate the award and remand for further proceedings.

In this post-divorce case, Kolo Lynn Davis (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s classification of an agreement to maintain health insurance through his company, Cleveland Building Materials (“CBM”), as alimony in futuro. Husband and Carol D. Davis (“Wife”) were married in 1964 and divorced in 1995. Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties, Wife was given the option of maintaining health insurance through CBM. In furtherance of this agreement, Wife was given a paid position as a non-voting member of CBM’s board of directors, which allowed her to maintain health insurance through CBM. Wife was tasked with reimbursing CBM for all costs associated with the health insurance coverage. Husband later sold CBM to Kolo Lynn Davis, II (“Son”). Son, through CBM, continued to pay Wife for her services as a board member. In 2005, CBM discontinued its group health insurance, thereby removing Wife from the plan and ceased paying Wife for her services as a board member. Wife filed suit, naming Husband and CBM as parties. Following a hearing, the trial court classified the payments from CBM as alimony in futuro, held Husband personally liable for CBM’s non-payment, and instructed Husband to continue with future payments pursuant to the agreement. Husband appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves a boundary line dispute raised by the plaintiff, Melvin B. Smith and his wife, Charlotte E. Smith (“the Smiths”) and a request for an easement by the defendants, Gary Hankins and Stanley Hankins (“the Hankinses”). After a trial, the court entered rulings in favor of the Hankinses as to both the establishment of the boundary line and the easement. The Smiths appeal. We affirm.

Daughter of decedent filed claim against estate. The probate court dismissed the daughter’s claim on the ground that it was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The purchasers of lots in a “subdivision known as Timberlake Estates, Phase One” – described in a plat and restrictive covenants as a twenty-lot subdivision – acquired with their deeds the right to use a boat ramp and parking area to be located in a common area within the subdivision. When they learned that additional lots – not located within the combined acreage of the twenty lots – were being advertised for sale along with the right to use the same boat ramp and parking area, they filed this action against their predecessor in interest.1 After a trial on the merits, the court held that only the purchasers of lots in “Phase One” were entitled to use the boat ramp and parking area. The defendants appeals. We affirm.

In this legal malpractice case, Alfie Tucker filed suit against his attorney, Tabitha Finch, alleging that she had negligently represented him in his lawsuit against his former employer by failing to timely file his claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission (“TCC”). Ms. Finch filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the applicable statute of limitations had passed. The trial court granted Ms. Finch’s motion and dismissed the case. Mr. Tucker appeals. We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal.

This interlocutory appeal stems from a lien enforcement action. Tri Am Construction, Inc. (“Tri Am”) filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Rhea County (“the Trial Court”) against J & V Development, Inc. (“J & V”), Randall E. Vick, Brenda B. Jung, and Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) to enforce a lien. BB&T moved to dismiss Tri Am’s complaint, citing alleged fatal procedural defects. The Trial Court denied BB&T’s motion to dismiss and allowed Tri Am to amend its complaint to cure the procedural defects. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in liberally construing the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes to permit Tri Am to amend its complaint in order to cure the procedural defects. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in declining to hold that BB&T’s rights would be retroactively impaired by the liberal application of the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A show cause order was entered in this case on July 15, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time specified. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3 a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature.

This is a contested divorce case involving two minor children. K.B.J. (“Husband”) was the first to file a complaint for divorce. T.J. (“Wife”) answered his complaint and coupled a counterclaim with her answer. The trial court found that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife a divorce, but made Husband the primary residential parent of the minor children with final authority on certain parental decisions. The court ordered equal parenting time on an alternating week basis. It also denied Wife’s request for spousal support and allocated to her approximately $32,350 of the marital debt. Wife appeals. We reverse that part of the judgment making Husband the primary residential parent with final decision-making authority and modify the parenting schedule. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a guaranty case. Appellants personally guaranteed a line of credit for their trucking company. Later, Appellants sold the trucking company to two employees, but were not released by the Appellee lender from their guaranties. Under new ownership, the company falsified borrowing documents so that more money was extended on the line of credit than was collateralized per the loan agreement. This was done with the complicity of the lender, but without the knowledge of the guarantors. The debtor trucking company defaulted, and the lender sought repayment of the loan from the guarantors. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellants liable for their personal guaranties, but denied prejudgment interest and punitive damages due to what the court characterized as the fraudulent actions of Appellee. In an apparent clerical mistake, on the same date that the trial court entered its final judgment, it also entered an order voluntarily dismissing all claims against Appellants. More than a year later, the trial court entered an order clarifying its prior order of dismissal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that: (1) the trial court properly afforded Appellee relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 to clarify its prior order of dismissal; and (2) the trial court made incomplete and contradictory findings of fact and conclusions of law, such that further appellate review is precluded. Consequently, we vacate and remand for additional findings.

Lyndsey S. (“Mother”) and Trey S. (“Father”) are the biological parents (“Parents”) of Maddox B.S. and Rylie M.S. (“Children”). Veronda S. and James S. (“Grandparents”) are the paternal grandparents of Children. Mother, acknowledging that her consent would result in the termination of her parental rights, sought to consent to the adoption of Children by Grandparents. Grandparents and Mother petitioned the trial court to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights and allow Grandparents to adopt Children. The court accepted Mother’s consent and terminated her parental rights. The court terminated Father’s parental rights in a default judgment, citing abandonment as the ground for the termination of Father’s rights. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved the court to set aside the final order of adoption, citing fraud and duress as grounds. Father also moved the court to set aside the termination of his parental rights and the order of adoption, citing fraud and misrepresentation as grounds. Mother and Father subsequently alleged that the court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Children. The trial court found that it had failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and set aside the final order of adoption. Mother then sought to revoke her consent. The trial court allowed the revocation, finding that the final order of adoption that had been set aside was the only document in which Mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights and subsequent adoption. Grandparents appeal the court’s action of setting aside the order, the allowance of Mother’s revocation of consent, and the dismissal of the case. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In an action for divorce and custody, Father appeals the trial court’s decision to declare Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. Because Father failed to file a transcript or statement of the evidence pertaining to a portion of the trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the Hawkins County Circuit Court’s determination that the Department of Safety could not suspend James W. Grooms, Jr.’s handgun permit because the permit had been confiscated previously by a police officer, and Mr. Grooms, therefore, was unable to surrender the permit. We reverse.

This is an appeal from an action originally filed in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, seeking damages for Appellees’ alleged breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, mismanagement, negligence, and breach of duty to diversify in its roles as executor of Decedent’s estate and Decedent’s successor trustee. Decedent’s son, the Appellant herein, filed his original suit in the Probate Court of Shelby County, seeking return of  administrative costs and fees charged by Appellee. The probate court affirmed the fees, and Appellant filed a subsequent complaint in the chancery court. The chancery court complaint was eventually transferred to the probate court, where it was dismissed on grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Appellant appeals. We conclude that there was no final order in the first probate proceeding and, consequently, the criteria for both collateral estoppel and res judicata are not met. Reversed and remanded.

This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother’s death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home and others connected to its administration. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by the son. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the son was not the decedent’s agent and did not have authority to sign on her behalf. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

A social worker employed by an agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was discharged from her job following an allegation that she had pinched a child attending a Head Start program. She then filed a discrimination and wrongful termination claim with the Metro Civil Service Commission. After the allegations against her proved to be baseless, she settled her claim with Metro for $45,000 and agreed not to be reinstated in her former job. She subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County for retaliatory discharge and for employment discrimination. The discrimination claim was eventually dismissed by agreed order. Metro filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning among other things that because of the settlement of her claim and her agreement not to be reinstated, she could not prove, as a matter of law, that she was “adversely affected” in any material way by the termination of her employment. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court granted both parties an absolute divorce after a marriage of twenty-four years, divided the marital property equally between them, and declared that neither party was to be awarded alimony. The husband appeals, arguing that the property division was inequitable because he came into the marriage with $500,000 worth of separate property while the wife only owned a negligible amount of separate propertyat the time of the parties’ marriage, and also because he was also the primary wage earner during the marriage. He also argues that the trial court should have awarded him alimony. The wife asserts that the husband’s separate assets became maritalpropertyover the years through the processesof commingling of assets or transmutation, and that the equal division of that property was equitable. She also denies that the husband is entitled to alimony. We affirm.
 

Plaintiff injured in automobile accident died while his negligence action was pending. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a suggestion of death but neglected to move to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff within 90 days, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(1). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which led plaintiff’s estate to file a motion to enlarge time within which to move to substitute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. The trial court determined plaintiff’s counsel’s neglect in moving to substitute within 90 days was not excusable and granted defendants’ motions, dismissing the action. On appeal we affirm the trial court’s judgment because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the neglect was not excusable.
 

Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action to have the Court declare that she was entitled to the proceeds of a trust fund, as she was the legitimate child of her father. The Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on the grounds that all the records of her birth, baptismal records, and the parents divorce, and the father never questioning her legitimacy, established her legitimacy, and the defendant's son who challenged her right to the proceeds had no standing to question her legitimacy. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a post-divorce action. Appellant/Father, who is incarcerated for sexually abusing his step-daughter, appeals the trial court’s: (1) grant of Appellee/Mother’s petition to change the surnames of the two minor children that were born to the marriage; (2) denial of Appellant/Father’s petition to grant him visitation with the minor children; and (3) entry of an order requiring Appellant/Father to execute a qualified domestic relations order to effectuate the trial court’s award of assets as child support. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries.