APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, the second mortgage holder on the subject property, appeals the trial court’s determination that Appellee held a valid first mortgage on the property, when Appellee’s mortgage was taken under a deed of trust that contained a scrivener’s error that incorrectly identified the property’s lot number. The trial court held that: (1) the scrivener’s error was not fatal to Appellant’s deed of trust as the instrument otherwise clearly identified the property; (2) Appellant’s mortgage was superior to Appellee’s; and (3) Appellee’s bid at Appellant’s foreclosure sale created a valid contract, under which Appellee owed Appellant the purchase price. Finding no error, we affirm.

Husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido beginning after three years of rehabilitative alimony. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision.
 

I fully concur with the reasoning and result in this opinion.Agreeing that the two most significant points we derive from Gonsewski are “the great deference appellate courts are to give to the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony and the disfavor for long-term alimony,” I write separately to recognize an important exception to the deferential standard of review that was not affected by Gonsewski, that being the less deferential standard that applies when the alimony decision is based upon findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence.Such was the case in Jekot v. Jekot, No. M2010-02467-COA- R3CV, 2011 WL 5115542 (Tenn. Ct. App.Oct.25,2011), wherein we recently reversed the trial court’s alimony award.
 

In a divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent, its allocation of the marital debt, and its denial of alimony. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

An in-state bottled soft drink manufacturer argues, pursuant to the bottler’s tax statute, that the in-state distributor to which it sells may pay the bottler’s tax on such sales and utilize its own franchise and excise tax credit. Absent this flexibility, the manufacturer contends, equal protection guarantees are offended. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue, finding that the manufacturer bore the tax burden and that it could not utilize the distributor’s credit. We affirm.

In this post-divorce dispute, wife challenges the trial court’s credibility finding, an award for alimony arrearage, and an award of attorney fees. While we find that the amount of the arrearage award should be modified, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects.
 

This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case to this court. Donna Lynn Lund (“Wife”) and John Fredrik Lund (“Husband”) were divorced in 2008. In the first appeal of the trial court’s classification of marital property, this court held that the increase in value of Husband’s pre-marital annuity was separate property. On remand, the trial court divided the property as consistent with this court’s opinion. Wife filed post-judgment motions and a subsequent motion for Rule 60.02 relief, asserting that the order on remand contained errors of law and that she mistakenly failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals denied plaintiff's use on review application for a proposed shopping center. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Circuit Court by way of a Writ of Certiorari. The Trial Court upheld the Board of Zoning Appeals' decision and plaintiff appealed to this Court. We reverse the decision of the Circuit Court on the grounds the record before the Board of Zoning Appeals does not contain substantial material evidence to uphold the Board's ruling. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The legal guardians of the child filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on her alleged willful failure to visit and support the child. The trial court found that Mother’s efforts to visit and support had been frustrated by the legal guardians’ actions. Therefore, the trial court concluded that Mother’s failure to visit and support was not willful. Because the legal guardians failed to prove any of the grounds required to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the trial court denied the petition. We affirm.

This case concerns a holographic will executed by the testator while under a conservatorship.  After the testator died, Appellant sought to be named personal representative over the decedent’s estate and to have the decedent’s holographic will probated. The decedent’s daughter objected, arguing that at the time the holographic will was executed, the decedent was under a conservatorship that expressly revoked the decedent’s right to make a will. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the decedent’s daughter. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after falling down a staircase while working on the construction of a home. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against the general contractorand the subcontractorresponsible for the construction ofthe custom staircase. The matter was tried before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding Plaintiff fifty percent at fault, the subcontractor thirty-five percent at fault, and the general contractor fifteen percent at fault. After his motion for new trial was denied, Plaintiff filed this appeal. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the subcontractor’s employees used marijuana while working on the construction of the staircase, and erred by excluding evidence of misdemeanor convictions and probation violations of one of the subcontractor’s employees. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding notice, negligence, and foreseeability. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of alleged marijuana use or the evidence of misdemeanor convictions and probation violations. Similarly, we find that the jury instructions on notice, negligence, and foreseeability were proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Tennessee corporation located in Montgomery County filed a breach of contract action against a Tennessee corporation located in Sullivan Countyto collect moneyallegedlyowing for services rendered in North Carolina. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint because it concluded the proper venue was Sullivan County, where the defendant resides. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The plaintiff’s action is transitory and therefore governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-4-101. We conclude the cause of action arose in North Carolina and, pursuant to the statute, venue is proper in Tennessee where the defendant resides.
 

This lawsuit for damages arises out of an explosion. The plaintiff customers went to the defendant  propane gas facility to fill their recreational vehicle with propane. Soon after they arrived, one of the propane hoses began to leak, and propane gas vapor began to envelope the premises. After a short period of time, the propane gas tank exploded, causing devastating property damage and destroying the plaintiffs’ recreational vehicle. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendants, alleging that they were near the explosion site when the explosion occurred, and that the explosion caused them numerous physical and psychological injuries. The defendants admitted liability and compensated the plaintiffs for their property damage. The defendants claimed, however, that the plaintiffs were not present  at the explosion site when the explosion occurred and did not sustain any personal injuries caused by the explosion. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, determining that the explosion did not cause any personal injuries to the plaintiffs and awarding zero damages. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves a trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award. The parties engaged in arbitration over a dispute in which the respondent investors asserted that the petitioner investment company mismanaged their funds. The investors prevailed and received a substantial arbitration award against the investment company. The investment company filed a petition in the trial court to vacate the arbitration award, alleging partiality and bias on the part of two members of the arbitration panel. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order vacating the arbitration award and remanding the matter to the regulatory authority for a rehearing before another panel of arbitrators. The respondent investors now appeal. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Respondent father asserts the petition for dependency and neglect filed by the Department of Children’s Services in juvenile court should be dismissed for insufficient service of process, and that Tennessee Code Annotated 37-1-102(b)(23) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Upon de novo appeal, the circuit court affirmed the finding of dependency and neglect and dismissed the Constitutional challenge. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order granting a partial summary judgment in an action to modify a final decree of divorce. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties but rather orders the remaining issues set for trial, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

Appellant appealed a non-final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

While touring a model home in a new residential home development, the plaintiff fell when she failed to see a four-inch step as she walked from the foyer into the sunken living room. This premises liabilityaction followed. The defendant constructed, owned, and managed the model home in which the plaintiff fell. Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon two findings: that the defendant did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was more than fifty percent at fault. We affirm upon the finding that the plaintiff cannot establish that a duty was owed to her by the defendant.
 

The Memphis Police Department terminated the employment of Petitioner Police Officer for conduct unbecoming an officer following a physical altercation with a parking lot attendant. On appeal pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the chancery court affirmed. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred by refusing to admit additional evidence of disparate treatment in violation of his equal protection rights. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns a note executed by Robert Denton (“Husband”) and Susan L. Denton (“Wife”) and payable to Husband’s sister, Carolyn L. Denton-Preletz (“Lender”). When Lender sought recovery of the note, Wife denied liability and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations for recovery of the note had passed. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case as it related to Wife. Lender filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to amend the complaint, which were denied. Lender appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This case is before us for the second time on appeal. In our first Opinion, Kerney v. Endres, No. E2008-01476-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009), no appl. perm. appeal filed (“Kerney I”), we found and held that defendants’ beauty salon violated the restrictive covenants of residential use only, vacated the Trial Court’s order to the contrary, and remanded the case for a determination of whether the restrictive covenants had been waived. On remand, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the restrictive covenants of residential use only had been waived and were unenforceable. Plaintiffs appeal the finding of waiver to this Court. We find that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s finding that the restrictive covenants had been waived. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s May 3, 2010 order.

Avis Budget Group, Inc. (“Avis”) sued James Hagood d/b/a Hagood & Sons Wrecker Service (“Hagood”) and, after a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment on October 15, 2010 awarding a judgment in favor of Avis in the amount of $7,284 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees. Subsequently, Hagood filed a motion to alter or amend or for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Hagood appealed to this Court. Since the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees remains outstanding, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Chattanooga’s mayor, the subject of a recall petition, filed suit against the county election commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition process was flawed and to enjoin the election commission from placing the recall issue on the November 2010 election ballot. The trial court found the election commission could not lawfully certify the recall petition due to noncompliance with applicable statutory provisions and enjoined the placement of the recall issue on the ballot. The leader of the recall effort appeals. We find that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entering an injunction against the election commission. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and the complaint dismissed.

The Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Troy L. (“Father”) to the minor child Breanna A. L. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 13 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed such that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

In this divorce case involving a minor child of the parties and the appellant Charles Braun’s stepson, the record before us does not contain a permanent parenting plan certified by the trial court clerk as being entered by that court. Furthermore, the record affirmatively shows that the trial court has not yet made a final decision as to an amount of child support to be paid by Charles Braun. Therefore, we are persuaded that there is no final judgment in this case. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.