APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The parties married twice and divorced twice. Under the terms of their second divorce decree, the wife was awarded the marital home, the husband and wife were made jointly responsible for the mortgage on the home, and the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro of $1,200 per month. About five years after their second divorce became final, the husband filed a petition to terminate or to modify his alimony obligation. He alleged among other things that his income had declined and that his wife no longer needed his support, as demonstrated by her conveyance of the marital home without consideration to the party’s son, and her relationship with her new boyfriend. For her part, the wife petitioned the trial court to increase the husband’s alimony obligation, alleging that her need had actually increased because her physical ailments had worsened and that the monthly cost of medications to treat them had soared. The trial court denied both petitions. We affirm

This appeal arises out of a personal injury suit, wherein the plaintiff and Dewayne Duffer filed suit against a trucking company for injuries suffered in an accident and for loss of consortium as a result of the accident. Plaintiff’s employer intervened to recover worker’s compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Soon thereafter, the trucking company discovered that plaintiff was male, had filed the action using an assumed female identity, and had lied throughout the discovery process. The trucking company filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s and employer’s complaints,finding that plaintiff had committed a fraud upon the courtand thatemployerhad failed to file suitwithin the applicable statute of limitations because plaintiff’scomplaintwas rendered void ab initio. Plaintiff and employer appeal. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint but reverse the dismissal of employer’s complaint.
 

In this appeal, numerous beneficiaries under a will challenge the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees of $9,024.75 out of the funds of the estate to another beneficiary who is their adversary. At an earlier time, the court had entered an order setting the attorney’s fees of that beneficiary at $34,669.25 without specifying who was responsible for the payment of those fees. On the motion of that beneficiary, the court granted a new trial on the subject of attorney’s fees. When the matter came on for the “new trial,” the court announced that it would listen to argument but would not receive substantive evidence on the subject. Following that “hearing,” the court awarded the fees now before us. The court’s order does not articulate any findings with respect to whether the attorney’s services were reasonable, necessary or benefited the estate. The “challenging” beneficiaries filed a notice of appeal. We vacate the order awarding attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order on attorney’s fees complying with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

The great aunt and the great-grandmother of a little girl obtained an emergency order giving them temporary custody of the child when she was less than eight months old. The child’s mother was informed that she was entitled to appear at a preliminary hearing and an adjudicative hearing on a more permanent custody order, but she failed to appear for those hearings. The trial court found that the child was dependent and neglected, and awarded custody of the child to her two older relatives. They subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of abandonment and of persistence of conditions. The trial court found that both grounds were proved and granted the petition. We affirm the termination on the ground of persistence of conditions.
 

This case arose from a dispute between neighbors over the ownership of an elaborate stone and metal gate used for entry into both their residential properties. The predecessors-ininterest of the defendants installed the gate at their own expense, placing it on an easement over the plaintiffs’ adjoining lot. The plaintiffs decided to sell their house, and included a picture and a description of the gate in their real estate listing and advertisements. The defendants asserted that they owned the gate and compelled the plaintiffs’ realtor to remove all mention of the gate from sales materials. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to quiet title. After a bench trial, the court found that the gate belonged to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred because the gate is a fixture and, thus, that it has become part of the plaintiffs’ property by operation of law. We affirm the trial court.
 

This appeal arises out of a wrongful death action involving numerous defendants. We dismiss the appeal as to two defendants for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal as to the remaining defendants for lack of a final judgment.
 

The plaintiff, a public official, sued the defendants for libel and false light invasion of privacy. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the truth of the statements. The plaintiff sought to complete discovery before the motion was heard. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and plaintiff appealed. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the libel claims, but reverse the grant of summary judgment as to some of the false light claims.
 

The issue presented in this divorce case is which parent should be designated as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children. The trial court named the Appellee/Mother primary residential parent, and Appellant/Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Buyer purchased used automobile and signed contract stating the vehicle was being sold “as is” and without any warranties. After the transaction was completed and Buyer complained to Seller that the power steering was not working properly, Seller agreed to credit Buyer’s account with the cost of repairing the power steering. Buyer was unwilling or unable to pay for the repair out of his own pocket, and Seller ultimately repossessed the vehicle. Buyer sued Seller for breach of contract and trial court awarded Buyer damages. Seller appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Seller modified the parties’ original contract when it agreed to compensate Buyer for the cost of repairing the vehicle.
 

Mary G. (“Foster Mother”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Trial Court”) to adopt Haily A. S. (“the Child”), then under the guardianship of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child’s paternal grandparents, Marvin S. and Sandra S. (“the Grandparents”), filed an intervening petition to adopt the Child and shortly thereafter filed a motion to intervene. DCS filed a motion to dismiss the Grandparents’ petition. After a hearing at which the parties’ respective counsels made their arguments, the Trial Court granted DCS’s motion to dismiss the intervening petition for adoption. The Grandparents appeal, arguing that the Trial Court should have permitted them to present evidence on the issue of the Child’s best interest. We hold that because DCS, the Child’s guardian, did not consent to the Grandparents’ adoption of the Child, the Grandparents’ intervening petition properly was dismissed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The State filed a petition for child support against a father, on behalf of a non-parent caretaker who was caring for the father’s son. The juvenile court ordered the father to pay current and retroactive child support. The father filed a motion asking the court to rehear the child support matter and/or consolidate it with a separately pending child custody case. The juvenile court denied the motion, and the father appealed. We affirm.

This appeal involves a construction loan obtained by the plaintiffs for the construction of a new home. The loan proceeds were exhausted prior to the completion of the home. The plaintiffs then sued the lender bank for breach of contract, alleging that the bank had a duty
to inspect the construction prior to disbursing funds, and that its failure to complete inspections resulted in improper disbursement of the loan funds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank upon concluding that the bank had no contractual duty to
inspect the construction of the residence. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

Plaintiffs charged defendant with medical malpractice. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. An out-of-state medical doctor testified on behalf of the defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, insisting that it was reversible error for the Trial Court to allow that expert to testify in violation of the "Locality Rule". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

I do not believe the trial court went outside the parameters of its sound discretion when it increased father’s co-parenting time from 85 days to 143 days. Unlike many of the divorce cases we see, this one involves parents who, after the divorce, in the words of the majority opinion, “maintain[ ] a positive, cooperative relationship with one another regarding their co-parenting responsibilities.” Even more unique, this case presents a situation where father’s wife and his former spouse have a “positive relationship.”

The parties were divorced on September 2, 2009, and the Trial Court entered a Permanent Parenting Plan. On February 11, 2011, the father filed a Motion to Modify the PPP, alleging a change in circumstances. Following trial of the issues, the Trial Court increased the number of days the father would have the children and reduced the award of child support. The mother has appealed, we reverse the Trial Court.

Plaintiff filed this action in Circuit Court challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Retention Election Statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-1010 et seq. The Trial Judge held the statutes were constitutional, but concluded that intermediate appellate judges are subject to retention election only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resides. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's decision that the statutes are constitutional, but reverse the Trial Court's holding that intermediate appellate judges are subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resides.
 

This appeal involves retrospective insurance premiums on a workers’ compensation insurance policy. The defendant trucking company operates in several states, including Texas and Tennessee. Tennessee requires employers to maintain worker’s compensation insurance for certain employees, but Texas does not. The defendant trucking company purchased workers’ compensation insurance for its Tennessee employees from the plaintiff insurance company. The trucking company employed over-the-road truck drivers who were Tennessee residents. The trucking company decided to classify its Tennessee-resident overthe-road drivers as Texas employees whose on-the-job injuries would not be covered by the Tennessee workers’ compensation insurance policy. Consequently, the trucking company did not pay insurance premiums to cover those employees. The plaintiff insurance company conducted a retrospective premium audit; in the audit, it determined that the Tennesseeresident over-the-road drivers presented a risk of loss to the insurance company. Consequently, the insurance company notified the trucking company that it owed retrospective premiums based on those drivers. The trucking company refused to pay, so the insurance company canceled the insurance policy and filed this lawsuit for the retrospective premiums. The trialcourtgranted summaryjudgmentin favorof the insurance company,and the trucking company now appeals. We affirm, finding under the undisputed facts that the Tennessee-resident over-the-road employees presented a risk of loss to the insurer under the workers’ compensation insurance policy during the relevant policy periods.
 

Plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit in the General Sessions Court. Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff then attempted to raise his claim in Circuit Court, but the Circuit Court dismissed his claim on the basis of res judicata, finding no evidence that he had appealed the adverse General Sessions judgment to Circuit Court. Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Because Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to this Court is untimely, the appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a products liability settlement and a pension plan. Following the grant of the parties’ request for divorce, the trial court classified the proceeds of the settlement and the portion of the pension earned during the marriage as marital property. The court held that husband had dissipated the settlement proceeds without wife’s knowledge or consent. The court awarded husband the pension but awarded wife a judgment of $27,520.97 to equalize the division. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellees claim ownership to two tracts of land listed as parcels 4.00 and 4.01 on the Union County Tax Map. They assert ownership through adverse possession as a result of members of their family allegedly farming and paying taxes on the parcels  ince 1917. The appellant was a bona fide purchaser of parcel 4.00 in 2003. The appellees filed a complaint to quiet title to determine ownership of the land; the appellant countered with a complaint for a declaratory judgment. The trial court consolidated the actions and concluded that the appellees held title to the parcels by adverse possession. The appellant appeals. We reverse.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of abandonment by incarcerated parents, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. On appeal, Mother and Father argue that DCS did not clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination. Father further argues that DCS did not clearly and convincingly prove that termination was in the best interests of the children. Finally, Mother and Father argue that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify them with their children. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

On May 23, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Defendant”) to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Defendant responded to the show cause order and admitted that claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act remain outstanding. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The City of Etowah appeals a decision of the trial court leaving in place an injunction prohibiting the City from demolishing a house owned by the plaintiff, Edward Lee Carruth. The City’s Building Inspector, on behalf of the City, directed that the house be demolished. He acted pursuant to a city ordinance governing the clearing of unsafe structures. Carruth filed a complaint seeking (1) judicial review of the administrative ruling or, in the alternative, (2) review by writ of certiorari. The trial court issued the writ and entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the City from demolishing or otherwise destroying the house. Following a bench trial, the court found that (1) there was inadequate proof to sustain the City’s action; (2) Carruth did not receive a hearing from the City prior to the City’s action; (3) the City failed to make findings of fact, as required by statute, in support of its decision; and (4) the cost of repairing the house was less than fifty percent of its value. The City challenges each of the trial court’s determinations and it further challenges the trial court’s conduct of a hearing on a common-law writ of certiorari. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit brought by the parents of a minor child who was struck by a school bus while riding his bicycle. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court found that the child was 58% percent at fault for the accident and that the defendants were 42% at fault; judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. The trial court’s finding that the child was negligent was proper, and the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s allocation of fault between the parties; the judgment is affirmed in all respects.