APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jesse L. Rogers (“Plaintiff”) appeals an order from the Chancery Court for Johnson County (“Chancery Court”) dismissing his Petition for Access to Public Records. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition.

Corin Mucha Wilkinson (“Wife”) filed a petition for criminal contempt in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against Thomas Gregg Wilkinson (“Husband”). Wife and Husband were in the midst of a divorce. Wife, in her petition for contempt, alleged that Husband had willfully failed to pay his monthly pendente lite support as ordered. The Trial Court found Husband guiltyof two counts of criminal contempt. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

After twenty-five years of marriage, Marcella E. May (“Wife”) sued Donald B. May (“Husband”) for divorce. Husband’s adult son Donald P. May (“Son”) was added later to the suit as a defendant concerning a real property transfer. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the marital property, awarding Wife transitional alimony, and awarding Wife judgment for attorney’s fees against Husband. After further hearing, the Trial Court entered subsequent orders awarding Wife $63,474.34 in attorney’s fees and $2,965.77 in costs against Husband, and $4,083.50 in attorney’s fees against Son. Husband and Son appeal to this Court raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of specific property, and the awards of alimony and attorney’s fees. We affirm with regard to the classification and distribution of property, the award of alimony, and the award of attorney’s fees against Husband. We find and hold that no contractual or statutory basis allowed for an award of attorney’s fees against Son, and we, therefore, vacate the award to Wife of a judgment for attorney’s fees against Son.

This case concerns the divorce of Thomas Gregg Wilkinson (“Husband”) and Corin Mucha Wilkinson (“Wife”). Wife filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court, in its final decree granting the divorce, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife alimony. Husband appeals, contesting the division of the marital estate, the award of alimony to Wife, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and a judgment against him for pendente lite support arrearages. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court as it relates to the Trial Court’s marital debt allocation/alimony in solido and the amount of arrearages Husband owes. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action for fraud based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the existence of an easement. The dispute between the two adjoining landowners began after the defendant landowners blocked the plaintiff neighboring landowner’s access to a roadway crossing over the defendants’ property. The plaintiff landowner filed this action seeking condemnation or a finding of an implied easement for access to the roadway over the defendants’ property, arguing that his property was landlocked. Upon the admission into evidence of severalaffidavits,the trialcourtfound both an easement implied from prior use and, in the alternative, an easement created by necessity. The defendant landowners now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Appendix - Exhibit 1

This is an appeal from an order entered by the Chancery Court for Davidson County transferring an inmate’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Chancery Court for Morgan County. Because the order appealed does not resolve the claims raised in the petition but merely transfers those claims to another court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

This is a medical malpractice case in which Pauletta C. Crawford (“Wife”) and James Crawford (“Husband”) filed suit against Eugene Kavanaugh, M.D. (“Doctor”). While the suit was pending, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122 was amended to require the contemporaneous filing of a certificate of good faith with complaints alleging medical malpractice. Husband and Wife (collectively the “Crawfords”) dismissed their suit and filed a new complaint that did not include a certificate of good faith. Doctor filed a motion to dismiss, and the court dismissed the case. The Crawfords appeal. We affirm the trial court.

The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Trial Court to terminate the parental rights of the mother, DJ, and the presumptive father, TH, who was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court terminated the parental rights of the mother DJ and her husband at the time of the child's birth, TH. Both parties appealed to this Court and we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights and vacate the Judgment terminating TH's parental rights on the grounds that the statutory grounds for termination was not established by the evidence.

Plaintiff made claim for credit disability insurance coverage after he became disabled, and defendant insurance company denied benefits on the grounds of misrepresentations in the application for insurance, which he had executed. The Trial Court ruled in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that misrepresentations in the application did not increase the risk of loss. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court's Judgment because the misrepresentations contained in the application for insurance increase defendant's risk of loss under the statute.

At issue in this appeal is the amount of income that can be imputed to the father for child support, as well as whether the mother should be charged with the attorney fees and costs in regard to an order of protection. The trial court found that the father was voluntarily underemployed. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of voluntary underemployment, we affirm the trial court as to that matter. We reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the attorney fees and costs.

Appellant, the second mortgage holder on the subject property, appeals the trial court’s determination that Appellee held a valid first mortgage on the property, when Appellee’s mortgage was taken under a deed of trust that contained a scrivener’s error that incorrectly identified the property’s lot number. The trial court held that: (1) the scrivener’s error was not fatal to Appellant’s deed of trust as the instrument otherwise clearly identified the property; (2) Appellant’s mortgage was superior to Appellee’s; and (3) Appellee’s bid at Appellant’s foreclosure sale created a valid contract, under which Appellee owed Appellant the purchase price. Finding no error, we affirm.

In a divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent, its allocation of the marital debt, and its denial of alimony. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

An in-state bottled soft drink manufacturer argues, pursuant to the bottler’s tax statute, that the in-state distributor to which it sells may pay the bottler’s tax on such sales and utilize its own franchise and excise tax credit. Absent this flexibility, the manufacturer contends, equal protection guarantees are offended. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue, finding that the manufacturer bore the tax burden and that it could not utilize the distributor’s credit. We affirm.

In this post-divorce dispute, wife challenges the trial court’s credibility finding, an award for alimony arrearage, and an award of attorney fees. While we find that the amount of the arrearage award should be modified, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects.
 

This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case to this court. Donna Lynn Lund (“Wife”) and John Fredrik Lund (“Husband”) were divorced in 2008. In the first appeal of the trial court’s classification of marital property, this court held that the increase in value of Husband’s pre-marital annuity was separate property. On remand, the trial court divided the property as consistent with this court’s opinion. Wife filed post-judgment motions and a subsequent motion for Rule 60.02 relief, asserting that the order on remand contained errors of law and that she mistakenly failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals denied plaintiff's use on review application for a proposed shopping center. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Circuit Court by way of a Writ of Certiorari. The Trial Court upheld the Board of Zoning Appeals' decision and plaintiff appealed to this Court. We reverse the decision of the Circuit Court on the grounds the record before the Board of Zoning Appeals does not contain substantial material evidence to uphold the Board's ruling. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido beginning after three years of rehabilitative alimony. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision.
 

I fully concur with the reasoning and result in this opinion.Agreeing that the two most significant points we derive from Gonsewski are “the great deference appellate courts are to give to the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony and the disfavor for long-term alimony,” I write separately to recognize an important exception to the deferential standard of review that was not affected by Gonsewski, that being the less deferential standard that applies when the alimony decision is based upon findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence.Such was the case in Jekot v. Jekot, No. M2010-02467-COA- R3CV, 2011 WL 5115542 (Tenn. Ct. App.Oct.25,2011), wherein we recently reversed the trial court’s alimony award.
 

This case concerns a holographic will executed by the testator while under a conservatorship.  After the testator died, Appellant sought to be named personal representative over the decedent’s estate and to have the decedent’s holographic will probated. The decedent’s daughter objected, arguing that at the time the holographic will was executed, the decedent was under a conservatorship that expressly revoked the decedent’s right to make a will. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the decedent’s daughter. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The legal guardians of the child filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on her alleged willful failure to visit and support the child. The trial court found that Mother’s efforts to visit and support had been frustrated by the legal guardians’ actions. Therefore, the trial court concluded that Mother’s failure to visit and support was not willful. Because the legal guardians failed to prove any of the grounds required to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the trial court denied the petition. We affirm.

A Tennessee corporation located in Montgomery County filed a breach of contract action against a Tennessee corporation located in Sullivan Countyto collect moneyallegedlyowing for services rendered in North Carolina. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint because it concluded the proper venue was Sullivan County, where the defendant resides. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The plaintiff’s action is transitory and therefore governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-4-101. We conclude the cause of action arose in North Carolina and, pursuant to the statute, venue is proper in Tennessee where the defendant resides.
 

This lawsuit for damages arises out of an explosion. The plaintiff customers went to the defendant  propane gas facility to fill their recreational vehicle with propane. Soon after they arrived, one of the propane hoses began to leak, and propane gas vapor began to envelope the premises. After a short period of time, the propane gas tank exploded, causing devastating property damage and destroying the plaintiffs’ recreational vehicle. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendants, alleging that they were near the explosion site when the explosion occurred, and that the explosion caused them numerous physical and psychological injuries. The defendants admitted liability and compensated the plaintiffs for their property damage. The defendants claimed, however, that the plaintiffs were not present  at the explosion site when the explosion occurred and did not sustain any personal injuries caused by the explosion. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, determining that the explosion did not cause any personal injuries to the plaintiffs and awarding zero damages. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves a trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award. The parties engaged in arbitration over a dispute in which the respondent investors asserted that the petitioner investment company mismanaged their funds. The investors prevailed and received a substantial arbitration award against the investment company. The investment company filed a petition in the trial court to vacate the arbitration award, alleging partiality and bias on the part of two members of the arbitration panel. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order vacating the arbitration award and remanding the matter to the regulatory authority for a rehearing before another panel of arbitrators. The respondent investors now appeal. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.