APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

DCS filed a Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court determined there were statutory grounds to terminate the father's parental rights, and that it was in the best interest of the children that his rights be terminated. The father appealed and did not question that statutory grounds existed for termination, but argued that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his children. We conclude the father failed to demonstrate that the Department did not make reasonable efforts for reunification. The evidence is clear and convincing that the Department made reasonable efforts for reunification. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The two sons of decedent asked the Court to declare that their father died intestate and that his marriage to appellant a few days before he died was void because he was neither competent to make a will or enter into a marriage contract. Upon trial, the jury determined that the deceased was not of sound mind when he executed a will, a copy of which was filed in evidence, and the will was obtained through undue influence of appellant. The jury also found that the marriage between the decedent and appellant was invalid as well. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdict and appellant has appealed. We hold that material evidence supports the jury verdict as approved by the Trial Judge and remand.

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., dissenting.
This case pits the biological children of the deceased, being two sons, against Linda Caraway, who claims to be the widow of the deceased by virtue of a marriage ceremony that occurred thirteen days before his death on July 7, 2009. What is “on the line” is apparently the entire estate of the deceased. One of his sons testified that his father’s will of April 16, 2009 – the original of which was never found – left the deceased’s entire estate to Ms. Caraway.

Paternal Grandparents filed a motion to intervene in a divorce action between Mother and Father, seeking custody of the parties’ two minor children. The trial court ultimately awarded custody to Mother and ordered Grandparents to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees and costs. Grandparents appeal, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) only provides for awards of attorney’s fees against spouses in a custody matter, and therefore, the trial court was not authorized to order them to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This appeal centers on the effective date of a judgment against Appellant–2000 or 2004. Appellant argues that both the equitable estoppel and law of the case doctrines bar Plaintiff from arguing that the judgment was entered in 2004, and therefore, that it has not expired. The trial court found that the judgment had not expired, and we affirm.
 

This case involves the valuation of assets for division of marital property and alimony. Wife filed for divorce, seeking an equitable division of the marital assets, including Husband’s one-half interest in a real estate partnership. At trial, each party introduced experts to testify as to the value of Husband’s interest in the partnership. The trial court valued the partnership at a fair market value that was between the values testified to by the experts. The court awarded Wife one-half of the value, awarded Wife one-half of a note that was based on property Husband owned prior to the marriage, and awarded Wife alimony. After a motion to alter or amend, the trial court reduced Wife’s interest in the partnership and the note to take into account Husband’s tax liability. Wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in valuing the partnership and in its alimony award. Affirmed.

In this case, Kimberlie Lois Edmonson (“Ms. Edmonson”) filed suit against Terry Lynn Wilson (“Mr. Wilson”) for breach of an alleged partnership agreement. Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement. Following the announcement of the agreement in court by counsel, Ms. Edmonson refused to honor the agreement. Mr. Wilson filed a motion to enforce the agreement, and the trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the court held in favor of Ms. Edmonson. Mr. Wilson appeals. We hold that the court should have enforced the settlement agreement and reverse the decision of the court.

Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in holding a hearing on his wife’s petition for an order of protection when his attorney was not present. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Purchasers of house sued sellers for breach of contract because, contrary to the sale agreement, the house was not connected to the sewer. After a trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the purchasers for the cost of connecting the house to the sewer. In this appeal, the sellers argue that the trial court erred in applying the wrong statute of limitations, in finding in favor of the purchasers, in using the wrong measure of damages, and in the award of attorney fees. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.
 

This case arises from a will contest. Appellant, the executor and sole beneficiary of the contested will, appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not met his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence based upon the existence of a confidential relationship between Appellant and Decedent. Finding no error, we affirm.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants Shelby County and the City of Memphis upon determining that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-7-210, Defendants have authority to regulate billboards pursuant to private acts applicable to Memphis and Shelby County. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm entry of a judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds of standing and ripeness.

Appellee filed an action to set aside Defendant Homeowners’ Association non-judicial foreclosure sale of a condo unit for allegedly unpaid homeowners’ association fees. The trial court set aside the sale upon determining that there was no credible basis upon which to determine the amount due at the time of the sale. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale of her property. The trial court dismissed the case based on Plaintiff’s failure to effect service of process on the Defendant. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. The defendant seller entered into a contract to sell a mobile home to the plaintiff’s decedent. The contract required the decedent to make monthly payments by a date certain for eighty-four months, and if he failed to do so, all of his payments would be forfeited as rent. The decedent failed to make all of his payments in a timely manner. Later, the decedent died. The plaintiff, the decedent’s sole devisee, offered to pay the contract off by making a lump-sum payment to the defendant. The defendant rejected this offer. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, seeking to require the defendant to accept the lump-sum payment and convey the property to her. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims upon the close of her proof, because the undisputed evidence showed that she had not made the required monthly payments under the contract. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.
 

This is a negligence case in which Chanda Keith (“Ms. Keith”) filed suit against Regas Real Estate Company (“Regas”) and LDB Corporation operating in Tennessee as Mr. Gatti’s Incorporated formerly doing business as Mr. Gatti’s and/or Mr. Gatti’s, L.P. (“Mr. Gatti’s”). The trial court dismissed the suit against Regas. Approximately ten years after the initial suit was filed, the trial court dismissed the suit against Mr. Gatti’s without prejudice, finding that Ms. Keith failed to comply with an order. One year later, Ms. Keith filed a new suit against Regas and Mr. Gatti’s. The trial court dismissed both suits. Ms. Keith appeals. We affirm the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Regas but reverse the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Mr. Gatti’s. The case is remanded.

This is an appeal from a child support action. A juvenile court magistrate found the father to be willfully and voluntarily unemployed and imputed income to him for the purposes of calculating his child support obligation. The magistrate refused to consider a motion to modify or vacate. On appeal to the juvenile court judge, the father was refused review on the basis that the magistrate had heard the motion to modify or vacate pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The father appealed. We vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves summary judgment in a vehicular accident case. In a line of vehicles, the defendant service vehicle was first, followed by the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer, and then by the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer. The defendant’s service vehicle allegedly made a left turn without braking or using a turn signal, forcing the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer to brake quickly. This resulted in the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer rear-ending the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant tractor-trailer for rear-ending him, and against the defendant service vehicle that turned in front of him. The defendant service vehicle owner filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the defendant service vehicle owner had negated the element of proximate cause. The defendant tractor-trailer owner appeals. We reverse under the summary judgment standard in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the entry of a default judgment and the resulting Order of Divorce and Permanent Parenting Plan. The husband was properlyserved but never filed an answer. Months later, upon motion of the wife, the trial court granted a default judgment against the husband as he had not filed an answer to the complaint for divorce when the motion was heard. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

Defendants, Williamson Medical Center and five of its employees, appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action. They contend the action is time barred because it was filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued, in violation of the one year statute of limitations applicable to Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act actions, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-305(b). The trial court, however, found that the action was timely filed because it was commenced within the 120-day extension afforded to the plaintiffs pursuant to an amendment to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(c) (2009). We have determined that the amendment codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)-(c) applies, notwithstanding the one-year statute of limitations provision under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, that the plaintiffs’ compliance with the pre-suit notification provision in Tennessee Code Annotate § 29-26-121(a) extended the statute of limitations by 120 days, and that this action was timely filed within the 120-day extension. Therefore, were affirm.

W. Turner Boone and wife, Sally-Bruce M. Boone (“the Taxpayers”), are Tennessee residents who own stock in South Carolina corporations. In 2001, the Taxpayers paid South Carolina income tax of $43,328 based on pass-through income of $623,941. The Taxpayers received dividend distributions of $204,988 on the same income. They filed a 2001 Tennessee Hall Income Tax return reporting the dividends with a resulting tax of $12,288, against which they claimed a credit for a like amount based upon their payment of the South Carolina income tax. Their claimed credit is based upon a deduction allowed by statute for “tax paid to [another] state . . . provided, that there exists a tax credit reciprocity agreement between Tennessee and the other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-2-122 (2011). Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Commissioner”) declined to allow the credit. She gave notice of an outstanding tax liability for 2001 in the amount of $15,017.93, including penalties and interest. The Taxpayers paid the assessment under protest and filed this action against the Commissioner after they demanded and were denied a refund. The trial court upheld the Commissioner’s denial. The Taxpayers appeal. We affirm.

Tenant filed suit against his former landlord and the current owner of premises that tenant leased alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Trial court dismissed tenant’s claim against the former landlord holding that the landlord was exempt from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-305. The court dismissed the claim against the current owner because tenant failed to complywith the fourteen day pre-suit notice requirement at Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-501(a). Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
 

This case was appealed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3. The appellee raised the issue that the appeal was not from a final judgment pursuant to any rules of the Court.

After finding that cy pres relief was available to modify conditions imposed by donor of artwork which had been gifted to Fisk University, the trial court approved agreements whereby the Crystal Bridges Museum would purchase a fifty percent interest in the art for $30 million and would thereafter share in the display and maintenance of the artwork. The court conditioned approval of the agreements on the requirement that Fisk establish an endowment of $20 million from the proceeds of sale in furtherance of the donor’s intent to make the art available for the citizens of Nashville. The Attorney General of Tennessee appeals, contending that the trial court exceeded the scope of remand and that the court erred in determining that the agreement with the Crystal Bridges Museum most closely reflects the donor’sintent. Fisk seeks review of trialcourt’s requirementthatitestablish the endowment. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s grant of cy pres relief.
I write separately to state that I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s limitation of the funds awarded to Fisk University to $10 million and the corresponding requirement that the University establish an endowment with the remaining $20 million.
 

Jesse L. Rogers (“Plaintiff”) appeals an order from the Chancery Court for Johnson County (“Chancery Court”) dismissing his Petition for Access to Public Records. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition.