APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Zona Mayo (“Plaintiff”) sued Donna L. Shine, M.D., Fort Sanders Obstetrical and Gynecological Group, P.C., and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) alleging medical malpractice in connection with Plaintiff’s birth. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding that neither Dr. Shine nor the Hospital were legally responsible for any harm suffered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals raising issues regarding alleged jury misconduct and alleged errors with regard to admission of evidence, among other things. We find and hold that Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial due to errors in the admission of specific evidence and the improper limitation of Plaintiff’s cross-examination of Dr. Shine, among other things. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court for a new trial in compliance with this Opinion.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights, persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, and abandonment by failure to maintain a suitable home. The trial court also found that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm.
 

The plaintiff from a case that was dismissed in 2002 by agreed order filed a motion nine years after the dismissal to “extend the judgment” from that case and for injunctive relief. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the motion.

This is a survivor and wrongful death suit arising out of the alleged neglect and abuse of Earl McLemore while he was a resident in a nursing home, Life Care Center of Elizabethton, which is located in Elizabethton, and is owned and operated by defendants. The suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Carter County, and following a ten day trial in May of 2010, the jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff and against all defendants. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $500,000.00 and punitive damages of $4,250,000.00. The Trial Court suggested a remittitur of compensatory damages to $225,000.00, but sustained the punitive damages award. Defendants/appellants appealed the verdict on numerous grounds. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff, was general contractor for the renovation of a private club, and employed defendant to install flooring at the club. Plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages incurred when plaintiff was sued by the club which obtained judgment for damages against plaintiff for the defective floor, as well as for attorney's fees for defending the action and other expenses. Defendant moved to dismiss the action, relying on the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-202. The Trial Court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the action, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal involves a suit to restrain a surviving wife from inheriting from her deceased husband. Husband’s daughter filed a complaint against wife, alleging that wife intentionally killed husband, thereby forfeiting any right to inherit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-1-106. When wife was convicted of first degree murder, Daughter filed a motion for summary judgment and attached the judgment of conviction. The court granted the motion, finding that no genuine issues of fact remained because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded litigation of whether wife killed husband. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the Opinion and Judgment of this Court to reverse the Judgment of the Circuit Court. I agree with the Opinion that Ms. Leath’s “judgment of conviction cannot be used for collateral estoppel purposes because the judgment of conviction is not a final judgment.” Likewise, I agree with the Opinion that under current Tennessee law, Ms. Wilkerson “cannot assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel because she was not in privity with the State” and, therefore, the mutuality of parties as required in Tennessee for offensive collateral estoppel is missing. Sullivan v. Wilson County, No. M2011–00217–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 1868292, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2012), no appl. perm. appeal filed.

This appeal involves the disqualification of an attorney and the denial of permission to appear pro hac vice. The plaintiff taxpayer corporations filed two lawsuits against Tennessee’s Commissioner of Revenue for a refund of franchise and excise taxes. The Commissioner filed a motion to permit an out-of-state attorney to appear pro hac vice to assist in representing Tennessee’s Attorney General in the taxpayers’ lawsuits. The attorney to be admitted pro hac vice is a full-time in-house attorney with a quasi-governmental multistate tax policy entity. The plaintiff taxpayers objected, arguing that admission pro hac vice of the multistate tax entity’s in-house attorney was tantamount to allowing the multistate tax entity to intervene in the lawsuits. The plaintiff taxpayers also argued that the attorney should be disqualified from representing the Commissioner because such representation would present an inherent conflict of interest and would give the attorney access to confidential taxpayer information. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff taxpayers. It denied the Commissioner’s motion to admit the attorney pro hac vice and disqualified the attorney from representing the Commissioner in these proceedings. This Court granted the Commissioner’s application for an extraordinary appeal. We reverse and remand the case for entry of an order granting permission for the attorney to appear on behalf of the Commissioner pro hac vice.
 

This appeal concerns a contract for the purchase and sale of property. The buyer refused to close pursuant to the terms of the contract and stopped payment on its earnest money check. The sellers brought an action for specific performance and breach of contract. The buyer alleged that the sellers breached the contract first. The trial court found in favor of the buyer, holding that because the sellers did not cause title to be examined ten days from the effective date of the contract, the buyer had a right to withdraw the earnest money payment. The sellers appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action originated in Sessions Court, when the plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that defendant had confiscated an automobile of plaintiff's over a disputed debt for repairs on another vehicle. The Circuit Judge refused to award either party damages, but ordered plaintiff's vehicle to be returned to him. Plaintiff appealed to Circuit Court, which inter alia held that plaintiff was entitled to damages of $663.88. Defendant was awarded $663.88 under its counter-complaint. The Court said the two awards offset each other and dismissed all claims and taxed costs equally. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion affirming the Trial Court's granting of summary judgments to all defendants. In my view, the record in this case does not demonstrate that this case is ripe for summary judgment.

This appeal arises from a judgment for arrears in child support. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Turner (“the State”) filed a civil contempt petition against Jamie Reed (“Reed”) in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered Reed to pay $75 per month towards satisfying his $17,330 in arrears. The minor child at issue had attained majority age by the time of these proceedings. The Juvenile Court found Reed to be in substantial compliance with his payments, and he was given an opportunity to comply with the Court’s order. The Juvenile Court rejected Reed’s demands for a jury trial and for discharge of the arrearage. Reed appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The plaintiffs in this matter, the city and a redevelopment group, filed this action against the defendant entities involved in the design and construction of a large municipal project on the city’s waterfront. Also named as a defendant was the development manager for the project. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-105. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Wife filed a complaint against Husband seeking a legal separation or, in the alternative, an absolute divorce. Husband counter-claimed for a divorce. Both Wife and Husband alleged the other had engaged in marital misconduct. The trial court awarded Wife a legal separation for two years, ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,500 per month as alimony during that period, and divided the marital estate between the parties. The trial court refused Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appealed, claiming the trial court erred by failing to award her alimony in futuro, a larger portion of the marital estate, and her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. First, the statute addressing legal separation directs the trial court to make a final and complete adjudication of the parties’ support rights following the parties’ legal separation when the court awards the parties an absolute divorce. Thus, Wife’s request for alimony in futuro is premature. Second, Wife failed to show the court’s division of marital property was inconsistent with the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4121(c) or was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Third, Wife failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for attorney’s fees.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother argues that the evidence presented to the trial court did not clearly and convincingly establish that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

Wife was granted divorce on the grounds of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court distributed the marital property and awarded Wife transitory alimony for four years. Wife appealed, arguing she should have been awarded a larger portion of the marital estate and was entitled to alimony in futuro. She also argued she should have been awarded her attorneys’ fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. The trial court equitably distributed the marital assets and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife transitional alimony to help her adjust to living as a single person again.
 

Homeowners in a subdivision used water from a sulfur well to water their lawn. Neighbors complained about the noxious odor, and when the Homeowners continued to use the sulfurous water, the neighbors sought and obtained an order permanently enjoining them from using their well for irrigation purposes. Three years later the Homeowners began using the sulfur well to water their lawn again, and the neighbors filed a petition seeking to hold the Homeowners in contempt for violating the court’s order. The Homeowners filed a retaliatory complaint against the neighbors, and the neighbors sought Rule 11 sanctions for having to defend that action. The trial court consolidated the hearing of the two motions, and following a hearing where testimony and documentary evidence were introduced, the court found the Homeowners had willfully violated the court’s order on at least nine occasions. The court also found the Homeowners’ action was filed in violation of Rule 11 and fined the Homeowners $1,000. The Homeowners appealed,claiming the two motions should not have been heard together and that the evidence did not support the court’s finding of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the two motions in the same proceeding, and that the evidence was not insufficient for the court to have found the Homeowners guilty of willfully violating its earlier order beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Landowner owns property that was once part of a single parcel of land. The only way she can access her property is over a gravel roadway approximately nine feet wide that crosses through her neighbors’ property. One of Landowner’s neighbors erected fence posts near the roadway that Landowner alleges interfere with her ability to pull her horse trailers back and forth to her property. Landowner filed a complaint alleging she has the right to a forty foot easement across her neighbors’ property. After Landowner presented her proof at trial, Defendant neighbors moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. The trial court dismissed Landowner’s complaint. We reverse the dismissal as to the Landowner’s claim for interference with her use and enjoyment of the easement because she presented evidence to establish the elements of that claim. We also reverse the dismissal of the claim for damages resulting from the interference. Dismissal of the other claims by Landowner is affirmed. We remand this case for further proceedings.
 

This appeal arises from a dispute over the constitutionality of City of Maryville (“Maryville”) ordinance 16-110 (“the Ordinance”). The ordinance requires the issuance of a permit for certain public meetings and parades in Maryville. Wallace Scott Langford (“Langford”) and two associates engaged in street preaching at a Maryville intersection. Langford declined to apply for a permit and was cited for violating the ordinance. After a default judgment was rendered against him in municipal court, Langford appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). Langford challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance on grounds that it is overly broad and vague. Following a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Langford appeals. We hold that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as it is vague, overly broad, and affords too much discretion to the officials charged with issuing permits. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

The plaintiff was severely injured while working on the premises of his employer. Because the employer was immune from liability in tort under the Workers’ Compensation statutes, the employee’s negligence suit named as defendants two other companies whose equipment was implicated in his injury. After a five-day trial, the jury found that the employer was solely at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, resulting in no award. The plaintiff then filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted the motion ten months after it was filed, declaring that in his capacity as the thirteenth juror he had found the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. The case was tried before a second jury, which reached a different verdict, finding that one of the defendant companies was 90% at fault for the plaintiff’s injury while the plaintiff himself was 10% at fault. The net verdict for the plaintiff amounted to $2,925,000. The defendant company argues on appeal that the trial court erred in vacating the first jury verdict, that the second jury verdict was “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” and that the amount of the verdict was excessive. We affirm the jury verdict and the judgment based on it.
 

This appeal involves a dispute over the decedent's Codicil to his Will. The Codicil divided decedent's real property between decedent's daughter and Jeff W. Powell. When decedent was on his death bed he asked a lawyer to prepare the Codicil, which described where certain property lines between the parties would be drawn, and the Codicil essentially gave 45 acres to decedent's daughter and 55 acres to Powell. During the administration of the Estate, the parties employed a surveyor to survey the property lines for the purpose of preparing the respective deeds. The surveyor determined that the description of the boundaries in the Codicil gave Powell 80 plus acres and the decedent's daughter 19 plus acres. Essentially, the Trial Court held that the descriptions created patent ambiguities, but he also concluded that even if the ambiguities were latent, extensive governance would be required to validate the Codicil, which is not appropriate. Accordingly, he voided the Codicil altogether. Powell has appealed. We reverse the Trial Court and hold that the decedent's intent was to give his daughter 45 acres and Powell 55 acres, and we reinstate the Codicil with directions to the Trial Court to direct the surveyor to reconfigure the boundaries to carry out the intent of the testator.

A patient who alleged that he had been negligently injured by his podiatrist filed a complaint against him for malpractice, and then voluntary dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Less than a year later, he furnished the defendant podiatrist with the sixty day notice of potential claim required by a recently enacted statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(a). He subsequently refiled his complaint in reliance on his rights under the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was time-barred under the saving statute because it was filed more than one year after the dismissal of the original complaint. The plaintiff contended, however, that he was entitled to the benefit of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the statute of limitations on medical malpractice claims by 120 days if the plaintiff has complied with the sixty day notice requirement. The defendant responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) does not apply to complaints filed under the saving statute. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but allowed him to file an application for interlocutory appeal because of the novelty of the legal question involved. After careful consideration of the relevant statutes, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(c) does apply to the saving statute, and we affirm.
 

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. The trial court found two grounds for termination, abandonment and persistence of conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home. The finding of abandonment was based on the mother’s incarceration at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate and because the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest due to the fact that the mother lacked a meaningful relationship with the child, that the mother failed to make adjustments to her home and lifestyle to make it safe for a child, and that the child was happy and healthy in her foster home of over two years such that removal would have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional and psychological condition. We affirm.
 

A former student who obtained a student loan from Middle Tennessee State University appeals the judgment of the trial court holding him liable on the student loan, including interest that accrued thereon, costs of collection, attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. Finding no error, we affirm.

In a previous appeal, this court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for an order of protection based upon the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. On remand, the trial court issued an order making the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof and thereby abused its discretion. We find no merit in this argument. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.