APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendants filed a notice of appeal in the trial court seeking to appeal the court’s order of May 11, 2012. That order is not a final judgment. Accordingly, the defendants’ putative appeal is hereby dismissed.

Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to three children, contending that the court erred in finding that the Department of Children’s Services complied with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 37-2-403. We affirm the judgment terminating parental rights.
 

The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants to recover monies alleged to be due the plaintiff on two construction projections. The first complaint was involuntarily dismissed. The defendants averred that the plaintiff’s claims against them in the second complaint are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court found that the involuntary dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits. The defendants pursued this interlocutory appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This case concerns a dispute over attorney’s fees. Attorney, who was hired to represent a client in connection with the probate of her uncle’s estate, sued his former client and the beneficiaries of the estate under theories of civil conspiracy and inducement of breach of contract. Court found in favor of attorney and held the attorney was entitled to $20,000 in damages. The court trebled the damages in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-50-109. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s holding regarding inducement of breach of contract, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
 

Charles Raymond Loveday and his wife, Virginia Hope Loveday (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), filed this action in January 2011 against Blount County and the Blount County School Board (collectively “the Defendants”) to recover for flood damage to their property allegedly caused by the construction of a new school next to the Plaintiffs’ property. The school was built in 2007. The Plaintiffs allegedly sustained “permanent” damage in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the action was barred by the statute of limitations for a taking. The trial court granted the motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This is an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in an action for misrepresentation and breach of contract. The jury returned a general verdict finding Defendant liable and awarding Plaintiff $62,083.18 in compensatory damages. Defendant appeals, asserting that the elements of misrepresentation are not supported by the evidence and that the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of damages. We hold there is substantial and material evidence in supportof a finding that Defendant breached the contract between the parties and affirm the jury’s verdict in all respects.
 

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this medical malpractice action where Plaintiff failed to attach a HIPPA compliant medical authorization to her notice to Defendants prior to filing her complaint as required by Tennessee Code Annotated  29-26-121. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and for discovery sanctions, and stated that the order was final under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02. Defendant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the trial court’s order. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Defendants filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s entry of an order of voluntary dismissal, and appeal the trial court’s award of discovery sanctions to Plaintiff. We hold that the order awarding sanctions was not an effective final judgment under Rule 54.02. Defendants’ appeal accordingly is timely. We vacate the award of sanctions and remand for further proceedings.

The City Commission terminated plaintiff as a police officer. He then filed a certiorari petition to the Chancery Court, where the Chancellor held that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the case, and the Chancellor reversed the Commission and ordered plaintiff to be reinstated as a policeman. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's ruling that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the facts of the case, but vacate the reinstatement of the officer and remand to the City Commission to apply the proper legal standards in a new trial in plaintiff's case.

Plaintiffs who own homes in Mallard Baye subdivision, brought this action against defendants who had constructed a septic system on several of the residential lots serving other properties, alleging that defendants acted in violation of the restrictive covenants of their subdivision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court held that the defendants' construction of the septic system violated the subdivision restrictive covenants, and the defendants appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal one day past the deadline imposed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss this appeal.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found multiple grounds for termination of his rights and that termination was in the best interest of the two children. Father appealed. Because he did not appeal the ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, we find it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds at length. We do find, however, that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting a finding that additional grounds exist. We further find that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Consequently, we affirm the trial court.
 

Michael Stevison (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a breach of contract claim against the State of Tennessee. His claim was assigned to the small claims docket of the Claims Commission. The State filed a “Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment,” both of which were granted by the Commission. The Claimant filed a notice of appeal seeking to appeal the adverse decision to this Court. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon its argument that the relevant statutory scheme prohibits appeals from decisions on claims “appearing on the small claims docket.” Since we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, it is dismissed.

The plaintiff tripped and fell in a parking lot. She sued the owners, claiming that the step up from the parking lot to a ramp leading onto the sidewalk was a hidden danger because it was painted the same color as the top surface of the ramp. The court below granted the defendants a summary judgment, holding that the defendants had not violated any duty to the plaintiff and that the sole cause of the injury was the plaintiff’s inattention to the surroundings. After a review of the record, we hold that the defendants are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the lower court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
 

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors. Plaintiffs live in a home next door to the defendant neighbor. The defendant neighbor embarked on a campaign of harassment that included, among other things, blasting an air horn in the wee hours on intermittent nights. The air horn blasts occurred on over forty nights. The plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the noisome neighbor, seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Summonses were issued on two occasions, but no return of summons was filed with the trial court. The defendant neighbor wrote a pro se letter to the trial court, acknowledging receipt of a notice of hearing, but no other papers, and stating that he would not appear at the hearing. After the hearing, the trial court issued an injunction and awarded a default judgment for compensatory damages to the plaintiffs. The defendant neighbor then filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment, based on failure to serve process. This motion was granted. Pursuant to the defendant neighbor’s motion, the trial court then dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the defendant neighbor’s pro se letter constituted an appearance and that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and dismissing the complaint. We affirm.

The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside a second order of voluntary nonsuit in this medical malpractice action. We affirm.

This case involves the denial of a handgun carry permit by the Department of Safety to an individual who had previously been convicted of a felony and sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction. The applicant appealed to the General Sessions Court, which reversed the decision of the Department of Safety. The Department of Safety then appealed to Circuit Court, which affirmed the General Sessions Court and held that the applicant was entitled to obtain a handgun carry permit because his full civil rights had been restored upon the issuance of a Certificate of Restoration of Voting Rights. We hold that the applicant is not entitled to obtain a handgun carry permit pursuant to Tennessee law because the applicant’s right to seek and hold public office has not been restored by a court of competent jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded.
 

In this case, we are asked to address the question of whether the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law of 1987, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-39-401 through 406, or the Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., negate the provisions of ordinances passed by Appellees, the Town of Middleton, Tennessee and the Town of Whiteville, Tennessee, which granted Appellant, the City of Bolivar and its municipal utility, the right to franchise in the Appellee towns. We conclude that: (1) Appellants may be liable for both franchise fees under the ordinances, and for payments in lieu of taxes under the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law because franchise fees are not in the nature of taxes on the valuation of property and are “operating expenses” for the privilege of doing business; (2) although the ordinances initially granted Bolivar’s utility exemption from payments in lieu of taxes to Appellees, by resolution, Bolivar waived its exemption and is now obligated to make payments in lieu of taxes to Appellees under the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law; (3) to the extent that the Whiteville ordinance conflicts with Bolivar’s statutory right to charge consumers for the actual costs of its services (which would include the franchise fee expenses), it is void; (4) the trial court’s award of pendente lite payments to Appellees was not reversible error in light of our holding that Appellees were (and are) entitled to the franchise fees. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

On February 23, 2012, M. Shane Mills (“Defendant”) filed a notice of appeal of an order entered by the Trial Court on January 24, 2012. On June 12, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Defendant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Defendant did not respond to the show cause order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the settlement of a lawsuit. Teresa Larkin died in 2003, with her life insurance proceeds and her estate passing to her husband, Dale Larkin (“Larkin”). Teresa Larkin’s minor daughter, Tia Gentry (“Gentry”), sued Larkin, her stepfather, alleging that he caused the death of her mother and that, as a result, he should not receive any life insurance proceeds or inheritance because of the “Slayer’s Statute.” Gentry and Larkin settled the lawsuit and split the life insurance proceeds and the estate of Teresa Larkin. Later, Larkin was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Teresa Larkin. Gentry filed this suit in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), seeking to overturn the agreement based upon fraud in the inducement as Larkin had represented that he did not kill Teresa Larkin. Larkin filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court held that the issues in this lawsuit already had been, or could have been, litigated, and, as inequitable as the result might seem in light of Larkin’s conviction for first degree murder in the death of Teresa Larkin, Gentry’s lawsuit must be dismissed. Gentry appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. By clear and convincing evidence, the trial court found two grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and (2) prison sentence of more than ten years, imposed when the child was under the age of eight. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights with respect to his son. The father was incarcerated for sexually abusing his stepdaughters, the son’s half sisters, while all resided in the same home. The trial court also found that the father had physically abused the son. The trial court found that all of this conduct constituted severe abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(23)(C). It found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the son’s best interest. The trial court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights; the order was entered over thirty days after the termination hearing. The father appeals the tardiness of the termination order and the best interest finding. We affirm.

A prisoner filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court dismissed sua sponte for failure to prosecute due to the prisoner’s failure to file the necessary summonses. The prisoner appeals. We affirm.