APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jason C. (“Putative Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Alexis M.M. (“the Child”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) pursued termination after Putative Father was incarcerated and the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected in the care of her mother, LeAnn M. (“Mother”). Following a bench trial, the court applied Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), applicable to non-legal parents, and terminated Putative Father’s rights based upon multiple grounds, including the failure to provide child support, to visit, or to establish his paternity. Putative Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of these grounds. We affirm.

Plaintiff in case alleging legal malpractice appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant attorney. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

The mother of an eleven year old boy asked his father to take care of the child for a few weeks because she was moving out of her apartment. The mother did not find a place of her own for the next six months. Meanwhile, the father enrolled the child in school, boy scouts and football, and filed a petition for change of custody. The father alleged that there had been a change of circumstances in that the mother’s unstable home life and frequent moves adversely affected the child at school and elsewhere, and that the child’s grades and his attitudes had greatly improved while he was under the father’s care. After a hearing, the trial court transferred custody of the child to the father. The mother argues on appeal that, contrary to the trial court’s finding, there had not been a material change of circumstances, and that the trial court’s decision placed too much emphasis on an incident when she was arrested for shoplifting in the presence of the child. We affirm the trial court.
 

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, a property developer. The underlying case is for personal injuries sustained by Plaintiffs in a motorcycle accident, which was allegedly caused by a pothole in the road. The question presented for determination is, as between Appellee and Appellant Hardin County, who owns the portion of the road where the accident occurred. After completing its development, Appellee dedicated portions of the roadway to Hardin County for public use. However, in cross-motions for summary judgment the Appellee and Appellant each claimed that the other owned the disputed portion of the road where the accident occurred. Although the disputed portion of the road was specifically excluded from the dedication, and Appellee maintained the road, the trial court determined that Appellee had implicitly dedicated the disputed portion to Appellant and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee developer. Based upon the evidence in record, we conclude that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions concerning ownership of the road and accordingly, reverse the grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his action for failure to prosecute. We hold that, in light of the uncontradicted fact that Plaintiff was not properly served with notice of the trial date, the case should not have been dismissed.
 

In this divorce action the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, gave custody of the children to the father, divided the marital property and ordered a monetary judgment against the mother to the father, as an equitable distribution of the marital property. The mother has appealed and questioned the Trial Judge's award of custody of the children to the father, and the Trial Judge ordering a monetary judgment against the mother to the father. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
 

Blair Wood and Gary Wood (“Plaintiffs”) sued Tony Wolfenbarger and Brenda Wolfenbarger (“Defendants”) alleging, in part, that Defendants had wrongfully cut down six trees on Plaintiffs’ real property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendants were liable for negligently cutting the trees, that the current market value of the timber cut was $840, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment in double the amount of the current market value of the timber pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-28-312. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court alleging that the Trial Court erred in awarding damages based upon the timber value. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the finding that timber value was the correct measure of damages in this case. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment to award Plaintiffs damages of $62,100 based upon the trunk formula method of valuation and affirm the judgment as so modified.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to have the appellees held in criminal contempt based upon their failure to comply with various subpoenas commanding them to appear at depositions and produce documents to be used by the appellants in the context of an administrative asset forfeiture proceeding on the docket of the Tennessee Department of Safety. The petition was filed in the Criminal Court for Knox County, Tennessee. It was denied on grounds that the court in which the petition was filed had no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The appellants appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a parental termination and adoption decree. The motion asked relief from the Judgment on the ground set forth in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 62.02(1) and (2). The Trial Court held that petitioner did not establish a basis to set aside the Judgment on the grounds relied upon in the Rule 60.02 motion. On appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Losing proposer for solid waste management services challenges Lawrence County’s decision to contract with another proposer. Because we find that the County acted arbitrarily and illegally in making its decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
 

Property of the appellants was seized following a traffic stop. Requests for return of the property were denied by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department. The appellants, who were not facing any criminal charges, filed an action in criminal court seeking the return of all the seized property. The Sheriff’s Department subsequently filed drug forfeiture warrants and property receipts. The appellants argued that the Sheriff’s Department was attempting to initiate Department of Safety jurisdiction in disregard of their earlier filing in criminal court. The criminal court dismissed the action, asserting lack of jurisdiction. The appellants appeal. We affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued a permit allowing a proposed rock quarry to discharge storm water and wastewater into a nearby creek. Owners of property allegedly affected by the discharge filed an appeal challenging the issuance of the permit with the Water Quality Control Board, as well as a petition seeking a declaratory order construing the rules regarding the protection of existing uses of waters. The Water Quality Control Board refused to issue a declaratory order and the property owners appealed to the Davidson County Chancery Court. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested,we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for dismissal of this cause. Vacated and remanded.
 

At issue is the scope of a binding arbitration clause in a federally-reinsured multiple peril crop insurance policy and the scope of federal preemption of common law claims. The insured, a nursery in Warren County, Tennessee, suffered a catastrophic loss of stock, primarily trees and shrubs, due to a tornado on April 7, 2006. The insured submitted a claim in excess of a million dollars. The adjuster determined, due to “under-reporting of inventory”, that the insured was only entitled to recover $195,225. The insured demanded arbitration; the arbitrator ruled that the insured was due no additional payment. Thereafter, the insured filed this action asserting common law claims against the insurer, its adjustment firm, and the independent insurance agency that solicited the policy, for breach of contract, negligence, breach of the duty of care, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory bad faith. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against the insurer and its adjustment firm finding the claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata because the issues were decided at arbitration and that the insured’s only remedy was judicial review of the arbitration decision. On appeal, the insured contends that its state law claims were not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Appellees disagree and additionally assert that the insured’s common law claims are preempted by federal law. We have determined the claims for breach of contract, breach of duty of care, and statutory bad faith are preempted by federal law; however, the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not preempted by federal law and are not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this action for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

This is the second of two similar but separate civil actions and appeals among the same
parties. At issue is the scope of a binding arbitration clause in a federally-reinsured multiple
peril crop insurance policy and the scope of federal preemption of common law claims. The
insured, a nursery in Warren County, Tennessee, suffered a catastrophic loss of stock,
primarily trees and shrubs, due to a severe freeze in April of 2007. The insured submitted a
claim for indemnity. The adjuster determined, due to “under-reporting of inventory”, that the
insured was only entitled to recover $115,822. Instead of pursuing arbitration pursuant to the
policy of insurance, the insured filed this action asserting common law claims against the
insurer, its adjustment firm, and the independent insurance agency that solicited the policy,
for negligent misrepresentation, breach of duty of care, negligence, breach of contract, and
statutory bad faith. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against the insurer and its
adjustment firm finding there were no issues of material fact and the insurers were entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law because the policy mandated arbitration. On appeal,
the insured contends that its state law claims are not barred by the policy. The insurer and its
adjustment firm disagree contending that all claims related to the insurance policy must be
submitted to arbitration and additionally assert that the insured’s common law claims are
preempted by federal law. We have determined the claims for breach of contract, breach of
duty of care, and statutory bad faith are preempted by federal law; however, the claims for
negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not preempted by federal law and these two
claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

Appellants attempted to appeal the decision of the General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court without filing an appeal bond, but the Circuit Court dismissed the attempted appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants claim that an appeal bond need not be filed where an appeal filing fee is paid. We find that, to perfect an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court, an appeal bond must be filed; payment of the appeal filing fee does not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the matter.

Attorney representing the husband in a divorce proceeding claimed a statutory lien on funds in his trust account to secure payment of his fee; the attorney filed a separate action seeking a determination of his rights to funds held in his trust account. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Finding that the court dismissed the case employing an erroneous legal standard, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
 

This appeal involves a dispute between brothers. One brother owned an apartment complex and leased one of the apartments to his brother. The tenant brother allegedly failed to pay rent to the landlord brother. The landlord brother filed a forcible entry and detainer action in general sessions court seeking possession of the property and a judgment for the unpaid rent. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the landlord brother. The tenant brother appealed to circuit court. The circuit court conducted a trial de novo. After the trial, the circuit court awarded the landlord brother possession of the property and a judgment for the unpaid rent. The tenant brother now appeals. We affirm.

In this contentious post-divorce dispute, the father has appealed from the trial court’s order
disposing of numerous issues including visitation and contempt. The order appealed does
not, however, address the mother’s request for modification of child support, and we
therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

April Hunter Rigsby (Edmonds) (“Mother”) and Aaron R. Edmonds (“Father”) divorced in 2008. Mother and Father are the parents of the minor child, Elijah E. (“the Child”). In the permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce, Mother was designated as the Child’s primary residential parent. Mother and Father were to have equal time with the Child. Mother later petitioned the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to relocate with the Child. The Trial Court granted Mother’s petition. In 2011, Father filed a petition to modify the final decree of divorce, attached to which was his new proposed permanent parenting plan wherein he requested to be designated the Child’s primary residential parent. Father argued, among other things, that because the Child was approaching school age, the child would be better served going to school in Father’s community. Mother filed an answer to Father’s petition, including her own proposed new permanent parenting plan. The Trial Court found in favor of Father, designated Father as the new primary residential parent of the Child, and set a new parenting schedule. The Trial Court also ordered Mother to pay child support. Mother appeals. We hold that no material change of circumstances occurred to justify a change in the Child’s primary residential parent. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part.

This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings. The respondent mother has three children, one an infant. The infant suffered numerous unexplained injuries and was diagnosed with failure to thrive. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to have all three children declared dependent and neglected, and alleged severe child abuse as to the infant. The trial court declared all three children dependent and neglected, but declined to find severe abuse. The respondent mother now appeals the trial court’s finding of dependency and neglect, and the Department of Children’s Services appeals the trial court’s failure to find severe child abuse as to the infant. We affirm the trial court’s finding that all three children were dependent and neglected, but find clear and convincing evidence that the infant suffered severe abuse; therefore, we reverse the trial court’s finding on severe abuse.

Plaintiffs filed a voluntary notice of nonsuit in this medical malpractice action in July 2009.  They refiled their claim in September 2010. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The trial court found that Defendant City of Memphis was not liable for injuries to Plaintiff resulting from an automobile accident in which Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by a third party. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff was a full-time employee of the Tennessee National Guard until 2002 when he commenced active duty service in the Active Guard and Reserve. Near the completion of his active duty service in the Active Guard and Reserve, Plaintiff asked the Tennessee National Guard to rehire him pursuant to the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). When the Tennessee National Guard refused, Plaintiff filed this action alleging it violated USERRA. The Tennessee National Guard responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity from USERRA claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Because the Tennessee General Assembly has not passed legislation to expressly waive its sovereign immunity from claims based on USERRA, as other states have done, we affirm.

In appeal from final decree in divorce action, Husband contends that the trial court erred in designating Wife as primary residential parent, in valuing the marital residence which was awarded to Wife, and in failing to require Wife to refinance the marital residence in her name alone. We affirm the designation of Wife as primary residential parent and the court’s valuation of the marital residence and remand the case for the courtto determine a reasonable length of time for Wife to secure Husband’s release from the indebtedness on the marital residence and to amend the final decree accordingly.
 

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Finding that two grounds for parental termination have been established and that termination is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.