APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that the Department failed to credit him with 2,511 days of pretrial credits that were awarded him pursuant to a plea agreement. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the petition based upon a finding that the material facts show Petitioner received all pretrial jail credits awarded and due Petitioner. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff was seriously injured during a dog attack by his neighbors’ two dogs. Plaintiff sued, among others, the neighbors’ landlord and an employee of the landlord. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that although the defendants retained sufficient control over the leased property, they lacked notice or knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. We find a question of fact exists regarding defendants’ notice or knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. We affirm in part and reverse in part and we remand for further proceedings.

The defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict holding her liable to her employer for her involvement in a co-worker’s misappropriation of funds. The jury found that the defendant’s involvement included (1) intentional misrepresentations, (2) concealment of facts relevant to the misappropriation, and (3) breach of contractual duties owed to the employer. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the proof. The motion was based upon the defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations barred the claim. We affirm.

This medical malpractice action, which had been pending for several years, was summarily
dismissed because the plaintiff did not file a response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff’s only expert witness admitted she was not qualified to opine
concerning the standard of care at issue, and the statute of limitations had run. Upon motion
of the defendants pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), the trial court
awarded the defendants $9,000 in discretionary costs. This appeal followed. We affirm. We
have also determined that this appeal is frivolous and remand to the trial court to determine
the proper amount of damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122.

In this negligence action, the jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict against one of the two
defendants. We find no error in the judgment regarding liability, but we must vacate and
remand as to damages because the trial court erred in excluding testimony and evidence
regarding the plaintiff’s medical expenses.

This custody case arises from an agreed order of parentage. After Father’s paternity was established, he filed a petition in juvenile court for custody of the child. At the conclusion of several hearings that took place over a span of years, the juvenile court entered an order naming Father primary residential parent and awarding Mother weekend parenting time. Mother appealed. While awaiting appeal, Mother filed a petition to have the child declared dependent and neglected. The Special Judge presiding over that petition transferred Mother’s petition to Lake County, where Father and the child reside. In response to the allegations in Mother’s petition, Father filed a petition for an injunction and to have Mother’s future parenting time supervised. A different Special Judge granted Father’s request without a full hearing, stating that Mother’s parenting time would remain supervised until further orders of the court. No further orders were ever entered. We affirm the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent, but vacate the transfer of Mother’s petition to Lake County and the modification of Mother’s parenting time. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

In this appeal, a show cause order was entered in this case on August 28, 2012, directing counsel for the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has responded to the show cause order in a response that does

In this action, the Estate has appealed to this Court the denial of an exception to
appellee's claim.

This case involves an agreement between the Appellee, a nonprofit corporation, and the Appellant, a real estate agent, whereby the Appellant would acquire foreclosed properties, oversee all necessary repairs and renovations of the properties, and ultimately sell them for the benefit of the Appellee. The Appellee’s executive director was given the authority to act on its behalf in all dealings with the Appellant. As compensation, the Appellant received commissions on the purchase and sale of each property, and a percentage of the repair costs for his oversight of the repairs and renovations of each property. After operating pursuant to the oral agreement for over a year, the parties executed a written agreement for the same purpose. Throughout their relationship, the Appellant acquired approximately eighty-four (84) properties for the Appellee. Subsequently, after discovering that their records did not contain documentation of actual repair costs which the Appellant was required to submit under the written agreement, the Appellee filed a complaint for an accounting. The trial court appointed a Special Master to conduct an accounting. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master filed a report in which he ordered that the Appellant be disgorged of all funds received by virtue of the agreements with the Appellee based on his failure to provide documentation of actual repair costs, and further suggested an award of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the Appellee. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order adopting and confirming the Special Master’s findings, and denied the Appellant’s objections to the Special Master’s report. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs on the properties acquired pursuant to the oral agreement. We further conclude that the course of conduct between the Appellant and the Appellee’s executive director modified the written agreement, such that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Husband of a decedent filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action against the
decedent’s physician and sought to amend his complaint to add a count for negligence per
se based on the physician’s failure to review his physician assistant’s narcotics prescription.
The trial court denied Husband the opportunity to amend his complaint and dismissed the
action on summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court
erred in denying Husband’s motion to amend but affirmed the trial court’s other rulings. On
remand, the trial court allowed Husband to amend his complaint to add a count for
negligence per se, but the court then granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment
on the issue of causation. Between the first Court of Appeals decision and this appeal, the
Tennessee Supreme Court decided Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546
(Tenn. 2011), in which it held that negligence per se claims cannot be maintained when
medical malpractice is alleged. The Estate of French holding bars Husband’s negligence per
se claim against the physician. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the
physician summary judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Lisa C. and Michael C. filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christopher M. to his child. The paternal grandparents filed an intervening petition to adopt the child. The trial court terminated Christopher M.’s parental rights and granted Lisa C. and Michael C.’s petition to adopt the child. Christopher M. appeals the termination of his parental rights. Following our review, we conclude that the court erred in relying upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3) in terminating Father’s parental rights and reverse that ground of termination. Additionally, we are unable to review the remainder of the court’s decision because the final order failed to set forth findings of fact as required by section 36-1-113(k) in support of its second ground of termination. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon section 36-1-113(g)(3) and vacate the remainder of the final order. The case is remanded for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the termination of Christopher M.’s parental rights.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. The four children at issue were removed from the father’s home by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services due to neglect and abuse. After three years, the Department instituted termination proceedings. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions, but it declined to find abandonment by failure to support. The father appeals both the grounds for termination and the best interest finding. We reverse the trial court’s holding on abandonment by failure to support, affirm to the remainder, and so affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for
recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo
standard as required under Rule 10B, §2.06, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the
petitioner’s motion for recusal.

The appellant filed a single-page brief on appeal that fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, we dismiss the appeal.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B
from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition
for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.06, we
affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petitioner’s motion for recusal.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B
from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition
for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, §2.06, we
affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petitioner’s motion for recusal.

A Memphis police officer was terminated after he was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend during which she sustained facial injuries. The Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the chancery court affirmed. In the initial appeal to this Court, we remanded for the Commission to make  findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission issued an amended decision with additional findings. Upon reviewing the amended decision, the chancery court  reversed the termination and reinstated the officer. The City appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. The officer presents numerous arguments in support of his assertion that reversal of the Commission was proper. We affirm the order of the chancery court in part, but we vacate the reinstatement of the officer and reinstate the Commission’s decision to uphold termination.

In this parental termination case, the father was appointed counsel at the time the Court held a dependency hearing in the Juvenile Court and the Order appointing counsel in that proceeding also appointed the attorney for the subsequent termination of parental rights trial. When the Petition to terminate the father's parental rights trial was held, neither the father nor counsel appeared at trial and a Judgment was entered terminating the father's parental rights. On appeal, appellant argues that the statue and rule governing this proceeding required notification to the father's attorney. We vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that both the Court and the Department of Children's Services were charged with the knowledge that the appellee was appointed counsel and that the termination Petition's Judgment was prejudicial to the judicial process when the father's lawyer was not notified of the Petition or trial. We vacate and remand for a new trial.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The subject child is the eighth born to the appellant mother. The appellant mother failed a prenatal drug screen prior to the birth of the child at issue, so the appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took the child into protective custody three days after birth. A permanency plan was adopted and the mother made efforts to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to this child. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The mother now appeals only as to the grounds for termination. We reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan but affirm as to the ground of persistent conditions. On that basis, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

This matter arose from a car accident between Traci Jones and Bernice Jones. At trial, the
jury found Bernice Jones 100% at fault and awarded Traci Jones a portion of her requested
relief. On appeal, Traci Jones argues that the trial court erred by reversing its pre-trial ruling
on a motion in limine, denying her motion for mistrial, and denying her motion for directed
verdict. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property. Appellee church purchased the disputed property from the seller bank in 1974, but failed to record its deed. Through a clerical error, the seller bank sold the disputed property to Appellant real estate investor in 2008. Appellant promptly recorded his deed. After the investor demolished a portion of a wall constructed by the church on the disputed property, the church sued to quiet title and for damages. The trial court ruled that the deed to the investor was void as champertous because the church’s possession of the property was open and obvious at the time of conveyance. Thus the trial court ruled that the church was the true owner of the property. Although we affirm the decision of the trial court, we rely on grounds other than those found by the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal we held that the parties did not have a contract for the sale of the property, and we remanded it back to the Trial Court to determine a reasonable fee in quantum meruit for the plaintiff as the facilitator of the sale. Upon remand, the Trial Court heard proof and held that plaintiff was entitled to a 6% commission on the sale price. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment as modified.

Plaintiff purchased a vent hood from defendant. The hood was paid for at the time of purchase and delivered, but was returned to defendant as being unworkable. Plaintiff brought this action for reimbursement of payment for the hood in Sessions Court. Sessions Court entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Judge entered Judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500 for the amount paid for the hood to defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. 

Plaintiff in suit seeking to have court declare boundaries of fifteen acre tract of land appeals
the declaration of boundaries and award of the tract to Defendants, adjoining landowners.
Defendants appeal finding that Plaintiff adversely possessed a portion of the fifteen acre
tract. Finding no error, we affirm.

In January of 2011, Ezra Williams (“Plaintiff”) sued Stephen Leon Williams and Regions Bank . Plaintiff died in May of 2011. Regions Bank filed a Suggestion of Death. No motion for substitution of proper party was made within ninety days after Plaintiff’s death was suggested upon the record. In July of 2011, the attorney who had represented Plaintiff prior to Plaintiff’s death filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. In October of 2011, Regions Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court granted the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice. Regions Bank appeals to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court should have dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01 for failure to timely move for substitution of proper party. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and dismiss this case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01.