APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The trial court found that a proposed construction project involving the petitioner’s property was not covered by the local zoning ordinance, and, therefore, the petitioner was not required to seek a variance from the local board of zoning appeals in order to obtain a building permit. The respondents appeal. We affirm.

Elizabeth C. Wright (“the Seller”) filed suit against Frederico A. Dixon, III (“the Buyer”) for breach of a contract to purchase real property. The contract allowed the Buyer to terminate in the event he was unable to obtain financing. Under the contract, termination was to be effective only if notice of same was “received.” The Buyer claims to have sent a notice of termination through his agent by fax to the Seller. The Seller claims that she did not receive it. The trial court found that the attempted termination was ineffective because it was not received. The Buyer appeals. We affirm.

U.S. Bank, N.A. (“Bank”) had a mortgage on a residence which was insured against fire loss by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). When the owner of the residence failed to pay the mortgage, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, the owner filed for bankruptcy which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. After the residence was destroyed in a fire, the Bank filed a claim to recover the insurance proceeds. Tennessee Farmers refused to pay the claim. As a result, the Bank filed suit against Tennessee Farmers alleging breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, and unfair or deceptive practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Bank, concluding that the Bank's failure to give Tennessee Farmers notice of the foreclosure proceedings did not invalidate the insurance coverage. On appeal to this Court, we reversed, finding that the Bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard under the policy and the Bank’s failure to provide notice precluded coverage. After granting the Bank’s application for permission to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court, and held that commencement of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an increase in hazard under the terms of the insurance policy or the applicable statutory provisions, and therefore, the Bank was not required to give notice to Tennessee Farmers. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2009). Subsequently, on remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank for the amount due on the mortgage plus accrued interest. The trial court further awarded the Bank attorney’s fees and costs based on its finding that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy, that the Bank was required to provide them with notice of the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, amounted to bad faith and an unfair act or practice under the TCPA. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reverse and remand.

Kenneth E. King was arrested for driving on a revoked license. He was put in a cell with several violent criminals. At his arraignment, the court ordered him released. The person charged with processing the release delayed his release by simply doing nothing. While awaiting his release, Mr. King was assaulted by one of his cellmates. He sustained serious injuries, including partial loss of vision in one eye. He filed this action against Anderson County (“the County”). After a bench trial, the court found the County 55% at fault and King 45% at fault for provoking the assault. It determined that the total damages were $170,000 reduced to $93,500 to account for King’s comparative fault. The County appeals. We affirm.

Martha Scent filed a declaratory judgment action against multiple defendants to establish her rights with respect to a deed of trust that granted her a lien on a tract of land. In addition, Scent sought to establish that “her” signature on a release of her deed of trust is a forgery. The trial court granted Scent partial summary judgment voiding and nullifying the release of her trust deed. The case proceeded to a bench trial with the focus on the priority of trust deeds as between Scent and the defendant Ellen W. Hood. Based upon the application of the doctrine of merger, the court ruled that Scent held the priority position. The court awarded judgment in her favor and Hood appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff, a retail business specializing in hair restoration and related services that leased “beauty equipment” from a third party lessor, filed this action against the manufacturer of the “beauty equipment” and the distributor of the products asserting claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff obtained a monetary judgment against the distributor, however, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the manufacturer. Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of its claims against the manufacturer. We affirm.

Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. (“Husband”) sued his former spouse, Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick (“Wife”); her attorney, David W. Noblit (“Counsel”); and Noblit’s law firm (collectively “Defendants”). Husband alleges that, since the time of the parties’ divorce, Wife and Counsel had conspired against him in an effort to destroy him and gain access to his separate funds. Husband claims the Defendants are guilty of fraud on the court, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a civil conspiracy, for which he seeks eight million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed Husband’s complaint. The court stated “that the[] causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations or that the complaint failed to state a claim, or both.” Husband appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. Delwin Huggins (“Huggins”) sued R. Ellsworth McKee (“McKee”) and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”) (McKee and AF as “the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Huggins filed for bankruptcy. Konvalinka later purchased the claims asserted by Huggins in this lawsuit. The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, even if Konvalinka’s claim for damages was successful, McKee had an offset far in excess of these damages which rendered any further proceedings useless. The Trial Court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the case. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a dispute over a claim for rent reimbursements in a lease agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the undisputed facts showed that a limitation of remedy provision in the lease relieved the defendant from any liability. We affirm the judgment of the court below.

Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation denying his application for a billboard permit because his proposed location was within 1000 feet of another permit location. He contends the Department erroneously deviated from its regulation requiring permit applications for locations within 1000 feet of each other to be considered on a “first come first served” basis, insisting he submitted a “complete” application before the applicant who was granted a permit for the nearby location. The Chancery Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Department’s decision to grant a permit to the other applicant. The court also found that the Department complied with its rules in issuing the permit to the other applicant and denying the petitioner’s application because petitioner’s location was less than 1000 feet away from the other applicant’s location. We affirm.

This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case. The original plaintiff, the decedent, filed the initial malpractice action against the defendant, but the case was dismissed after the decedent passed away during the pendency of the suit. Her sole surviving heir re-filed the action without complying with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122, which require a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit (1) to give a health care provider who is to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit, and (2) to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Appellant takes exception to the trial court’s order, enforcing a settlement agreement. ollowing a judicial settlement conference, the parties signed a written agreement, which contemplated the execution of more formal settlement documents. When the formal documents were presented to Appellant, he refused to sign. Upon Appellees’ motion, the trial court enforced the settlement and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant, occupant of the property which had been foreclosed. Plaintiff held a deed of ownership. Plaintiff sued for possession and for damages for unlawful detainer of the property. The Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment for possession and damages for unlawful detainer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-120. On appeal, we affirm.

In this case the Trial Court entered a "Final Judgment". The Judgment did not resolve defendant's Counter-Claim. On appeal, we hold we are without jurisdiction to consider the Appeal and dismiss the Appeal.

This matter involves a disagreement between an insurer and an insured over the proper classification of employees for the purpose of workers’ compensation insurance. The decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance was in favor of the insurer. The insured appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the Department. We find that the decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance is supported by substantial and material evidence and affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim filed by the Administrator of Decedent’s estate to recover monetary assets that were misappropriated from Decedent prior to her death. Administrator alleged that the Kidds depleted Decedent’s monetary assets, thereby breaching a confidential relationship they held with her. The trial court agreed and issued a judgment against the Kidds with prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment against Wife as modified but reverse the judgment against Husband. The case is remanded.

This is an interpleader action resulting from competing claims to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Insured’s mother, finding that, because she was the only named beneficiary of the policy, she was entitled to the proceeds. Insured’s husband appeals, arguing that, because Insured’s mother was only named as a contingent beneficiary, the default provisions of the policy remained in effect, resulting in him being the primary beneficiary of the policy. Husband also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his bad faith claim against the insurer. We affirm the dismissal of the bad faith claim, but conclude that the contract at issue is ambiguous and the issue in this case is not properly decided on summary judgment. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court determined that the minor children in this case were dependent and neglected upon finding that one of the children was the victim of severe child abuse. Mother appeals. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

This case arises out of the sale of a tractor. The plaintiff purchaser bought a tractor online from the defendant company, which specializes in the sale of tractors. The company advertised the tractor as having many fewer hours of use than it actually had. After taking possession of the tractor and learning the tractor’s true condition, the purchaser filed this lawsuit against the company, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, rescission, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the purchaser, and awarded compensatory damages and attorney fees. The company now appeals, arguing inter alia that the evidence does not support an award of compensatory damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm.

The mother brought a petition to modify support and for contempt, alleging that the father
had willfully understated his income during an earlier proceeding to modify support. The
juvenile court judge found that the mother had proved her allegations and awarded her a
judgment of over $26,500 for back child support as well as attorney fees of over $12,800.
We hold that the statutory prohibition against retroactive modification of child support
disallows the award of pre-petition support. Accordingly, we are compelled to vacate the
trial court’s award of support for the time prior to the date on which the mother filed her
petition to modify child support. We affirm the prospective modification and the award of
child support from that date.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a will. The named residuary beneficiary predeceased the testatrix. The executrix of the decedent’s estate argued that a survivorship requirement in the will applies to the named residuary beneficiary, so her interest lapsed. The issue of the residuary beneficiary argued that the survivorship requirement did not apply to the residuary beneficiary, so Tennessee’s anti-lapse statute operates to pass the beneficiary’s interest to her issue. The trial court held for the executrix, construing the will so as to apply the survivorship requirement to the residuary beneficiary. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the will, and so affirm.

In re Estate of Milam, 181 S.W.3d 344, 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). (“[W]hen a decedent undertakes to make a will, we must presume that the decedent intended to die testate, and we must seek to construe the will, where possible, as including all of the testator’s property at death”). Second, as I will discuss more fully hereafter, the testatrix in this case clearly evidenced an intent to die testate. “The testator’s intent is to be determined from the particular words used in the will itself, . . . and not from what it is supposed the testator intended.” Id. at 353 (internal citation omitted).

In this action a Petition was filed and a conservator was appointed for Dr. Maurice M. Acree,
Jr., and William Acree was made a party to that proceeding. Five years after a conservator
was appointed, William Acree filed a "Complaint" in that action. The Trial Court determined
that a complaint could not lie in that action, and treated it as a Rule 60 Motion and denied
William Acree any relief. William Acree has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Trial
Court's Judgment, but modify the Judgment on the basis that the record reveals plain error
which should be addressed because the trusts remain active.

Married couple sought judicial review of decision of Department of Human Services holding that they were not eligible for medicaid under an amendment to the Social Security Act known as the “Pickle Amendment.” Upon consideration of the record we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

In this post-divorce dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan to designate Mother as primary residential parent and the trial court’s calculation of his income and monthly child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.