APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

James Bostic (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee and others seeking money damages. The claim against the State was transferred from the Division of Claims Administration to the Claims Commission pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c) 2012). The State filed (1) a motion to dismiss raising several defenses and (2) the affidavit of Brenda Boatman. Based upon the affidavit, the Claims Commission granted the State summary judgment and dismissed the Claimant’s claim. We affirm.

This appeal turns on whether a commercial lease agreement requires the tenant to pay the landlord’s Tennessee excise tax. We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the lease does require the tenant to pay the excise tax.

This case involves the sale of a home in 1994. The purchaser and her husband filed a complaint against the seller, alleging that they discovered extensive fire damage to the home in 2010. The complaint alleged misrepresentation, mistake, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted the seller’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss on the basis that the claims were barred by various statutes of limitations, as the trial court found that the discovery rule was inapplicable. We find that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, as they implicate the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Therefore, we reverse in part the order of dismissal, to the extent that the purchaser’s claims were dismissed on the basis of the statutes of limitations, and we remand for further proceedings. We affirm in part the portion of the trial court’s order that addressed a separate issue, as that ruling was not challenged on appeal.

This is an action for breach of contract to purchase real property. The trial court found that a valid contract existed between the parties and that Buyer breached the contract. The trial court found that Seller failed to prove general damages, however, where Seller failed to prove the fair market value of the real property at the time of breach. The trial court further found that Buyer was entitled to a credit against special damages proven by Seller, and that Seller was not entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party where the provision for attorney’s fees had been crossed out on the standard form contract. Seller appeals and Buyer cross-appeals. We affirm.

In this post-divorce appeal regarding child support, we have concluded that the trial court erred in requiring mother to establish a trust account for gifts to the parties’ minor child. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The orders of the trial court were designated as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because we find that certification of the judgment under Rule 54.02 was in error, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Shelby County. Appellants, former employees of the Shelby County Department of Homeland Security, filed suit against Appellee for retaliatory discharge under both the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-1-304, and the Tennessee Public Employee Political Freedom Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-50-603. The trial court determined that Appellants had failed to meet their burden to show that the termination of their employment was causally connected to any whistleblowing activity and granted judgment in favor of Appellee. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff appeals a jury verdict awarding her damages in the amount of approximately $5,000 in her action for damages against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on two minor children, Holly B.C. (DOB: December 22, 2005) and Kylie M.C. (DOB: December 6, 2006) (collectively “the Children”). Defendants, Angela C. (“Mother”) and Chad C. (“Father”), are the biological parents of the Children. The Children were taken into custody in September 2007, after the defendants left them with a church nursery worker for two weeks and did not return during that period. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate parental rights on September 25, 2008, and a hearing was held on the petition in September 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The court later decided to hold the petition in abeyance to give the defendants an opportunity to make more progress with respect to their permanency plans. In July 1 2010, the defendants’ visitation with the Children was suspended due to alleged danger to the Children. A final hearing was held in September 2011. At that time, the Children had been in state custody for approximately four years. The trial court terminated the defendants’ parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parents had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, that the conditions leading to removal still persisted, and that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

This appeal concerns an inmate’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The petitioner inmate was convicted of disciplinary offenses, which were affirmed by the Tennessee Department of Corrections. The inmate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the convictions. The trial court found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the inmate’s petition because it did not include a recitation that it was his first application for the writ. We reverse and remand the cause for further consideration in light of Talley v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 358 S.W.3d 185 (Tenn. 2011).

This appeal involves jurisdiction over a divorce case. The parties lived in Maryland throughout their 19-year marriage. In 2007 or 2008, the husband left the marital home in Maryland. Several months later, he moved to Tennessee. About one year after he moved to Tennessee, the husband filed this complaint for divorce in the trial court below. The wife filed an answer and a counterclaim for divorce. The trial court conducted the first day of trial in the matter, and the case was continued. Before the trial resumed, the trial court sua sponte entered an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,jurisdiction over the wife and apparently also lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The husband now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

Sonya Wyche (“the Putative Daughter”) was named as one of the heirs of James Sheperd Smith, deceased (“the Deceased”), in the petition for letters of administration filed by James B. Smith and Jacqueline Smith Gunn (collectively “the Adminstrators”). The Administrators filed a “Motion to Determine Identity of Heirs” approximately 13 months after the Deceased died. The court held that the Putative Daughter’s claim as a child born out of wedlock was not perfected in a timely fashion. The court also held that the Putative Daughter did not carry her burden of proving that the Administrators, by naming her as an heir in the petition, acted with intent to trick her into not filing a timely claim. The Putative Daughter appeals. We affirm.

In this modification of custody case, Mother appeals only the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding that modification is in the child’s best interest. Concluding that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate the order of the trial court naming Father primary residential parent and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) provided financing for a construction project and recorded a deed of trust. The excavation contractor, Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc., started work on the project and had done substantial work when Marshall & Ilsley Bank (“M&I Bank”) made a loan and recorded its trust deed. BB&T was paid off out of the proceeds of the loan from M&I Bank. Blalock was also paid current with the proceeds from the M&I Bank loan. BB&T released its trust deed. The developer later defaulted, and Blalock filed this action to enforce its statutory lien. M&I Bank’s assignee, Cay Partners, LLC, filed a counterclaim asserting that it should be entitled to the priority position of BB&T. Blalock and Cay filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Blalock’s motion. Cay appeals. We affirm.

Father’s individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) were garnished to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees, and he filed a motion to quash the garnishment, claiming that the accounts were exempt from garnishment under Tennessee law. In a previous appeal, this Court concluded that the IRAs were exempt property, and we reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Father’s motion to quash the garnishment. On remand, the trial court vacated its previous order but again dismissed Father’s motion to quash. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Father’s motion to quash and to dissolve the writ of garnishment.

This is a breach of contract case.  Appellant Homeowner contracted with Appellee for the installation of a “smart home” system. After myriad problems arose, Appellant fired Appellee, who filed the instant lawsuit to collect the unpaid balance for equipment and installation. The trial court determined that the primary purpose of the parties’ agreement was the sale of goods and applied Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court granted judgment in favor of Appellee, but allowed certain offsets for items rejected by Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the UCC, and in its calculation of damages. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act does not apply. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Homeowner and Contractor filed competing suits against one another in the general sessions court. Homeowner was awarded $1,500.00 against Contractor; Contractor’s suit against Homeowner was dismissed. Contractor then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed all actions filed by both parties, finding that the construction contracts required arbitration of disputes. Homeowner appeals and we affirm.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, insurance company and its agent, on Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence on the basis of duty. We dismiss for failure to appeal a final judgment.
 

Plaintiffs filed an action in the Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment and damages against defendants. Plaintiffs are property owners and lessors to defendants/appellees, who are lessees and operators of an oil and gas production unit. The Trial Court bifurcated the issues raised in the Complaint, and a trial was held before a jury. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs, determining that there was an oral lease "expanding the said storage yard from approximately 1/3 acre to approximately 2 and ½ acres." Based upon the jury's verdict, the Trial Court found there was proof of a lease and that plaintiffs were entitled to rentals of $1,000.00 per month from October 1994 through November 2010, totaling $194,000.00 with pre-judgment interest of $243,043.04. The Trial Court, in its discretion, referred the remaining issues to the Tennessee Oil and Gas Board for resolution and entered final Judgment. Plaintiffs appealed and we affirm the Trial Court Judgment, as modified.

This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile accident. After the accident, Plaintiff/Appellant learned that he suffered from a degenerative disc disease, which required surgery. Appellant sued the two drivers involved in the accident for damages, which included his medical expenses for the disc surgery. At trial, Appellant’s surgeon’s deposition testimony was read to the jury, in which the surgeon testified that while the accident “aggravated” Appellant’s existing condition, the treatment he received was not “causally related” to the accident. Appellant offered another expert’s testimony, however, that did relate the treatment to the accident. At the close of proof, Appellant moved for a directed verdicton the issue of causation for his medical expenses, arguing that because the surgeon’s testimony was contradictory, it was subject to the cancellation rule. The trial court denied the motion and sent the issue to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Appellant, but in an amount that did not include the medical expenses he incurred to treat the degenerative disc disease. Appellant was also awarded discretionary costs. After a careful review of the record, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. After approximately four years of marriage, Herbert L. Hall (“Husband”) sued Chona S. Hall (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital estate. Wife filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Wife appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in entering a decree for divorce when the parties had not engaged in mediation, and, that the Trial Court failed to adhere to applicable local court rules. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The appeal concerns a dispute over personal property. The appellant landlord refused to permit the appellee tenant to renew her lease, and the tenant was forced to leave the premises. Several items of personal property belonging to the tenant were apparently left behind. The tenant sued the landlord for reimbursement for the value of the property. After a bench trial, the trial court ordered the landlord to reimburse the tenant. The landlord now appeals. As the appellate record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a statement of evidence, we affirm.

The parties to this action were divorced by Decree on December 15, 2009. The former husband filed a Motion asking the Court to reopen the case on June 28, 2011. The Motion was styled as a Rule 59 and/or 60 Motion, Tenn. R. Civ. P. At a hearing before the Trial Court, the Trial Judge dismissed the Motions on the grounds that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain these Motions. On appeal, we affirm.
 

Shortly after the mother of four children was killed in an accident, her husband instituted an action to recover damages for her death; the father of the children moved to intervene in the action and for the court to hold a hearing on whether the husband had abandoned the mother, thereby waiving his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action. The trial court did not hold a hearing; rather, it held that the husband was the proper party to pursue the action, allowed the Guardian of the children to represent the interest of the children in the action, and dismissed Father’s petition. The surviving spouse, Guardian and tortfeasor subsequently petitioned the court for approval of a settlement of the wrongful death claim; the court granted the petition. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the issue of whether the husband was estranged from the mother, in approving the settlement, and in placing the settlement documents under seal. We remand the case for a hearing on whether the husband waived his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action and reverse the court’s placement of the settlement documents under seal; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a direct appeal by newly incorporated Berry’s Chapel Utility, Inc., from a declaratory order by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. The dispute hinges on whether the TRA had jurisdiction over Berry’s Chapel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010). The TRA held that Berry’s Chapel was a public utility as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010), thus, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the TRA. Berry’s Chapel asserts it was a non-profit and, thus, it was a non-utility by statutory definition and not subject to the TRA’s jurisdiction. We affirm the decision of the TRA.