APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Respondent Convention Center Authority appeals the trial court’s determination that the residential addresses of employees of third-party contractors contained in payroll records submitted by the contractors to the Convention Center Authority aren ot exempt from disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act. Petitioners cross-appeal the trial court’s denial of their request for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After primary residential parent Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate, Father opposed relocation and he petitioned to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The trial court determined the Father had demonstrated a material change in circumstances, but it found the child’s best interests would be promoted by Mother remaining the primary residential parent, and it allowed Mother’s relocation with the child. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority affirms summary judgment on the basis that Aegis is unable to show that a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence could find that the advertisement was capable of a defamatory meaning. Instead, I would hold that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case, reverse the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
 

Husband appeals the order granting Wife a legal separation and alimony in futuro. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

I dissent from the majority because I believe that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the husband did not prove a ground for divorce. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the husband did, in fact, produce unrebutted evidence that established the ground of inappropriate marital conduct.
 

I fully concur with the decision to affirm the trial court in all respects; I write separately to address the emphasis on reconciliation as a predicate to granting Wife a legal separation for two years even though Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce. I fully recognize that the trial court had the discretion to grant or deny Wife’s request for a legal separation; however, based upon the facts of this case, I submit the only party who would have a basis to appeal the grant or denial of a legal separation would be Wife, not Husband. This is because Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce at the time of the hearing.
 

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother to her child, finding that she wilfully failed to visit or support the child. Mother appeals, contending that she lacked the capacity to visit or pay support. Upon our de novo review we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that Mother abandoned the child and that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest.
 

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants in this action for defamation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment on its claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. We affirm.
 

This appeal involves a GTLA claim for personal injuries arising out of alleged negligence. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries after falling in a hole in a school football field. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant board of education alleging negligence by failure to maintain the school premises and failure to warn. As defenses, the defendant board of education asserted governmental immunity and comparative fault. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the board of education had constructive notice of the hole in the football field and so did not have governmental immunity, and awarded the plaintiff monetary damages. The board of education now appeals, challenging the trial court’s holding on governmental immunity and arguing the plaintiff’s comparative fault. We affirm the trial court’s holding as to governmental immunity, but remand on the issue of comparative fault for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

The State of Tennessee Department of Revenue rendered an assessment against James T. Higdon (“Higdon”) for certain business taxes owed. Higdon, challenging the actions taken by the department, sued the State of Tennessee; Commissioner Richard Roberts of the Department of Revenue; and, M. Bernadette Welch of the Department of Revenue (“the Defendants,” collectively), in the Chancery Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court held, among other things, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case as Higdon had not satisfied the statutory requirements for seeking relief regarding state tax claims. Higdon appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

This case was filed pursuant to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. Customer sought reimbursement from Bank for unauthorized transactions made using a debit card linked to his account. Bank limited reimbursement to the transactions that occurred prior to and within 60 days of the transmittal of the bank statement that revealed the first unauthorized transaction. Customer filed suit. The trial court upheld Bank’s denial of recovery, finding that Customer’s failure to review his bank statements resulted in losses beyond the 60-day time period. Customer appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Edith M. Ramsey and Mary E. Horton filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment with regard to the interpretation of the Last Will and Testament of Pauline Martin (“the Will”). Specifically, Ms. Ramsey and Ms. Horton sought an order establishing the location and width of a right-of-way granted in the Will. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment on October 11, 2011 finding and holding, inter alia, that the right-of-way referenced in the Will was a farm road with a width of twelve feet as shown on an August 25, 2009 survey. Charles E. Martin, another beneficiary under the Will, appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the right-of-way referenced in the Will is not the farm road, but is what is referred to as the Ramsey right-of-way as shown on the August 25, 2009 survey, and we reverse the Trial Court’s judgment as to the location. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s judgment.

The biological father of the child at issue appeals the termination of his parental rights and the dismissal of Father and Step-Mother’s petition for custody and counter-petition for stepparent adoption. The petition for termination was filed by the partial guardians who were seeking to adopt the minor child. The trial court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to support the mother for the four months prior to the birth of the child and willfully failed to support the child for the four months prior to the filing of the petition. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We have determined that one ground for abandonment was established by clear and convincing evidence, however, we have also determined that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights. We have also determined the trial court erred in dismissing Father and Step-Mother’s petition for custody and counter-petition for step-parent adoption and remand this issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this action for divorce the Chancery Court of Jefferson County awarded the parties a divorce, divided the marital property and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, both parties attack the appropriateness of the alimony award. The wife also asserts that the court erred in classifying one asset as the husband’s separate property. We affirm.

I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. However, it is my opinion that the Guardians failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to support the child in the four months prior to the filing of the petition. The evidence set out in the majority opinion does not, in my opinion, meet the Constitutionally required standard

This is an action to recover damages for breach of a commercial lease from an individual whom the lessor claims guaranteed the obligations of the corporate tenant. The only issue on appeal is whether the individual defendant signed the lease solely in his capacity as the president of and on behalf of the corporate tenant, or whether the parties also intended to bind the individual defendant as a guarantor of the tenant’s obligations. The trial court distinguished the facts of this case from those in the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380 (2011), and summarily dismissed the claims against the individual defendant. We affirm.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from an order granting a Motion for Default and authorizing the clerk and master to sell the parties’ real property. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

A physician convicted of driving under the influence in another state was adjudged to have engaged in “unprofessional, dishonorable or unethical conduct”, as proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b)(1), by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners; the Board placed the physician’s medical license on probation and ordered him to obtain treatment and counseling. On petition for review, the Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and reversed the Board’s decision. We reverse, holding that Tenn.Code Ann.§ 63-6-214(b)(1) provides sufficient notice to the physician that his conduct was subject to potential discipline by the Board.

Plaintiff, David Desgro, alleged that he hired defendant, Paul Pack d/b/a Resi Chek, to perform an inspection on a house plaintiff wanted to purchase. After defendant inspected the house and reported the house had no major problems, plaintiff purchased the house in reliance on defendant’s report. Plaintiff claims that he then discovered multiple serious issues with the house, including plumbing problems, insulation and heat pump problems, and inadequate floor support. Plaintiff filed suit 13 months after the inspection was completed, and defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff’s signed contract with defendant provided that plaintiff must file suit on any claims within one year of the date of inspection. The trial court found that plaintiff signed such an agreement and that the contractual limitations period of one year was reasonable. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, ruling that plaintiff’s claims were untimely. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is an action for legal malpractice against a court-appointed attorney in a criminal case. The Circuit Court of Knox County entered a judgment for the defendant. We affirm.

After he lost his job at the University of Tennessee, the plaintiff filed this action against UT and several of his coworkers. The complaint can be summarized thusly: the plaintiff had an intimate relationship with a female coworker and, after it ended, she and three of her friends, who were also coworkers of the plaintiff, set out to get him fired. He seeks to impose liability on the four individuals and UT under various theories. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend which the trial court denied. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. Custodial Parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support several statutory grounds of termination and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. The Parents appeal the court’s best interest finding. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on four minor children (“the Children”) of the defendant, Tabitha W. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Children into custody in July 2010 because of Mother’s continuing drug use and the Children’s truancy problems. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother in July 2011, alleging that numerous grounds for termination exist. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan, and that the conditions originally leading to removal still persisted. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm.

A prison inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking review of a prison disciplinary action. Numerous respondents were listed in the complaint, and one respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss because, among other things, the petition was not verified or sworn, and it did not state that it was the first application for the writ. The petitioner appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.