APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns an overcollection of child support by the State in a Title IV-D matter. Anthony Phillips (“Father”) and Suzanna R. Phillips (“Mother”) divorced, and Father was ordered to pay child support. Later, Father’s child support obligation was suspended on account of his disability status. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) garnished Father’s Social Security checks to satisfy an arrearage. The Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”) found that Father had paid his arrears and, in fact, had overpaid. The Trial Court ordered the State to reimburse Father the overpayment and to pursue Mother for the overpayment sum. The State appeals, arguing that the Trial Court lacked authority because of the State’s sovereign immunity to render such an order. We affirm as modified.

At the time of the parties’ divorce, both parties lived in Tennessee, and Mother was named primary residential parent. Shortly thereafter, Mother was allowed to relocate to Georgia with the children, and Father’s requests that he be named primary residential parent were denied. Following the move, the parties were unable to agree to a parenting plan, and the circuit court resolved the remaining parenting issues and transferred future disputes to Georgia. On appeal, the pro se parties raise numerous issues related to various decisions of the trial court. We affirm in part and we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a contested divorce. After a trial of approximately one week, the court entered a judgment that, with regard to the issues on appeal: (1) split the family by making Angelia Lynette Maupin (“Mother”) the primary residential parent of the parties’ daughter and designating Paul Wayne Maupin (“Father”) the primary residential parent of the parties’ two sons; (2) ordered Mother to pay prospective child support ; and (3) awarded the marital residence to Father and made him solely responsible for the debt securedby the residence, and ordered Mother to pay half of any deficiency balance in the event of a foreclosure. On Father’s motion to alter or amend, the court made the child support obligation retroactive to the date of the parties’ separation. The record shows that Mother has been unable to spend any individual parenting time with her sons since the parties separated in April 2009. Mother appeals. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment ordering that Mother shall be responsible for paying half of any deficiency in the event of a foreclosure. We modify the trial court’s judgment to provide for family counseling. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This action against David Higgins (“the Instructor”) and his employer, the Knox County Board of Education (“KCBE”), is based upon events that occurred while the plaintiff Jane Doe (“the Student”) was a freshman ROTC student at West High School in Knoxville. In simple terms, the Instructor allowed the Student and other female ROTC students to drink alcohol to the point of intoxication and, while they were intoxicated, he persuaded them to expose their breasts. The Student reported the episodes to the school and her parents when the Instructor’s demands escalated to the point that he repeatedly encouraged the Student to allow him to film her and others in a sexual “threesome.” The case went to trial. The claims against the Instructor were tried to a jury. The claims against KCBE pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) were heard simultaneously by the trial court. The jury awarded the Student damages against the Instructor in the amount of $65,000 for negligent infliction of emotional distress. It rejected the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The portion of the court’s judgment pertaining to the claims against the Instructor is not at issue in this appeal. The trial court determined that KCBE was not liable for the Instructor’s actions because the court concluded he was acting outside the scope of his employment. The court further determined that there was no negligence upon which liability as to KCBE could be imposed. After the judgment was entered, the Student learned that the trial judge’s wife was a retired employee of KCBE. On that basis, the Student moved the court to recuse itself and award her a new trial. The court denied the Student’s post-trial motion. The Student appeals only as to the claims against KCBE. We affirm.

This is the second appeal of this case, involving the question of whether Appellant acted in good faith in seeking to enforce an arbitration clause in a consulting contract, which was entered by and between Appellant and Appellee. The trial court determined that Appellant failed to act in good faith in unilaterally demanding arbitration in a forum of its choice, in setting an arbitrary deadline, and then in unilaterally accelerating the deadline. We affirm the decision of the trial court that Appellant breached the duty of good faith and remand with instructions to consider whether Appellant’s lack of good faith operates as a waiver of its right to seek arbitration pursuant to the contract.

The petitioners are holders of special use permits issued by the federal government allowing them to own and use for non-commercial recreational purposes certain improvements on federally-owned national forest land. The Polk County tax assessor valued and assessed the petitioners’ interests in the properties as leasehold interests. The Petitioners brought this action challenging their real estate tax assessments. The issues presented include whether the appraisal methodology used in valuing the petitioners’ leasehold interests violated the governing leasehold valuation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-605, and whether the petitioners should receive an offsetting tax credit for monies allegedly paid by the federal government to Polk County pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 500. We affirm the judgment of the trial court holding that the appraisal methodology violated the statute by arbitrarily applying a static 99-year term when the express term of the special use permits was less than seven years during the tax years in question, 2003 through 2008. We reverse the trial court’s judgment ordering the tax assessor to allow an offsetting credit because the petitioners have cited no legal authority requiring or permitting such a result. The case is remanded with instructions to the Polk County Tax Assessor to reassess the petitioners’ leasehold interests for the years 2003 through 2008 in a manner consistent with this opinion.

The trial court granted summary judgment to a judgment creditor of the decedent’s estate on a claim that the decedent fraudulently deeded an interest in real property to his wife so she would receive it free from the claims of his legitimate creditors after his death. The trial court’s judgment was based on circumstances surrounding the property transfer that satisfied the elements of fraudulent conveyance under both Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-305(a)(1) and (a)(2). The widow denies that there was any fraudulent intent behind the transfer of the disputed property to her, but insists that it arose naturally from the love and affection that existed between husband and wife. We affirm the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit, contending that her failure to visit the children was not willful and that termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment terminating her parental rights.

This appeal involves whether a document purporting to be a joint will meets the statutory requirements for a valid will. The trial court concluded that the document did not meet the statutory requirements for probate, but did not indicate the statute to which it referred or the requirements that were not met. We are unable to effectively review the trial court’s decision and must remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This consolidated appeal concerns Director’s non-renewal of Teacher’s contract, his refusal to recommend her for tenure, and his refusal to schedule a hearing regarding his decision. Upon learning that she had not been recommended for tenure, that her contract would not be renewed, and that Director would not schedule a hearing with the Board, Teacher filed suit, alleging that Director’s actions were unlawful and beyond the scope of his duty and that the Board had abdicated its responsibility by allowing Director to act in such a manner. Likewise, Board Member filed suit, alleging that the Board abdicated its responsibilities and that Director’s actions were unlawful. The trial court initially ruled in favor of Teacher and Board Member; however, the court altered its judgment to hold that Teacher and Board Member did not have standing to bring their respective complaints. Teacher and Board Member appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of the second consolidated case to be tried in a number of related cases involving accidents that occurred in Mexico and allegedly were caused by defective tires and/or vehicles. The trial judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion that he recuse himself. The motion was based upon allegations of the appearance of bias or prejudice. Having reviewed the filings in this appeal under the required de novo standard of review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.
 

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Nicholas K.S. (“Father”) to the minor children, Brooklyn J.S., Bailey L.S., and Cadince N.S. (collectively “the Children”). After a trial the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence had been proven of grounds to terminate pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We affirm.

This case presents the question of whether certain notes on a final subdivision plat constitute restrictive covenants, which prevent the purchasers of property in the subdivision from installing an experimental wetland sewage disposal system on their property or on an easement for the benefit of their property. The trial court concluded that the plat notes constitute restrictive covenants preventing the installation, and permanently enjoined the purchasers from installing or constructing such a system on their own property or on the easement. We affirm and remand.

Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Jenkins, Habenicht & Woods, PLLC, Daniel K. Habenicht, and Rebecca S. Woods (“Defendants”) alleging legal malpractice, among other things. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that several of Plaintiff’s claims were completely unsupported by expert testimony and that for the remaining three claims Plaintiff had suffered no harm. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising an issue about whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel. We find that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact as to one of Plaintiff’s malpractice claims, a claim relative to a stipulation. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to this claim. We affirm the grant of summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s other claims and Defendants’ counterclaim for attorney’s fees. Because we are unable to determine at this stage whether Plaintiff’s complaint completely lacked merit, we vacate the award of Rule 11 sanctions. We also vacate the award of discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

In this malpractice action, the plaintiff failed to attach proof of service of the statutory notice and the required affidavit with the complaint. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.

This appeal sought under Tenn. R. App. P. 3 is from an Order to Register Foreign Decree entered by the trial court on December 14, 2012, which order gave “full faith and credit for enforcement and modification purposes” to the parties’ New Jersey divorce judgment and subsequent consent orders entered by the New Jersey court on the issue of child custody. Subsequent to the entry of the December 14, 2012 order, the appellee (“Father”) filed a petition to modify the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and consent orders. The trial court entered an emergency order on January 9, 2013, temporarily modifying the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and orders to change custody of the parties’ minor children from the appellant (“Mother”) to Father. Pursuant to Rule 10 of Tenn. R. App. P., Mother then sought and was granted an extraordinary appeal from the January 9, 2013 order. See order in Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic, No. E2013-00238-COA-R10-CV, (Tenn. Ct. App., Knoxville, Feb. 5, 2013). That case is now pending in this Court. She also sought this Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal as to the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012. Since the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012, is not a final order, we have no jurisdiction to consider her Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal.

The order from which the appellant, Charlie D., seeks to appeal was entered on November 30, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed on January 4, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 30, 2012 order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Father of adult child with spina bifida and other impairments challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to continue to pay child support. We have concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We further find no error in the trial court’s determination that the adult child is severely disabled, in its calculation of child support, or in its determination of the amount owed by Father for past uncovered medical expenses.

This case involves a claimant’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. After initially being awarded such benefits, claimant was denied benefits based upon a finding that she had refused to return to her former position after being medically released to do so. The chancery court, however, reinstated her benefits concluding that her due process rights had been violated when a telephone hearing–as opposed to a face-to-face hearing–was conducted. We reverse the chancery court’s conclusion that the telephonic hearing violated claimant’s due process rights and we dismiss the case.

The parents of three minor children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court found the Department of Children’s Services established two grounds for termination: 1) severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4); and 2) persistence of  conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3). In a previous dependency and neglect proceeding, the Franklin County Circuit Court found that Father severely abused the children’s half-sister and that Mother knew of the abuse but did nothing to protect her child. Neither parent appealed that judgment; as a consequence, the severe abuse findings are res judicata. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1113(g)(4), a court may terminate parental rights when the parent is found to have committed severe child abuse under any prior order of a court against any sibling or half-sibling. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests. We therefore affirm.

Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed.

Husband and wife entered into a post-nuptial agreement detailing the division of their marital estate. Upon Husband’s subsequent filing of a complaint for divorce, wife moved for a declaratory judgment that the post-nuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Husband appeals the trial court’s holding that the agreement is enforceable and implementing its provisions. We affirm, holding the post-nuptial agreement is sufficiently definite to be enforced and that the agreement is fair and equitable.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.