APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying a petition to terminate the parental rights of the appellant, Willie G., to his three minor children. Because the judgment of the trial court is not adverse to the appellant, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

This appeal involves jurisdiction as to a parentage petition and related issues. The mother of the subject child lives in New York and the father lives in Tennessee. The child lives with the mother in New York. The mother filed this parentage petition in Tennessee. The Tennessee juvenile court entered an order establishing the father’s parentage and adjudicating child support, the designation of the primary residential parent, and the allocation of the parties’ residential parenting time. The mother appeals, challenging in part the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to adjudicate custody and child support. We affirm the juvenile court’s final order on the father’s parentage. We vacate the final order on the designation of primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time, as the Tennessee court did not have jurisdiction over these issues under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. We hold that the Tennessee court had jurisdiction to adjudicate child support, but vacate its final order on child support because the determination is based in part on the adjudication of the primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time.

Customer of a restaurant who was injured when she fell on a concrete ramp leading into the restaurant brought suit against the restaurant, alleging that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition and that the restaurant failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to customers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the ramp did not constitute a dangerous condition and that the owners did not have notice that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Ex-wife appeals from a trial court’s adoption of a report by the clerk and master that her ex-husband had fully satisfied a judgment for unpaid pension payments arising from the parties’ 1996 divorce and the determination that she is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the underlying case and other proceedings. The clerk and master found that an October 2001 judgment for an unpaid arrearage in pension payments had been satisfied and the ex-wife did not timely file an objection. The trial court adopted the clerk and master’s report and entered judgment accordingly. The court also ruled that the ex-wife was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees in this or other proceedings including those specified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order. Although the ex-wife waived any objection to the report of the clerk and master, and thus, the trial court’s adoption of that report is affirmed, we have determined that the reference to the clerk and master was limited to determining the ex-husband’s pension obligations under the October 2001 chancery court judgment. Whether the sums owed by the ex-husband for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $13,904.44 identified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order were not specified as issues in the order of reference to the master. Because the ex-husband’s obligations to pay to the ex-wife the attorney’s fees and costs specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order were not identified in the order of reference, the ex-wife’s failure to timely file an objection does not constitute a waiver of that issue. We have also determined that whether the sums owing under the 2003 bankruptcy order are a legal obligation of the ex-husband is a question of law, not a question of fact, and the failure to timely object to the master’s report does not constitute a waiver of an issue of law. The 2003 bankruptcy order expressly states the ex-husband owes the sum of $13,904.44, plus interest, to the ex-wife for her attorney’s fees and costs, and he is collaterally estopped from denying the debt specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order. Therefore, we have concluded that the ex-wife is entitled to recover $13,904.44, plus interest. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This action arises out of the alleged breach of a construction subcontract due to the general contractor’s failure to pay for work performed by the subcontractor. At issue in this appeal are the plaintiff’s two claims against the general contractor and the insurer that provided the performance and payment bond. One claim is for breach of the subcontract; the other is for violation of the Prompt Pay Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 66-34-101 through -703.The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that both claims were time-barred by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-109(a)(3), the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. We affirm.

Civil service employee appeals the trial court’s judgment affirming the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate the employee for the good of the service pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-326. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This case involves the application of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctor, finding that the statute of limitations defense was not waived by her failure to raise it in her first pre-answer motion, that the defense was sufficiently pleaded, and that the undisputed facts in the record supported a finding that the statute of limitations had expired at the time of filing the initial complaint. Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the petitioner’s application for four billboard construction permits on I-240 in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee. The dispositive issues concern the zoning classifications of the proposed billboard locations. The Department of Transportation denied the permits based upon the finding that none of the proposed billboard locations met the zoning requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-21-103(4) or Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.03(1)(a)1, or the definitions for “Zoned Commercial” or “Zoned Industrial” in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.1680-2-3-.02(29). The trial court affirmed the Department’s denial of the permits, finding subsection (d) of 23 C.F.R. § 750.708, which states, “A zone in which limited commercial or industrial activities are permitted as an incident to other primary land uses is not considered to be a commercial or industrial zone for outdoor advertising control purposes” was controlling. The trial court also found the area was comprehensively zoned for residential, agricultural and flood plain uses, not commercial or industrial, and that “TDOT acted within its statutory authority in denying the petitioner’s application for permits,” and thus the court dismissed the petition. We affirm the decision to deny the permits based upon federal and state law.

A police officer who was terminated for violating chain of command and insubordination filed suit for retaliatory discharge pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, alleging that he had been terminated for reporting illegal activities of the Police Chief to the Mayor. Following a trial, the court held that the evidence did not establish that the officer had been terminated solely for his refusal to remain silent about the illegal activities. Finding that the reasons given for the officer’s termination were pretextual within the meaning of the applicable statute, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Taxpayers appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and dismissal of the taxpayers’ claims for refund of sales taxes paid to the State of Tennessee. Holding that the service at issue was not excluded from the definition of taxable telecommunications as a private line service or as an enhanced service, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Ned McCoy and Carolyn McCoy (“Plaintiffs”) sued Richard Lee Bales and Shelia M. Bales (“Defendants”) alleging, in part, that Defendants had encroached upon real property owned by Plaintiffs, and seeking, in part, a determination with regard to a boundary line. The case was tried before a jury, and the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the property is owned by the parties as set out in the Dennis Fultz survey dated February 29, 1996. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the evidence supports the jury’s verdict. We hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and we affirm.

The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on January 7, 2013. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on February 7, 2013, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from a divorce and child custody determination. After 18 years of marriage, Terri Ann Kelly (“Wife”) sued Willard Reed Kelly (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court, among other things, awarded Wife alimony and custody of the parties’ son, Will. Husband appeals, raising several issues. We reverse the Trial Court in its award of custody of Will to Wife. We modify the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate and its award of alimony to Wife. Finally, we affirm the Trial Court as to its award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm, in part, as modified, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

I agree with the majority that the evidence in this case preponderates against the trial court’s division of the net marital estate. I also concur in the majority’s further conclusion that the evidence preponderates against the type and amount of alimony awarded to Ms. Kelly. In my judgment, the evidence preponderates in favor of the majority’s division of the net estate and its award of transitional alimony in the amounts stated in the opinion.

The trial court dismissed Claimant’s claim against Decedent’s estate as void not with standing the failure of the Estate to file a timely exception to the claim. We reverse.

Consulting group that served as the agent of record for a trust established to provide insurance to employees of a county school system filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Act when a group of trustees met for lunch with one of the consulting group’s employees and later changed the school system’s agent of record when the employee formed a different association with another company. The trial court found that no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred at the lunch meeting because no decision was made during the lunch. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, dismissing Appellant’s claims of: (1) slander/defamation; (2) false light invasion of privacy; (3) false imprisonment; (4) malicious harassment; (5) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; (6) negligent failure to affirm identification; (7) negligence; (8) assault and battery; and (9) civil conspiracy. Appellant also raises issues concerning the scope of cross-examination and the admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion concerning either the scope of the cross-examination, or by excluding certain evidence. We further conclude that Appellant failed to put forth sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case for any of the foregoing claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict. Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent paternity testing.  Discerning no error, we affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.

This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

The trial court granted Mother’s petition to waive mediation and modify custody, and modified the parties’ parenting schedule upon finding a material change of circumstance. We affirm.

Mary Fern Smith (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the trial court seeking the appointment of a conservator for her 90-year-old mother, Mary F. Stratton (“Mother”). Mother filed a motion to dismiss citing the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction of the petition because Mother was not a resident of Roane County. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-101 (2007). It dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties’ minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the mother had violated the parenting plan and held that this constituted a material change in circumstances. It changed the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father, held the mother in contempt, and awarded the father attorney fees as punishment for the contempt. The mother now appeals. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the finding of a material change in circumstances, but hold that the trial court erred in holding that it was in the child’s best interest to change the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father. We also vacate the holding of contempt against the mother and the award of attorney fees as punishment for the alleged contempt and remand for additional findings.

This complex litigation arises out of a series of disputes between two former partners and members in more than twenty partnerships and limited liability companies that were in the business of real estate development. Following a tumultuous six year business relationship, in an attempt to extricate themselves from their business relationships, the parties executed a Membership Interest and Exchange Agreement, which distributed the entities so a portion were solely owned by one former partner/member and the others were solely owned by the other former partner/member. After closing on the Exchange Agreement, the plaintiff commenced this action against his former business partner alleging fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent transfer of which most, but not all, of the claims arose from the Exchange Agreement. The complaint was later amended to add additional claims. The defendant filed a Counter-Claim alleging that the plaintiff was also in breach of the Exchange Agreement. The trial court dismissed several of the plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment. The remaining issues were tried. At the close of the plaintiff’s proof during the jury trial, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on some, but not all, of the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury entered a verdict for the defendant on the remaining claims. Although the jury found the defendant in breach of three provisions of the Exchange Agreement and a partnership agreement of a jointly owned company, the jury awarded no damages based upon the plaintiff’s prior knowledge and acquiescence of the breaches. Thereafter, each party sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees pursuant to § 11(l) of the Exchange Agreement. The trial court held that defendant was the prevailing party; therefore, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to recover his attorney’s fees pursuant to § 11(l) of the Exchange Agreement and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. The trial court also awarded the defendant indemnity under the bylaws of one corporation and the partnership agreement of another.The trial court also assessed discretionary costs against the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff raises numerous issues relating to the dismissal of his claims on summary judgment and directed verdict, the instructions given to the jury, the trial court’s ruling on a post-trial motion to amend the defendant’s answer, attorney’s fees and costs, and indemnity. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on summary judgment and directed verdict in all respects. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on attorney’s fees and costs under the Exchange Agreement, holding that as the trial court correctly determined the defendant was the prevailing party for those purposes. We also affirm the trial court’s determinations that the defendant was entitled to indemnification under the provisions of the Partnership Agreement and indemnification under the bylaws of IS Investment, Inc.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor children (“the Children”) of Tammy S. (“Mother”). Upon order of the Campbell County Juvenile Court entered September 19, 2011, the Children were taken into emergency protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) due to unsanitary conditions in the family home and concerns regarding inappropriate supervision and medical neglect of one of the Children. DCS filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights on July 11, 2012. The petition alleged several statutory grounds for termination, including abandonment based on willful failure to visit the Children, abandonment based on failure to provide a suitable home, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial conducted October 4, 2012, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children due to her failure to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, and (3) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal persisted. The trial court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Joseph G., Trinity G., and Stephen G. (“the Children”), the minor children of a married couple, J.G. (“Father”) and E.G. (“Mother”). The Children, then ages four, two and one respectively, were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) following the incarceration of both parents. The Children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected by stipulation of the parents. A year after the Children entered foster care, DCS filed suit to terminate the parents’ rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted DCS’s petition. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother separately appeal. As to both parents, we reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.