APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff, a supplier of customized lamps that were used exclusively in Cracker Barrel restaurants, filed this action for breach of express contract and breach of contract implied in fact and at law against Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (“Cracker Barrel”), and its subsidiary CBOCS Distribution, Inc. (“CBOCS”). The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that both defendants were bound by the Supply Agreement entered into between the plaintiff and CBOCS, and that both defendants breached the contract by failing to purchase 120 days of floor-stock inventory after cancellation of the Supply Agreement or discontinued use of the “Approved Products” identified in the agreement. Defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis that the Supply Agreement expired on July 31, 2011, and that, thereafter, the parties conducted at-will transactions not governed by the Supply Agreement. The trial court granted the motion dismissing all claims against both defendants finding,inter alia: 1) there was no contract between the plaintiff and Cracker Barrel; 2) the Supply Agreement between the plaintiff and CBOCS terminated by its own terms on July 31, 2011, and there was no written extension; 3) there was no contract implied in fact; and 4) there was no contract implied at law. We affirm the dismissal of all claims against Cracker Barrel because Cracker Barrel was never a party to the contract and the complaint failed to state a claim against Cracker Barrel upon which relief could be granted. As for the claims against CBOCS, we have determined that the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state claims against CBOCS for breach of express contract, contract implied in fact and contract implied at law. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the claims against CBOCS and remand the claims against CBOCS for further proceedings.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Michaela V.; Michael V., Jr.; and Tyler V., the minor children (“Children”) of Michael V., Sr. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on August 22, 2008. On January 5, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial held on October 12, 2011, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to provide financial support during the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

Singer brought action for breach of contract against musical tribute show Producer. Producer did not attend trial and his counsel moved to withdraw immediately prior to trial. The court heard Singer’s evidence and entered judgment in Singer’s favor. Producer retained new counsel and moved for a new trial on the basis of excusable neglect.  The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and Producer appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves post-divorce modification of a parenting schedule. Mother sought modification of the schedule after moving to Florida to be nearer to Father and the minor child. The trial court considered the case and modified the schedule to allow Mother more time with the child. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, that the trial court should have declined jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens, that Mother failed to prove a material change in circumstances, and that the modification was not in the child’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to jurisdiction, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, and a material change in circumstances. However, because the trial court failed to make a finding that modification was in the child’s best interests, we vacate the remainder of the order and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether modification is in the child’s best interests. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s second Motion to Alter or Amend, and Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an appropriate notice of appeal. Plaintiff then filed a third Motion to Alter or Amend in the trial court, which the trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a second appeal to this Court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is the second appeal of this property dispute involving the Parties. The Sellicks initially brought suit to determine whether the Millers had obtained an easement to use Farm Road for the benefit of Parcel 5.07. The Sellicks also complained that concrete slabs encroached upon the agreed-upon Farm Road easement for the benefit of Parcel 5.02. This court held that the Millers did not have an easement to use Farm Road for the benefit of Parcel 5.07. Upon remand, the Parties reached a settlement agreement in which the Millers agreed to a removal of the portion of their driveways on Parcel 5.02 that encroached upon Farm Road. Shortly thereafter, the Millers filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Sellicks had violated the agreement. The Sellicks responded in kind by filing their own petition for contempt. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a mutual restraining order, found Mr. Miller in contempt for failing to remove a gate as agreed, ordered Mr. Sellick to undertake repairs to the driveways owned by the Millers, and disposed of the remaining issues between the Parties. The Sellicks appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the enforcement of guaranty agreements in light of a bankruptcy. Marlin Financial & Leasing Corp. (“Marlin”) sued Lucius E. Burch, III (“Burch”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging breach of contract, conversion, and, unjust enrichment. Marlin asserted that Burch owed money under certain guaranty agreements he had signed for leases entered into by Marlin. After a trial, the Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Marlin appeals to this Court. We hold that, given the Bankruptcy Court’s orders deeming all claims related to the leases at issue satisfied, the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This Court granted an extraordinary appeal in this health care liability action to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to waive the contiguous state requirement for a testifying expert witness set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated §29-26- 115(b). Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the latest in a series of attempts by Mother to recover child support arrearages owed by Father. In this particular case, Mother sought to register and enforce in Tennessee a 2007 Arkansas judgment for approximately $47,000 in child support arrearages. The trial court entered an order registering the Arkansas judgment in Tennessee. However, it granted a declaratory judgment motion filed by Father, declaring that the Arkansas judgment was unenforceable in Tennessee due to the ten-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgments found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Former unmarried partner of the child’s adoptive mother seeks visitation with the child. Because the former partner has no biological or legal relationship with the child, we affirm the trial court’s finding that she does not have standing to seek visitation.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of penalties and interest on ad valorum taxes owed by a funeral home business after the business was placed in receivership. The Appellant/Shelby County Trustee filed a claim with the Appellee/Receiver to recover delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. The trial court denied the penalties and interest, but allowed the Receiver to pay the base taxes. The Trustee appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm and remand.

Plaintiff purchased landlocked property and filed suit against adjoining landowners to establish an easement for a private road and for utilities pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-101, et seq. After the jury of view returned its verdict form selecting a certain route for the easement, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which the trial court granted. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which the trial court denied. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

This consolidated appeal concerns Plaintiff’s ownership interest in condominium units. Plaintiff filed several complaints concerning the alleged mismanagement of her property. The complaints at issue in this case were dismissed by the trial court, which found that the applicable statute of limitations had passed and that several of Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This civil action is the progeny of a criminal proceeding in which Plaintiff was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for criminal trespass and stalking following an incident that occurred at the headquarters of Nissan North America. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal trespass; however, the stalking charge was dismissed because a corporation is not defined as a “person” under the stalking statute. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan North America asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process pertaining to the stalking charge. Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed facts that was supported by the affidavit of the Williamson County Deputy District Attorney General who investigated and prosecuted the criminal proceedings. Plaintiff filed a response opposing Nissan’s motion for summary judgment; however, she failed to file a statement of disputed facts or any affidavit or deposition testimony to dispute the facts relied upon by Nissan as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires. After setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 56.04, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon the findings that Nissan presented competent evidence to negate essential elements of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of disputed material fact regarding any of the grounds relied upon by Nissan. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on Sworn Account, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 245-107, for unpaid credit card charges against the credit card holder. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a statement of the material facts as to which Plaintiff contended there was no genuine issue for trial, and each fact was set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph as the rule required, with a specific citation to the record. Defendant filed a response objecting to the motion; however, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the facts Plaintiff relied upon in making the motion for summary judgment were, in fact, disputed as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. As a consequence, the facts relied upon by Plaintiff were undisputed and the trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the amount owed. We affirm.
 

Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, and their parenting plan did not include an award of child support because residential parenting time was equally shared and they were earning roughly the same amount. Mother filed a petition in 2010 seeking an award of child support based on Father’s increased income. The trial court deviated downward from the presumptive amount of child support established by the child support guidelines to take into account each party’s expenses incurred in driving back and forth to work, and then awarded Mother child support payable on a monthly basis. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its authority by deviating downward for a reason not explicitly set forth in the guidelines. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because tribunals have discretion to deviate from the guidelines for reasons other than those explicitly set forth in the guidelines.

Attorney filed petition pursuant to the Public Records Act for disclosure of documents held by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, the Board’s Chair, and Disciplinary Counsel to the Board relating to eight disciplinary proceedings. Access to the documents had been withheld based on a claim that the documents were exempt from disclosure in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 25.3. Responding officials appeal the trial court’s order that the documents be produced. Finding that the documents sought were confidential and privileged from disclosure, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition.

The Disciplinary Board of the Turney Center Industrial Complex convicted Petitioner of assault based upon his involvement in a gang stabbing of another inmate, the conviction was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. Petitioner then filed this common law writ of certiorari with the Chancery Court of Hickman County to challenge his conviction. The trial court granted the writ and the administrative record was filed with the trial court. Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the trial court denied relief to Petitioner on the grounds the record demonstrated that the disciplinary board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or exceeded its jurisdiction, and that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Finding no error, we affirm.

In a post-divorce action, Mother filed a motion to set aside the permanent parenting plan that had been incorporated into the parties’ final decree of divorce. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for relief based on a mutual mistake of the parties. Additionally, the trial court amended the parenting plan to reflect parties’ original agreement and ordered Father to pay child support. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the classification and division of the marital estate, the alimony and attorney fee awards, and the parenting plan decision of the trial court. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and modified in part.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s medical malpractice and wrongful death case for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a). Appellant’s pre-suit notice contained a misnomer, naming the Appellee’s fundraising entity, rather than Appellee, as the proper defendant. The trial court determined that under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012), substantial compliance was not effective to satisfy the statutory requirement for pre-suit notice. Furthermore, because the type of notice required under Section 29-26-121 precedes the filing of the lawsuit, it is not the same type of notice as required for correction of misnomers in pleadings under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03; thus, this rule will not operate to cure the misnomer in the pre-suit notice. Because the Appellant failed to show extraordinary cause for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing this matter. Affirmed and remanded.
 

Father appeals the parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent entered by the trial court in this divorce action. We remand for further proceedings, if necessary, and findings regarding the comparative fitness of the parties.
 

This case concerns custody and alimony decisions relative to a divorce. Discerning no error, we affirm

This action presents the question of whether a claim properly may be brought against the City of Knoxville (“the City”) pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) under circumstances where a tree located on the real property of a private landowner fell and caused the death of a motorist traveling on a city street. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the City maintained immunity pursuant to the GTLA and the public duty doctrine. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the claim.

Megan A.A. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her children, Kayla N.A. and Haylei M.A. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition alleging that the Children were dependent and neglected as a result of both parents’ drug abuse. On the same day, the juvenile court entered an ex parte order awarding temporary custody of the Children to Teresa W., the Children’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). After later entering an agreed order that adjudicated the Children as dependent and neglected, the court awarded temporary legal and physical custody to Grandmother. More than a year after the Children came into her custody, Grandmother filed a petition in the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that Mother abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit and support them. The court further found that termination of Mother’s rights is in the Children’s best interest. The court stated that it made both findings by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm.