APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion to Recuse in a post-divorce proceeding. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Petitioner/Former Husband, Joel David Constance (“Petitioner”), pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B results from the trial court’s denial of a post-trial recusal motion. The Appellant filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge from presiding over the preparation of the record for her appeal of the substantive issues in the case. The trial judge denied the motion by written order, making specific findings of fact. The Appellant appeals. Discerning no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to question the trial judge’s impartiality, we affirm the denial of Appellant’s recusal motion.

Mother’s parental rights to her daughter were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to pay support, and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, asserting that the evidence in support of the grounds is not clear and convincing and that the record does not show that termination of her rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Chiropractic clinic which provided services to party injured in an automobile accident brought action against the injured party, who had assigned the proceeds of his claim against tortfeaser to the clinic in payment of the services, and the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, which did not honor the assignment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer holding that: the victim did not have any rights relative to the insurance provider; the insurance policy required written consent for an assignment and there was no evidence of such consent; there was no privity between the clinic and the insurance provider; the clinic was not a beneficiary of the insurance policy; and the suit was a direct action against an insurance company which is prohibited by Tennessee law. The clinic appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The trial court found that Defendants were liable to Plaintiff bank for losses stemming from a scheme wherein Defendants defrauded Plaintiff bank into making automobile loans to unqualified borrowers who were customers of a defendant. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves the modification of a parenting arrangement. After many years without parenting time, the mother asked the juvenile courtto designate her as the primaryresidential parent for the parties’ daughter. The juvenile court held domestic violence in the father’s home constituted a materialchange in circumstances. However,the juvenile courtconcluded that, despite the incidents of domestic violence, it was in the daughter’s best interest for the father to remain as the primary residential parent. The juvenile court awarded the mother alternate residential parenting time. The mother appeals, raising numerous issues. We affirm.

The trial court prohibited the use of taped testimony from a prior trial when a doctor exercised his statutory right not to appear at trial, ordering that the doctor “needs to testify live or not at all.” Efforts of the defendants’ counsel to secure the doctor’s live testimony were successful,only to have the plaintiffs’ counsel argue that counsel was being ambushed. The trial court finally determined not to allow the doctor to testify. The issues relating to prohibiting the doctor’s taped testimony and then prohibiting the doctor’s live testimony were appealed, along with other issues that arose during the trial. We find these two testimonial issues dispositive. We reverse the trial court on both issues and remand for a new trial.

This is an easement case in which the Appellant, the servient estate owner, appeals the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief in favor of the Appellee, the dominant estate owner. Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had interfered with Appellee’s use of the easement by erecting a gate across it. The trial judge ordered the Appellant to remove the gate, and enjoined her from further interference with the Appellee’s use of the easement. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal challenges the effectiveness of a QDRO which requires Wife to pay taxes on a $115,000.00 divorce settlement. The trial court held that the amount should not be reduced by taxes. We conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Wife’s $115,000.00 divorce settlement was not subject to reduction for taxes, and we reverse its holding in that regard. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an appeal from an Order of Protection entered on July 2, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 19, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Conservator for injured bus passenger challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her action after the defendant’s filing of a confession of judgment for the full amount of damages requested in the general sessions warrant. In light of the plaintiff’s failure to amend the complaint after transferring the case to circuit court to increase the amount of damages sought, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Heather Widner, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Edward Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a Electric Cowboy (“Electric Cowboy”) and Ashley Langworthy with regard to the tragic death of Glenn Edward Smith (“Deceased”). Electric Cowboy filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Electric Cowboy summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that on the relevant night there had been no sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Electric Cowboy summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff additional time for discovery. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that no sale of alcoholic beverages by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy occurred on the relevant night, and that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery. We, therefore, affirm.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. The motion was based upon allegations of bias against the party, who is also a licensed attorney representing herself in this matter. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The sole issue in this putative class action is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. Plaintiffs, shareholders of O’Charley’s Inc., filed this action against several parties to enjoin the imminent merger with and acquisition by Fidelity National Financial, Inc.; no monetary relief was sought. The gravamen of the complaint was breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs requested additional disclosures but did not seek to enjoin the merger. After the merger was completed, Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a motion to recover attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motions to dismiss and an agreed order was entered by which the complaint was dismissed but, by agreement, the issue of attorneys’ fees was reserved for hearing. Plaintiffs acknowledged this was not a shareholder derivative action and that they were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-17-401; however, Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. The chancellor disagreed and denied Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s parental rights with regard to his son. The child at issue was removed from the custody of the mother as a result of the mother’s drug use and neglect. The child, now five years of age, did not have a significant relationship with the father, if any. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights for failure to substantially comply with the responsibilities of the permanency plan. The father appeals. We affirm.

Landlords filed suit against a tenant for breach of the rental contract. The trial court held the tenant breached the contract and awarded the landlords damages for the breach. Tenant appeals asserting that the landlords failed to mitigate their damages, that his counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Tenant’s arguments are without merit. We affirm the trial court.

Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and awards of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm. Husband also appeals the trial court’s judgment holding him in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s order to pay to Wife one-half of a health savings account. We affirm on this issue. Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is granted.

In this retaliatory discharge action brought by a former city administrator of the City of LaFollette, Tennessee (“LaFollette”), the trial court, following a bench hearing, denied LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s demand for a jury trial. The trial court, however, granted LaFollette permission for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the city administrator’s request for a jury trial properly may be granted pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2013), despite the non-jury provision of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-307 (Supp. 2013). We conclude that the non-jury requirement of the GTLA applies to this TPPA claim. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s jury demand, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings without a jury.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, affirming the decision of the Designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that Appellant/Employee was not qualified for unemployment benefits. Because there is substantial and material evidence in the record, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, we affirm the order of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Lessee in this action for breach of contract and promissory fraud.  It also awarded Plaintiff punitive damages and prejudgment interest at the rate of eight percent per annum.  We affirm.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of divorce entered on March 19, 2007. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until December 2, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the final judgment to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This case arises from a dispute between family members over the proper distribution of assets from two separate trusts. Appellant contends that the grantor of one of the trusts revoked a modification of the trust prior to her death pursuant to a settlement agreement with Appellant. The trial court declined to give effect to a settlement agreement because it was never signed by the parties prior to the grantor’s death. Additionally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of various provisions in each of the trusts. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Johnson v. Floyd, No. W2012-00207-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2500900 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rajvongs v. Wright, --- S.W.3d ----, 2013 WL 6504425 (Tenn. 2013). Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

A person whose property was seized, and subsequently forfeited, pursuant to a drug arrest challenges the actions of the Department of Safety. In light of the nine-year delay in the filing of a petition for review, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the action.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for return of personal property. Because the order does not resolve all the claims between the parties we dismiss for lack of a final judgment.